

Third Edition

The World

A History

Volume 2

Since 1300

—
**Felipe
Fernández-
Armesto**



The World

A History

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VOLUME TWO
since 1300

Third Edition

The World

A History

Felipe Fernández-Armesto

University of Notre Dame

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A Closer Look


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Getting the Most Out of the Maps in *The World*

Projection

A map projection is used to portray all or part of the round Earth on a flat surface, which cannot be done without some distortion. The projections in *The World* show the Earth at global, continental, country, and city scale and vary with each map. The map shown here uses a Robinson projection, which uses curvature to provide a good balance between the size and shape of the lands being depicted. As any number of projections could have been selected for each map in *The World*, great care was shown in choosing projections that best serve the goals of the author.

Maps use a unique visual language to convey a great deal of information in a relatively simple form. The maps in this book use a variety of different projections—techniques used to show Earth's curved surface on a flat map—to trace the history of humans from about 150,000 years ago to the present. This brief guide explains the different features on the maps in *The World*, Third Edition and how to interpret the different layers of information embedded in them.



Inset Map and Global Locator

Several of the maps in *The World* include inset maps that show in greater size and detail a region depicted on the main map. Many of the maps in *The World* also include global locators that highlight that portion of the Earth's surface that is being shown.

The Middle East and the Mediterranean, ca. 1000–500 B.C.E.

- Assyrian Empire at its greatest extent
- Babylonian Empire at its peak under Nebuchadnezzar II
- Phoenicia and Phoenician colonies
- Areas frequented or settled by Greeks
- Etruria
- Greek colony
- Phoenician colony
- SLOVENIA selective modern country
- copper
- gold
- tin
- Greek trade route
- Phoenician trade route
- ancient coastline

Map Key

Maps use symbols both to show the location of a feature and to give information about that feature. The symbols are explained in the key that accompanies each map.

Topography

Many maps show relief—the contours of mountains and valleys. Topography is an important element in reading maps, because the size and scale of the physical terrain has served as a critical factor in shaping human history.

Timeline









Many of the maps featured in *The World* are accompanied by timelines. Various important events and developments are plotted along a historical line, which shows the order in which they occurred during a certain period in history.

Scalebar





When using a map to work out what distances are in reality, it is necessary to refer to the scale of that particular map. Many of the maps in *The World* (such as the one shown here) use a linear scale. This only works on equal-area maps, where distances are true. On maps with projections that are heavily curved, a special “perspective-scale graphic” is used to show distance.

KEY TO MAP FEATURES IN THE WORLD, THIRD EDITION






PHYSICAL FEATURES

 coastline	 glacier	 elevation above sea level (mountain height)
 ancient coastline	 ancient lake	 volcano
 river	 marshland	 pass
 ancient river course	 ice cap / sheet	
 canal	 ice shelf	




LATITUDE/LONGITUDE

 equator
 lines of latitude / longitude
 tropics / polar circles
 degrees of longitude / latitude



BORDERS

 international border
 undefined border
 maritime border
 internal border
 disputed border

COMMUNICATIONS

 major road
 minor road
 major railway

SETTLEMENT / POSSESSION

 settlement symbol
 colonial possession

TYPOGRAPHIC KEY

REGIONS

state / political region..... LAOS

administrative region
within a state..... HENAN

cultural / undefined
region / group..... FERGHANA

MISCELLANEOUS

tropics / polar circles..... Antarctic Circle

people / cultural group..... Samoyeds

annotation..... 1914 British
protectorate

PHYSICAL FEATURES

continent / ocean..... AFRICA

landscape features.....Mekong

Lake Rudolf

Tien Shan

Sahara

INDIAN
OCEAN

SETTLEMENTS

settlement / symbol
location / definition..... Farnham

Major land borders
are shown using a
solid line.



Annotations provide additional
explanatory information.

Political control is
identified by color.

Broad arrows
indicate
general
movement
or spread of
ideas, crops,
or goods.



Diffused colors are used to show
a general region.



Thin arrows indicate
journeys, trade routes,
or campaigns.

About Felipe Fernández-Armesto



Felipe Fernández-Armesto holds the William P. Reynolds Chair of Arts and Letters at the University of Notre Dame. He has master's and doctoral degrees from the University of Oxford, where he spent most of his teaching career, before taking up the Chair of Global Environmental History at Queen Mary College, University of London, in 2000, and the Prince of Asturias Chair at Tufts University (2005–2009). Dr. Fernández-Armesto is on the editorial or advisory boards of many periodicals, including *Comparative Studies in Society*

and *History*, *The Medieval Globe*, *Journeys*, and *Journal of Global History*. Recent awards include Fellowship of the Academia Europea and the Cátedra Reina Victoria Eugenia of the Universidad Complutense, Madrid (2011), the World History Association Book Prize (2007), Spain's Premio Nacional de Gastronomía (2005, for his work on the history of food), and the Premio Nacional de Investigación (Sociedad Geográfica Española, 2004). Dr. Fernández-Armesto has had many distinguished visiting appointments, including a Fellowship of the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences and a Union Pacific Visiting Professorship at the University of Minnesota. He won the Caird Medal of the National Maritime Museum in 1995 and the John Carter Brown Medal in 1999 and has honorary doctorates from La Trobe University and the Universidad de los Andes. He has served on the Council of the Hakluyt Society, on the Committee of English PEN, and as Chairman of the PEN Literary Foundation. Dr. Fernández-Armesto's work in journalism includes regular columns in the British and Spanish press, and, among his many contributions to broadcasting, he was the longest-serving presenter of BBC radio's flagship current affairs program, *Analysis*. He has been short-listed for the most valuable literary prize in the United Kingdom.

Dr. Fernández-Armesto is the author, coauthor, or editor of 36 books and numerous papers and scholarly articles. His work has been translated into 28 languages. His books include *Before Columbus*; *The Times Illustrated History of Europe*; *Columbus*; *Millennium: A History of the Last Thousand Years* (the subject of a ten-part series on CNN); *Civilizations: Culture, Ambition, and the Transformation of Nature*; *Near a Thousand Tables*; *The Americas*; *Humankind: A Brief History*; *Ideas That Changed the World*; *The Times Atlas of World Exploration*; *The Times Guide to the Peoples of Europe*; *Amerigo: The Man Who Gave His Name to America*; *Pathfinders: A Global History of Exploration*; and *Our America: A Hispanic History of the United States*.

From the Author to the Reader

Dear Reader,

History is stories. There are hundreds of tales in this book about real, flesh-and-blood people—commoners and kings, sons and mothers, heroes and villains, the famous and the failed. I try to combine them in two narratives that crisscross throughout the book. One is the story of how people connect and separate, as cultures take shape and influence and change one another. Alongside this story, there is another one of how humans interact with the rest of nature—other species, the unstable natural environment, the dynamic planet.

History is global. The whole world stays in view in almost every chapter. Readers can compare and connect what was happening in every region and every continent in every period—like observers from another galaxy, gazing at the world from outer space and seeing it whole.

History is universal. This book tries to say something about every sphere of life—including science and art, suffering and pleasure, thought and imagination.

History is a problem-posing discipline. This book is full of provocations, contested claims, debated speculations, open horizons, and questions too complex and too interesting to answer easily. I employ facts not just for their own sake but also to make my readers—and myself—think.

History is evidence. Readers of this book confront the sources on every page—the words, images, and objects people really used in the past—to reveal vivid pictures of what history looked like and what it felt like to live in the past.

History enhances life. I believe that a textbook can be entertaining, even amusing, as well as instructive and accessible; challenging without being hostile; friendly without being cloying.

History isn't over. This book is about how the world got to be the way it is, confronting present problems and perspectives for the future—which is, after all, only the past that hasn't yet happened.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Felipe Fajana". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

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Introducing the World

By the standards of astronauts, say, or science fiction writers, historians seem timid, unadventurous creatures who are only interested in one puny species—our species, the human species—on one tiny planet—our planet, Earth. But Earth is special. So far, we know of nowhere else in the cosmos where so much has happened and is happening today. By galactic standards, global history is a small story—but it's a good one.

Humans, moreover, compared with other animals, seem outward looking. Our concerns range over the universe, and beyond it, to unseen worlds, vividly imagined or mysteriously revealed. Not just everything we do but also everything that occurs to our minds is part of our history and, therefore, is part of this book, including science and art, fun and philosophy, speculations and dreams. We continually generate stories—new stories—at an amazing rate.

But the present passes instantly into the past. The present is always over, transformed into history. And the past is always with us, tugging at our memories, shaping our thoughts, launching and limiting our lives. Human history may seem narrowly self-interested, but it focuses on an undeniably riveting subject that is also our favorite subject—ourselves.

The Way of Humankind

Although the story of this book is a human story, it can never be merely human because, in isolation, humankind does not make perfect sense. Humans are animals, and to understand ourselves thoroughly and to know what, if anything, makes us unique, we have to compare ourselves with other animals. As with other animals, we are best studied in our habitats. We cannot begin to comprehend our own history except in context. Our story is inseparable from the climates where it takes place and the other life-forms that we depend on or compete with. We lord it over other species, but we remain linked to them by the food chain. We transform our environment, but we can never escape from it. We differentiate ourselves from nature—we speak loosely, for instance, of nature as if we were not natural creatures ourselves. We distance ourselves from our fellow animals by adopting what we think are unnatural behaviors—wearing clothes, for instance, cooking food, replacing nature with culture. In short, we do what is natural to us, and all the elaborate culture we produce generates new, intimate relationships with the environment we refashion and the life-forms we exploit.

We are exceptionally ambitious compared to other animals, consciously remodeling environments to suit our own purposes. We carve out fields, turn prairies into wheat lands, deserts into gardens, and gardens into deserts. We fell forests where we find them and plant them where none exist; we dam rivers, wall seas, cultivate plants, breed creatures, extinguish some species, and call others into being by selection and hybridization. Sometimes we smother terrain with environments we build for ourselves. Yet none of these practices liberates us from nature. As we shall see, one of the paradoxes of the human story is that the more we change the environment, the more vulnerable we become to ecological lurches and unpredictable disasters. Failure to establish the right balance between exploitation and conservation has often left civilizations in ruins. History becomes a path picked across the wreckage. This does not mean that the environment determines our behavior or our lives, but it does set the framework in which we act.

