The New Structural Social Work

Ideology, Theory, and Practice

Bob Mullaly
Marilyn Dupré

Fourth Edition

Fourth Edition

The New Structural Social Work

Ideology, Theory, and Practice

Bob Mullaly
Marilyn Dupré

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

PART I In Search of a Paradigm

① The Social Work Vision: A Progressive View   2

② Capitalism, Crises, and Paradigms   29

6 The Marxist Paradigm   145

7 Feminist, Anti-racist, and Postmodern Critiques   167

PART II Structural Social Work Theory and Oppression

PART III Structural Social Work: Practice Elements

Boxes

Acknowledgements

To write a book such as this, which calls for a social order and a social work approach different from those now dominant, requires a tremendous amount of angry energy. It is not enough to understand how our present set of social arrangements benefits a privileged minority (mainly white, bourgeois, entrepreneurial males) at the expense of the majority (mainly people living in poverty, racialized individuals, immigrants, people with disabilities, Indigenous persons, and the working class). One must be angry enough to want to do something about it. As argued in this book, anger can be a gift. To paraphrase Marx, it is not enough to understand the world as it is; the task is to change it. If channelled constructively, anger can be a powerful force for such change. It is what will enable those of us who are committed to a just society to translate our social justice ideals and goals into practice and to carry out the struggle for liberation.

So we wish to thank all those individuals and groups and organizations that have fuelled and sustained our sense of indignation and rage over attitudes and acts that unfairly and unnecessarily have denied so many people their essential human dignity and have blocked the realization of their human potential. Included among them are: conservative politicians of all stripes for pandering to the corporate agenda in exchange for monetary and political support, leaving millions of people to fend for themselves; business organizations such as the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, and the Business Council on National Issues, which in their greed for higher and higher profits have created a social Darwinian business culture in society that has swelled the ranks of the underclass; right-wing think tanks that do not think at all (such as the Fraser Institute, the C.D. Howe Institute, and the Conference Board of Canada) but continue to recycle a 200-year-old socially pernicious economic doctrine of laissez-faire that has never worked; the mainstream media that trivialize alternative social arrangements and economic policies and brainwash people into accepting a social system that victimizes and oppresses them; and all those social work academics who smugly and arrogantly dismiss progressive forms of social work and continue to teach recycled, conventional theories of social work that implicitly accept an inhumane social order and attempt to fit people into it; they should know better.

Of course, anger by itself is not enough to sustain one's writing. Support, encouragement, and help are also required. So we wish to thank the hundreds of people in Canada, the United States, Australia, Britain, and elsewhere—other progressive social work writers, instructors, students, and activists—who took the time to give constructive feedback on the first three editions of this book. In particular, I (Bob) want to thank my co-author, Dr Marilyn Dupré, who worked with me through the entire project of writing this book. I first met Marilyn years ago when she was one of my BSW students at St Thomas University in Fredericton, NB. Subsequently, when I was appointed as dean of the Faculty of Social Work at the University of Manitoba, Marilyn was a student in their PhD program, and I agreed to be a member of her thesis committee. She was an outstanding student—one of the best among those with whom I've had the pleasure of

working. She possesses a keen mind, superior writing abilities, exemplary research skills, and sound knowledge of oppression and privilege and of structural and other progressive social work approaches—so much so that I invited her to become co-author for this current edition of *The New Structural Social Work*. It was a pleasure to work with Marilyn, and I will miss our stimulating and energizing conversations on social theory, politics, and critical social work.

Throughout my academic career, I have often been asked by students (and others) how, living in a society replete with conservative attitudes, values, institutions, and practices that ridicule, dismiss, and punish persons who advocate for a more just set of social arrangements and a progressive social work approach, I am able to maintain my commitment to the pursuit of a more just and egalitarian society and to the development of an alternative practice of social work. I owe gratitude to those just mentioned for their support and encouragement, but I owe my greatest appreciation to my parents, Audrey and Clement Mullaly. Although neither had the opportunity to attend university, each possessed a keen mind, an insightful social analysis, and a well-developed social conscience. I grew up in one of the poorest areas in one of the poorest cities in Canada (Saint John, NB) where I experienced, directly and indirectly, discrimination, oppression, and punitive treatment from most of our social institutions and organizations on a daily basis. Most privileged individuals and groups blamed people in this area for their inferior living circumstances, but it was my parents who helped me to interpret these issues through a critical lens that did not blame victims of social injustice for living conditions that were imposed on them by social forces of over which they had no control. It was my mother and father who helped me to develop a critical understanding of social inequality, to better understand issues of oppression and privilege, and to become aware of structural forces that have such a powerful impact on our lives. Most of all, they helped me to develop an understanding and appreciation of the concept of social resistance and the importance of looking for ways to carry it out in constructive ways. This book is one form of such resistance. It is to their memory that I dedicate my portion of this book.

