

POLITICAL SCIENCE
An Introduction

FOURTEENTH EDITION UPDATE

Roskin • Cord • Medeiros • Jones

Political Science

An Introduction

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FOURTEENTH EDITION UPDATE

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Brief Contents

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Preface

Political Science and Democracy

Worldwide, democracy is declining. It reached a high point around 2000, after the collapse of Communist regimes in East Europe and the Soviet Union and the spread of democracy through most of Latin America. Since then, many democracies have taken on authoritarian hues that concentrate power in the hands of one person, control the judiciary and media, and silence opposition. Some critics are sounding alarms.

What will be the long-term consequences if this decline continues? You could witness them firsthand. They may include populist demagoguery drowning out reasoned discourse, shrinking world trade, and increased bellicosity among nations. This book attempts to make you aware of your political situation so you will avoid being misused and may even take an active interest in opposing such misuse. In the face of indifference, we ask, "Well, what kind of a country do you want? You'd better start developing your own rational perspectives now because soon you will have to make political choices."

In this way and others, political science can be quite practical. It began, in fact, as practical advice to rulers and still serves that function. Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Machiavelli, Kautilya, and Ibn Khaldun, among others, aimed to give sound advice based on one or another theory. John Locke and the Baron de Montesquieu deeply influenced the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Political science has always entwined theoretical abstractions with applied reasoning. You may not become a political scientist, but you should equip yourself with the knowledge to make calm, rational choices and protect yourself from being manipulated.

One of the great questions of our day, for example, is whether democracy can and should be exported. China, the Middle East, and many other areas could benefit from democratic governance, but is it practical to push democracy on them? One of the original aims of the 2003 Iraq War was to install a democratic regime that would then inspire others in the region. Iraq, totally unready for democracy, turned from a brutal dictatorship into brutal chaos.

Even the United States, after more than two centuries of trying to apply a democratic constitution, is far from perfect. Reforms are badly needed—but blocked at every turn—in taxation, voting fairness, election campaigning, powerful lobbies, economic policy, and the inefficiency and complexity of government programs. By examining such problems, students see that democracy is a constantly self-critical and self-correcting process moved by open discussion and the admission of mistakes. It is always a work in progress.

Political science instructors may take some joy in the uptick of student interest in politics, although we cannot be sure how deep and durable this interest may be. Impeachment, misuse of power, endless wars, spending cuts, and tax increases can provoke discussion. For some years, students were rather apolitical, a trend this book always tried to fight. *Political Science: An Introduction* seeks to blend scholarship and citizenship. It does not presume that freshmen taking an intro course will become professional political scientists. Naturally, we hope to pique their curiosity so that some will major in political science. This is neither a U.S. government text nor a comparative politics text. Instead, it draws examples from the United States and other lands to introduce the whole field of political science to new students. Fresh from high school, few students know much of their own

political system, much less of others, something we attempt to correct.

The fourteenth edition update continues our eclectic approach that avoids selling any single theory, conceptual framework, or paradigm as the key to political science. Attempts to impose a grand design are both unwarranted by the nature of the discipline and not conducive to broadening students' intellectual horizons. Instructors with a wide variety of viewpoints have no trouble using this text. Above all, the fourteenth edition still views politics as exciting and tries to communicate that to young people new to the discipline.

New to This Update

Instructor input, the rapid march of events, and the shift to digitalization brought some changes to the current edition:

- The rise of demagogic populism, in the United States and other lands, illustrates how easily democracy can be warped.
- The 2016 election raises anew the defects of the U.S. electoral system, where once again the majority vote lost.
- Foreign cyber-manipulation heightened Americans' divisions.
- The social media intrude into politics, not always to good effect.
- Party–voter alignments have partially inverted, with much of the white working class going right while many educated better-off voters go left. We debate whether the cause is economic or cultural.
- The 2016 election ushered in an increase in political participation by women.
- SCOTUS has been taken over by the Federalist Society.
- Paralysis and indecision grip many democracies.
- The Afghan war is now older than some of our soldiers fighting it, but we seem stuck there.
- The predicted triumph of liberal capitalism has not panned out.

As ever, I am open to all instructor comments, including those on the number, coverage, and ordering of chapters.

Features

The fourteenth edition merged old Chapters 1 and 2 (Theories) to give us 17 chapters, down from 21 a few years ago. This has received positive instructor feedback. We retain the introduction of methodologies early in an undergraduate's career. This does not mean high-level numbers-crunching—which I neither engage in nor advocate—but a reality-testing frame of mind that looks for empirical verifiability. Where you can, of course, use valid numbers. As an instructor, I often found myself explaining methodologies in the classroom in connection with student papers, so I decided to insert some basic methodologies in boxes. Each of these boxes makes one methodological point per chapter, covering thesis statements, references, quotations, tables, cross-tabulations, graphs, scattergrams, and other standard points, all at the introductory level. Instructors suggested that topics as important as "Key Concepts" should be integrated into the narrative, and I have done so. Boxes on Democracy, Theories, Classic Works, and Case Studies still highlight important political science ideas, provide real-world examples, and break up pages, making the text reader-friendly.

The text boldfaces important terms and defines them in running marginal glossaries throughout the chapters. As an instructor, I learned not to presume students understood the key terms of political science. The definitions are in the context under discussion; change that context and you may need another definition. There is a difference, for example, between the governing elites discussed in Chapter 5 (a tiny fraction of 1 percent of a population) and public-opinion elites discussed in Chapter 7 (probably several percent). Italicized terms signal students to look them up in the glossary at the book's end.

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- **Assessments** tied to primary chapter sections, as well as full chapter exams, allow instructors and students to track progress and get immediate feedback.
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POWERPOINT PRESENTATION Make lectures more enriching for students. The PowerPoint Presentation includes a full lecture outline and figures from the book and Revel edition. Available within Revel and on the IRC.

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My special thanks to Ted Rueter of the University of Maryland University College who pointed out several examples of unclear wording, now corrected. Jonathan Williamson of the University of Houston Honors College made many updates to this edition. Several people reviewed this and earlier editions, and I carefully considered their comments. For this edition, I wish to thank: Walton Brown-Foster, Central Connecticut State University; Maorong Jiang, Creighton University; Kimberly Turner, College of DuPage; Shari MacLachlan, Palm Beach State College; Robert Porter, Ventura College; Erin Richards, Cascadia Community College; Eric Royer, Saint Louis University; Christopher Sprecher, Allan Hancock College; John Sutherlin, University of Louisiana at Monroe; Ngozi Kamalu, Fayetteville State University; and Aaron Cooley, Johnston Community College. My thanks to Emily Edling for her careful work throughout the production process.

Are further changes needed in the book, or have I got it about right? Instructors' input on this matter—or indeed on anything else related to the text or supplementary materials—is highly valued. Instructors may contact me directly at maxxumizer@gmail.com.

Michael G. Roskin

Part I
The Bases of Politics

Ch. 1 Politics and Political Science Political scientists (and we hope you too) study politics like a medical scientist studies bacteria, never getting angry at a fact but trying to understand how and why something happens. Political science focuses on power—how A gets B to do what A wants. We do not confuse our partisan preferences with the scholarly study of politics. Theories provide the framework for understanding the politics we study. This objective, theory-driven approach of political scientists differs from the emphasis on the unique of historians and journalists and the normative questions (How *should* politics work?) of political theorists.

Ch. 2 Political Ideologies Ideologies are plans to improve society. The classic liberalism of Adam Smith and classic conservatism of Edmund Burke and their modern versions still try to explain how our world functions. Marx led to both modern social democracy and, through Lenin, to communism. Nationalism is one of the strongest ideologies, sometimes turning into fascism. Newer ideologies include neoconservatism, libertarianism, feminism, environmentalism, and Islamism. When we study ideologies, it doesn't mean we necessarily believe them.

Ch. 3 States Not all states are effective; many are weak, and some are failed. Aristotle's division of governments into legitimate and corrupt is still useful. Basic institutional choices can make or break a state. The territorial organization of states—unitary versus federal—and electoral systems—single-member versus proportional representation—are such basic choices. State intervention in the economy, or lack of it, may facilitate prosperity or stagnation.

Ch. 4 Constitutions and Rights These institutionalized documents formalize the basic structure of the state, limit government's powers, and define civil rights. Judicial review, the great U.S. contribution to governance, has over the years curbed sedition laws and expanded freedom of speech and freedom of press.

Ch. 5 Regimes Democracy is complex and must include accountability, competition, and alternation in power. In even the best democracies, elites have great influence, but pluralistic inputs often prevail. Totalitarianism is a disease of the twentieth century and has largely faded, but authoritarianism is rebounding. Democracy is not an automatic success but can fail in unprepared countries like Russia and Iraq.

Chapter 1
Politics and Political Science

Courtesy of Michael G. Roskin

Ancient Athens' Parthenon has come to symbolize democracy—and its decay.

Learning Objectives

1.1 Evaluate several explanations of political power.

1.2 Justify the claim that the study of politics may be considered a science.

1.3 Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of several theoretical approaches to political science.

1.4 Contrast normative theories of politics to political science.

Some say political science is impractical—interesting but not useful for much. Not so. One might compare political science to medical science. Both aim to be highly useful. Both combine many fields of knowledge to seek improvement in, respectively, human governance and individual health. Both advance in *paradigm shifts* when better empirical evidence overturns mistaken assumptions. Doctors did not understand that germs caused illness until the second half of the nineteenth century. Medical treatment, it has been estimated, started doing more good than harm only around 1913. In our day, foods denounced as unhealthy turn out to be harmless, and some medical recommendations turn out to be ineffective.

Likewise, political scientists optimistically proclaimed that the collapse of communism and Arab Spring signaled the spread of democracy, but many newly freed countries—such as Russia and Egypt—slid back into authoritarianism. Indeed, recently democracy has declined worldwide. We now see that democracy does not work everywhere and are more cautious about its inevitability. Like medical advances, political science learns from its mistakes, becoming better able to anticipate election outcomes, revolutions, extremism, and wars. Elected officials, of course, often ignore advice, just as smokers may ignore doctors' warnings to stop smoking. Often their phrasing is parallel: "If trend X continues, there is a strong chance that Y will result."

Political science began as practical advice and still serves that function. Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Machiavelli, Kautilya, and Ibn Khaldun, among others, gave rulers reasoned advice. John Locke and the Baron de Montesquieu deeply influenced the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Today's political scientists, now cited as much as economists, gather empirical evidence to build firm generalizations. You need not become a political scientist to find its methods useful in sorting out your political views and choices and protecting yourself from manipulation. Political science can help you think for yourself.

What Is Politics?

1.1 Evaluate several explanations of political power.

Politics brings to mind government and elections. Both are clearly political, but politics happens in many places, in the workplace, in families, and even in the classroom. Consider the class member who asks too many questions and keeps the class late. What happens? Either the professor cuts the student off, or his classmates express their disapproval to shape his behavior to achieve their goals. Either way, the person's behavior is shaped by the politics of the classroom.