We are an exceptionally successful species in terms of our ability to survive in a wide range of diverse climates and landscapes—more so than just about any other creature, except for the microbes we carry around with us. But even we are still explorers of our planet, engaged in an ongoing effort to change it. Indeed, we have barely begun to change planet Earth, though, as we shall see, some human societies have devoted the last 10,000 years to trying to do it. We call ourselves lords, or, more modestly, caretakers of creation, but about 90 percent of the biosphere is too far underwater or too deep below the earth for us to inhabit with the technology we have at present. These are environments that humans have only recently begun to invade and that we still do not dominate.

If we humans are peculiarly ambitious creatures, who are always intruding in the life of the planet, we are also odd compared to other animals in the way we generate change among ourselves. We are an unpredictable, unstable species. Lots of other animals live social lives and construct societies. But those societies are remarkably stable compared to ours. As far as we know, ants and elephants have the same lifeways and the same kinds of relationships that they have had since their species first appeared. That is not to say animals never change their cultures. One of the fascinating discoveries in primatology is that apes and monkeys develop cultural differences from one another, even between groups living in similar and sometimes adjacent environments. In the forest region of Africa, chimpanzees have developed a termite-catching

technology. They “fish” with stripped branches that they plunge into termite nests but do not use tools to break open nuts. Chimps in neighboring regions are experts in nut-cracking, using rocks like hammers and anvils. In Sumatra in Indonesia, orangutans play a game—jumping from falling trees—that is unknown to their cousins in nearby Borneo. In Ethiopia in East Africa, males in some baboon groups control harems while others nearby have one mate after another. In some chimpanzee societies, hunting and meat-eating seem to have increased dramatically in recent times.

These are amazing facts, but the societies of nonhuman animals still change little compared with ours. So, alongside the theme of human interaction with the rest of nature is another great theme of our history: the ways our societies have changed, grown apart from one another, reestablished contact, and influenced one another in their turn.

The Way of This Book

This book, then, interweaves two stories—of our interactions with nature and of our relationships with each other. The environment-centered story is about humans distancing themselves from the rest of nature and searching for a relationship that strikes a balance between constructive and destructive exploitation. The culture-centered story is of how human cultures have become mutually influential and yet mutually differentiating. Both stories have been going on for thousands of years. We do not know whether they will end in triumph or disaster.

There is no prospect of covering all of world history in one book. Rather, the fabric of this book is woven from selected strands. Readers will see these at every turn, twisted together into yarn, stretched into stories. Human-focused historical ecology—the environmental theme—will drive readers back, again and again, to the same concepts: sustenance, shelter, disease, energy, technology, art. (The last is a vital category for historians, not only because it is part of our interface with the rest of the world, but also because it forms a record of how we see reality and of how the way we see it changes.) In the global story of human interactions—the cultural theme—we return constantly to the ways people make contact with each another: migration, trade, war, imperialism, pilgrimage, gift exchange, diplomacy, travel—and to their social frameworks: the economic and political arenas, the human groups and groupings, the states and civilizations, the sexes and generations, the classes and clusters of identity.

The stories that stretch before us are full of human experience. “The stork feeds on snakes,” said the ancient Greek sage, Agathon, “the pig on acorns, and history on human lives.” The only way to build up our picture of human societies and ecosystems of the past is to start

with the evidence people have left. Then we reassemble it bit by bit, with the help of imagination disciplined by the sources. Anyone reading a history book needs to bear in mind that interpreting evidence is a challenge—half burden and half opportunity. The subject matter of history is not the past directly because the past is never available to our senses. We have only the evidence about it. This makes history an art, not a science, an art disciplined by respect for the sources, just as patterns impose discipline on poets or as the limitations of stagecraft discipline a play.

For a book like this, the sources set the limits of my imagination. Sometimes these are concrete clues to what people really did—footprints of their wanderings, debris of their meals, fragments of their technologies, wreckage of their homes, traces of diseases in their bones. Usually, however, the sources do not reflect the way things were but the way people wished to represent them in their arts and crafts and writings. In short, most sources are evidence of what happened only in the minds of those who made them. This means, in turn, that our picture of what went on in the world beyond human minds is always tentative and open to reinterpretation. The historian’s job is not—cannot be—to say what the past was like, but rather, what it felt like to live in it because that is what the evidence tends to reveal.

One of the most admirable historians of the twentieth century, R. G. Collingwood, who was also a professor of philosophy at Oxford, said that “all history is intellectual history.” He was right. History—even the environmental and cultural history that is the subject of this book—is largely about what people perceived rather than what they really saw, what they thought or felt rather than what happened outwardly, what they represented rather than what was real. Nineteenth-century philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, one of the most pessimistic thinkers ever, who drew on Hindu and Buddhist writings for his inspiration, said that history’s only subject was “humankind’s oppressive, muddlesome dream.” He thought that made history pointless. I think the dream makes it intriguing.

Because the evidence is always incomplete, history is not so much a matter of describing or narrating or question-answering as it is a matter of problem-posing. No one reading this book should expect to be instructed in straightforward facts or to acquire proven knowledge. The thrill of history is asking the right question, not getting the right answer. Most of the time, the most we can hope for is to identify interesting problems that stimulate debate. And we have to accept that the debate is worthwhile for its own sake, even if we have insufficient knowledge to reach conclusions.

There is no agreement among historians even about what are the right sorts of questions to ask. Some—including me—are interested in huge philosophical questions, such as how does history happen? What makes change? Is

it random or is it subject to scientific laws? Do impersonal forces beyond human control—environmental factors or economics or some world force called fate or evolution or God or progress—determine it? Or is change the externalization of ideas, which arise in minds and are projected onto the world through human action? And if it's a mixture, what's the balance?

At a slightly lower level of analysis, some historians ask questions about how human societies function. How and why do societies grow and fragment and take different forms? How do some people get power over others? How and why do revolutions happen and states and civilizations rise and fall?

Other historians like to pose problems about the present. How did we get into the mess we're in? Can we trace the causes of present dilemmas back into the past and, if so, how far? Why do we have a globally connected world without global governance? Why is peace always precarious? Why does ecological overkill menace our global environment? Having accounted—or failed to account—for the present, some historians like to focus on the future. They demand lessons from history about how to change our behavior or cope with recurrences of past difficulties. Others, again, search to make sense of the past, to find an overall way of characterizing it or narrating it that makes us feel we understand it.

Yet others—the majority, in the current state of historical fashion, and again including me—like to study the past for its own sake and try to identify the questions that mattered to people at the time they first asked them. This does not mean that the sort of history found in this book is useless (although I do not necessarily think it would be a bad thing if it were). For to penetrate the minds of people of the past—especially the remote past of cultures other than your own—you have to make a supreme effort of understanding. The effort has dividends for the person who practices it. It enhances life by sharpening responses to the streetscapes and landscapes, art and artifacts, laws and letters we have inherited from the past. And understanding is what we need most today in our multicultural societies and multicivilizational world.

How This Book Is Arranged

After finding the time, accumulating the knowledge, posing the questions, stiffening the sinews, and summoning the blood, the big problem for the writer of a global history textbook is organizing the material. The big problem for the reader is navigating it. It is tempting to divide the world up into regions or cultures or even—as I did in a previous book—into biomes and devote successive chapters to each. You could call that “world history,” if you genuinely managed to cover the world. But “global history” is different: an attempt to see the planet whole, as if

from an immense, astral height, and discern themes that truly transcend geographical and cultural boundaries. In this book, therefore, I try to look at every continent in just about every chapter (there are a couple of chapters that, for reasons described in their place, focus only on part of the world). Each chapter concentrates on themes from the two great global stories: how human societies diverge and converge, and how they interact with the rest of nature.

Because history is a story in which the order of events matters, the chapters are grouped into parts, arranged chronologically. No one should be misled into thinking the parts are more than devices of convenience. Events that happened in, say, 1850, are in a different part of this book from those that happened in, say, 1750. But the story is continuous, and the parts could equally well be recrafted to start and end at different moments.

At every stage, some regions are more prominent than others because they are more influential, more populous, more world-shaping. For great stretches of the book, China occupies a lot of space, not for reasons of political correctness, but because China has, for much of the past, been immensely rich in globally influential initiatives. In the coverage of the last couple of hundred years, Europe and the United States get plenty of attention: this is not “Eurocentrism” or “Westocentrism” (if there is such a word), but an honest reflection of how history happened. But I have tried not to neglect the peoples and parts of the world that historians usually undervalue: poor and peripheral communities sometimes have a stunning impact on the world. The margins and frontiers of the world are often where world-changing events happen—the fault lines of civilizations, which radiate seismic effects.

Learning Features for the Third Edition of *The World*

The pedagogical program for the Third Edition of *The World* has been carefully devised to complement the narrative, reinforce important concepts, and prompt students to ask questions and formulate arguments.

Chapter-opening vignettes use dramatic and unusual stories to put the main themes of each chapter in relief.

Learning Objectives are provided at the outset of each chapter within the chapter outline and at the start of every major section within.

Global Dimensions, a set of global learning outcomes, are included at the end of each chapter's opening vignette to prepare the readers to think about the main topics covered within the chapter.

Making Connections tables throughout the text help students see the global linkages behind important historical

developments. Praised by users of *The World*, every chapter includes at least one, and in some cases, as many as three, Making Connections tables. To further improve their visual efficacy, there are locator maps showing the regions examined in each Making Connections table.

A Closer Look sections, one per chapter, provide in-depth visual analysis of a specific cultural artifact. Praised by users for the way in which they connect the macro with the micro, detailed notes and tie lines draw the reader into close contact with the object, providing opportunities to pose larger questions. Users of *The World* have consistently cited the Closer Look sections as effective learning tools for their students. See page xvii for a complete listing.

Maps Widely hailed by users of the prior editions, the maps in *The World* employ innovative perspectives to help the reader see world history in a fresh and dynamic way. A range of different maps—from two-page thematic maps to spot maps that pinpoint specific events—connect with the discussion on a variety of different levels. Each map has been extensively checked for accuracy and/or redrafted to improve its graphical presentation. The Third Edition includes 35 full-size maps and 102 locator maps. See page xiii for a listing of the maps.

The Big Picture Building on the success of the map program for the prior editions, each of the nine parts in *The World* ends with “The Big Picture,” a two-page map of the world that graphically highlights an important, pivotal development in global history. Accompanied by text and questions, each Big Picture map provides the reader with a visual snapshot of what the world looked like at key intervals in human history. Interactive versions of the Big Picture maps can be found on MyHistoryLab. Short video clips of the author discussing developments in global history related to the Big Picture maps are also available on the MyHistoryLab that accompanies the text.