I (Marilyn Dupré) would like to thank Dr Robert (Bob) Mullaly for approaching me to contribute to this latest edition of *The New Structural Social Work: Ideology, Theory, and Practice*. I was privileged to be able to attend St Thomas University, Fredericton, back in the late 1980s when Bob was teaching his BSW theory course using the notes that would form the chapters of the first edition of the book *Structural Social Work: Ideology, Theory, and Practice*, published in 1993. Over the years our academic paths have crossed on several occasions. In 2003, I was accepted into the PhD program in the Faculty of Social Work, University of Manitoba, and discovered to my absolute delight that Bob had been hired as the new dean that same summer. Being Maritimers, we both "returned home from away" and kept in touch over the years. I had the privilege of becoming the director of the School of Social Work at St Thomas University in July 2014, and in contributing to the fifth edition of the book that inspired me as a student and as a practising social worker and now as an academic, I feel as though I have come full circle in my career. Just this year (2017) St Thomas University School of Social Work celebrated its 35th anniversary as an accredited school of social work. The mission of the school has changed little since Bob Mullaly and Noel Kinsella (former St Thomas faculty member and Speaker of the Senate of Canada) worked together with the university administration to establish a school of social work

founded on a progressive social work vision. I would like to thank Bob Mullaly for continuing to promote and advance that vision, which I believe is more relevant than ever to our profession, given the changing socio-political and economic circumstances of our time. Therefore, I would like to thank Bob and all the students and social work practitioners who have kept the spirit and philosophy of structural social work thriving and developing in classroom discussions and presentations.

We wish to thank the reviewers, both named and anonymous, of the four editions of this book, including Brenda A. LeFrancois, Memorial University of Newfoundland; Karen McCauley, Laurentian University; Bharati Sethi, Western University; Kelly-Ann Spezowka, University of Windsor; and Anne Wagner, Nipissing University. We hope our revisions do their suggestions justice. We are very grateful to Leah-Ann Lymer of Oxford University Press, who worked with us throughout this entire project. She was quick to respond to all of our questions and concerns and provided us with helpful advice. And we want to extend our appreciation to our copy editor, Dorothy Turnbull, for her attention to detail and care in putting the finishing touches on our manuscript.

In solidarity,

bob mullaly
Fredericton

Marilyn Dupré
Fredericton

Preface

This book represents the third stage of the development of thinking and writing with respect to "structural social work." The first edition, *Structural Social Work: Ideology, Theory, and Practice*, published in 1993, followed a period of relative quiet from the progressive or radical social work camp. The second edition, published in 1997, was one of many progressive social work books that appeared around this time. This new edition, which is called *The New Structural Social Work*, raises the question: what is new about structural social work? To answer this, a brief overview of the development of progressive social work in Anglo-democracies is presented here.

Although progressive forms of social work date back to the Settlement House Movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the modern formulation of progressive social work began with the 1975 publication of Roy Bailey and Mike Brake's *Radical Social Work* in Britain, Jeffry Galper's *The Politics of Social Services* in the United States, and Harold Throssell's *Social Work: Radical Essays* in Australia. Despite being written independently from one another and in three different English-speaking countries, they contained a number of common themes that had emerged in the radical sixties. Each criticized capitalism as a social and economic system that was antithetical to human need; each criticized mainstream social work for being an unwitting agent for capitalism; and each called for emancipatory/radical forms of social work practice that would contribute to the transformation of capitalism to some form of socialism.

A flood of progressive social work writings appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s that focused mainly on class struggle. From these writings the progressive social work agenda was clear. The critical analysis of capitalism would be further developed to show not only its oppressive effects but also its contradictions, which would provide the levers and latitude for the practice of radical social work. The critique of mainstream social work practices would also be further developed to show how they actually covered up many of the oppressive features of capitalism by helping people to cope with it, adjust to it, or fit back into it. These critical analyses of capitalism and mainstream social work would, in turn, be used to develop radical/progressive theories and practices of social work at both the personal and the political level. This would include raising the consciousness of social services users of how capitalism exploited them and encouraging them to organize and mobilize against it; joining with the trade union movement, which was seen as the major vehicle for overthrowing capitalism; building up the welfare state that had need rather than profit as its criterion for production and distribution; and electing social democratic political parties, which were viewed as more committed to social justice than were bourgeois parties. Also, radical social work in the 1970s was responding to the criticism by feminist social workers that it was gender-neutral and in the early 1980s to the criticism by mainly black social workers that it was colour-neutral. In varying degrees, most social work educational programs incorporated some of these progressive ideas and analyses into parts of their curriculum, but for the most part, they occupied marginal or token positions alongside mainstream social work ideas and practices.

By the mid-1980s, it was clear that the progressive project of radical social work was being undermined by the worldwide economic crisis and right-wing social policies brought about by the oil crisis in 1973 along with the inflation-fuelling Vietnam War. Led by "big business" and bourgeois governments, economic restructuring was initiated to address a worldwide recession and inflation (i.e., stagflation). Capitalism was transformed from its rigid and centralized postwar form to a flexible (for the capitalists at least) and global form (Harvey, 1989), thus making much of the earlier critical analyses of capitalism outdated and irrelevant. We witnessed, as Leonard (1997) pointed out, the ascendancy of neo-conservatism on a global scale and the virtual collapse of leftist politics, a reduced welfare state, increasing disparities between rich and poor, national trade unions in disarray, and massive economic uncertainty. Given the irrelevance of much of its analysis of capitalism, the diminished political power of the trade union movement, continuous cutbacks in the welfare state, and the election of neo-conservative governments, not only did the development of radical social work halt, but the whole radical social work movement seemed to have gone underground.

Though never dead, radical social work underwent a period of inactivity and virtual invisibility (roughly during the 1980s) before an important book was published in Britain in 1989. *Radical Social Work Today* contained a number of articles by various radical writers and practitioners that reassessed the need for radical social work in its new socio-economic–political context and identified what the various contributing authors believed to be the essential elements of a radical social work strategy in the 1990s. In our view, this book breathed new life into progressive social work. The title of its opening chapter, "Whatever Happened to Radical Social Work?" addressed the questions that so many progressive social workers had. What *did* happen to radical social work? To what extent is it still relevant? Which aspects should be modified and/or rejected, given the events of the previous decade and the new realities facing social work? The editors of the book (Mary Langan and Phil Lee), who were also the authors of the first chapter, identified a number factors that, in their view, would have to be considered and addressed before radical social work could move on.