Politics is the ongoing competition between people and groups to shape policy in their favor. To do so, they may seek to guide policy indirectly by shaping the beliefs and values of members of their society. Notice this definition can

encompass the politics of government, but it can also encompass the political dynamics in other contexts. While this text largely focuses on politics of governments, it is important to understand that politics is more fundamental than governments but occurs wherever humans seek power to shape policy or outcomes.

Political Power

As Renaissance Florentine philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) emphasized, ultimately politics is about power, specifically the power to shape others' behavior. Power in politics is getting people to do something they wouldn't otherwise do—and sometimes having them think it was their idea.

political power
Ability of one person to get another to do something he or she wouldn't otherwise do.

Some people dislike the concept of **political power**. It smacks of coercion, inequality, and occasionally brutality. Some speakers denounce "power politics," suggesting governance without power, a happy band of brothers and sisters regulating themselves through love and sharing. Communities formed on such a basis do not last; or, if they do last, it is only by transforming themselves into conventional structures of leaders and followers, buttressed by obedience patterns that look suspiciously like power. Human beings are naturally going to disagree about the best path forward. As James Madison (1751–1836) argued in *The Federalist Papers*, as long as men (and women) are imperfect in their ability to reason and are free to act on their beliefs, we will end up with differences of opinion. Leaders think: "If I can persuade someone I'm right, fine. But if not, I will need to resort to using power to get my way."

Political power is built into the human condition. But why do some people hold political power over others? There is no definitive explanation of political power. Biological, psychological, cultural, rational, and irrational explanations have been put forward.

BIOLOGICAL Aristotle said it first and perhaps best: "Man is by nature a political animal." (Aristotle's words were *zoon politikon*, which can be translated as either "political animal" or "social animal." In Greek city-states the *polis* was the same as society.) Aristotle meant that humans live naturally in herds, like elephants or bison. Biologically, they need each other for sustenance and survival. It is also natural that they array themselves into ranks of leaders and followers, like all herd animals. Taking a cue from Aristotle, modern biological explanations, some of them looking at primate behavior, say that forming a political system and obeying its leaders are innate, passed on with one's genes. Some thinkers argue that human politics shows the same *dominance hierarchies* that other mammals set up. Politicians tend to be alpha males—or think they are.

The advantage of the biological approach is its simplicity, but it raises a number of questions. If we grant that humans are naturally political, how do we explain the instances when political groups fall apart and people disobey authority? Perhaps we should modify the theory: Humans are imperfectly political (or social) animals. Most of the time, people form groups and obey authority but sometimes, under certain circumstances, they do not. This begs

the question of which circumstances promote or undermine the formation of political groups.

PSYCHOLOGICAL Psychological explanations of politics and obedience are related to biology. Both suggest that our human needs are derived from centuries of evolution of group formation. Psychologists have refined their views with empirical research. In the famous Milgram study, a "professor" tells unwitting subjects to administer progressively larger electric shocks to a victim. The "victim," strapped in a chair, is actually an actor who only pretends to suffer. Most of the subjects were willing to administer potentially lethal shocks simply because an authority figure in a white lab coat told them to. Most subjects disliked hurting the victim but rationalized that they were just following orders and that any harm done was really the professor's responsibility. They surrendered their actions to an authority figure.

Psychological studies also show that most people are naturally conformist. Group members tend to see things the group's way. Psychologist Irving Janis found that many foreign policy mistakes were made in a climate of *groupthink*, in which a leadership team tells itself that all is well and that the present policy is working. Groups ignore doubters who tell them, for instance, that the Japanese will attack Pearl Harbor in 1941 or that the 1961 Bay of Pigs landing of Cuban exiles will fail. Obedience to authority and groupthink suggest that humans have deep-seated needs—possibly innate—to fit into groups and their norms. Perhaps this is what makes human society possible, but it also makes possible horrors, such as the Nazi Holocaust and more recent massacres. Psychological explanations of power raise questions, such as why campaign professionals continue to use techniques proven not to work, like buying millions of dollars of television ads. Is it because that is what everybody else does?

CULTURAL How much of human behavior is learned as opposed to biologically inherited? This is the very old nature-versus-nurture debate. For much of the twentieth century, the cultural theorists—those who believe behavior is learned—dominated. Anthropologists concluded that all differences in behavior were cultural. Cooperative and peaceful societies raise their children that way, they argued. Political communities are formed and held together on the basis of cultural values transmitted by parents, schools, churches, and the mass media. Political science developed an interesting theoretical approach, political culture, whose researchers found that a country's political culture was formed by many long-term factors: religion, childrearing, land tenure, and economic development.

Cultural theorists forecast trouble when the political system gets out of touch with the cultural system, as when the shah of Iran attempted to modernize an Islamic society that did not like Western values and lifestyles. The Iranians threw the shah out in 1979 and celebrated the return of a medieval-style religious leader, who voiced the values favored by traditional Iranians. Many see cultural tribalism in current polarized U.S. politics. Republicans articulate the values of religion, family, and self-reliance, which are deeply ingrained into American **culture**.

culture
Human behavior that is learned as opposed to inherited.

Democrats argue for social responsibility and reducing inequality. The two tribes don't just disagree but claim the other's goals or policies to reach them will destroy the country.

The cultural approach to political life holds some optimism. If human behavior is learned, bad behavior can be unlearned and society improved. Educating young people to be tolerant, cooperative, and just will gradually change a society's culture for the better, according to this view. Changing culture, however, is slow and difficult, as the American occupiers of Iraq and Afghanistan discovered.

Culture contributes a lot to political behavior, but the theory has some difficulties. First, where does culture come from? History? Economics? Religion? Power? Second, if all behavior is cultural, various political systems should be as different from each other as their cultures. But, especially in the realm of politics, we see similar political attitudes and patterns in lands with very different cultures. We see corruption among politicians everywhere, regardless of culture.

rational
Based on the ability to reason and act on your understanding of your interest.

RATIONAL Another school of thought approaches politics as a **rational** thing; that is, people know what they want and need, and they have good reasons for doing what they do. Classic political theorists, such as Hobbes and Locke, held that humans form a *civil society* because their powers of reason tell them that it is much better than anarchy. To safeguard life and property, people form governments. If those governments become abusive, the people have the right to dissolve them and start anew. This Lockean notion greatly influenced the U.S. Founding Fathers.

The biological, psychological, and cultural schools downplay human reason, claiming that people are either born or conditioned to certain behavior and that individuals seldom think rationally. But what about cases in which people break away from group conformity and argue independently? How can we explain a change of mind? "I was for Jones until he came out with his terrible economic policy that could cost me my job, so now I'm voting for Smith." People make rational judgments like that all the time. A political system based on the presumption of human reason stands a better chance of governing justly and humanely. If leaders believe that people obey out of biological inheritance or cultural conditioning, they will think they can get away with all manner of deception and misrule. If, on the other hand, rulers fear that people are rational, they will respect the public's ability to discern wrongdoing. Accordingly, even if people are not completely rational, it is probably for the best if rulers think they are.

irrational
Based on the power of fear and myth to cloud reason.

IRRATIONAL Late in the nineteenth century, a group of thinkers expounded the view that people are basically **irrational**, especially when it comes to politics. They are emotional, dominated by myths and stereotypes, and politics is really the manipulation of symbols. A crowd is like a wild beast that can be whipped up by charismatic leaders to do their bidding. What people regard as rational is really myth; just keep feeding the people myths to control them. Mussolini, founder of fascism in Italy, and Hitler in Germany were both practitioners of this

school of thought. A soft-spoken Muslim fundamentalist, Osama bin Laden, got an irrational hold on thousands of fanatical followers by feeding them the myth that America was the enemy of Islam. Some argue that President Donald Trump's standard denunciation of "fake news" falls in this category.

There may be much truth to the irrational view of human political behavior, but it has catastrophic consequences. Leaders who use irrationalist techniques start believing their own propaganda and lead their nations to war, economic ruin, or tyranny. Irrationalism exists to some degree even in the most advanced societies, where much of politics consists of leaders striking heroic poses before screaming crowds.

Power as a Composite

There are elements of truth in all these explanations of political power. At different times in different situations, any one of them can explain power. Tom Paine's pamphlet *Common Sense* rationally explained why America should separate from Britain. The drafters of both the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were imbued with the rationalism of their age. Following the philosophers then popular, they framed their arguments as if human political activity were as logical as Newtonian physics. Historian Henry Steele Commager referred to the Constitution as "the crown jewel of the Enlightenment," the culmination of an age of reason.

But how truly rational were they? By the late eighteenth century, the 13 American colonies had grown culturally separate from Britain. People thought of themselves as Americans rather than as English colonists. They increasingly read American newspapers and communicated among themselves rather than with Britain. Perhaps the separation was more cultural than rational.

Nor can we forget the psychological and irrational factors. Samuel Adams was a gifted firebrand, Thomas Jefferson a powerful writer, and George Washington a charismatic general. "Give me liberty or give me death" and

Classic Works

Concepts and Percepts

The great Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote in the late eighteenth century, "Percepts without concepts are empty, and concepts without percepts are blind." This notion helped establish modern philosophy and social science. A *percept* is what you perceive through your sensory organs: facts, images, numbers, examples, and so on. A *concept* is an idea in your head: meanings, theories, hypotheses, beliefs, and so on. You can collect many percepts, but without a concept to structure them you have nothing; your percepts have no meaning. On the other hand, your concepts are blind if they cannot look at reality, which requires percepts. In other words, you need both theory and data.

"Together we stand, divided we fall" are powerful imagery. The American break with Britain and the founding of a new order were complex mixtures of all these factors. Such complex mixtures of factors go into any political system. To be sure, at times one factor seems more important than others, but we cannot exactly determine the weight to give any one factor. And notice how the various factors blend into one another. The biological factors lead to the psychological, which in turn lead to the cultural, the rational, and the irrational, forming a seamless web.

One common mistake about political power is viewing it as a finite, measurable quantity. Power is a connection among people, the ability of one person to get others to do his or her bidding. Political power does not come in jars and isn't measured in megawatts. Revolutionaries in some lands speak of "seizing power," as if they could sneak in and grab it at night. The Afghan Taliban seized power in 1995–1996, but they were a minority of the Afghan population. Many Afghans hated and fought them. Revolutionaries think they automatically gain **legitimacy** and authority when they seize power—they do not. Power is earned, not seized.

legitimacy
Mass feeling that the government's rule is rightful and should be obeyed.

Is power identical to politics? Power-mad people (including many politicians) see the two as the same, but this is an oversimplification. We might see politics as a combination of goals or policies plus the power necessary to achieve them. Power, in this view, is a prime ingredient of politics. It would be difficult to imagine a political system without political power. Even a religious figure who ruled on the basis of love would be exercising power over followers. It might be nice power, but it would still be power. Power, then, is a sort of enabling device to carry out or implement policies and decisions. You can have praiseworthy goals, but unless you have the power to implement them, they remain wishful thoughts.