Visual Sources Users of *The World* consistently rank its photo program as the best found in any textbook available today. Intimately connected to the narrative, each photo provides a compelling visual record, from mammoth huts to satellite images of Earth from space. Detailed captions, crafted by the author, explicate the meaning behind each visual source.

In Perspective sections conclude each chapter and do much more than summarize the preceding discussion. They put the developments covered in the chapter into historical perspective, and they make explicit for the student the process by which historians interpret the past.

Chronologies throughout each chapter arrange key historical developments in the order in which they occurred.

Key Terms are defined in the Glossary and set in boldface type in the text.

Changes to the Third Edition

The text of previous editions has been revised, corrected, shortened, and updated to reflect recent scholarship. A new opening chapter replaces former Chapters 1 and 2. New Chapters 27, 28, and 29 have been added to extend coverage of the twentieth century and to bring the narrative up to the second decade of the twenty-first century:

- Chapter 27: “Order Unraveled: The Trial of Empires, ca. 1898–ca. 1931”—NEW and EXPANDED coverage on World War I, Postwar Mindsets, and The Age of Extremism.
- Chapter 28: “The Anvil of War: Ideology and Violence, ca. 1931–ca. 1957”—NEW and EXPANDED coverage on The Origins of Global Conflict, World War II, and The Suspension of World Order.
- Chapter 29: “Paradise Postponed: Cold War between Planned Societies, ca. 1957–ca. 1980”—NEW and EXPANDED coverage on Globalization, Countercolonization and Social Change, Personal Freedom Resurgent, Life after Empires, Superpower Confrontation, and The Return of the Free Market.
- Chapter 30: “World Order and Disorder: Capitalist Convergence and Conflicts of Culture, ca. 1980–ca. 2010”—NEW and UPDATED coverage of The New World Order, Culture and Globalization, and Secularism and the Religious Revival.

New to This Edition

Revel™

Educational technology designed for the way today’s students read, think, and learn

When students are engaged deeply, they learn more effectively and perform better in their courses. This simple fact inspired the creation of REVEL: an immersive learning experience designed for the way today’s students read, think, and learn. Built in collaboration with educators and students nationwide, REVEL is the newest, fully digital way to deliver respected Pearson content.

Revel enlivens course content with media interactives and assessments—integrated directly within the authors’ narrative—that provide opportunities for students to read about and practice course material in tandem. This immersive educational technology boosts student engagement, which leads to better understanding of concepts and improved performance throughout the course.

Learn more about REVEL

www.pearsonhighered.com/REVEL

Rather than simply offering opportunities to read about and study world history, REVEL facilitates deep, engaging interactions with the concepts that matter most. By providing opportunities to improve skills in analyzing and interpreting primary and secondary sources of historical evidence, for example, REVEL engages students directly and immediately, which leads to a better understanding of course material. A wealth of student and instructor resources and interactive materials can be found within REVEL. Some of our favorites are mentioned in the paragraphs that follow.

Interactive Maps

Custom-built interactive maps, with contextual hotspots, animated routes, chronological layers, and panning and zooming functionality, provide students with multiple ways of engaging with map visualizations.

World History Videos

Each chapter of the text contains videos selected from Pearson's World History video library that appear directly in line with the content narrative. Students are able to watch the videos right there without ever leaving the page, providing a richer explanation of key people and events, such as Alexander the Great, the Thirty Years' War, and Apartheid in South Africa.

A Closer Look

In REVEL, we have turned this feature into an interactive widget with hotspot locations, allowing students to examine photos, paintings, and other historical items of interest in detail. The feature allows students to closely examine the items with intricate detail. Each A Closer Look concludes with questions that encourage students to focus on important issues raised within the feature.

Integrated Writing Opportunities

To help students reason more logically and write more clearly, each chapter offers three varieties of writing prompts. The Journal prompt elicits free-form topic-specific responses addressing topics at the module level, and the Shared Writing prompt encourages students to address multiple sides of an issue by sharing and responding to each other's viewpoints, encouraging all to interpret a historical event or text as would people of the time. Finally, each chapter includes an Essay prompt from Pearson's Writing Space, where instructors

can assign both automatic-graded and instructor-graded prompts.

For more information about all of the tools and resources in REVEL and access to your own REVEL account for *The World, Third Edition*, go to www.pearsonhighered.com/REVEL.




Support Materials

The World, Third Edition, comes with an extensive package of support materials for teachers and students.


For Instructors


- **The Instructor's Manual/Test-Item File** includes chapter outlines, overviews, key concepts, discussion questions, teaching notes, map quizzes, and suggestions for audiovisual resources, as well as approximately 1,500 test items. Particular emphasis is placed on essay questions that test students' understanding of concepts across chapters.
- **Test Manager** is a computerized test management program for Windows and Macintosh environments. The program allows instructors to select items from the test-item file to create tests. It also allows for online testing.
- **The Instructor's Resource Center** (www.pearsonhighered.com) Text-specific materials, such as the instructor's manual, the test-item file, map files, digital transparencies and PowerPoint™ presentations, are available for downloading by adopters.

Popular Valuepacks for *The World*


-  **Connections: Key Themes in World History.** Series Editor Alfred J. Andrea. Concise and tightly focused, the titles in the popular Connections Series are designed to place the latest research on selected topics of global significance, such as disease, trade, slavery, exploration, and modernization, into an accessible format for students. Available at a 50% discount when bundled with *The World*. For more information go to www.pearsonhighered.com.
-   **Getz/Hoffman/Rodriguez, *Exchanges: A Global History Reader*** introduces students to the discipline of world history. Unlike other

source collections, *Exchanges* helps students look beyond strictly delineated regionalism and chronological structures to understand history as a series of ongoing debates. Available at a 50% discount when bundled with *The World*.

-  Clark, *A Guide to Your History Course: What Every Student Needs to Know*. This concise, spiral-bound guidebook orients students to the issues and problems they will face in the history classroom. Available at a 50% discount when bundled with *The World*.

-  **The Prentice Hall Atlas of World History, Second Edition** includes over 100 full-color maps in world history, drawn by Dorling Kindersley, one of the world's most respected cartographic publishers. Copies of the Atlas can be bundled with *The World* for a nominal charge. Contact your Pearson sales representative for details.

For Students

-  Extensively revised and updated, the **Primary Source: Documents in Global History DVD** is both a rich collection of textual and visual documents in world history and an indispensable tool for working with sources. Extensively developed with the guidance of historians and teachers, the revised and updated DVD version includes over 800 sources in world history—from cave art to satellite images of the Earth from space. More sources from Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia have been added to this revised and updated DVD version. All sources are accompanied by headnotes and focus questions, and are searchable by topic, region, or time period.
- **CourseSmart eTextbooks Online** is an exciting new choice for students looking to save money. As an alternative to purchasing the print textbook, students can subscribe to the same content online and save up to 50% off the suggested list price of the print text. With a CourseSmart eTextbook, students can search the text, make notes online, print out reading assignments that incorporate lecture notes, and bookmark important passages for later review. For more information, or to subscribe to the CourseSmart eTextbook, visit www.coursesmart.com.

Acknowledgments

Without being intrusive, I have tried not to suppress my presence—my voice, my views—in the text because no book is objective, other than by pretense, and the reader is entitled to get to know the writer's foibles and failures. In overcoming mine, I have had a lot of help (though there are sure still to be errors and shortcomings through my fault alone). Textbooks are teamwork, and I have learned an immense amount from my friends and helpers at Pearson Prentice Hall, especially my editors, Ed Parsons and Clark Baxter, and program manager, Deb Hartwell, whose indefatigability and forbearance made the book better at every turn. Wendy Albert, executive field marketer, and Jeremy Intel, product marketing manager, for their creativity. I also thank the picture researcher Lauren McFall, and the members of the production and cartographic sections of the team who performed Herculean labors: Denise Forlow, senior managing editor; Lynne Breittfeller, production project manager; and Kevin Lear, cartographer.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to the senior management team at Pearson who supported this endeavor every step of the way.

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
Felipe Fernández-Armesto
Somerville, Massachusetts

A Note on Dates and Spellings

In keeping with common practice among historians of global history, we have used B.C.E. (before the common era) and C.E. (common era) to date events. For developments deep in the past, we have employed the phrase “years ago” to convey to the reader a clear sense of time. Specific dates are only given when necessary and when doing so improves the context of the narrative.

Recognizing that almost every non-English word can be transliterated in any number of ways, we have adopted the most widely used and simplest systems for spelling names and terms. The *pinyin* system of Chinese spelling is used for all Chinese words with the exception of such words as *Yangtze*, which are still widely referred to in its Wade-Giles form. Following common usage, we have avoided using apostrophes in the spelling of Arabic and Persian words, as well as words from other languages—thus, *Quran* and *Kaaba* instead of *Qu’ran* and *Ka’ba*, and *Tbilisi* instead of *T’bilisi*. Diacritical marks, accents, and other specialized symbols are used only if the most common variant of a name or term employs such devices (such as *Çatalhöyük*), if they are part of a personal noun (such as *Nicolás*), or if the inclusion of such markings in the spelling of a word makes pronouncing it easier (*Teotihuacán*).

Part V



▲ **THIS KOREAN WORLD MAP**, from about 1402, known as the Kangnido, is the earliest known map of the world from East Asia. It is also the oldest surviving Korean map. Based on Chinese maps from the fourteenth century, the Kangnido clearly shows Africa (with an enormous lake in the middle of the continent) and Arabia on the lower left. The Indian subcontinent, however, has been merged into a gigantic landmass that represents China. The Korean peninsula, on the upper right, is shown as much bigger than it actually is, while Japan, on the lower right, is placed much farther south than where it is actually located.

The Crucible


The Eurasian Crises of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries

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Chapter 12

The World the Mongols Made: Trans-Eurasian Links



FRONT



BACK



FRONT



BACK

▲ **THE MONGOLS ARRIVE IN GEORGIA.** Two coins from the kingdom of Georgia, minted less than two decades apart, show that the Mongols had conquered that Caucasian state. The front of the top coin, minted by Queen Rusudan of Georgia in 1230, features a bust of a bearded Jesus Christ, draped in a mantle and backed by a cross-shaped halo. The Greek abbreviations for the words "Jesus" and "Christ" flank his right and left shoulders, respectively. A Georgian inscription runs along the border. The back of the coin shows inscriptions in both Georgian and Arabic. In contrast, on the bottom coin, minted by King David in 1247, a figure on horseback has replaced the image of Jesus Christ (front), while the inscription on the back of the coin is exclusively in Arabic and identifies the king as "the slave of the Great Khan."