One of these factors, of course, was the changed practice context in which social work operated, such as dramatic increases in the workloads of social workers, criticism and condemnation of social workers from conservative politicians and the mainstream media, the drive to push social workers into a more coercive and interventionist role in policing "deviant" families, and a growing criticism from members of oppressed groups such as women, racialized individuals, persons with disabilities, and older people that their interests had not been adequately articulated by the radical social work movement. A major criticism of the 1970s radical social work was that it was strong on critique but short on practice. Although this criticism seemed to underestimate how necessary the critique was and the constructive role it played, by 1989 it was obvious that radical social work had to translate its critical analysis into practice if it were to move on. Several other books appeared around this time that furthered the critical analysis of social work and the social welfare state but did not really address the practice of radical social work: Fiona Williams's 1989 book from Britain, *Social Policy: A Critical Introduction: Issues of Race, Gender, and Class*; Ben Carniol's second edition of *Case Critical* (1990) from Canada; and George Martin's *Social Policy in the Welfare State* (1990) from the US.

It was shortly after the publication of *Radical Social Work Today* that the first edition of *Structural Social Work* (1993) appeared. It attempted to address many of the criticisms made of radical social work in Langan and Lee's book, but in particular it focused on the inconsistent treatment that radical social work had received in the literature until that time and the criticism that it had not moved much beyond a critique of conventional social work. This first edition attempted to clarify the clutter of the existing radical social literature by providing a framework that integrated its ideological context, its theoretical base, and its political practice. As well, it attempted to advance the existing theoretical and practice bases of radical social work beyond that which existed in the literature at that time by linking social work practice with individuals, families, and groups to contribute simultaneously to fundamental changes of structures in society. As its theoretical base, critical social theory was chosen, and as its framework, a particular school of radical social work was chosen that had been pioneered in Canada by Maurice Moreau, which he termed "structural social work." Critical social theory was selected because it, unlike mainstream social theory, goes beyond attempting to simply explain and understand social phenomena to a political purpose of changing social conditions and challenging oppression.

The label "structural social work" was chosen for several reasons. First, the term "structural" is descriptive of the nature of social problems in that they are an inherent part of our neo-conservative/liberal, capitalist society and do not reside in the individual. Second, the term is prescriptive because it indicates that the focus for change is mainly on the structures of society, not on the personal characteristics of the individual. Third, structural social work has more potential for integrating various theoretical concepts and political practices because it does not establish hierarchies of oppression but is concerned with all oppressed groups. Fourth, it is a dialectical approach to social work practice and, therefore, does not get trapped within false dichotomies or binary opposites. Finally, most of the development of structural social work had occurred in Canada, and it was increasingly becoming a major social work perspective.

Coincidentally, another book on radical social work was published in Australia the same year as the first edition of *Structural Social Work*. Jan Fook's *Radical Casework* focused primarily on the practice (at the micro level) of radical social work and de-emphasized theory whereas *Structural Social Work* was stronger on theory than it was on practice. Many radical social work instructors in Australia and Canada used the two books together because they complemented each other. As well, these two books are widely credited as representing an important milestone in the development of radical forms of social work theory and practice, as evidenced by the plethora of books on progressive social work that were published a few years after 1993. However, *Radical Casework* is still one of the best books written on the practice of radical social work.

The first edition of *Structural Social Work* proved immensely popular because, in our view, it filled a large gap in the literature. There were many, many social work practitioners and academics committed to fundamental social change and to social work practices that did not blame people experiencing social problems for their situations who were looking for a workable progressive form of social work. However, this first edition contained a number of limitations and over time required further development. For example, it did not contain a full analysis of the transformation of capitalism from its previous postwar form, when it existed almost on a nation-by-nation

basis, to its global form. Thus, the book represented a reaction to the negative consequences of globalization without a full understanding of what was happening or how to challenge it. Although the first edition acknowledged other forms of oppression and furthered the analysis of social problems beyond those associated with class, it still did not sufficiently emphasize other forms and sources of oppression, such as patriarchy, racism, and ageism, which not only existed in society but were also present in the postwar welfare state and in social work practice. As well, the first edition of *Structural Social Work* was conceptualized within a modernist framework, since postmodernism was just beginning to appear in the social work literature. Thus, it did not contain any of the insights of postmodernism and, in fact, was based on the emancipatory narrative of Western modernity with certain claims to unqualified universalisms and essentialisms and with a linear view of history and progress.

In late 1997, the second edition of *Structural Social Work* was published. Among other changes, an attempt was made to address the limitations of the first edition and in doing so to further the development of structural social work theory and practice. An overview of the transformation process from postwar capitalism to its global form was included (thanks to David Harvey, 1989), which outlined the latter's negative consequences on vulnerable populations, the welfare state, and social work. Given this analysis, at least social work now knew what it was up against and who the beneficiaries and victims of globalization were. Without such understanding, it is difficult to challenge or influence any such movement. The second edition also included a chapter on oppression, which was presented as the primary focus of structural social work. In other words, it is not capitalism or class relations that constitute the major source of social problems and exclusion. Rather, it is the exploitation and oppression based on dominant–subordinate relations that result in social problems. Classism is one form and source of oppression but not the only one. Also included was the postmodern critique of modernist thinking, which had influenced earlier forms of radical (and mainstream) social work. It was argued that it was not a matter of modernist versus postmodernist thought but that both were necessary because each informed and provided a corrective to the other. Several other books on progressive social work were published around the same time as the second edition of *Structural Social Work* so that by the late 1990s there was a substantial body of literature on various schools of progressive social work, including structural social work.