Others see the essence of politics as a struggle for power, a sort of gigantic game in which power is the goal. What, for example, are elections all about? The getting of power. There is a danger here, however: If power becomes the only goal of politics, devoid of other purposes, it becomes cynical, brutal, and self-destructive. The Hitler regime destroyed itself in the worship of power. Obsessed with retaining presidential power, President Richard Nixon ruined his own administration. As nineteenth-century British historian and philosopher Lord Acton put it, "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." Some argue that the current American political system is focused too much on winning (or causing the other side to lose) elections so that votes in Congress are designed to embarrass the other party rather than to solve problems.

What Is Political Science?

1.2 Justify the claim that the study of politics may be considered a science.

Political science ain't politics but the methods of how to study politics. It is not training to become a practicing politician. Political science is training in the calm,

objective analysis of politics, which may or may not aid working politicians. The two professions compare like this:

Politicians	Political Scientists
Love power	Are skeptical of power
Seek popularity	Seek accuracy
Think practically	Think abstractly
Hold firm views	Reach tentative conclusions
Offer single causes	Offer many causes
See short-term payoffs	See long-term consequences
Plan for next election	Plan for next publication
Respond to groups	Seek the good of the whole
Seek name recognition	Seek professional prestige

Many find politics distasteful, and perhaps they are right. Politics may be inherently immoral or, at any rate, amoral. Misuse of power, influence peddling, and outright corruption are prominent in politics. But you need not like the thing you study. Medical professionals may study a disease-causing bacterium under a microscope. They do not like the bacterium but are interested in how it grows, how it does its damage, and how it may be controlled. Neither do they get angry at the bacterium and smash the glass slide. Medical professionals first understand the forces of nature and then work with them to improve a patient's health.

Classic Thought

Never Get Angry at a Fact

This basic point of all serious study sounds commonsensical but is often ignored, even in college courses. It traces back to the extremely complex thought of German philosopher Georg Hegel (1770–1831), who argued that things happen not randomly or accidentally but for good and sufficient reasons: "Whatever is real is rational." This means that nothing is completely accidental and that if we apply reason, we will understand why something happens. We study politics in a naturalistic mode, not getting angry at what we see but trying to understand how it came to be.

For example, we hear of a politician who took money from a favor-seeker. As political scientists, we push our anger to the side and ask questions like: Do most politicians in that country take money? Is it an old tradition and part of the culture? Do people even expect politicians to take money? How big are campaign expenses? Can the politician possibly run for office without taking money? In short, we see if extralegal exchanges of cash are part of the political system. We seek to understand the causes and the consequences of such corruption. From the perspective of a political scientist, it makes no sense to get angry at an individual politician. If we dislike it, we may then consider how the system might be reformed to discourage the taking of money on the side. And reforms may not work. Japan reformed its electoral laws in an attempt to stamp out its traditional "money politics," but little changed. Like bacteria, some things in politics have lives of their own. It does help, however, to have the political scientist's understanding of *what*, *why*, and *how* before we try to make changes to something we don't like.

Political scientists try to do the same with politics. The two professions of politician and political scientist bear approximately the same relation to each other as do bacteria and bacteriologists.

The Master Science

discipline
Field of study, often represented by an academic department or major.

Aristotle, the founder of the **discipline**, called politics "the master science." He meant that almost everything happens in a political context, that the decisions of the *polis* (the Greek city-state and root of our words *polite*, *police*, and *politics*) governed most other things. Politics, in the words of Yale's Harold Lasswell (1902–1978), is the study of "who gets what." But, some object, the economic system determines who gets what in countries with free markets. True, but should we have a totally free-market economy with no government involved? A decision to bail out shaky banks sparked angry controversy over this point. Few loved the bankers, but economists say it had to be done to save the economy from collapse. Politics is intimately connected to economics.

Suppose a natural calamity strikes, like a pandemic. The political system decides when and how to react with testing, isolating, cures, and bolstering the economy. The disaster is natural, but its impact on society is controlled in large part by politics. How about science, our bacteriologists squinting through microscopes? That is not political. But who funds the scientists' education and their research institutes? It could be private charity (the donors of which get tax breaks), but the government plays a major role. When the U.S. government decided that AIDS research deserved top priority, funding for other programs was cut. Bacteria and viruses may be natural, but studying them is often quite political. In this case, competition for funding pitted gays against women concerned with breast cancer. Who gets what: funding to find a cure for AIDS or for breast cancer? The choice is political.

Can Politics Be Studied as a Science?

Students new to science often assume it implies a certain subject for study. But science is a way to study nearly any subject. It is the method, not the subject. The original meaning of science, from the French, is simply "knowledge." Later, the natural sciences, which rely on measurement and calculation, took over the term. Now most people think of science as precise and factual, supported by experiments and data. Many political scientists also **quantify** data to validate **hypotheses**. The quantifiers generally focus on areas that can be quantified: public opinion, elections, budgets, demographics, congressional voting, and much else. The science of any topic, including politics and biology, is usually done in small steps. Over time, individual scientific studies add up to our overall knowledge.

quantify
Measuring with numbers.

hypothesis
Initial theory a researcher starts with, to be proved by evidence.

Some areas are hard to support with numbers. How and why do leaders make their decisions? Many decisions are made in secrecy, even in democracies.

Political scientists use interviews and memoirs to learn how decisions were made in the White House in Washington, the Elysée in Paris, or the Zhongnanhai in Beijing. Bismarck, who unified Germany in the nineteenth century, famously compared laws with sausages: It's better not to see how they are made.

Does that mean that politics can never be like a natural science? Political science is an **empirical** discipline that accumulates both quantified and qualitative data. With such data we can find persistent patterns, much like in biology. Gradually, we begin to generalize. When the generalizations become firmer, we call them theories. In a few cases, the theories become so firm that we may call them laws. In this way, the study of politics accumulates knowledge, the original meaning of science.

empirical
Based on observable evidence.

The Struggle to See Clearly

Political science also resembles a natural science when its researchers, if they are professional, study things as they are and not as they wish them to be. This is more difficult in the study of politics than in the study of stars and cells. Most political scientists have viewpoints on current issues, and it is easy to let these views contaminate their analyses of politics. Indeed, precisely because a given question interests us enough to study it indicates that we bring a certain passion with us. Can you imagine setting to work on a topic you cared nothing about? If you are interested enough to study a question, you probably start inclined to one side. Too much of this, however, renders the study biased; it becomes a partisan outcry rather than a scholarly search for the truth. How can you guard against this? The discipline's professional journals review articles for **scholarship**, namely, work that is *reasoned*, *balanced*, supported with *evidence*, and *theoretical*.

scholarship
Intellectual arguments supported by reason and evidence.

REASONED You must spell out your reasoning, and it should make sense. If your perspective is colored by an underlying assumption, you should say so. You might say, "For the purpose of this study, we assume that bureaucrats are rational," or "This is a study of the psychology of voters in a small town." Your basic assumptions influence what you study and how you study it, but you can minimize bias by honestly stating your assumptions. German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), who contributed vastly to all the social sciences, held that any findings that support the researcher's political views must be discarded as biased. Few attempt to be that pure, but Weber's point is well taken: Beware of structuring the study so that it comes out to support your original view, what is called *confirmation bias*.

BALANCED You can also minimize bias by acknowledging other ways of looking at your topic. You should mention the various approaches to your topic and what other researchers have found. Instructors are impressed that you know the literature in a given area. They are even more impressed when you can then criticize the previous studies and explain why you think they are incomplete or faulty: "The Jones study of voters found them largely apathetic, but this was an off-year

election in which turnout is always lower." By comparing and criticizing several approaches and studies, you present a much more objective and convincing case. Do not commit yourself to a particular viewpoint or theory but admit that your view is one among several. Don't be tempted to present other approaches as "straw men," is weak and easily beaten arguments. If your approach is convincing, it has to beat out the best, not the weakest, alternatives.

SUPPORTED WITH EVIDENCE All scholarly studies require evidence, ranging from the quantified evidence of the natural sciences to the qualitative evidence of the humanities. Political science utilizes both. Ideally, any statement open to interpretation or controversy should be supported with evidence. Common knowledge does not have to be supported; you need not cite the U.S. Constitution to prove that presidents serve four-year terms.

But if you say presidents have gained power over the decades, you need evidence. At a minimum, you would cite a scholar who has amassed evidence to demonstrate this point. That is called a *secondary source*, evidence that has passed through the mind of someone else. Most student papers use only secondary sources, but instructors are impressed when you use a *primary source*, the original gathering of data, as in your own tabulation of what counties in your state showed the strongest Trump vote. Anyone reading a study must be able to review its evidence and judge if it is valid. You cannot keep your evidence or sources secret. Why? First, you don't want to be accused of plagiarism. Second, and equally important, is that ideas build upon each other so you want to demonstrate who laid the foundation for your ideas.

THEORETICAL Serious scholarship is always connected to a theoretical point. It need not be a sweeping new theory, but it should advance the discipline's knowledge a bit. At a minimum, it should confirm or refute an existing theory. Just describing something is not a theory, which is why Google or Wikipedia are seldom enough. You must relate the description to some factor or factors, supported, of course, with empirical evidence. The general pattern of this is: "Most of the time there is C there is also D, and here's probably why." Theory building also helps lift your study above polemics, an argument for or against something. Denouncing the Islamic State (IS), which amply merits denunciation, is not scholarship. Determining why people join IS (studied by several scholars) has important theoretical and practical impacts. That is the difference between description and explanation.

What Good Is Political Science?

Political science is not just opinions. Pursuing the preceding points keeps it out of the just-opinions category. Yes, we all have political views, but if we let them dominate our study we get invalid results. Professional political scientists push their personal views well to one side while engaged in study and research. First-rate thinkers are able to come up with results that actually refute their previously

held opinion. When that happens, we have real intellectual growth, an exciting experience that should be your aim.

Something else comes with such an experience: You start to conclude that you should not have been so partisan in the first place. You may back away from the strong views you held earlier. You may see the world as shades of gray, rather than black and white. Accordingly, political science is not necessarily training to become a practicing politician, where explanations generally need to be clear and definitive. Political science is training in objective and often complex analysis, whereas the practice of politics requires fixed, popular, and simplified opinions.

Political science can contribute to good government, often by warning those in office that all is not well, "speaking Truth to Power," as the Quakers say. Sometimes this advice is useful to working politicians. Public-opinion polls, for example, showed an erosion of trust in government in the United States starting in the mid-1960s. The causes were Vietnam, Watergate, and inflation. Candidates for political office, knowing public opinion, could tailor their campaigns and policies to try to counteract this decline. Ronald Reagan, with his sunny disposition and upbeat views, utilized the discontent to win two presidential terms.

Some political scientists warned for years of the weak basis of the shah's regime in Iran. Unfortunately, such warnings went unheeded. Washington's policy was to support the shah, and only two months before the end of his rule did the U.S. embassy in Tehran start reporting how unstable Iran had become. State Department officials had let politics contaminate their political analyses; they could not see clearly. Journalists were not much better; few covered Iran until violence broke out. Years in advance, American political scientists specializing in Iran saw trouble coming. More recently, political scientists warned that Iraq was unready for democracy and that a U.S. invasion would unleash chaos, but Washington deciders paid no attention. Political science can be useful.