Chapter Outline & Learning Objectives

12.1 The Mongols: Reshaping Eurasia

How were the Mongols able to conquer such a vast empire?

12.2 The Mongol World beyond the Steppes

How did Mongol rule differ in China, Persia, and Russia?

12.3 The Limits of Conquest

Why did the Mongols fail to conquer Egypt and India?

12.4 Europe

How did the Mongol peace benefit Europe?

In Perspective: The Uniqueness of the Mongols

Two coins lie alongside each other in the British Museum in London. One, minted in 1230, is stamped with the name of the queen of Georgia, Rusudan, and the words “Queen of Queens, Glory of the World and Faith, Champion of the Messiah.” Beside it, another Georgian coin, minted only 17 years later, shows a figure on horseback: “King David, slave of . . . the Great Khan Kuyuk.” A lot had happened in a short time. The changes the coins reflect were important not just for Georgia but for the world, for they were huge in scale, reshaping the politics, communications, and culture of Eurasia.

Georgians, protected by the high Caucasus Mountains (see Map 12.1), had been remarkably successful in resisting nomad armies in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. They refused to pay tribute, recovered lost territories, and extended their frontiers over parts of neighboring Armenia. In the early thirteenth century, Georgia was a formidable state, capable of imposing rulers as far afield as the Byzantine city of Trebizond on the Black Sea coast of Anatolia and the Muslim city of Ahar in Azerbaijan on the Caspian. In the 1220s, James of Vitry, a Catholic bishop and historian of his own times, admired Georgian pilgrims he saw in Jerusalem, who “march into the holy city with banners displayed, without paying tribute to anyone, for the Muslims dare in no way molest them.”

As James of Vitry noted, Georgia was “surrounded by infidels.” That did not seem to matter. The Georgians even promised the pope that they would assist in a new crusade. Suddenly, however, in 1224, letters from Georgia arrived in Rome, withdrawing the promise. “Savage people of hellish aspect have invaded my realm,” wrote Rusudan, “as voracious as wolves in their hunger for spoils, and as brave as lions.” In the next decade, her letters got increasingly desperate. The Mongols were coming. The world would never be the same again.



The events of the rest of the thirteenth century refashioned Eurasia, destroying old states, creating new ones, disrupting existing communications, and reforging stronger, wider-ranging links. Eurasian civilizations benefited from enhanced contacts the

Mongols fostered. Mongol methods were at first pitilessly bloody. They used terror and massacres to overawe their enemies. They razed cities, destroyed crops, slaughtered elites, and depleted peoples. Yet it looked as if a safer, richer, more interconnected, more dynamic, more expanding, and more enlightened world might emerge—as if something precious were to form in an alchemist’s crucible, out of conflicting ingredients, flung at random and stirred with violence.

Then, as we see in the next chapter, a century of environmental disasters arrested these changes in most of Eurasia. Catastrophes reversed the growth of populations and prosperity. But previously marginal regions began to be drawn more closely into a widening pattern of contacts and cultural exchange. Some peoples, in Africa and Southeast Asia, for example, looked outward because they escaped disaster. Others, especially in Europe, did so because their reverses were so enormous that there was nothing else they could do.

***Global Dimensions** What kinds of political developments do grassland environments favor? Why did a vast empire emerge in Eurasian grasslands in this period, and not in similar environments in Africa and America? How did peoples in widely separated parts of Eurasia know about each other? How did their mutual contacts change them?*

12.1 The Mongols: Reshaping Eurasia

How were the Mongols able to conquer such a vast empire?

The earliest records of Mongol peoples occur in annals of the seventh century, when Chinese and Khitan writers used versions of the names “Mongols” and “Tatars” for many communities, who had various religions and competing leaderships but who shared languages of common origins, different from those of the Turks. In the forests to the north the Mongols seem to have been hunters and small-scale pig breeders. When they emerged onto the steppes of the Central Asian land now called Mongolia (see Map 12.1), they became horse-borne nomads and shepherds. In the early twelfth century, the bands or alliances they formed got bigger, and their raids against neighboring sedentary peoples became more menacing. In part, this was the effect of the growing preponderance of some Mongol groups over others. In part, it was the result of slow economic change.

12.1.1 Genghis Khan

Contact with richer neighbors gave Mongol chiefs opportunities for enrichment as mercenaries or raiders. Economic inequalities greater than the Mongols had ever known arose in a society in which blood relationships and seniority in age had formerly settled every person’s position. Prowess in war enabled leaders to build up bands of followers of their own in parallel with—and sometimes in defiance of—the old social order. They called this process “crane catching”—comparing it to caging valuable birds. The most successful leaders enticed or forced rival groups into submission. The process spread to involve peoples who were not strictly Mongols, though the same name continued to be used—we use it still—for a confederation of many peoples, including many who spoke Turkic languages. In 1206, Temujin, the most dynamic leader, proclaimed himself **khan** of “all those who live in felt tents”—staking a claim to a steppe-wide empire. He was acclaimed by a title of obscure meaning, perhaps signifying “Ocean-King” and therefore, by implication, king of everything the ocean encloses. The title is traditionally rendered in the Roman alphabet as “Genghis Khan.”

CHRONOLOGY: The Rise of the Mongols

Seventh century	Earliest records of the Mongol people
Early twelfth century	Larger Mongol bands attack sedentary peoples
1206	Temujin proclaims himself khan

We know maddeningly little about Temujin. In recent times, his memory has twisted between myths. When Mongolia was a Communist state between 1921 and 1990, he was an almost unmentionable figure, inconsistent with the peace-loving image the Communists tried to project. Now he is Mongolia's national hero.

In his own day, he toyed with similarly contradictory images: a warlord who intimidated enemies into submission by massacre; an avenger of insults to his dynasty and tribe; an embodiment of Mongol convictions of superiority over sedentary peoples; a scourge of heaven, divinely appointed to chastise a wicked world; a lawgiver and architect of enduring empire. In surviving documents, Genghis Khan addressed different audiences with conflicting messages. To Muslims, he was an instrument of God, sent to punish them for their sins. To Chinese, he was a candidate for the mandate of heaven. To Mongols, he was a giver of victory and of the treasure it brought. When he addressed monks and hermits, he stressed his own asceticism. "Heaven is weary of the inordinate luxury of China," he declared. "I have the same rags and the same food as cowherds and grooms, and I treat the soldiers as my brothers."

The violence endemic in the steppes now turned outward to challenge neighboring civilizations (see Map 12.1). Historians have been tempted to speculate about the reasons for the Mongols' expansion. One explanation is environmental. Temperatures in the steppe seem to have fallen around this time. People farther west on the Russian plains complained that a cold spell in the early thirteenth century caused crops to fail. So declining pastures might have driven the Mongols to expand from the steppes. Population in the region seems to have been relatively high, and the pastoral way of life demands large amounts of grazing land to feed relatively few people. It is not a particularly energy-efficient way to provide food because it relies on animals eating plants and people eating animals, whereas farming produces humanly edible crops and cuts out animals as a wasteful intermediate stage of production. So perhaps the Mongol outthrust was a consequence of having more mouths to feed. Yet the Mongols were doing what steppelanders had always sought to do: dominate and exploit sedentary peoples. The difference was that they did it with greater ambition and greater efficiency than any of their predecessors.

Genghis Khan enforced or induced unity over almost the entire steppeland. The ensuing campaigns of the confederation of tribes he put together really did represent a combined effort of steppe dwellers against the sedentary peoples who surrounded them. A single ideology came to animate, or perhaps reflect, that effort: the God-given, terror-enforced right of the Mongols to conquer the world. The way events were recorded at the Mongol court in the next generation, it seemed as if from the moment of Genghis Khan's election as supreme ruler, "eternal heaven" had decreed that his conquests would encompass the world. The ruler is depicted as a constant devotee of Tengri—the sky, conceived as a supreme deity. The early Mongol-inspired sources constantly insist on an analogy between the overarching unity of the sky and God's evident desire for the Earth to echo that unity through submission to one ruler.



GENGHIS KHAN. Rashid al-Din (1247–1318) was a former Jewish rabbi, converted to Islam, who became the chief minister of the Mongol rulers of what is now Iran. His *Compendium of Chronicles* was propaganda that depicted Mongol rulers in Persian style. This is the image of Genghis Khan that his successors liked to project—a lone, simple tent-dweller who was the arbitrator and lawgiver to petitioners from many nations.

It is more likely, however, that the sky cult was invented during the Mongol conquests to explain Genghis Khan's uniformly successful fortunes in war. The khan's imperial vision probably grew on him only gradually, as he felt his way from raiding, tribute-gathering, and exacting ransom to constructing an empire, with permanent institutions of rule. Tradition alleges a turning point. When one of his generals proposed to exterminate 10 million Chinese subjects and convert their fields into pasture for Mongol herds, Genghis Khan realized that he could profit more by sparing the peasants and taxing them to the tune of 500,000 ounces of silver, 400,000 sacks of grain, and 80,000 bolts of silk a year. The process, however, that turned the khan from destroyer to builder was tentative. He may have been only dimly aware of it.

Genghis Khan's initially limited ambitions are clear from the oath the Mongol chiefs swore to him at his election as khan, recorded in the earliest surviving Mongol record of the events: "If you will be our khan, we will go as your vanguard against the multitude of your enemies. All the beautiful girls and married women that we capture and all the fine horses we will bring to you." The khan soon acquired an unequaled reputation for lust and bloodlust (see Map 12.1, for his campaigns). "My greatest joy," he was remembered for saying, "is to shed my enemies' blood, wring tears from their womenfolk, and take their daughters for bedding." He made the streets of Beijing—according to an admittedly imaginative eyewitness—"greasy with the fat of the slain." His tally of victims in Persia amounted, believably, to millions. When his army captured the city of Herat in Afghanistan, it killed the entire population. Even after Genghis Khan had introduced more constructive policies—and even after Genghis Khan's death, in 1227—terror remained an instrument of empire. Mongol sieges routinely culminated in massacre. When the Mongols captured Baghdad in 1258, the last caliph and his sons were trampled to death—a ritual form of death reserved for rulers, which was designed to demoralize the enemy.