In spite of attending to the limitations of the earlier edition, the 1997 version of *Structural Social Work* still contained gaps and weaknesses. Although the analysis of the transformation of capitalism was retained, the book did not include any real plan or strategy of what to do about it beyond caring for its victims. Although it was argued that postmodernism had to be a part of any progressive school of social work, the dominant paradigms that have played such an important part of our approach to structural social work were still steeped in modernist concepts and contained elements of universalism, essentialism, and linear progress with respect to the pursuit of social justice and equality. Some critics contended that the chapters on practice were not sufficiently nuanced to address the complexities of real-world practice and that the book did not address the micro-politics of practice sufficiently. Another criticism was that little attention had been given to issues of identity and subjectivity and to the structural social worker as a person or to the social location of the worker and how this might affect their practice.

In the third edition, which appeared in 2007, an attempt was made to address these criticisms. And because the third edition was sufficiently different from the previous two editions and because the context of social work was also sufficiently different from what it was when the previous edition was published 10 years earlier, the title was changed to *The New Structural Social Work*.

In the interim, many observers and commentators, such as Canada's John Ralston Saul, had argued that globalization had run its course and was now on the decline. It had not delivered the goods it promised, and very few people expected that it could. Many countries had opted out of the globalization process and were reasserting their national autonomy over economic and social affairs. Some of the leaders of the globalization movement had not only lost credibility because of their exorbitant salaries and benefits, but many of them were before the courts answering to charges of corruption, fraud, and other white-collar crimes. In addition to the decline of globalization as an economic theology or religion, there were other hopeful signs that had not been present 10 years before. For example, Canada, instead of being in a deficit situation as it had been a decade before, was recording surpluses in the billions of dollars in each of the previous eight years, so government deficits could no longer be used as the excuse for cutting social services. As well, the anti-globalization movement, once considered by corporate and government elites as a rag-tag group of extreme anarchists and radicals, showed that people can organize, challenge large movements, and make changes in the face of formidable odds. What was made by an elite few can be unmade and remade.

In addition to a different economic and political context in 2007, there was also a new intellectual context. When the 1997 version of *Structural Social Work* was published, there was a seemingly unalterable tension between modernist and postmodern ideas as they applied to ideas and ideals such as social justice, emancipation, and solidarity that were crucial to the modernist notion of a progressive social work. In 2007, there were several versions of postmodernism, ranging from a nihilistic and individualistic form on one end of the continuum to a critical postmodernism on the other end whereby writers and theorists were attempting to bridge the positive and liberating aspects of the critical social theory tradition with those of postmodernism. This developing epistemology called for: work on the interstices of materialist philosophies and postmodernism; a retention of the ideals of social justice, emancipation, and equality in ways that respect difference, diversity, and inclusion; and an avoidance of totalizing belief systems and essentialisms, on the one hand, and politically disabling fragmentation and witless relativism on the other hand. Most progressive social work writers had moved beyond a modernist versus postmodernist dichotomy. This perspective is the one that guided the new structural social work. This is not to say that antagonisms did not exist between the two, but many believed that a healthy tension existed rather than a binary opposition or dualism.

However, there were also limitations and new social changes that occurred after the 2007 edition was published, requiring an updating. For example, there was a global financial crisis in 2007–8, which negatively affected the welfare state of every Western country, and elections in Canada, the UK, and the US resulted in new federal governments with different approaches to social welfare. These and other updates are included in the current (2018) edition. As well, the new edition includes a major addition—"privilege" as a major cause of oppression, social problems, social inequality, and social injustice. Oppression and privilege are opposite sides of the

same coin. We have oppression because we have privilege, and if we want to eliminate oppression, we must do something about privilege. This is a relatively new perspective in social work, which has dramatic implications for social work theory, practice, and pedagogy.

Part 1 of the present work shows how and why current social work theory and practice are parts of the larger crisis of global capitalism and oppression and what it must do to contribute to the resolution of social problems. Chapter 1 differentiates two major social work perspectives—the conventional view and the progressive view. The former accepts our social system, and the latter seeks to transform it. Structural social work is based on the progressive view and believes that an alternative vision of society must exist in advance of practice as a necessary prerequisite to social transformation. An outline of such a vision based on a progressive view of social work values and principles is developed and articulated, and a progressive critique of the Canadian Association of Social Workers (CASW) 2005 *Code of Ethics* is provided.

The transformation to global capitalism and the devastating effects that it and neo-conservative policies have imposed on the labour market, the autonomy of communities, the social welfare state, the social work profession, and historically marginalized groups are examined in Chapter 2. To date, social work has been ineffective in dealing with the deleterious consequences of the "fiscal crisis of the state" and, therefore, is itself in a state of crisis. This situation has resulted in considerable soul-searching within social work with respect to many of its comfortable assumptions about the nature of society, the nature of social problems, and the nature of social work practice. And although many social workers have fallen back on victim-blaming explanations for social problems, there has been considerable criticism of our present set of social arrangements and our conventional social work practices, and there is a significant call for alternative models and practices. The concept of paradigm is presented in Chapter 2 as a means of exploring alternative models of society more in keeping with human well-being, alternative explanations for social problems more in keeping with people's lived realities, and alternative theories of social work practice more in keeping with social emancipation than social control. There are hopeful signs today on the national and international scenes that were not present a decade ago, and they are presented in Chapter 2. Potentially, they could alleviate some of the devastation incurred since the mid-1970s by global capitalism and ease some of the pressure that social workers have experienced over the past four decades because of the fiscal crisis of the state.