The Subfields of Political Science

Most political science departments divide the discipline into several subfields. The bigger the department, the more subfields it likely has. We will get at least a brief introduction to all of them in this text.

- *U.S. Politics* focuses on institutions and processes, mostly at the federal level but some at state and local levels. It includes parties, elections, public opinion, and executive and legislative behavior. Sometimes the study of the legal system—the Constitution, laws, and courts—falls under this subfield; sometimes it is separate.
- *Comparative Politics* examines politics within other nations, trying to establish generalizations about institutions and political culture and theories of democracy, stability, and policy. It may be focused on various regions, as in "Latin American politics" or "East Asian politics," or on themes, as in democratization or civil conflict.

- *International Relations* studies politics among nations, including conflict, diplomacy, international law and organizations, and international political economy. The study of U.S. foreign policy has one foot in U.S. politics and one in international relations.
- *Political Theory*, both classic and modern, attempts to define the good polity, often focused on major thinkers.
- *Public Administration* studies how bureaucracies work and how they can be improved.
- *Public Policy* studies the interface of politics and economics with an eye to developing effective programs.

Comparing Political Science to History and Journalism

Political science is distinct from history and journalism. They have different goals but share common features. History studies the past, and not all history focuses on politics. Journalism covers the present, and only some news stories are on politics. What makes them different from political science is that they share a focus on unique events. When a historian studies the French Revolution, she wants to tell the story of the people, the places, and the events to better understand what happened and put forward a thesis about why it happened. She is not interested in comparing the French to the American Revolution, as those are distinct, unique events that one should study separately. Similarly, journalists reporting a war describe events as they unfold. They interview people affected by the conflict and chronicle a battle to explain why it was a turning point.

Instead of focusing on one revolution, a political scientist might compare several revolutions to discover what links them together. What factors cause revolutions? Why do they sometimes succeed but often fail? What are the consequences of revolution? Similarly, a political scientist would not write about today's battle or interview a war refugee but might be interested in what causes wars generally or why some small conflicts result in major wars and others do not. Under what circumstances do civil conflicts lead to genocide? What forms of aid are most successful when wars create large numbers of international refugees?

generalize
Explaining the causes and consequences of a whole class of events.

Whereas historians or journalists often seek to explain the unique circumstances of a particular event, political scientists seek to **generalize**. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions that will lead to revolution, to war, or to other political outcomes? If decapitating the aristocracy happened only in the French Revolution, then a political scientist would dismiss it as not explaining revolution, whereas a historian might be very interested in guillotines. If a refugee fled war, the journalist might tell her story. A political scientist would focus on how a new strategy for the international response to a refugee crisis led to a 50 percent increase in the number of refugees helped compared to the old strategy.

Political science ignores things that might appear important in one context but are irrelevant beyond that context. Instead, it can focus on the few factors that exist across similar contexts. Did a politician win an election because he ran a negative ad about his opponent or because he spent $10 million to say so? Studying one campaign would not yield a definitive answer. Studying many campaigns could discover which was more important—negative advertising or campaign spending.

Theory in Political Science

1.3 Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of several theoretical approaches to political science.

Schools in the United States typically ask students to accumulate knowledge—to know more stuff. Critics point out that knowledge is more than just accumulating facts because the facts will not structure themselves into a coherent whole. Gathering facts without an organizing principle leads only to large collections of meaningless facts, the point made by Kant. In science, theories provide structure that give meaning to patterns of facts. To be sure, theories can grow too complex and abstract and depart from the real world, but without at least some theoretical perspective, we do not even know what questions to ask. Even if you say you have no theories, you probably have some unspoken ones. The kinds of questions you ask and which ones you ask first are the beginnings of theorizing.

Theories are not facts. They are suggestions as to how the facts should be organized. Some theories have more evidence to support them than others. All theories bump into facts that contradict their explanations. Even in the natural sciences, theories such as the so-called Big Bang explain only some observations. The question is, do any other theories explain more? Theories often compete with other theories. How can you know which model is more nearly correct? Political scientists—really all scientists—test theories with observations of the world and adjust theories to better reflect what they see. The accumulation of knowledge through science is nearly always a slow incremental process. The following sections outline several theoretical frameworks political scientists have used to understand the political world.

Behavioralism

From the late nineteenth century through the middle of the twentieth century, American thinkers focused on **institutions**, the formal structures of government. By studying the documents that establish the creation of government institutions, they felt they could understand those institutions. Constitutions were a favorite subject for political scientists of this period, for they assumed that what was on paper was how the institutions worked in practice. The rise of the Soviet, Italian, and German dictatorships shook this belief. The constitution of Germany's

institutions
Formal structures of government, such as the U.S. Congress.

Weimar Republic (1919–1933) looked fine on paper; experts had drafted it. Under stress it collapsed, for Germans of that time did not have the necessary experience with or commitment to democracy. Likewise, the Stalin constitution of 1936 made the Soviet Union look like a perfect democracy, but it functioned as a brutal dictatorship.

The Communist and Fascist dictatorships and World War II forced political scientists to reexamine their institutional focus, and many set out to discover how politics really worked, not how it was supposed to work. Postwar American political scientists here followed in the tradition of the early nineteenth-century French philosopher Auguste Comte, who developed the doctrine of **positivism**, the application of natural-science methods to the study of society. Comtean positivism was an optimistic philosophy, holding that as we accumulate valid data by means of scientific observation—without speculation or intuition—we will perfect a science of society and with it improve society. Psychologists are perhaps the most deeply imbued with this approach. **Behavioralists**, as they are called, claim to concentrate on actual behavior as opposed to thoughts or feelings.

positivism
Theory that society can be studied scientifically and incrementally improved with the knowledge gained.

behavioralism
Empirical study of actual human behavior rather than abstract or speculative theories.

Beginning in the 1950s, behaviorally inclined political scientists accumulated statistics from elections, public-opinion surveys, votes in legislatures, and much else. Behavioralists made some remarkable contributions to political science, shooting down some long-held but unexamined assumptions and giving political theory an empirical basis. Behavioral studies were especially good in examining the "social bases" of politics, the attitudes and values of citizens, which go a long way toward making the system function the way it does. Their best work has been on voting patterns, for it is here they can get lots of valid data.

By the 1960s, the behavioral school established itself and won over much of the field. In the late 1960s, however, behavioralism came under heavy attack, and not just by rear-guard traditionalists. Many younger political scientists, some of them influenced by the radicalism of the 1960s, complained that the behavioral approach was static, conservative, loaded with its practitioners' values, and irrelevant to the urgent tasks at hand. Far from being scientific and value-free, behavioralists often defined the current situation in the United States as the norm and anything different as deviant. Gabriel Almond (1911–2002) and Sidney Verba (1932–2019) found that Americans embody all the good, "participant" virtues of the "civic culture." By examining only what exists at a given moment, behavioralists neglect the possibility of change; their studies may be time-bound. Behavioralists have an unstated preference for the status quo; they like to examine established democratic systems, for that is where their methodological tools work best. People in police states or civil conflicts know that stating their opinions honestly could get them jailed or killed, so they voice only acceptable views.

Perhaps the most damaging criticism, though, was that the behavioralists focused on relatively minor topics and steered clear of the big questions of politics. Behavioralists can tell us, for example, what percentage of Detroit blue-collar Catholics vote Democratic, but they tell us nothing about what this means for the quality of Detroit's governance or the kinds of decisions elected

officials will make. There is no necessary connection between how citizens vote and what comes out of government. Critics charged that behavioral studies were often irrelevant.

By 1969, many political scientists had to admit that there was something to the criticism of what had earlier been called the *behavioral revolution*. Some called the newer movement **postbehavioral**, a synthesis of traditional and behavioral approaches. Postbehavioralists recognize that facts and values are tied together. They are willing to use both the qualitative data of the traditionalists and the quantitative data of the behavioralists. They look at history and institutions as well as public opinion and rational-choice theory. They are not afraid of numbers and happily use statistics, graphs, and percentages to make their cases. If you look around your political science department, you are apt to find traditional, behavioral, and postbehavioral viewpoints among the professors—or even within the same professor.

postbehavioral
Synthesis of traditional, behavioral, and other techniques in the study of politics.

New Institutionalism

In the 1970s, political science partially pulled away from behavioralism and rediscovered institutions. In the 1980s, this was proclaimed as the "New Institutionalism." Its crux is that government structures—legislatures, parties, bureaucracies, and so on—take on lives of their own and shape the behavior and attitudes of the people who live within and benefit from them. Institutions are not simply the reflections of social forces. Legislators, for example, behave as they do largely because of rules laid down long ago and reinforced over the decades.

Once you know these complex rules, some unwritten, you can see how politicians logically try to maximize their advantage under them, much as you can often predict when a baseball batter will bunt. It is not a mystery but the logic of the game they are playing. The preservation and enhancement of the institution becomes one of politicians' major goals. Thus, institutions, even if outmoded or ineffective, tend to rumble on. The Communist parties of the Soviet bloc were corrupt and ineffective, but they endured because they guaranteed the jobs and perquisites of their members. New Institutionalism, then, studies how institutions shape behavior just as much as how behavior shapes institutions.

Systems Theory

A major postwar invention was the "political systems" model devised by David Easton (1917–2014), which contributed to our understanding of politics by simplifying reality but in some cases departed from reality. The idea of looking at complex entities as systems originated in biology. Living organisms are complex and highly integrated. The heart, lungs, blood, digestive tract, and brain perform their functions in such a way as to keep the animal alive. Take away one organ, and the animal dies. Damage one organ and the other components of the system alter their function to compensate and keep the animal alive. The crux of systems thinking is this: You cannot change just one component because that changes all of the others.

Figure 1.1 A Model of the Political System.

SOURCE: Adapted from David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 32.



Political systems thinkers argued that the politics of a given country works as a feedback loop, like a biological system. According to the Easton model (Figure 1.1), citizens' demands, "inputs," are recognized by government decision makers, who process them into authoritative decisions and actions, "outputs." These outputs impact the social, economic, and political environment that the citizens may or may not like. Citizens express their demands anew—this is the crucial "feedback" link of the system—which may modify the earlier decision. Precisely what goes on in the "conversion process" was left opaque, a black box.

In some cases, the political systems approach fits reality. As the Vietnam War dragged on, feedback on the military draft turned negative. The Nixon administration attempted to defuse youthful anger by ending the draft in 1973 and changing to an all-volunteer army. In the 1980s, the socialist economics of French President François Mitterrand produced inflation and unemployment. The French people, especially the business community, complained loudly, and Mitterrand altered his policy back to capitalism. In these cases, the feedback loop worked. Feedback can also be split. Over a third of Americans liked and supported President Trump's arguments about issues like immigration and trade, but a majority did not. The resulting split appeared in the results of subsequent elections.

But in other cases, the systems model falls flat. Would Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia really fit the systems model? How much attention do dictatorships pay to citizens' demands? To be sure, there is always some input and feedback. Hitler's generals tried to assassinate him—a type of feedback. Workers in Communist systems had an impact on government policy by not working much. They demanded more consumer goods and, by not exerting themselves, communicated this desire to the regime. Sooner or later the regime had to reform. All over the Soviet bloc, workers used to chuckle: "They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work." In the USSR, (botched) reform came with the Gorbachev regime, and it led to system collapse.