Wherever the Mongol armies went, their reputation preceded them. Armenian sources warned Westerners of the approach of "precursors of Antichrist . . . of hideous aspect and without pity in their bowels, . . . who rush with joy to carnage as if to a wedding feast or orgy." Rumors piled up in Germany, France, Burgundy, Hungary, and even in Spain and England, where Mongols had never been heard of before. The invaders looked like monkeys, it was said, barked like dogs, ate raw flesh, drank their

"EXCEPTIONALLY ADAPTABLE WARMONGERS." This fourteenth-century Muslim painting shows the Mongols capturing Baghdad in 1258, with the help of siege craft and specialist engineers as well as their traditional cavalry. The last caliph appears behind a screen in his palace in the left background. In the center background, he emerges on a white horse to meet the Mongol leader, Hülegü. The painting seems to show the Mongols respecting the sacredness of the city and its ruler. Indeed, they showed their respect by putting the caliph to death without spilling his blood—a sign of reverence for the condemned in their culture.



horses' urine, knew no laws, and showed no mercy. Matthew Paris, the thirteenth-century English monk who, in his day, probably knew as much about the rest of the world as any of his countrymen, summed up the Mongols' image: "They are inhuman and beastly, rather monsters than men, thirsting for and drinking blood, tearing and devouring the flesh of dogs and men. . . . And so they come, with the swiftness of lightning to the confines of Christendom, ravaging and slaughtering, striking everyone with terror and with incomparable horror."

The Mongol conquests reached farther and lasted longer than those of any previous nomad empire. After Genghis Khan's death, the energy that the conquests generated took Mongol armies to the banks of the Elbe River in eastern Germany and the Adriatic Sea (see Map 12.1, for campaigns after his death). Invasions of Syria, India, and, as we shall see, Japan failed, and the Mongols withdrew from Europe without attempting to set up a permanent presence west of Russia. They largely completed the conquest of China, however, by 1279. At its fullest extent, therefore, the empire covered the region from the Volga River to the Pacific, encompassing the whole of Russia, Persia, China, the Silk Roads, and the steppes (see Map 12.1). This made it by a big margin the largest empire, in terms of territorial extent, the world had seen.




Efforts to explain this unique success refer to Genghis Khan's military genius, the cunning with which the Mongols practiced feigned retreats only to encircle and destroy their advancing enemies, the effectiveness of their curved bows, the demoralizing psychological impact of their ruthless practices. Of course, they had the usual steppelander advantages of superior horsemanship and unrivaled mobility. It is likely that they succeeded, in part, through sheer numbers. Though we call it a Mongol army, Genghis Khan's was the widest alliance of steppelander peoples ever. And it is probable—though the sources are not good enough for certainty—that, relatively speaking, the steppeland was more populous in his day than ever before.


Above all, the Mongols were exceptionally adaptable warmongers. They triumphed not only in cavalry country but also in environments where previous steppelander armies had failed, pressing into service huge forces of foot soldiers, mobilizing complex logistical support, organizing siege trains and fleets, appropriating the full potential of sedentary economies to finance further wars. The mountains of Georgia could not stop them. The Mongols captured the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, in 1234, turning Georgia into a puppet kingdom. Nor, in the long run, could the rice paddies and rivers of southern China, where the Mongols destroyed the Song dynasty in the 1270s. Toward the end of the century, when another supreme khan wanted to conquer Java and Japan, they were even willing to take to the sea. But both attempts failed.

As well as for extent, the Mongol Empire was remarkable, by steppelander standards, for longevity. As his career progressed, Genghis Khan became a visionary lawgiver, a patron of letters, an architect of enduring empire. His first steps toward acquiring a bureaucracy and a judicial system more or less coincided with his election as khan. When he then turned to lawmaking, a code gradually took shape, regulating hunting, army discipline, behavior at feasts, and social relationships, with death the penalty for murder, serious theft, conspiracy, adultery, sodomy, and witchcraft. Initially,

"Though we call it a Mongol army, Genghis Khan's was the widest alliance of steppelander peoples ever."

Making Connections Reasons for Mongol Military Success

Tactics/Strategies	Technologies	Practices
 Psychological warfare; feigned retreats; unrivaled mobility	 Superior horsemanship; curved bows; siegecraft	 Ability to adapt to different environment and to overcome complex logistical obstacles; alliance formation among steppeland peoples; recruitment of workers and administrators without favoritism





the khan relied on Uighurs for his administrators and ordered the adoption of the Uighur script for the Mongols' language. But he recruited as and where he conquered, without favoritism for any community or creed. His closest ministers included Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists.

In 1219, a Chinese Daoist sage, Changchun, answered the khan's call for wise experts. At the age of 71, he undertook an arduous three-year journey from China to meet the khan at the foot of the Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan (see Map 12.1). There were sacrifices of principle Changchun would not make. He would not travel with recruits for the imperial harem, or venture "into a land where vegetables were unavailable"—by which he meant the steppe. Yet he crossed the Gobi Desert, climbed "mountains of huge cold," and braved wildernesses where his escort smeared their horses with blood to ward off demons. Admittedly, Changchun's meeting with the khan was disappointing. The question the conqueror was most eager to put was not about the art of government, but about a potion to confer longevity on himself.

12.1.2 The Mongol Steppe

Still, many lettered and experienced officials from the Jurchen, Khitan, and Tangut states (see "The Rise of the Song and the Barbarian Conquests," in Chapter 11) took service at the khan's court. The result was an exceptional, though short-lived, era in steppe history: the Mongol peace. A European, who witnessed it in the 1240s, described it in an evident effort to reproach his fellow Christians with the moral superiority of their enemies: "The Mongols are the most obedient people in the world with regard to their leaders, more so even than our own clergy to their superiors. . . . There are no wranglings among them, no disputes or murders." This was obviously exaggerated, but Mongol rule did make the steppeland safe for outsiders. This was new. A previously inaccessible road through the steppes opened across Eurasia north of the Silk Roads. Once they had learned the benefits of peace along the steppeland road, the Mongols became its highway police. Teams of Mongol horses, for instance, took the pope's ambassador, John of Piano Carpini, 3,000 miles in 106 days in 1246 (see Map 12.2). Missionaries, spies, and craftsmen in search of work at the Mongol court also made the journey, in an attempt to forge friendship between the Mongols and the Christian West, or, at least, to gather intelligence.

Traveling by a similar route, William of Rubruck—a Franciscan envoy—recorded

vivid details of his mission to Mongke Khan, Genghis Khan's grandson, in 1253. As well as describing the road, William also described the Mongol way of life more accurately and completely than any other Western visitor until the late nineteenth century.

After taking leave of the king of France, who hoped for an alliance with the Mongols against the Muslims, William crossed the Black Sea in May and set out across the steppe by wagon, bound for Karakorum, the new city in Mongolia where the khan held court (see Map 12.1). "After three days," he recorded, "we found the Mongols and I really felt as if I were entering another world." By November, he was in the middle of Transoxiana, "famished, thirsty, frozen, and exhausted." In December, he was high in the dreaded Altai Shan, the mountain barrier that guarded the road to Karakorum. Here he "chanted the creed, among dreadful crags, to put the demons to flight." At last, on Palm Sunday 1254, he entered the Mongol capital.

Friar William always insisted that he was a simple missionary, but he was treated as an ambassador and behaved like a master spy. And, indeed, he had more than one objective. The Mongols might be amenable to Christianity or at least to an alliance against common enemies in the Muslim world. On the other hand, they were

WILLIAM OF RUBRUCK. "He shall pass into the country of strange peoples. He shall try good and evil in all things." In the only surviving illumination that illustrates his report, Friar William of Rubruck looks alarmed at the instructions from King Louis IX of France to go on a mission to the Mongols. William's journey of 1253–1255 took him as far as the Mongol capital of Karakorum and generated an account full of vivid and faithful detail. The text illustrates how Western Europeans were becoming more aware of the wider Eurasian world.





MAP 12.2
European Travelers of the
Mongol Roads, 1245–1295

- John of Piano Carpini 1245–1247 and William of Rubruck 1253–1254
- Marco Polo 1271–1275
- Marco Polo 1275–1295
- Silk Road

potential enemies, who had already invaded the fringes of Europe and might do so again. Intelligence about them was precious. William realized that the seasonal migrations of Mongol life had a scientific basis and were calculated for military efficiency. “Every commander,” he noted, “according to whether he has a greater or smaller number of men under him, is familiar with the limits of his pasture lands and where he ought to graze in summer and winter, spring and autumn.”

Little useful intelligence escaped William. But he also showed interest in the culture he tried unsuccessfully to convert to Christianity. His description of a Mongol tent dwelling still holds good. The layout, social space, and way of life William saw have not changed much since his day. A frame of interlaced branches stretched between supports made of branches, converging at the top. The covering was of white felt, “and they decorate the felt with various fine designs.” Up to twenty-two oxen hauled houses on wagons 20 feet broad.

Each wife of the master of the household had her own tent, where the master had a bench facing the entrance. In an inversion of Chinese rules of precedence, the women sat on the east side, the men to the right of the master, who sat at the north end. Ancestral spirits resided in felt bags arrayed around the walls. One each hung over the heads of master and mistress, with a guardian image between them. Others hung on the women’s and men’s sides of the tent, adorned with the udders of a cow and a mare, symbols of the sources of life for people who relied on dairy products for their diet. The household would gather to drink in the tent of the chosen wife of the night. “I should have drawn everything for you,” William assured his readers, “had I known how to draw.”

Shamans’ trances released the spirits from the bags that held them. Frenzied drumming, dancing, and drinking induced the shamans’ ecstasies. The power of speaking

with the ancestors' voices gave shamans enormous authority in Mongol decision making, including the opportunity to interfere in making and unmaking khans. This was a point William missed. The Mongols leaders' interest in foreign religions, and their investment in the cult of heaven, were, in part at least, strategies to offset the power of the native priests.

Outside the tent, William vividly captured the nature of the terrain—so smooth that one woman could pilot thirty wagons, linked by trailing ropes. He described a way of life that reflected steppeland ecology. The Mongols had mixed flocks of various kinds of sheep and cattle. Mixed pastoralism is essential in an environment in which no other source of food is available. Different species have different cycles of lactation and fertility. Variety therefore ensures a reliable food supply.