Chapters 3 to 6 examine the ideologies of four dominant societal paradigms (neo-conservatism, liberalism, social democracy, and Marxism) along with how each paradigm views human nature, the nature of society, the role of the state, and the concepts of social justice and social change. Also presented is an explanation that each paradigm offers for the existence of social problems, the ideal social welfare system consistent with each paradigm's ideology and interpretation of social problems, and the nature and form of social work practice dictated by each paradigm.

Chapter 7 presents three critiques of the four paradigms: the feminist critique (i.e., the paradigms are gender-neutral), the anti-racist critique (i.e., the paradigms are colour-neutral), and the postmodern critique (i.e., the paradigms are steeped in modernist thought where there is no respect for diversity and difference and oppressed groups are subjugated under working-class oppression). An argument is made that the progressive paradigms (social democracy and Marxism) must be reconstructed to accommodate these critiques.

Part 2 presents the theoretical basis of structural social work, with oppression as its focus. Chapter 8 compares and contrasts the four paradigms with each other and with the elements of the progressive social work vision outlined in Chapter 1. It is concluded that progressive social work is much more congruent with the socialist paradigms (social democracy and Marxism) than it is with the capitalist paradigms (neo-conservatism and liberalism). However, it must be a *revitalized socialism* and not the "old" socialism of the twentieth century, which reflected a project of emancipation rooted in domination. This revitalized socialism must engage with postmodernism along with feminist, anti-racist, and other struggles against domination and demand the acknowledgement and celebration of diversity in cultures, sexualities, races, ages, abilities, and other human characteristics that were excluded, suppressed, or discriminated against within an unreconstructed modernist version of socialism. The remainder of Chapter 8 discusses the fundamental components of structural social work theory—its socialist ideology, its radical social work heritage, its critical social theory base (including modernism and postmodernism), its conflict or change perspective, its dialectical analysis, its inclusion of all forms of oppression, and a conceptual framework that incorporates these components into social transformative and emancipatory forms of social work practice.

Chapter 9 argues that oppression is an issue of social justice and is the fundamental source of social problems. Rejected are the neo-conservative individual deficiency explanation and the liberal social disorganization explanation of social problems. Presented also are the nature of oppression; its causes, sources and forms; its production and reproduction; the three levels at which it occurs (personal, cultural, and institutional); its dynamics; its effects on oppressed groups, including its internalization; coping mechanisms used by oppressed persons; and the social functions it carries out in the interests of the dominant groups in society. Anti-oppressive social work is a prominent part of this chapter.

Chapter 10 is a new chapter that focuses on "privilege" and argues that it is the underlying source of oppression. Anti-privilege scholarship has a much shorter history than anti-oppressive social work, although both are important components of today's structural social work. This formulation and incorporation of both anti-oppression and anti-privilege as integral parts of structural social work is what makes this book innovative and timely. It acts as a call to all social workers to join in the pursuit of a society characterized by social equality and social justice.

Part 3 outlines several practice elements of structural social work that are derived from its theoretical base. Chapter 11 focuses on structural social work practice within (and against) the system, and Chapter 12 deals with structural social work practice outside (and against) the system as well as some personal characteristics of structural social workers. Chapter 11 discusses several structural social work practice elements to be used with service users that differentiate structural practice from conventional practice. The chapter also looks at how structural social workers can survive in a workplace that they are attempting to politicize and democratize. Issues and strategies of protecting oneself from reprisal while trying to radicalize the workplace are discussed. Chapter 12 considers several arenas for struggle outside the workplace where structural social workers can contribute to social transformation and presents a number of personal attributes that are essential for carrying out structural social work practice. It is argued in the

final section of the chapter that structural social work is much more than a technique or a practice modality. It is a way of life.

When the first edition of *Structural Social Work* appeared in 1993, there were only a few social work programs in Canada (and elsewhere) that might have had a single course on radical or progressive social work. Today, there are entire social work programs that advertise themselves as structural or anti-oppressive or some other variation of progressive social work. Times have changed, and so has structural social work. We hope that this edition of *The New Structural Social Work* reflects and contributes to these changes.

It should be noted that throughout this book, we use the plural "they/their" instead of the singular "he/she" or "his/her." Basically, we have decided to so because the use of "he/she" or "his/her" tends to privilege male over female and also constructs a two-gender world view as normal and natural. "They/their" challenges sexism and gender as binary, is inclusive of all people, and is congruent with the content of this book. The use of "they" and "their" is a change from the previous edition of this book. We appreciate the fact that Oxford University Press is willing to be progressive by allowing us to present a counter-hegemony with respect to gender and sexism.

PART I
In Search of a Paradigm

1 The Social Work Vision: A Progressive View

We do not anticipate the world with our dogmas but instead attempt to discover the new world through the critique of the old.

— Karl Marx (1844)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to present an argument that social work needs an alternative vision of society, one that is more in accordance with the social, emotional, cultural, physical, and spiritual well-being of all people (not just a privileged minority); and (2) to outline such a vision based on the espoused values of the social work profession. By itself, this twofold purpose is impossible to carry out because social work is not a unitary profession. There is no consensus within social work with respect to the ideal nature of society, or the nature and functions of the welfare state, or the nature and political consequences of social work practice. As the title of this chapter suggests, the analysis and discourse presented here are derived from the progressive wing of the social work profession as opposed to the conventional wing.