How could the systems model explain the Vietnam War? Did Americans demand that the administration send troops to fight there? No, nearly the opposite: Lyndon Johnson won overwhelmingly in 1964 on an antiwar platform. The systems model does show how discontent with the war ruined Johnson's popularity so that he did not seek reelection in 1968. The feedback loop did go into effect but only years after the decision for war had been made. Could the systems model explain the Watergate scandal? Did U.S. citizens demand that President Nixon have the Democratic headquarters bugged? No, but once details about the cover-up started leaking in 1973, the feedback loop went into effect, putting pressure on the House of Representatives to form an impeachment panel.

Plainly, there are some problems with the systems model, and they seem to be in the "black box" of the conversion process. Much happens in the mechanism of government that is not initiated by and has little to do with the wishes of citizens. The American people largely ignored the health effects of smoking. Only the analyses of medical statisticians, which revealed a strong link between smoking and lung cancer, prodded Congress into requiring warning labels on cigarette packs and ending advertising of cigarettes. It was a handful of specialists in the federal bureaucracy who got the anticigarette campaign going, not the masses of citizens.

Systems models are generally static, biased toward the status quo and unable to handle upheaval. This is one reason political scientists were surprised at the collapse of the Soviet Union. Systems are not supposed to collapse; they are supposed to continually self-correct.

We can modify the systems model to better reflect reality. By diagramming it as in Figure 1.2, we logically change little. We have the same feedback loop: outputs turning into inputs. But by putting the "conversion process" of government first, we suggested that it—rather than the citizenry—originates most decisions. The public reacts only later. That would be the case with the Afghanistan War: strong support in 2001 but fed up years later.

Next, we add something that Easton himself later suggested. Inside the black box, more happens than simply the processing of outside demands. Pressures from the various parts of government—stakeholders within the government

Figure 1.2 A Modified Model of the Political System.

SOURCE: Adapted from David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 32.



Theories

Models: Simplifying Reality

A model is a simplified picture of reality that social scientists develop to order data, to theorize, and to predict. A good model fits reality but simplifies it because a model as complex as the real world would be of no help. In simplifying reality, however, models risk oversimplifying. The problem is the finite capacity of the human mind. We cannot factor in all the information available at once; we must select which points are important and ignore the rest. But when we do this, we may drain the blood out of the study of politics and overlook key points. Accordingly, as we encounter models of politics—and perhaps as we devise our own—pause a moment to ask if the model departs too much from reality. If it does, discard or alter the model. Do not disregard reality because it does not fit the model.

short-circuiting the feedback loop—are what Easton called "withinputs." These two alterations, of course, make our model more complicated, but this reflects the complicated nature of reality.

Rational-Choice Theory

In the 1970s, a new approach, invented by mathematicians during World War II, rapidly grew in political science—rational-choice theory. Rational-choice theorists argue that one can generally predict political behavior by knowing the interests of the actors involved because they rationally maximize their interests. As U.S. presidential candidates take positions on issues, they calculate what will give them the best payoff. They might think, "Many people oppose the war in Afghanistan, but many also demand strong leadership on defense. I'd better just criticize 'mistakes' in Afghanistan while at the same time demand strong 'national security.'" The waffle is not indecision but calculation, argue rational-choice theorists.

Rational-choice theorists enrage some other political scientists. One study of Japanese bureaucrats claimed you need not study Japan's language, culture, or history. All you needed to know was what the bureaucrats' career advantages were to predict how they would decide issues. A noted U.S. specialist on Japan blew his stack at such glib, superficial shortcuts and denounced rational-choice theory. More modest rational-choice theorists immersed themselves in Hungary's language and culture but still concluded that Hungarian political parties, in cobbling together an extremely complex voting system, were making rational choices to give themselves a presumed edge in parliamentary seats. Again, we return to the issue of models; how does the model simplify the real world and what does the model explain? If it explains a lot, leaving out important but irrelevant details can be forgiven.

Many rational-choice theorists backed down from their know-it-all positions. Some now call themselves "neoinstitutionalists" (see the above section) because all their rational choices are made within one or another institutional context—the

U.S. Congress, for example. Rational-choice theory did not establish itself as the dominant **paradigm**—no theory has, and none is likely to—but it contributed a lot by reminding us that politicians are consummate opportunists, a point many other theories forget.

paradigm
Model or way of doing research accepted by a discipline.

Some rational-choice theorists subscribed to a branch of mathematics called game theory, setting up political decisions as if they were table games. A Cuban missile crisis "game" might have several people play President John F. Kennedy, who must weigh the probable payoffs of bombing or not bombing Cuba. Others might play Soviet chief Nikita Khrushchev, who has to weigh toughing it out or backing down. Seeing how the players interact gives us insights and warnings of what can go wrong in crisis decision making. If you "game out" the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and find that three games out of 10 end in World War III, you have the makings of an article of great interest.

Game theorists argue that constructing the proper game explains why policy outcomes are often unforeseen but not accidental. Games can show how decision makers think. We learn how their choices are never easy or simple. Games can even be mathematized and fed into computers. The great weakness of game theory is that it depends on correctly estimating the payoffs that decision makers can expect, and these are only approximations arrived at by examining the historical record. We know how the Cuban missile crisis came out; therefore, we adjust our game so it comes out the same way. In effect, game theory is only another way to systematize and clarify history (not a bad thing).

All these theories and several others offer interesting insights. None, however, is likely to be the last model we shall see, for we will never have a paradigm that can consistently explain and predict political actions. Every couple of decades, political science comes up with a new paradigm—usually one borrowed from another discipline—that attracts much excitement and attention. Its proponents exaggerate its ability to explain or predict. Upon examination and criticism, the model usually fades and is replaced by another. Political science, like most areas of thought, tends to get caught up in trends. After a few iterations of this cycle, we learn to expect no breakthrough theories. Instead of a crisp, right answer that will endure for all time, we open our minds to the richness, complexity, and drama of political life.

"Political Theory" versus Theory in Political Science

1.4 Contrast normative theories of politics to political science.

Departments of political science usually house both political scientists and political theorists. Their differences are not obvious to most students. Political scientists study politics by trying to understand how things *do* work, whereas political theorists approach the study of politics from the perspective of how things *should* work.

The Normative Study of Politics

Some say Plato founded political science. But his *Republic* described an ideal *polis*, a normative approach rather than the objective approach of political science, which seeks to understand how things do work. Plato's student, Aristotle, on the other hand, was the first *empirical* political scientist and sent out his students to gather data from the dozens of Greek city-states. With these data, he constructed his great work *Politics*, which combined both **descriptive** and **normative** approaches. Aristotle used the collected facts to prescribe the most desirable political institutions. Political science in its purest form describes and explains, but it is hard to resist applying what is learned to normative questions and prescribing changes. Both Plato and Aristotle saw Athens in decline; they attempted to understand why and to suggest how it could be avoided. They thus began a tradition that is still at the heart of political science: a search for the sources of a good, stable political system.

descriptive
Explaining what is.

normative
Explaining what ought to be.

Most European medieval and Renaissance political thinkers took a religious approach to the study of government and politics. They were almost strictly normative, seeking to discover the "ought" or "should," and were often rather casual about the "is," the real-world situation. Informed by religious, legal, and philosophical values, they tried to ascertain which system of government would bring humankind closest to what God wished.

By comparison, Machiavelli introduced what some believe to be the crux of modern political science: the focus on power. His great work *The Prince* was about the getting and using of political power. Machiavelli was a **realist** who argued that to accomplish anything good—such as the unification of Italy and expulsion of the foreigners who ruined it—the Prince had to be rational and tough in the exercise of power.

realism
Working with the world as it is and not as we wish it to be; usually focused on power.

Although long depreciated by American political thinkers, who sometimes shied away from "power" as inherently dirty, the approach took root in Europe and contributed to the elite analyses of Mosca, Pareto, and Michels. Americans became acquainted with the power approach through the writings of the refugee German scholar of international relations Hans J. Morgenthau, who emphasized that "all politics is a struggle for power."

The Contractualists

Not long after Machiavelli, the *contractualists*—Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau—analyzed why political systems should exist at all. They differed in many points but agreed that humans, at least in principle, had joined in what Rousseau called a **social contract** that everyone now had to observe.

social contract
Theory that individuals join and stay in civil society as if they had signed a contract.

state of nature
Humans before civilization.

civil society
Humans after becoming civilized. Modern usage: associations between family and government.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) imagined that life in "the **state of nature**," before **civil society** was founded, must have been terrible. Every man would have been the enemy of every other man, a "war of each against all." Humans would live in savage squalor with "no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor,

nasty, brutish, and short." To get out of this horror, people would—out of their profound self-interest—rationally join together to form civil society. Society thus arises naturally out of fear. People would also gladly submit to a king, even a bad one, for a monarch prevents anarchy.

John Locke (1632–1704) came to less harsh conclusions. Locke theorized that the original state of nature was not so bad; people lived in equality and tolerance with one another. But they could not secure their property. There was no money, title deeds, or courts of law, so ownership was uncertain. To remedy this, they contractually formed civil society and thus secured "life, liberty, and property." Locke is to property rights as Hobbes is to fear of violent death. Some philosophers argue that Americans are the children of Locke. Notice the American emphasis on "the natural right to property."

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1788) laid the philosophical groundwork for the French Revolution. In contrast to Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau theorized that life in the state of nature was downright good; people lived as "noble savages" without artifice or jealousy. (All the contractualists were influenced by not-very-accurate descriptions of Native Americans.) What corrupted humans, said Rousseau, was society itself. The famous words at the beginning of his *Social Contract*: "Man is born free but everywhere is in chains."

But society can be drastically improved, argued Rousseau, leading to human freedom. A just society would be a voluntary community with a will of its own, the **general will**—what everyone wants over and above the selfish "particular wills" of individuals and interest groups. In such communities, humans gain dignity and freedom. If people are bad, it is because society made them that way (a view held by many today). A good society, on the other hand, can "force men to be free" if they misbehave. Many see the roots of totalitarianism in Rousseau: the imagined perfect society; the general will, which the dictator claims to know; and the breaking of those who do not cooperate.

general will
Rousseau's theory of what whole community wants.

Marxist Theories

Karl Marx (1818–1883) produced an exceedingly complex theory consisting of at least three interrelated elements: a theory of economics, a theory of social class, and a theory of history. Like Hegel, Marx argued that things do not happen by accident; everything has a cause. Hegel posited the underlying cause that moves history forward as spiritual, specifically the ***Zeitgeist***, the spirit of the times. Marx found the great underlying cause in economics.

Zeitgeist
German for "spirit of the times"; Hegel's theory that each epoch has a distinctive spirit, which moves history along.

ECONOMICS Marx concentrated on the "surplus value"—what we call profit. Workers produce things but get paid only a fraction of the value of what they produce. The capitalist owners skim off the rest, the surplus value. The working class—what Marx called the **proletariat**—is paid too little to buy all the products the workers have made, resulting in repeated overproduction, which leads to depressions. Eventually, argued Marx, there will be a depression so big the capitalist system will collapse.

proletariat
Marx's name for the industrial working class.