The horse was the dominant partner of life on the steppe. Mare's milk was the Mongols' summer food. The intestines and dried flesh of horses provided cured meat and sausages for winter. By drawing blood from the living creatures, Mongols on campaign could refresh themselves without significantly slowing the herds. This was the basis of their reputation for blood-sucking savagery among their sedentary neighbors. They made, said William, "very fine shoes from the hind part of a horse's hide." Fermented mare's milk was the favorite intoxicating drink. The Mongols revered drunkenness and hallowed it by rites: offerings sprinkled over the bags of ancestral spirits, or poured out toward the quarters of the globe. Challenges to drinking bouts were a part of nightly entertainment. To the accompaniment of singing and clapping, the victim would be seized by the ears, with a vigorous tug "to make him open his gullet."

William related in detail his conversations with the habitually drunken Möngke Khan. Despite the khan's bluster and self-righteousness, the conversations revealed some of the qualities that made the Mongols of his era great: tolerance, adaptability, respect for tradition. "We Mongols believe," Möngke said, if we can trust William's understanding of his words, "that there is but one God, in Whom we live and in Whom we die, and towards him we have an upright heart." Spreading his hand, he added, "But just as God has given different fingers to the hand, so He has given different religions to people." Later in the thirteenth century, Kubilai Khan, another of Genghis Khan's grandsons, expressed himself to the Venetian traveler, Marco Polo, in similar terms. So this was genuinely a Mongol saying.

12.2 The Mongol World beyond the Steppes


How did Mongol rule differ in China, Persia, and Russia?

The steppeland route was ideal for horse-borne travelers. Trading caravans, however, still favored the traditional Silk Roads, which crossed Eurasia to the south of the steppe through the Taklamakan Desert (see Map 12.2). These routes had developed over centuries, precisely because high mountains protected them from steppeland raiders. But they had never been totally secure before the Mongol peace. The new security boosted the amount of traffic the roads carried. Mongol partiality for merchants also helped. Mongols encouraged Chinese trade, uninhibited by any of the traditional Confucian prejudices against commerce as an ignoble occupation. In 1299, after the Mongol Empire had been divided among several rulers, a Persian merchant was made the ambassador of the Supreme Khan to the court of the subordinate Mongol Il-khan in Persia—an elevation unthinkable under a native Chinese dynasty, which would have reserved such a post for an official educated in the Confucian classics. The khans gave low-cost loans to Chinese trading companies. Chinese goods—and with them, patterns and styles—flowed to Persian markets as never before. Chinese arts, under Mongol patronage, became more open to foreign influences.

A Closer Look

A Mongol Passport

Although they were in use in China before the Mongols arrived, documents called *paizi*, such as the one depicted here, were used as passports to regulate communication and administration in the vast Mongol Empire. Their use, the way they were designed, and the language in which they were written help us understand the massive movements of people and the rapid exchange of ideas and technology that occurred across Eurasia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when Mongol rule was at its height. William of Rubruck and Marco Polo carried these passports on their return journeys to Europe from Mongol courts in Asia.



What does this passport reveal about the Mongol peace?

Nonetheless, geography made the Silk Roads hard to travel. Marco Polo was a young Venetian who accompanied his father and uncle on a trading mission to Mongol-ruled China in the early 1270s (see Map 12.2). “They were hard put to complete the journey in three and a half years,” Marco Polo reported at the start of his own account, “because of the snow and rain and flooded rivers and violent storms in the countries through which they had to pass, and because they could not ride so well in winter as in summer.” The Taklamakan Desert was the great obstacle. The normal rule for caravans was the bigger, the safer. But the modest water sources of the desert could not sustain many more than 50 men at a time with their beasts. The key to exploiting the desert routes was the distribution of water, which drains inland from the surrounding mountains and finds its way below the desert floor by underground channels. It was normal to go for 30 days without finding water, though there might be an occasional salt-marsh oasis or an unreliable river of shifting course, among featureless dunes. The worst danger was getting lost—“lured from the path by demon-spirits.” “Yes,” said Marco,

and even by daylight men hear these spirit-voices and often you fancy you are listening to the strains of many instruments, especially drums, and the clash of arms. . . . Travelers make a point of keeping very close together. Before they go to sleep they set up a sign pointing in the direction in which they have to travel. And round the necks of their beasts they fasten little bells, so as to . . . prevent them straying off the path.

As a fourteenth-century painter at Persia’s Mongol court imagined them, the demons were black, athletic, and ruthless, waving the dismembered limbs of horses as they danced. As Friar William had seen, the Mongols recommended warding them off by smearing a horse’s neck with blood.

A fourteenth-century guide included handy tips for Italian merchants who headed for East Asia to extend the reach of the commerce of their cities. At the port of Tana, on the Black Sea, you should furnish yourself with a good guide, regardless of expense. “And if the merchant likes to take a woman with him from Tana, he can do so.” On departure from Tana, twenty-five days’ supply of flour and salt fish were needed—“other things you will find in sufficiency and especially meat.” The road was “safe by day and night,” protected by Mongol police. But it was important to take a close relative for company. Otherwise, should a merchant die, his property would be forfeit. The text specified rates of exchange at each stop and recommended suitable conveyances for each stage of the journey: oxcart or horse-drawn wagon to the city of Astrakhan, where the Don River runs into the Caspian Sea, depending on how fast the traveler wanted to go and how much he wanted to pay; thereafter, camel train or pack mule, as far as the river system of China. Silver was the currency of the road, but the Chinese authorities would exchange it for paper money, which—Westerners were assured—they could use

throughout China.

After the deserts, the next obstacle was the Tian Shan, one of the most formidable mountain ranges in the world: 1,800 miles long, up to 300 miles wide, and rising to 24,000 feet. The extraordinary environment the Tian Shan encloses is odder still because of the deep depressions that punctuate the mountains, dropping to more than 500 feet below sea level. Farther north, the Altai Mountains guard the Mongolian heartlands. “Before the days of the Mongols,” wrote the bishop of the missionary diocese the Franciscans established in China, “nobody believed that the Earth was habitable beyond these mountains, . . . but by God’s leave and wonderful exertion the Mongols crossed them, and . . . so did I.”

THE SILK ROADS. Cresques Abraham was the finest mapmaker of his day. He painted this image of a caravan on the Silk Roads in the late 1370s or early 1380s in an atlas probably commissioned for the king of France. By that date, the Mongols no longer controlled the whole of the route, though the lances of an armed escort, presumably of Mongols, are visible behind the merchants. The caption says the caravan is bound for China, but it is heading in the opposite direction.



Europeans frequently made the journey to China. That reflects the balance of wealth and power at the time. China was rich and productive, Europe a needy backwater. We know of only one subject of the Chinese emperor who found it worthwhile to make the journey in the opposite direction. Rabban Bar Sauma was a Nestorian—a follower, that is, of a Christian tradition that had long flourished in Central Asia but the West had regarded as heretical since the fifth century (see “Trade,” in Chapter 8).

When making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Bar Sauma planned a route between Nestorian monasteries, heading initially for Maragha in what is now Azerbaijan (see Map 12.3), where the most respected bishop of the Nestorian church had his see. Maragha was a suitable way station: the intellectual capital of the western Mongol world, with a library reputedly of 400,000 books and a new astronomical observatory. There, Bar Sauma took service, first with the bishop, and later with the Mongol ruler of Persia, the Il-khan. He never completed his pilgrimage. In 1286, however, Bar Sauma did resume his travels (see Map 12.3). He was appointed the Mongols’ ambassador to the kingdoms of the Christian West, to negotiate an alliance against Muslim Egypt.

When he got to Rome, Bar Sauma was accorded a signal honor: reception by the cardinals who had assembled to elect a pope. In Paris, he recognized the university as an intellectual powerhouse reminiscent of Maragha, with schools of mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and philosophy. Persian was the only language in which Bar Sauma

CHRONOLOGY: Travelers during the Mongol Peace

1245–1247	John of Piano Carpini
1253–1254	William of Rubruck
1271–1275; 1275–1295	Marco Polo
1275–1288	Rabban Bar Sauma



MAP 12.3
The Travels of Rabban Bar Sauma, 1275–1288

- Silk Road
- travels of Rabban Bar Sauma, 1275–1288
- ✙ Nestorian see

could communicate with Western interpreters. From the errors he made in describing Western manners and politics, a lot evidently got lost in translation. He mistook diplomatic evasions for assent and vague expressions of Christian fellowship for doctrinal agreement. He returned to Persia with many assurances of friendship and exhortations to the Il-khan to convert to Christianity. The fact that he completed the journey at all shows how the Mongols made it possible to cross Eurasia.

12.2.1 China

The Mongols never ran their dominions as a centralized state. Nor did they apply consistent methods to govern territories as vast and diverse as theirs. Three main areas of conquest beyond the steppeland—in China, Persia, and Russia—were added after Genghis Khan's death (see Map 12.1). All were exploited in different ways, specific to the Mongols' needs and the peculiarities of each region.

The conquest of Song China was long and difficult for two reasons. It was a more powerful state than any the Mongols faced elsewhere, and it was highly defensible: compact, so that its armies could maneuver on interior lines of communication, and scored by terrain inhospitable to Mongol horsemen. But, fueled with resources from the Mongols' other conquests, and pursued with unfailing tenacity, the conquest unfolded relentlessly bit by bit. Letters from the Chinese court seeped desperation as the Mongols closed in for the kill. In 1274, the Chinese empress mother, Xie Qiao, reflected on where the blame lay.

The empire's descent into peril is due, I regret, to the instability of our moral virtue. . . . The sound of woeful lament reverberated through the countryside, yet we failed to investigate. The pall of hunger and cold enveloped the army, yet we failed to console.

The real reasons for China's collapse lay in the superiority of the Mongols' war machine. Unlike previous steppeland invaders, the Mongols spared no resources to pursue all-out victory and hired the troops and equipment needed to subdue a country of cities, rice paddies, and rivers. The Mongols' reach helped: They recruited Persian engineers to build siege engines. The last battle was at Changzhao in 1275 (see Map 12.1). The Chinese poet Yi Tinggao was there, "smelling the acrid dust of the field," spying "the green iridescence of the dead." The human misery could be measured in the grief-stricken literature that survives: the suicide notes, the cries of longing for loved ones who disappeared in the chaos, massacred or enslaved. Years later, Ni Bozhuang, bailiff of a Daoist monastery, recalled the loss of his wife: "I still do not know if you were taken because of your beauty, or if, surrounded by horses, you can still buy cosmetics." In 1276, with his advisers fleeing and his mother packed for flight, the young Song emperor wrote his abdication letter to the Mongol khan: "The mandate of heaven having shifted, your Servant chooses to change with it, . . . yet my heart is full of emotions and these cannot countenance the prospect of the abrupt annihilation of the . . . altars of my ancestors. Whether they be misguidedly abandoned or specially preserved intact rests solely with the revitalized moral virtue you bring to the throne."