Conventional and Progressive Perspectives within Social Work

Modern-day social work has two traditions that date back to the latter part of the nineteenth century: the Charity Organization Society movement that began in 1877 in the United States and the Settlement House movement that began in 1884 in England (Chandler, 1995). Although both were products of industrialization and urbanization, each adopted a different view of and approach to the problem of poverty and those experiencing poverty.

The Charity Organization Society movement believed that a rational system of coordinated, private, and scientific philanthropy supplemented by an army of "friendly visitors" would do much to diminish destitution, hardship, and begging. Coordination was viewed as important because otherwise, people living in poverty might take advantage of a fragmented charity system and obtain duplicative goods and services. All decisions regarding this system were made by the

"right" people in the community (i.e., mainly white, middle-class businessmen) because people living in poverty could not be trusted to make responsible decisions affecting their lives; their poverty, after all, was seen as evidence of this inability. (The United Way in Canada is the modern version of a Charity Organization Society.) The role of the friendly visitors (who were mainly volunteer women of high socio-economic status) was to visit people who were experiencing poverty in their homes and teach them life skills, thrift, and moral behaviour. Obviously, the explanation for poverty was one of character defect and moral deficiency, and the solution was to reform the individual. Out of this heritage came one of social work's primary methods (arguably, the primary method) of intervention, a type of casework with individuals and families that focused on coping, adjustment, and restoration of those living in poverty rather than a change of social conditions.

The Settlement House movement's approach to the problem of poverty and to those experiencing it rested on a different assumption from that of the Charity Organization Society movement. Rather than seeing people as makers of their own misfortune, it believed that they were victims of an unjust social order that discriminated against large numbers of people so that a few might benefit. In other words, the capitalist system caused poverty, not the people experiencing

Box 1.1 *Bleeding Hearts and Do-Gooders*

Social workers are sometimes portrayed in negative stereotypes and called such names as "bleeding hearts," "busybodies," and "do-gooders." In the early nineties, I (Bob) was teaching at St Thomas University in Fredericton, New Brunswick. Over the course of a few months there was a particular individual in the community who wrote a series of derogatory letters about social workers to the local newspaper, which were printed on the "Letters to the Editor" page. Referring to social workers as "do-gooders" was his major mantra. One day I'd had enough and wrote my own letter to the editor in response to his letters. The following is a modified version of my letter.

Dear Editor:
I wish to respond to the derogatory, uninformed, and prejudicial letters written by Mr Anti–Social Worker that have appeared in your paper over the past few months. In those letters he constantly refers to social workers and other community-minded people as "do-gooders." It seems to me that the label "do-gooder" suggests there are three kinds of people in the world: those who do good, those who do bad, and those who do nothing. Since Mr Anti–Social Worker is obviously not in the do-good group, I wonder if he could tell us which of the other two groups he belongs to.

A reply from Mr Anti–Social Worker did not follow, and no more social worker–bashing letters from this person appeared.

poverty. People involved in the Settlement House movement established houses in slum neighbourhoods and worked directly with families in attempts to do something about poor sanitary conditions, slum housing, crime, poverty, sweatshop work conditions, and so on. Their focus was on reforming society rather than on reforming the person. Out of this heritage came another of social work's primary methods of intervention, a self-help model of community organization that focused on participation of people living in poverty, community development, and social action.

When social work emerged in the 1940s in Canada as a profession requiring a university-based education, it was faced with the task of trying to reconcile these two different approaches to social problems and to integrate them into the curricula of schools of social work. For a variety of reasons (i.e., the theories of Sigmund Freud and the medical model were the dominant scientific bases of knowledge at that time, and the schools of social work were established mainly by social agencies that were part of the Charity Organization Society system), the casework "reform-the-person" approach became dominant. One only has to look at the disproportionate share of faculty and resources allocated to direct practice courses in most schools of social work today, or to the existing social work literature, or to the current practices employed in most social agencies to see the dominance of casework with its individual reform-the-person approach.[1]

From the above two traditions, modern social work has always had two major competing views of society, social welfare, and social work practice[2]—the conventional view and the progressive or critical view. The conventional view, which has always been held by the majority, is influenced by and reflective of popular beliefs and attitudes about the nature of the individual, of society, and of the relationship between the two. According to this perspective, our present social order, although not perfect, is the best there is, and it ought to be preserved. Society is viewed as comprising social institutions that serve the individual as long as they make full use of available opportunities for personal success. This view acknowledges that social problems do exist but defines them in terms of personal difficulties or immediate environmental issues that require social work intervention either to help people cope with or adjust to existing institutions or to modify existing policies in a limited fashion. Carniol (2010), a progressive Canadian social work scholar, points out that the conventional approach is adopted by those who believe that our institutions are responsive to and capable of meeting people's needs. Obviously, the political function of conventional social work practice is such that by conforming to established institutions, it reinforces, supports, and defends the status quo. This is not to say that there is no disagreement within the conventional view. Most of the political debate about social welfare has been conducted within a liberal–conservative framework, with the former seeing more services as a good thing and the latter seeing fewer services as a good thing (Galper, 1975). Neither liberalism nor conservatism questions the legitimacy of the present capitalist social order, however.