Classic Works

Not Just Europeans

China, India, and North Africa produced brilliant political thinkers centuries ago. Unknown in the West until relatively recently, they were unlikely to have influenced the development of Western political theory. The existence of these culturally varied thinkers suggests that the desire to understand the political nature of humans is basically the same no matter what the cultural differences.

In China, Confucius, a sixth-century BC advisor to kings, propounded his vision of good, stable government based on two things: the family and correct, moral behavior instilled in rulers and ruled alike. At the apex, the emperor sets a moral example by purifying his spirit and perfecting his manners. He must think good thoughts in utter sincerity; if he does not, his empire crumbles. He is copied by his subjects, who are arrayed hierarchically below the emperor, down to the father of a family, who is like a miniature emperor to whom wives and children are subservient. The Confucian system bears some resemblance to Plato's ideal Republic; the difference is that the Chinese actually practiced Confucianism, which lasted two and a half millennia and through a dozen dynasties.

Two millennia before Machiavelli and Hobbes, the Indian writer Kautilya in the fourth century BC arrived at the same conclusions. Kautilya, a prime minister and advisor to an Indian monarch, wrote in *Arthashastra* (translated as "The Principles of Material Well-Being") that prosperity comes from living in a well-run kingdom. Like Hobbes, Kautilya posited a state of nature that meant anarchy. Monarchs arose to protect the land and people against anarchy and ensure their prosperity. Like Machiavelli, Kautilya advised his prince to operate on the basis of pure expediency, doing whatever it takes to secure his kingdom domestically and against other kingdoms.

In fourteenth-century AD North Africa, Ibn Khaldun was a secretary, executive, and ambassador for several rulers. Sometimes out of favor and in jail, he reflected on what had gone wrong with the great Arab empires. He concluded, in his *Universal History*, that the character of the Arabs and their social cohesiveness were determined by climate and occupation. Ibn Khaldun was modern in his linking of underlying economic conditions to social and political change. Economic decline in North Africa, he found, had led to political instability and lawlessness. Anticipating Marx, Toynbee, and many other Western writers, Ibn Khaldun saw that civilizations pass through cycles of growth and decline.

Notice what all three of these thinkers had in common with Machiavelli: All were princely political advisors who turned their insights into general prescriptions for correct governance. Practice led to theory.

bourgeois
Adjective, originally French for city-dweller; later and current, middle class in general. Noun: *bourgeoisie*.

SOCIAL CLASS Every society divides into two classes: a small class of those who own the means of production and a large class of those who work for the small class. Society is run according to the dictates of the upper class, which sets up the laws, arts, and styles needed to maintain itself in power. (Marx, in modern terms, was an *elite theorist*.) Most laws concern property rights, noted Marx, because the **bourgeoisie** (the capitalists) are obsessed with hanging on to their property, which, according to Marx, is nothing but skimmed-off surplus value anyway. If the country goes to war, said Marx, it is not because the common people wish it but because the ruling bourgeoisie needs a war for economic gain. The proletariat, in fact, has no country; proletarians are international, all suffering under the heels of the capitalists.

HISTORY Putting together his economic and social-class theories, Marx explained historical changes. When the underlying economic basis of society gets out of kilter with the structure that the dominant class has established (its laws, institutions, businesses, and so on), the system collapses, as in the French Revolution and ultimately, he predicted, capitalist systems. Marx was partly a theorist and partly an ideologist.

Marxism, as applied in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, led to tyranny and failure, but, as a system of analysis, Marxism is still interesting and useful. For example, social class is important in structuring political views—but never uniformly. Economic interest groups still ride high and, by means of massive spending on election campaigns, often get their way in laws, policies, and tax breaks. They seldom get all they want, however, as they are opposed by other interest groups. Marx's enduring contributions are (1) his understanding that societies are never fully unified and peaceful but always riven with conflict and (2) that we must ask "Who benefits?" in any political controversy.

One of the enduring problems and weaknesses of Marx is that capitalism, contrary to his prediction, has not collapsed. Marx failed to understand the flexible, adaptive nature of capitalism. Old industries fade, and new ones rise. Imagine trying to explain Bill Gates and the computer software industry to people in the 1960s. Marx also missed that capitalism is not just one system—it is many. U.S., French, Singaporean, and Japanese capitalisms are distinct from each other. Marx's simplified notions of capitalism illustrate what happens when theory is placed in the service of ideology: Unquestioning followers believe it too literally.

Both political science and political theory have their place. As a citizen looking to improve the world, you are thinking like a political theorist—how things should be. You will need to decide what actions to take to achieve the political change you desire. To do so, you need to understand how things actually work and why. You need the skills of a political scientist to see the world as it is. If you only wish the world to be, you may be attempting impossible change. Thus, in navigating through political life, we merge the objective lens of political science with the normative lens of political theory.

Methods

Learning a Chapter

Read each chapter before class. And do not simply read the chapter; think deeply about it by writing down the following:

A. Find what strikes you as the *three main points*. Do not outline; construct three complete sentences, each with a subject and predicate. They may be long and complex sentences, but they must be complete declarative sentences. You may find two, four, or six main points, but by the time you split, combine, and discard what may or may not be the main points, you will know the chapter. Look for abstract generalizations; the specifics come under point C below, examples or case studies. Do not simply copy three sentences from the chapter. Synthesize several sentences, always asking what three sentences distilled from this chapter will most help on the exam. These might be three main points from this chapter (Chapter 1):

1. Study politics as a scientist studies nature, trying to understand reality without getting angry at it.
2. Political science combines many disciplines but focuses on power: who holds it and how they use it.
3. Politics can be studied objectively, provided claims are supported by empirical evidence and structured by theory.

B. List a dozen vocabulary words, and be able to define them. These are words new to you or words used in a specialized way. This text makes it easier with the boldfaced terms defined in the margins; for terms not in boldface, read with a dictionary (or your phone!) handy.

C. Note specific examples or case studies that illustrate the main points or vocabulary words. Most will contain proper nouns (i.e., capitalized words). Examples are not main points or definitions; rather, they are empirical evidence that support a main point. The examples need not be complete sentences. They need only remind you of what the main points look like out in the real world. These might be examples from this chapter (Chapter 1):

- Aristotle's "master science"
- AIDS versus breast cancer research
- West Germany's success story
- Communist regimes in East Europe
- Afghanistan's chaos
- Shah's regime in Iran erodes

Chapter 1 in Review: Politics and Political Science

Review Questions

1. What does it mean to "never get angry at a fact"?
2. Why did Aristotle call politics "the master science"?
3. Is politics largely biological, psychological, cultural, rational, or irrational?
4. How can something as messy as politics be a science?
5. What is rational-choice theory?
6. What did Machiavelli, Confucius, Kautilya, and Ibn Khaldun have in common?
7. How did Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau differ?
8. What is the crux of Marx's theory?

Key Terms

behavioralism
bourgeois
civil society
culture
descriptive
discipline
empirical
general will
generalize
hypothesis
institutions
irrational
legitimacy
normative
paradigm
political power
positivism
postbehavioral
proletariat
quantify
rational
realism
scholarship
social contract
state of nature
Zeitgeist

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Chapter 2
Political Ideologies

Courtesy of Michael G. Roskin

Mural in Tirana, Albania, tried to rouse citizens to support communism.

Learning Objectives

2.1 Explain the difference between a political theory and an ideology.
2.2 Distinguish between classic and modern liberalism.
2.3 Contrast Burkean conservatism with its current variety.
2.4 Explain how socialism split into several varieties.
2.5 Trace the origins of nationalism until the present day.
2.6 List and define as many current ideologies as you can.
2.7 Evaluate the "end of ideology" argument.

pragmatic
Using whatever works without theory or ideology.

In the last century, many political scientists thought ideological politics was over in the United States. **Pragmatic** politicians of both parties tended to stick to the political center and were willing to compromise. Recent elections, however, show strong and growing ideological divisions. Republicans denounce Democratic fiscal, health care, and finance reforms as ultraliberal or even socialist. Democrats denounce Republicans for trying to roll back necessary, progressive legislation and to make rich people richer. Few sought a middle ground of moderation and compromise.

America has experienced bouts of ideological politics before. Both main parties have ideological roots. Probably few Republicans knew it, but they were based on *classic liberalism*, harkening back to Adam Smith's 1776 admonition to shrink government's role in the economy. Democrats, on the other hand, had long emphasized government solutions for financial crashes, poverty, health care, and education. They were *modern liberals*, quite distinct from the classic variety. Ideology is alive, well, and powerful in America.

What Is Ideology?

2.1 Explain the difference between a political theory and an ideology.

ideologue
Strong believer in an ideology.

ideology
Belief system that society can be improved by following certain doctrines; usually ends in *ism*.

An ideology begins with the belief that things can be better; it is a plan to improve society. As economist Anthony Downs put it in 1957, ideology is "a verbal image of the good society, and of the chief means of constructing such a society." Political ideologies are not political science; they are not calm, rational attempts to understand political systems. They are, rather, commitments to *change* political systems. (An exception is classic conservatism, which aimed to keep things from changing too much.) **Ideologues** make poor political scientists, for they confuse the "should" or "ought" of ideology with the "is" of political science. **Ideologies** are often based on political and economic theories but simplified and popularized to sell to mass audiences, build political movements, and win elections.

Ideologies are necessary for cementing together movements, parties, and revolutionary groups. To fight and endure sacrifices, people need ideological motivation, something to believe in. Americans have sometimes not grasped this point. With their emphasis on moderation and pragmatism, they fail to understand the energizing effect of ideology in the world today. Muslim *jihadis*—committed to a mix of *salafiyya*, tribalism, anticolonialism, and even a bit of socialism (see box on Islamism below)—sacrifice their lives to kill Americans and fellow Muslims. We never understood the new, fanatic ideology of *Islamism* that we faced in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

We tend to forget that more than two centuries ago, Americans were quite ideological, too, and—imbued with a passion for freedom and self-rule, via the pens of John Locke and Thomas Paine—beat a larger and better-equipped army

of Englishmen and Hessians who had no good reason to fight. Our Civil War included ideological questions over who counted as human and the power of the states to go separate ways.

Be warned: Ideologies never work precisely the way their advocates intend. Some are hideous failures. All ideologies contain wishful thinking, which frequently collapses in the face of reality. Ideologues claim they can perfect the world; reality is highly imperfect. The **classic liberalism** of Adam Smith did contribute to the nineteenth century's economic growth, but it also led to great inequalities of wealth and recurring depressions. It was modified into modern liberalism. Communism led to brutal tyranny, economic failure, and collapse. China quietly abandoned Maoism in favor of rapid economic growth. Ideologies, when measured against their actual performance, fall far short. Some claim warped personalities thwarted implementation of the ideology, but more likely it is because the ideas themselves were defective.

classic liberalism
Ideology founded by Adam Smith urging a free-market economy; became U.S. conservatism.