For the Mongols, the conquest of China was a logical continuation of the policies of Genghis Khan and a stage in fulfilling the destiny of world conquest heaven supposedly envisaged. But it was also the personal project and passion of Kubilai Khan (1214–1294), Genghis's grandson, who became so immersed in China that he never asserted supremacy over Mongol leaders who resisted his claims in the extreme west of the Mongol world. Some of his Chinese subjects resented Kubilai's foreign ways: the libations of fermented mare's milk with which he honored his gods; his barbarous banquets of meat; the officials he chose with great freedom from outside the Confucian elite and even from outside China. Marco Polo reported that all the Chinese "hated the government of the Great Khan, because he set over them steppelanders, most of whom were Muslims, and . . . it made them feel no more than slaves." In this respect, the khan broke with Chinese tradition, which was to confine administrative positions to a meritocracy, whose members were selected by examination in the Confucian classics.

"For the Mongols, the conquest of China was a logical continuation of the policies of Genghis Khan and a stage in fulfilling the destiny of world conquest heaven supposedly envisaged."

Kublai showed his reverence for Confucius by building a shrine in his honor, but he needed to recruit, as Genghis Khan had, from the full range of talent the Mongol Empire supplied.

Kublai, indeed, remained a Mongol khan. In some respects, he flouted Chinese conventions. He showed traditional steppelander respect for the abilities of women, giving them court posts and, in one case, a provincial governorship. His wife, Chabi, was one of his closest political advisers. He introduced a separate tier of administration for Mongols, who became a privileged minority in China, ruled by their own laws, and resented for it by most Chinese. In defiance of Confucian teachings, Kublai felt obliged to fulfill the vision of world conquest he inherited from Genghis Khan. But beyond China, he registered only fleeting success. In Java, the Mongols replaced one native prince with another, without making permanent gains. In Vietnam, the Mongols were only able to levy tribute at a rate too low to meet the cost of their campaigns there. So-called kamikaze winds—divine typhoons that wrecked the Mongol fleets—drove Kublai's armies back from Japan.

While upholding Mongol traditions, Kublai also sought, emphatically, to be a Chinese emperor who performed the due rites, dressed in the Chinese manner, learned the language, patronized the arts, protected the traditions, and promoted the interests of his Chinese subjects. Marco Polo, who seems to have served him as a sort of professional storyteller, called him “the most powerful master of men, lands, and treasures there has been in the world from the time of Adam until today.”

12.2.2 Persia

In Persia, meanwhile, the Mongol rulers—Il-khans or “subordinate rulers,” so called in deference to Kublai Khan's nominal superiority—were like chameleons, gradually taking on the hues of the culture they conquered. But, as in China, they were anxious to maintain a distinct identity and to preserve their own traditions. The court tended to stay in the north, where there was grazing for the kinds of herds their followers brought with them from the steppe. The Il-khans retained nomadic habits, migrating every summer and winter to new camps with palatial tents. At the end of the thirteenth century, Ghazan Khan's tent took three years to make, and 200 men took twenty days to erect it. In southern Iran and Iraq, the Il-khans tended to entrust power to local dynasties, securing their loyalty by marriages with the ruling family or court nobility. In effect, this gave them hostages for the good conduct of provincial rulers.

Eventually in 1295, the Il-khans adopted Islam, after flirtations with Nestorianism and Buddhism. This marked an important departure from the tradition of religious pluralism Genghis Khan had begun and Kublai upheld. From the moment the Il-khan Ghazan (r. 1295–1304) declared his conversion to Islam, the state began to take on a militantly religious character, excluding the Christians, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and Jews formerly admitted to the khan's service.

Moreover, the form of Islam the Il-khans finally adopted was Shiism (see “The Muslim World,” in Chapter 7). The religious art of the Il-khanate is strikingly unlike that of any other Muslim country. The painters freely painted human figures, especially those of Muhammad and his son-in-law, and even copied Christian nativity scenes to produce versions of the Prophet's birth. The Il-khans' Persia, however, was not isolated from neighboring states. On the contrary, as was usual in the Mongol world, the presence of



KUBILAI KHAN. Liu Guandao was Kublai Khan's favorite painter. So we can be fairly sure that this is how the khan would like to be remembered: not just in the traditional inert Chinese pose (which Liu also painted), but also active, dressed and horsed like a Mongol ruler, engaged in the hunt. A woman, presumably his influential consort, Chabi, is at his side. The blank silk background evokes the featurelessness of the steppe, while also highlighting the human figures.

rulers descended from Genghis Khan promoted trans-Eurasian contacts and exchanges of goods, personnel, and ideas. Persia supplied China, for instance, with engineers, astronomers, and mathematicians, while Persia received porcelain from China. Chinese designs influenced Persian weavers, and Chinese dragons appeared on the tiles with which Persian buildings of the time were decorated. Mongol rule ended in Persia in 1343 when the last Il-khan died without an heir.

12.2.3 Russia

Meanwhile, the Mongols who remained in their Central Asian heartlands continued to lead their traditional, unreconstructed way of life. So did those who formed the elite in the remaining areas the heirs of Genghis Khan inherited: in Turkestan and Kashgaria in Central Asia, and the steppes of the lower Volga River (see Map 12.1). From the last of these areas, where the Mongols were known as the Golden Horde (see Map 12.3), they exercised a form of overlordship over Russia, where they practiced a kind of imperialism different from those in China and Persia. The Mongols left the Christian Russian principalities and city-states to run their own affairs. But their rulers had to receive charters from the khan's court at Saray on the lower Volga (see Map 12.1), where they had to make regular appearances, loaded with tribute and subject to ritual humiliations. The population had to pay taxes directly to Mongol-appointed tax gatherers—though as time went on, the Mongols assigned the tax-gathering to native Russian princes and civic authorities.

Russians tolerated this situation—albeit unhappily, and with many revolts—partly because the Mongols intimidated them by terror. When the Mongols took the great city of Kiev in 1240, it was said, they left only 200 houses standing and strewn the fields “with countless heads and bones of the dead” (see Map 12.1, for Russian sites). Partly, however, Russians were responding to a milder Mongol policy. In most of Russia, the invaders came to exploit rather than to destroy. According to one chronicler, the Mongols spared Russia's peasants to ensure that farming would continue. Ryazan, a Russian principality on the Volga, southeast of Moscow, seems to have borne the brunt of the Mongol invasion. Yet there, if the local chronicle can be believed, “the pious Grand Prince Ingvar Ingvarevitch sat on his father's throne and renewed the land and built

NOVGOROD. The cathedral of St. Sophia in Novgorod in Russia would have presented essentially the same outline in the thirteenth century that it does today. At the time, it was one of relatively few buildings in that mercantile city-state built of stone rather than wood. The tallest gilded dome shows the position of the sanctuary at the heart of the church.



churches and monasteries and consoled newcomers and gathered together the people. And there was joy among the Christians whom God had saved from the godless and impious khan.” Many cities escaped lightly by capitulating at once. Novgorod, that hugely rich city (see “Western Europe: Economics and Politics,” in Chapter 10), which the Mongols might have coveted, they bypassed altogether.

Moreover, Russian princes were even more fearful of enemies to the west, where the Swedes, Poles, and Lithuanians had constructed strong, unitary monarchies, capable of sweeping the princes away if they ever succeed in expanding into Russian territory. Equally menacing were groups of mainly German adventurers, organized into crusading “orders” of warriors, such as the Teutonic Knights and the Brothers of the Sword, who took monastic-style vows but dedicated themselves to waging holy war against pagans and heretics (see Map 12.5). In practice, these orders were self-enriching companies of professional fighters, who built up territorial domains along the Baltic coast by conquest. In campaigns between 1242 and 1245, Russian coalitions fought off invaders on the western front, but they could not sustain war on two fronts. The experience made them submissive to the Mongols.

12.3 The Limits of Conquest

Why did the Mongols fail to conquer Egypt and India?

12.3.1 Mamluk Egypt

In the 1200s, Egypt was in chaos because of rebellions by pastoralists from the southern desert and revolt by the Mamluks, the slaves who formed the elite fighting force. It seems counterintuitive to arm slaves. But for most of the thirteenth century, the policy worked well for the heirs of Saladin who had ruled Egypt since 1192. The rulers hand-picked their slave army. The slaves came overwhelmingly from Turkic peoples that Mongol rebels displaced or captured and sold. They had nowhere else to go and no future except in the Egyptian sultan’s service. They were acquired young. They trained in barracks, which became their substitutes for families and the source of their pride and strong sense of comradeship. Slaves seemed, from the ruler’s point of view, ideally reliable: a dependent class. Increasingly, however, the Mamluks came to know their own strength. In the 1250s, they rebelled. Their own later propaganda cites the sultan’s failure to reward them fairly for their services in repelling a crusader attack on Egypt. They also expressed outrage at the promotion of a black slave to one of the highest offices in the court. They “threw themselves . . . like the onrush of an unleashed torrent.” In 1254, the Mamluks replaced the last heir of Saladin with rulers from their own ranks.

The rebels, however, while contending with internal enemies, perceived the Mongols as a greater threat and turned to face them. In September 1260, they turned back the Mongol armies at one of the decisive battles of the world at Ain Jalut in Syria (see Map 12.1). It was the first serious reversal the Mongols had experienced since Genghis Khan united them. And it gave the Mamluk commander, Baybars, the chance to take over Egypt and Syria. He boasted that he could play polo in Cairo and Damascus within the space of a single week. The Mamluks mopped up the last small crusader states on the coast of Syria and Palestine between 1268 and 1291 (see Map 12.1). In combination with the effects of the internal politics of the Mongol world, which inhibited armies from getting too far from the centers of power, the Mamluk victory kept the Mongols out of Africa.

Mamluk victory also marked a further stage in the Islamization of Africa. The Mamluks levied tribute on the Christian kingdoms of Nubia. Then, in the next century, they imposed Islam there. Cairo, as we shall see in the next chapter, became a normal stopping place

“It seems counterintuitive to arm slaves. But for most of the thirteenth century, the policy worked well for the heirs of Saladin who had ruled Egypt since 1192.”