In contrast to the conventional view, the progressive or critical view does not believe that our present social institutions are capable of adequately meeting human need. Social workers with this view are quick to point out that in spite of a social welfare state and social work interventions that have existed for most of the last century and the early part of this century, social problems are not decreasing but, on the contrary, appear to be worsening. Thirty-five years ago there were no soup kitchens or food banks in Canada, nor were there emergency shelters to feed and house any other than derelict populations. Today these residual means of meeting basic needs have

become institutionalized. Progressive social workers also point to the growing gap between rich and poor, to the worsening plight of traditionally disadvantaged groups, to the resurrection of conservatism, and to the social control functions of welfare programs and social work practice as proof that the present set of social arrangements does not work for large numbers of people. Although there has always been a progressive or radical contingent within social work, it has been a minority voice. However, in recent years and in the face of the fiscal crisis of the state, its numbers have been growing as have their challenges to the conventional view.

Carniol (2010, p. 13) believes that the scope, quantity, and areas of injustice, both in Canada and globally, have deep roots and are not easily dislodged.

> Some people reap handsome benefit from injustice, and usually work hard to protect, enlarge, and entrench their well-established privilege. They will also try to ridicule, marginalize, intimidate, and silence individuals, networks, and organizations that expose this unfair privilege.

However, Carniol is optimistic that these injustices are being challenged in significant ways, with many people and groups concluding that equity, inclusion, and democratic accountability are not only possible and desirable but also critically urgent. Social transformation in support of social justice is the ultimate goal of progressive/critical social work, and the pursuit of this goal is a major theme of this book. However, there are disagreements within the progressive camp on how best to achieve this goal. For example, although the elimination of oppression and inequality may be a common goal, feminists, Marxists, social democrats, racialized groups, and so on have often disagreed on the fundamental source of oppression and on the strategies to overcome oppression and inequality. This is further discussed in Chapters 9 and 10.

Social Work Is a Political Profession

Historical overviews of social work perspectives and approaches that have been used in Canada have been discussed elsewhere (Hick, 2010; Jennissen & Lundy, 2011) and, therefore, will not be reproduced here. Instead, some of the major theories or approaches of social work are grouped in Table 1.1 according to the main focus or unit of analysis and change of each. There are two schools of conventional social work. One focuses on the individual or individuals as both the source of and the solutions to problems and has as its goal to help the individual cope with, fit into, and/or adjust to society. The other focuses on the "goodness of fit" between the individual and their environment. This approach seeks change either in the individual or in the individual's limited environment (i.e., within the family, the community, the school, the workplace, etc.). No thought is given to the possibility that maybe the system itself (i.e., society) is unjust and unfix-able and that the solution might be to transform it fundamentally to one based on a different set of values and social dynamics.

It is important to note here that although the conventional approaches outlined in Table 1.1 have historically reinforced the status quo, they can be used in progressive ways, as will be dis-cussed in Chapter 8. In fact, widespread agreement exists that social work has responsibility

Table 1.1 Selected Conventional and Progressive Social Work Perspectives/Approaches

Conventional (consensus-based)		Progressive (conflict/change)
personal change	*person-in-environment (personal change and/or limited social change)*	*fundamental social change/transformation**
· psychodynamic · behavioural · client-centred · psychosocial · clinical · family therapies · casework	· general systems · ecosystems (ecological) · life model · problem-solving · strengths perspective	· feminist theory · Marxist · radical · structural · anti-racist · anti-oppressive · critical · post-colonial · Indigenous · narrative · just therapy

Note: Any of the above can be used within a critical or progressive framework, although traditionally this has rarely occurred.

* Progressive social work today recognizes that fundamental social change cannot occur without fundamental personal change also occurring. Earlier versions of progressive social work tended to emphasize structural changes and psychological preparation to participate in social change activities but gave little or no consideration to the impact of oppressive structures on oppressed groups and how to respond to them in a way that was meaningful.

for both individual and structural (social change) interventions (Trainor, 1996). Today countless social work bodies and publications assert the need for social work to be involved in broader political action and social change (Schneider & Lester, 2001). The principles governing the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) and the social work codes of ethics in Australia, the US, and to a lesser extent Canada all include strong statements in favour of social justice. Many social workers have become involved in political and social action within formal structures of political parties. Therefore, social work must be viewed as a highly political practice in which social problems and their solutions are shaped by access to power and resources.

> To politicize something or someone is to introduce the idea that everything has political elements; that is, to introduce the idea that nothing is neutral and everything involves an overt or covert struggle over power, resources, and affirming identities. . . . When an issue is politicized rather than just thought of as an unfortunate social problem or individual shortcoming, individuals and groups can more easily analyze and act upon it. At the very core of social work's existence are conflicts between competing social-political groups and forces over defining needs and how to interpret and meet needs (Baines, 2011, p. 6).

> **Box 1.2** *Limitations of Systems and Ecological Perspectives*
>
> • They are not theories because they are descriptive only and have no explanatory or predictive capacities.
> • They are so vague and general that they offer little specific guidance for practice.
> • They do not deal with or explain power relationships (i.e., power differentials).
> • They do not accommodate or deal with conflict. All social units (or subsystems) are viewed as interacting in harmony with each other and with the larger system (i.e., society). The whole purpose of a systems approach is to eliminate any conflict that disrupts the system.
> • They operate to maintain the status quo, since the goal is to restore the system to normal functioning.
> • Social problems are believed to be a result of a breakdown between individuals and the subsystems (e.g., family, school, peer group, welfare office) with which they interact.
> • The focus on the here-and-now situation and possibilities for intervention contributes to a neglect of history.
> • There is no recognition or analysis of oppressive social structures that produce inequality.