Liberalism

2.2 Distinguish between classic and modern liberalism.

Classic liberalism first glimmered with the eighteenth-century Age of Enlightenment, when philosophers questioned why monarchs, aristocrats, and established churches should lock people into staying where they were born. They imagined free societies—*liber* is Latin for "free"—in which people would be equal and choose their own rulers, religions, and economic undertakings. This original liberalism saw concentration of power as inherently dangerous because it could so easily be abused, an obsession with the U.S. Founding Fathers.

The economic component of liberalism looms large. Frederick Watkins of Yale called 1776 "the Year One of the Age of Ideology" and not just for the American Revolution. That same year Scottish economist Adam Smith published *The Wealth of Nations*, thereby founding classic market economics. The true wealth of nations, Smith argued, is not in the gold and silver they amass but in the goods and services their people produce. Smith was refuting an earlier notion, called *mercantilism*, that the bullion in a nation's treasury determined its wealth. Spain looted the New World of gold and silver but grew poorer. The French, too, since at least Louis XIV in the previous century, had followed mercantilist policies by means of government supervision of the economy with plans, grants of monopoly, subsidies, tariffs, and other restraints on trade.

Smith reasoned that this was not the path to prosperity. Government control of the economy, argued Smith, retards growth. If you give one firm a monopoly to manufacture something, you banish competition and with it efforts to produce new products and lower prices. The economy stagnates. If you protect domestic industry by tariffs, you take away incentives for better or cheaper products. Leaving the economy largely alone (*laissez-faire*, in French) promotes prosperity, Smith argued.

Theories

The Origins of Ideologies

Many ideologies are founded on deeper political theories. Classic liberalism traces back to Locke, who emphasized individual rights, property, and reason. Communism traces back to Hegel, who emphasized that all facets of a society—art, music, architecture, politics, law, and so on—hang together as a package, all the expression of an underlying *Zeitgeist*.

The philosophers' ideas, however, are simplified and popularized. Ideologists want plans for action, not abstract ideas. Marx, for example, "stood Hegel on his head" to make economics the great underlying cause. Most ideologies have a large economic component, for it is economics that will improve society. Lenin later stood Marx on his head to make his ideas apply to a backward country where Marx doubted they should. Mao Zedong then applied Lenin's ideas to an even more backward country, where they did not fit at all. Ideologies become warped when transplanted from one country to another.

Ideologies can be located—with some oversimplification—on a left-to-right spectrum that dates back to the meeting of the French National Assembly in 1789. To allow delegates of similar views to caucus and to keep apart strong partisans who might fight, members were seated as follows in a semicircular chamber: Conservatives, who favored continuation of the monarchy, were on the speaker's right. Radicals, who favored sweeping away the old system altogether in favor of a republic of freedom and equality, were seated to the speaker's left. Moderates, who wanted some change, were seated in the center.

We have been calling their ideological descendants left, right, and center ever since, even though the content of their views has changed. The left now favors equality, welfare programs, and government intervention in the economy. The right stresses individual initiative and private economic activity. Centrists try to synthesize and moderate the views of both. People a little to one side or the other are called center-left or center-right. Sweden's political parties form a rather neat left-to-right spectrum: a small Left Party (formerly Communist); a large Social Democratic Party; and medium-sized Center (formerly Farmers'), Liberal, Christian, and Conservative parties, plus a new right-wing Sweden Democrats.

One ideology gives rise to others (see Figure 2.1). Starting with the classic liberalism of Adam Smith, liberalism branched leftward into radical, socialist, and communist directions. Meanwhile, on the conservative side, it branched rightward.

But won't free competition unsupervised by government lead to chaos? No, said Smith; the market itself will regulate the economy. Efficient producers will prosper and inefficient ones will go under. Supply and demand determine prices better than any government official. In the free marketplace, an "unseen hand" regulates and self-corrects the economy, argued Smith. If people want more of something, producers increase output, new producers enter the field, or foreign producers import their wares. The unseen hand—actually, the rational calculations of myriad individuals and firms all pursuing their self-interest—microadjusts the economy without government control.

Adam Smith never advocated no government role in the economy, which would be impossible. He understood that governments are needed to preserve order, enforce contracts, build infrastructure, safeguard the nation, and much else. Most Americans liked Smith's arguments and still do. As Thomas Jefferson put it, "That government is best that governs least." They internalized classic liberalism,

Figure 2.1 How Political Ideologies Relate to One Another: Key Thinkers and Dates of Emergence.



which fit a freedom-loving population who practiced individual economic hustle and the freedoms of religion, press, and speech.

But, you say, this "liberalism" is actually what Americans today call "conservatism." True. In the late nineteenth century, liberalism changed and split into modern liberalism and what is now conservatism. To keep our terminology straight, we call the original ideas of Adam Smith *classic liberalism* to distinguish it from the modern variety.

Modern Liberalism

Classic liberalism helped free up and modernize societies, but by the late nineteenth century it was clear that the free market was not completely self-regulating. Dangerous concentrations of power returned with giant corporations. Competition was imperfect. Producers rigged the market—a point Smith warned

about. The system created a large underclass of the terribly poor (depicted by Dickens). Class positions stayed largely inherited; children of better-off families got the education and connections to remain on top. Bouts of speculative investing led to recurring economic downturns—2008 and 2020—are recent examples—which especially hurt the poor and working class. In short, the laissez-faire economy wasn't so perfect.

Englishman Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882) rethought liberalism. The goal of liberalism, reasoned Green, is a free society, but it erodes when economic power becomes concentrated and unfair. The classic liberals place great store in contracts (agreements between consenting parties with little government supervision): If you don't like the deal, don't take it. But this doesn't work if the bargaining power of the two parties is greatly unequal, as between a rich employer and a poor person desperate for a job. Does the latter really have a free choice in accepting or rejecting a job with very low wages? Classic liberalism said let it be; wages will find their own level. But what if the wage is below starvation level? Here, Green said, it was time for government to step in. This would not be a question of government infringing on freedoms but of government protecting them. Instead of the purely negative "freedom from," there had to be a certain amount of the positive "freedom to." Green called this *positive freedom*. Government was to step in to guarantee the freedom to live at an adequate level.

modern liberalism
Ideology favoring government intervention to correct economic and social ills; U.S. liberalism today.

Classic liberalism aimed to limit the government in the marketplace; **modern liberalism** brought it back in, this time to protect people from a sometimes unfair economic system. Modern liberals championed wage and hour laws, the right to form unions, unemployment and health insurance, and improved educational opportunities. To do this, they taxed the rich more than the working class. They also regulated banking and finance to dampen the boom-and-bust cycle and used antitrust laws to break up concentrated economic power. This is the liberalism of the United States over the past century, the liberalism of Woodrow Wilson, Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, Barack Obama, and Elizabeth Warren. One part of the old liberalism remains in the new: the emphasis on freedom of speech and press.

Conservatism

2.3 Contrast Burkean conservatism with its current variety.

conservatism
Ideology of keeping systems largely unchanged.

We should call the ideas of Edmund Burke (1729–1797) *classic conservatism*, for his **conservatism** diverges in many ways from modern conservatism. Burke knew Adam Smith and agreed that a free market was the best economic system. Burke also opposed crushing the rebellious American colonists; they were only trying to regain the ancient freedoms of Englishmen, said Burke. So far, Burke sounds like a liberal.

But Burke strongly objected to the way liberal ideas were applied in France by revolutionaries. There, liberalism turned into *radicalism*, influenced by philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau and, fresh from the U.S. revolution, Thomas Paine. As is often the case, an ideology devised in one place becomes warped when applied to different circumstances. Liberalism in America was easy; once the English and their Tory sympathizers cleared out, it fell into place without resistance. But in France, a large aristocratic class and a state-supported Catholic Church had a lot to lose. The revolutionaries tried to solve the problem with the guillotine and swept away all established institutions.

This, argued Burke, was a terrible mistake. Liberals place too much confidence in human reason. People are only partly rational; they also have irrational passions. To contain them, society over the centuries has evolved traditions, institutions, and standards of morality, such as monarchy and an established church. Sweep these aside, warned Burke, and man's irrational impulses burst out, leading to chaos, which in turn ends in tyranny far worse than the old system. Burke, in his 1792 *Reflexions on the Revolution in France*, predicted that France would fall into military dictatorship. In 1799, Napoleon took over.

Institutions and traditions that currently exist cannot be all bad, Burke reasoned, for they are the products of hundreds of years of trial and error. People have become used to them. The best should be preserved or "conserved" (hence the name *conservatism*). They are not perfect, but they work. This is not to say that things should never change. Of course they should change, said Burke, but only gradually, giving people time to adjust. "A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation," he wrote.

Burke was an important thinker for several reasons. He helped discover the *irrational* in human behavior: Humans are often guided by passion rather than by reason. He saw that institutions are like living things; they grow and adapt over time. And, most important, he saw that revolutions end badly, for society cannot be instantly remade according to human reason. Although Burke's ideas have been called an *anti-ideology*—for they aimed to shoot down the radicalism then engulfing France—they have considerable staying power. Burke's emphasis on religion, traditions, and morality has been taken over by modern conservatives. His doubts about applying reason to solve social problems were echoed by political scientist Jeane Kirkpatrick (1926–2006), President Ronald Reagan's UN ambassador, who found that leftists always suppose that things can be much better when in fact violent upheaval always makes things worse. In these ways, classic conservatism is very much alive.

Modern Conservatism

What happened to the other branch of liberalism, the people who stayed true to Adam Smith's original doctrine of minimal government? They are still very important, only today we call them "conservatives." (In Europe, they still call

them liberals or *neoliberals*, much to the confusion of Americans.) American conservatives got a big boost from Milton Friedman (1912–2006), a Nobel Prize–winning economist. Friedman argued that free markets are still best, that Adam Smith was right. Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States applied this revival of classic liberalism in the 1980s.

Modern conservatives worship the market more than Adam Smith ever did. Smith recognized that markets could be rigged and unfair. Today's conservatives contend that all markets are honest and self-correcting, certainly more so than government regulation, which they would roll back. Alan Greenspan, powerful chair of the Federal Reserve Board from 1987 to 2006, ignored warnings that the U.S. housing market was a bubble ready to pop. The huge banks would not be so greedy or foolish as to let that happen, he reasoned, so Fed action was unnecessary. (He later recanted.) Republicans assume that markets are more efficient than government programs and would privatize many functions, such as running health care only through private insurers. Critics call this "market fundamentalism," like a religious creed.

Modern conservatism also borrows from Edmund Burke a concern for tradition, especially in religion. American conservatives would put prayer into public schools, outlaw abortion and same-sex marriage, and support private and church-related schools. Modern conservatives also oppose special rights for women and minority groups, arguing that everyone should have the same rights. Modern conservatism is a blend of the economic ideas of Adam Smith and the traditionalist ideas of Edmund Burke.

Socialism

2.4 Explain how socialism split into several varieties.

The candidacies of democratic socialists Senator Bernie Sanders (for president) and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (for Congress) revived interest in socialism among young Americans. Trouble is, few could define socialism as anything but criticism of capitalism or appreciate its history and varieties, which stretch from modest welfare measures to state intervention in and even takeover of the economy.