CHRONOLOGY: Rise of the Mamluks

1254	Mamluks depose sultan of Egypt
1260	Mamluk army victorious at the battle of Ain Jalut in Syria
1268–1291	Mamluks overthrow last of the crusader states

on the pilgrimage route to Mecca for Muslim kings and dignitaries from West Africa. Islam percolated through the region of Lake Chad and into Hausaland in what is today Nigeria.

12.3.2 Muslim India: The Delhi Sultanate

By the 1190s, a Muslim Turkic dynasty and people, the Ghurids, had resumed the habit of raiding into Hindu India. As their victories accumulated, they began to levy fixed tribute in the Punjab and even established permanent garrisons in the Ganges valley (see Map 12.4). One of their most far-flung outposts—and therefore one of the strongest—was at the city of Delhi in northern India. The adventurer Iltutmish took command there in 1211. He was a former slave who had risen to general and received his freedom from his Ghurid masters. He avoided war with Hindus—which was, in essence, his job—in favor of building up his own resources. In 1216, exhibiting to his subordinates the letters that had granted him his freedom, he effectively declared himself independent. Over the next twelve years, he played the power game with skill, exploiting the rivalries of Muslim commanders to construct a state from the Indus River to the Bay of Bengal. Meanwhile, the effects of the Mongol conquests on Central Asia protected this new realm, which became known as the Sultanate of Delhi (see Map 12.4), against outside attack: The Mongols effectively eliminated any possible invader and drove many refugees to take service with Iltutmish. As one of the early chroniclers of the sultanate said, “Rulers and governors, . . . and many administrators and notables came to Iltutmish’s court from fear of the slaughter and terror of the accursed Mongol, Genghis Khan.”

There was no consistent form of administration. In most of the more remote territories, the Delhi sultan was an overlord, mediating between small, autonomous states, many of which Hindus ruled. Bengal (see Map 12.4) was exceptional—a forest frontier, in which governors tried to promote Muslim settlement by making land grants to pioneering holy men and religious communities. But a core of lands was the sultan’s personal property, exploited to benefit his treasury and run by administrators he appointed. Lands the sultan granted to warriors in exchange for military service ringed this core. For most of the rest of the century, the sultanate had a volatile history, punctuated by succession wars that were resolved at great oath-taking ceremonies, when the aristocracy of the realm—encompassing a great diversity of effectively freelance warriors and local rulers whom it was difficult or impossible for the sultan to dismiss—would make emotional but often short-lived declarations of loyalty.

Iltutmish’s personal choice of successor set the tone on his deathbed in 1236. As an ex-slave, Iltutmish was no respecter of conventional ideas of hierarchy. Denouncing his sons for incompetence, he chose his daughter, Radiyya, as his successor. In the steppes, women often handled important jobs. In the Islamic world, a woman ruler was a form of impiety and a subversion of what was thought to be the natural order of the world. When, in 1250, a little before the Mamluks took over in Egypt, a woman had seized the throne there and applied to Baghdad for legitimation by the caliph, he is supposed to have replied that he could supply capable men, if no more existed in Egypt. Radiyya had to contend both with a brother who briefly ousted her—she had him put to death—and, what was harder, with male mistrust. Some of her coins emphasize claims to unique feminine virtues as “pillar of women.” Others have modest inscriptions, in which all the glorious epithets are reserved for

MAP 12.4
The Delhi Sultanate

- Delhi Sultanate 1236
- area subject to sporadic influence by Delhi Sultanate



her father and the caliph in Baghdad. Her best strategy was to behave like a man. She dressed in male clothing, refused to cover her face, and, according to a slightly late source, “mounted horse like men, armed with bow and quiver.” To conventional minds, these were provocations. Accused of taking a black slave as a lover, Radiyya was deposed in 1240 in favor of a brother. Her real offense was self-assertion. Those modest coin inscriptions suggest that power brokers in the army and the court were willing to accept her but only as a figurehead representative of her father, not as an active leader of men.

The sultanate had to cope not only with the turbulence of its own elite but also with its Hindu subjects and neighbors. Dominion by any state over the entire Indian subcontinent remained, at best, a dream. Frontier expansion was slow. Deforestation was an act of state because, as a Muslim writer of the fourteenth century complained, “The infidels live in these forests, which for them are as good as city walls, and inside them they have their cattle and grain supplies of water collected from the rains, so that they cannot be overcome except by strong armies of men who go into these forests and cut down those reeds.” In Bengal, the eastward shift of the Ganges River made Islamization easier. Charismatic Sufis, with tax-free grants of forest land for mosques and shrines, led the way.

For most of the thirteenth century, the Mongol menace overshadowed the sultanate. The internal politics of the dynasty of Genghis Khan caused dissensions and hesitations that protected Delhi. Mongol dynastic disputes cut short periodic invasions. Moreover, a buffer state that dissident Mongols created in Delhi’s western territories diminished the sultanate but also absorbed most of the khans’ attacks. In the 1290s, however, the buffer collapsed. By what writers in Delhi considered a miracle, the subsequent Mongol attacks failed, faltered, or were driven off.

12.4 Europe

How did the Mongol peace benefit Europe?

With the scare the Mongol invasions caused and the loss of the last crusader states in Syria to the Mamluks, Latin Christendom looked vulnerable. Attempts were made to revitalize the crusading movement—especially by Louis IX, the king of France (r. 1226–1270), who became a model monarch for the Western world. But they all failed. A further reversal was the loss of Constantinople by its Latin rulers to a Byzantine revival. Although the Mongols had destroyed or dominated most of the successor states that claimed Byzantium’s legacy, at Nicaea, in western Anatolia, rulers who continued to call themselves “Roman emperors” maintained the court rituals and art of Byzantine greatness. In 1261, they recaptured the old Byzantine capital from the crusaders—“after many failures,” as their ruler at the time, Michael VIII, admitted, “because God wished us to know that the possession of the city was a grace dependent on his bounty.”

Nevertheless, Latin Christendom grew on other fronts, extending the frontier deep into formerly pagan worlds along the Baltic in Livonia, Estonia, Prussia, and Finland (see Map 12.5). Between the 1220s and the 1260s, Christian kingdoms seized most of the Mediterranean seaboard of Spain and the Balearic Islands from the hands of Muslim rulers (see Map 12.5). Here the existing economy and population were not much disturbed. Conquests Castile and Portugal made over the same period in the Iberian southwest became a sort of Wild West of sparse settlements, tough frontiersmen, and vast cattle and sheep ranches. Meanwhile, traders of the western Mediterranean increased their commerce with northern Europe along the coasts the Spaniards conquered, through the Strait of Gibraltar (see maritime trade on Map 12.5). Toward the end of the century, as they became accustomed to Atlantic sailing conditions, some of them began to think of exploring the ocean for new routes and resources. In 1291, an expedition set off from



MAP 12.5
Latin Christendom, 1200–1300

- predominantly pagan lands
 - university/cathedral schools with date of earliest record
 - reconquest of Spain in thirteenth century
 - campaigns of Teutonic Knights and Sword Brothers
- Maritime Trade Routes**
- Venetian
 - Genoese
 - Catalan

the Italian city of Genoa to try to find “the regions of India by way of the ocean.” The voyagers were never heard of again, but their voyage marked the beginning of a long, faltering effort by maritime communities of Western Europe to exploit the ocean at their feet.

The transforming influences came from the east. The Mongol peace policing of the routes that linked the extremities of Eurasia ended Europe’s relative isolation and stimulated trade and travel between Europe and China. The thirteenth century was the most intense period ever in trans-Eurasian communications, and European traditions were rechanneled as a result or, at least, guided more securely in directions they might have taken anyway. Paper, for instance, a Chinese invention that had already reached the West through Arab intermediaries, was a former luxury that came into general use in late-thirteenth-century Europe—a major contribution to what we would now call information technology, making written communication cheap, easy, and prolific. Up to this

time, European maritime technology—on which long-range trade and most long-range imperialism depended—was especially primitive by non-European standards. The compass was first recorded in Europe in about 1190 in a text that explained the marvels of a pin well rubbed “with an ugly brown stone that draws iron to itself.” As far as we know, the West had as yet no maritime charts. The earliest reference to such a device dates only from 1270. Gunpowder and the blast furnace were among the magical-seeming technologies that first reached Europe from China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Meanwhile, with consequences for the future that can hardly be overestimated, Western science grew more empirical—more reliant on the reality of sense perceptions, more committed to the observation of nature. The renewal of this classical tradition in the West coincided with renewed contact with China, where empiricism had never been lost. At the University of Paris, which the Nestorian Rabban Bar Sauma so admired, scholars cultivated a genuinely scientific way of understanding the world (see Map 12.5, for universities and cathedral schools). The end products were the marvelously comprehensive schemes that encyclopedists of thirteenth-century Paris elaborated, especially in the work of the greatest intellect of the age, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), who arrayed in precise categories everything known by experience or report. In northwest Spain, an unknown, probably French, artist of the thirteenth century depicted a similar vision of the whole cosmos in the stained glass windows of León Cathedral. The cosmos was measurable, portrayed between the dividers of Christ the geometer, like a ball of fluff trapped between tweezers.

In the third quarter of the thirteenth century, Parisian teachers, of whom the most insistent was Siger of Brabant, pointed out that the doctrines of the church on the creation and the nature of the soul conflicted with classical philosophy and empirical evidence. “Every disputable question,” they argued, “must be determined by rational arguments.” Some thinkers took refuge in an evasive idea of “double truth,” according to which things true in faith could be false in science and vice versa. The church condemned this doctrine in 1277 (along with a miscellany of magic and superstition).

Meanwhile, another professor in the thirteenth century at the University of Paris, Roger Bacon, stated that excessive deference to authority—including ancestral wisdom, custom, and consensus—was a cause of ignorance. He insisted that scientific observations could help to validate holy writ and that medical experiments could increase knowledge and save life. He also claimed—citing the lenses with which Archimedes reputedly set



ASTROLABE. The Syrian instrument maker al-Sarraj engraved his signature on this fine astrolabe in 1230–1231. The purpose of the astrolabe is to assist in astronomy—one of the many sciences in which the Islamic world excelled at the time. By suspending the instrument at eye level and swiveling a narrow central bar until it aligned with any observed star, the user could read the star’s elevation above the horizon, as well as such additional information as the latitude, the date, and even the time of day from the engraved discs.

THE MEASURABLE COSMOS.

This thirteenth-century illustration of the creation of the world shows God as a well-equipped designer, measuring creation with an architect’s or mathematician’s dividers. The Earth is not the center of the cosmos, but a tiny blob in the corner, surrounded by chaos and dwarfed by God.