Liberalism (classic variety) dominated the nineteenth century, but critics deplored the growing gulf between rich and poor. Unlike T. H. Green, some did not believe that a few reforms would suffice; they wanted to overthrow the capitalist system. These were the early socialists, and their leading thinker was Karl Marx, who wrote less as a scholar than a promoter of revolution (see Chapter 1). He hated the *bourgeoisie* long before he developed his elaborate theories that they were doomed. An outline of his ideas appeared in his 1848 pamphlet *The Communist Manifesto*, which concluded with the ringing words: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workers of all countries, unite!" Marx participated in organizing Europe's first socialist parties.

Marx's later *Capital* was a gigantic analysis of why capitalism would be overthrown by the proletariat. Then would come socialism, a just, productive society without class distinctions. Later, at a certain stage when industrial production is very high, this socialist society will turn into *communism*, a perfect society without police, money, or even government. Goods will be in such plenty that people will just take what they need. There will be no private property, so there will be no need for police. Because government is simply an instrument of class domination, with the abolition of distinct classes there will be no need for the state. It will "wither away." Communism, then, was Marx's predicted utopia beyond socialism.

Marx focused on the ills and malfunctions of capitalism and never specified what socialism would be like, only that it would be much better than capitalism; its precise workings he left vague. This has enabled a wide variety of socialist thinkers to put forward their own vision of socialism and say it is what Marx really meant. This has ranged from the mild welfarism of social-democratic parties, to *anarcho-syndicalism* (unions running everything), to Lenin's and Stalin's hypercentralized tyranny, to Trotsky's denunciation of same, to Mao's self-destructive permanent revolution, to Tito's experimental decentralized system. All, and a few more, claim to espouse real socialism. These different interpretations of socialism caused first the socialist and then the communist movements to splinter.

Social Democracy

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the German Social Democrats (SPD), espousing Marxism, had become Germany's biggest party. Marx had disparaged conventional parties and labor unions; bourgeois governments would simply crush them. At most, they could be training grounds for serious revolutionary action. But the German Social Democrats started succeeding. They got elected to the Reichstag and local offices; their unions won higher wages and better working conditions. Some began to think that the working class could accomplish its aims without revolution. Why use bullets when there are ballots?

Eduard Bernstein developed this view. In his 1901 *Evolutionary Socialism*, he pointed out the real gains the working class was making and concluded that Marx had been wrong about the collapse of capitalism and revolution. Reforms that won concrete benefits for the working class could also lead to socialism, he argued. In revising Marxism, Bernstein earned the name **revisionist**, originally a pejorative hurled at him by orthodox Marxists. By the time of the ill-fated Weimar Republic in Germany (1919–1933), the Social Democrats had toned down their militancy and worked together with liberals and Catholics to try to save democracy. Persecuted by the Nazis, the SPD revived after World War II and in 1959 dropped Marxism altogether, as did social democrats everywhere, and got elected more and more. They transformed themselves into center-left parties with no trace of revolution.

revisionist
Changing an ideology or view of history.

social democracy
Mildest form of socialism, promoting welfare measures but not state ownership of industry.

What, then, do **social democrats** stand for? They abandoned state ownership of industry. Only a few percent of Sweden's industry is state-owned, and much of that conservatives did long ago to keep firms from going under and creating unemployment. Said Olof Palme, Sweden's Social Democratic prime minister, "If industry's primary purpose is to expand its production, to succeed in new markets, to provide good jobs for their employees, they need have no fears. Swedish industry has never expanded so rapidly as during these years of Social Democratic rule." Instead of state ownership of industry, social democrats use *welfare* measures to improve living conditions: unemployment and medical insurance, generous pensions, and subsidized food and housing. Social democracies have become welfare states: *Welfarism* would be a more accurate term than *socialism*.

There's one catch—there's always at least one catch—and that is that welfare states are expensive. To pay for welfare measures, taxes climb. In Denmark and Sweden, taxes consume half the **gross domestic product (GDP)**, exactly the kind of thing Milton Friedman warned about. With such high taxes, you are not free to choose how you live. At a much lower level, U.S. liberalism is tinged with social-democratic ideas on welfare, known here as *progressive*, a term often applied to the left wing of the Democratic Party.

gross domestic product (GDP)
Sum total of goods and services produced in a given country in one year, often expressed per capita (GDPpc) by dividing population into GDP.

Communism

While the social democrats evolved into reformists and welfarists, a smaller wing of the original socialists stayed Marxist and became the Communists. The key figure in this transformation was a Russian intellectual, Vladimir I. Lenin (1870–1924). He made several changes in Marxism, producing *Marxism-Leninism*, another name for **communism**.

communism
Marxist theory merged with Leninist organization into a totalitarian party.

IMPERIALISM Many Russian intellectuals of the late nineteenth century hated the tsarist system and embraced Marxism as a way to overthrow tsarism. But Marx meant his theory to apply in the most advanced capitalist countries, not in backward Russia, where capitalism was just beginning. Lenin, in his 17-year exile mostly in Switzerland, remade Marxism to fit the Russian situation. He offered a theory of economic imperialism, one borrowed from German revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg and English economist J. A. Hobson, who wondered why the proletarian revolutions Marx had predicted had not broken out in the advanced industrialized lands. They concluded that the domestic market could not absorb all the goods the capitalist system produced, so it found overseas markets. Capitalism had transformed itself, expanding overseas into colonies to exploit their raw materials, cheap labor, and new markets. Capitalism thus won a temporary new lease on life by turning into **imperialism**. With profits from its colonies, the mother imperialist country could also pay off its working class a bit to render it reformist rather than revolutionary.

imperialism
Amassing of colonial empires, mostly by European powers; pejorative in Marxist terms.

Imperialism had to expand, Lenin argued, but it was growing unevenly. Some countries, such as Britain and Germany, were highly developed, but where

capitalism was just starting, as in Spain and Russia, it was weak. The newly industrializing countries were exploited as a whole by the international capitalist system. It was in them that revolutionary fever burned brightest; they were "imperialism's weakest link." Accordingly, a revolution could break out in a poor country and then spread into advanced countries. The imperialist countries were highly dependent on their empires. Once cut off from exploiting them, capitalism would fall. World War I, wrote Lenin, was the collision of imperialists trying to dominate the globe.

Lenin shifted the Marxian focus from the situation within capitalist countries to the global situation. Their emphasis went from Marx's proletariat rising up against the bourgeoisie to exploited nations rising up against imperialist powers. Marx would probably not have endorsed such a redo of his theory.

ORGANIZATION Lenin's real contribution lay in his attention to organization. With the tsarist secret police always on their trail, Lenin argued, the Russian socialist party could not be like other parties—large, open, and trying to win votes. Instead, it had to be small, secretive, made up of professional revolutionaries, and tightly organized under central command. In 1903, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party split over this issue. Lenin had enough supporters at the party's Brussels meeting to win the votes of 33 of the 51 delegates present. Lenin called his faction *bolshevik* (Russian for "majority"). The losers, who advocated a more moderate line and a more open party, took the name *menshevik* ("minority"). In 1918, the Bolsheviks changed the party name to Communist.

Lenin's attention to organization paid off when Russia fell into chaos during World War I. In March 1917, moderates seized power from the tsar but were unable to govern the country. In November, the Bolsheviks shrewdly manipulated councils (*soviets* in Russian) that had sprung up in the leading cities and seized control from the moderates. After winning a desperate civil war, Lenin called on all true socialists around the world to join in a new international movement under Moscow's control, the Communist International, or *Comintern*. Almost all socialist parties in the world split; their left wings went into the Comintern and became Communist parties in 1920–1921. The resultant Social Democratic and Communist parties have been hostile to each other ever since.

How much Marxism–Leninism did Soviet rulers really believe? They constantly used Marxist rhetoric, but many were cynical about ideology and just used it as window dressing. The Soviets never defined their society as Communist—that was yet to come; it was what they were working on. It is we in the West who called these countries communist. In 1961, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev rashly predicted "communism in our generation," indicating that utopia would be reached by 1980. Instead, it declined, and at the end of 1991 the Soviet system collapsed.

MAOISM AND TITOISM In the 1930s, Mao Zedong concluded that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had to be based on poor peasants and guerrilla warfare. This was a break with Soviet leadership, and after decades of fighting, the CCP

took over mainland China in 1949. Mao pursued a radical course that included a lunatic attempt at overnight industrialization (the Great Leap Forward of 1958–1961, in which some 40 million Chinese died), the destruction of bureaucratic authority (the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966–1976), and even border fighting with the Soviet Union in 1969. After Mao's death in 1976, pragmatic leaders moved China away from his extremism, which had ruined China's economic progress. A few revolutionary groups stayed Maoist: Cambodia's murderous Khmer Rouge and India's Naxalites. **Maoism** is an ultraradical form of communism.

Maoism
Extreme form of communism, featuring guerrilla warfare and periodic upheavals.

Yugoslav party chief Josip Tito went the other way, developing a more moderate and liberal form of communism. Even though Tito's partisans fought the Germans in Stalin's name, Stalin did not fully control Tito, and in 1948 Stalin had Yugoslavia kicked out of the Communist camp. During the 1950s, the Yugoslav Communists reformed their system, basing it on decentralization, debureaucratization, and worker self-management. Trying to find a middle ground between a market and a controlled economy, Yugoslavia suffered economic problems in the 1980s. **Titoism** might have served as a warning to Communist rulers (e.g., Chinese) who seek middle ways between capitalism and socialism. The combination is unstable and worked only because Tito was undisputed ruler; when he died in 1980, Yugoslavia started coming apart until, by the early 1990s, it was a bloodbath.

Titoism
Moderate, decentralized, partially market form of communism.

Nationalism

2.5 Trace the origins of nationalism until the present day.

The real winner among ideologies—one that still dominates today—is **nationalism**, the exaggerated belief in the greatness and unity of one's country. Nationalism is often born out of occupation and repression by foreigners. "We won't be pushed around by foreigners any more!" shout Cuban, Palestinian, Chinese, and many other nationalists. Nationalism has triumphed over and influenced all other ideologies, so that, in the United States, conservatism is combined with American nationalism, and, in China, nationalism was always more important than communism.

nationalism
People's heightened sense of cultural, historical, and territorial identity, unity, and sometimes greatness.

The first seeds of nationalism came with the Renaissance monarchs who proclaimed their absolute power and the unity and greatness of their kingdoms. Nationality was born out of **sovereignty**. Nationalism, however, appeared only with the French Revolution, which was based on "the people" and heightened French feelings about themselves as a special, leading people destined to free the rest of Europe. When a Prussian army invaded France in 1792, the "nation in arms" stopped them at Valmy; enthusiastic volunteers beat professional soldiers. The stirring "Marseillaise," France's national anthem, appeared that year.

sovereignty
National government's being boss on its own turf, the last word in law in that country.

Later, Napoleon's legions ostensibly spread the radical liberalism of the French Revolution but were really spreading nationalism. The conquered nations of Europe quickly grew to hate the arrogant French occupiers. Spaniards, Germans, and Russians soon became nationalistic themselves as they struggled