Unfortunately, systems theory and ecological perspectives (under the "person-in-environment" subheading in Table 1.1), which have now been around for more than 40 years, are still presented as core social work theory in many schools of social work in North America. Box 1.2 outlines a number of serious limitations and flaws with this perspective that have been cited in the progressive literature for more than two decades (see, e.g., Pease, 2003; Finn & Jacobson, 2003). These and other limitations are discussed more fully in Chapter 8.

Need for a Progressive Social Work Vision

Over the past 30 years, we have witnessed an increasing body of social science writings criticizing our present social order because of its failure to provide satisfying levels of living for large numbers of citizens. These criticisms are important for social work because they identify and illuminate the sources of and reasons for many of our social problems and show us what we are struggling against. However, although critical analysis may show us what we are fighting against, by itself it does not show us what we are fighting for. It may be possible to resist dominant forces by engaging in the powerfully negative act of saying "no." But without a clear vision or alternative, that accomplishment of saying "no," while immensely important in terms of building confidence and capacities for struggle, only postpones the battle. To shift from the defensive to the

offensive requires a vision of a different kind of future. However, visions are not blueprints for future societies but provide the guiding principles of social justice "that may be implemented in different ways by different societies, at different times and places, and at different stages of knowledge and technological development" (Gil, 2013, p. 34).

We are passing through a period of history when societal visions or Utopian models of society have not been widely discussed. At present, many of our comfortable and cherished assumptions about the nature of our society and its ability to respond genuinely to human needs are in doubt. The global justice movement has experienced significant success, but it continues to be divided over its political and organizational direction; there are major difficulties in maintaining coalitions, agreeing to solutions to problems, and devising strategies that will have a real impact (Staggenborg, 2012). We need visions of alternative societies. Without such alternatives or visions, there is a danger that we will become victims of distorted notions of justice, well-being, and solidarity, thus denying many people their rightful place in society. Fortunately, given the apparent collapse of (or at least reconstituted) globalism, there is a return to discussions of visions or ideas of a different type of world—one based on social justice—as evidenced by such works as Ferguson, Lavalette, and Whitmore's book *Globalisation, Global Justice and Social Work* (2005), and Dominelli's *Social Work in a Globalizing World* (2010).

Because social work often deals with the casualties and victims of society, it too must become involved in questioning our present social arrangement. Given social work's belief in the inherent dignity and worth of the person, it must ask itself what type of society best promotes this ideal. Given social work's belief that people have a right to develop fully and freely their inherent human potential and to live productive and satisfying lives free from domination and exploitation by others, those in social work must ask what social arrangements best accommodate these values. In other words, what type of society best promotes the values, ideals, principles, and beliefs espoused by the social work profession? What is the vision that social work should pursue?

Unfortunately, it would be impossible to reach consensus among social workers on such a vision of society. A major obstacle to developing and articulating a universally accepted social work vision is the existence of the two incompatible views of current society, social welfare, and social work. Not even a common value base or a professional code of ethics is enough to unify the profession with respect to the coexisting conventional and progressive views. However, all social workers have a role to play in advocating for a world that is rooted in equality and can become allies in struggles for liberation and the elimination of structural inequalities that impede human growth and development (Dominelli, 2010, p. 171).

A Code of Ethics for Progressive Social Workers

If the espoused values of social work were to be used to formulate a social work vision, the nature and form of that vision would differ depending on whether a conventional or progressive view was used. The 2005 Canadian Association of Social Workers (CASW) *Code of Ethics* reflects a "liberal-humanist" approach to social work that seeks to comfort victims of social problems rather than a critical approach that seeks fundamental social change (i.e., transformation). Many of the changes to the Canadian *Code* were made in support of a competency-based framework for

overseeing practice that has been developed by the Canadian Council of Social Work Regulators (CCSWR), a group formed by a national association of provincial regulatory bodies. The council has developed entry-level competencies for the social work profession in Canada, arguing that professional regulation is necessary to protect citizens from persons who are "unqualified, incompetent or unfit to practice" (CCSWR, 2012). The council states that a further benefit of a competency-based framework is that education and training will be guided by regulation. In reality, Canadian social work educational institutions are being coerced into developing academic programs with more emphasis on learning about a variety of intervention techniques and assessments related to determining eligibility for services than on understanding the importance of connecting social work theory with practice. The definition and context of social work practice being advocated within the Competency Profile is based on an ecological perspective, which has been criticized for its serious limitations and flaws (Box 1.2).

> Social workers provide social services to a broad range of clients specifically focusing on their social development and the improvement or restoration of their social functioning, in particular by psychosocial evaluations and social intervention, by means of an approach focused in the interactions with the environment (CCSWR, 2012).

The current Canadian Association of Social Workers' *Code of Ethics* (2005) has retreated to an era when there was no vision or articulation of what social work wanted, when no statement of social philosophy existed, and when the primary task of social work was to help people cope with, adjust to, and/or fit back into the very society that caused them problems in the first place. In other words, the *Code* emphasizes residual ideas and regressive practices. Mullaly (2006) outlines a number of its major limitations:

1.   *No philosophical statement or vision.* Without a vision, what type of society should social work have as its goal? What is it that gives social work a sense of direction? The *Code* is silent on this issue. It does state in its preamble (p. 3) that "[t]he social work profession is dedicated to the welfare and self-realization of all people," but it does not offer an opinion on what type or kind of society would best promote this principle. Is it our current North American society with its value base of individualism and cutthroat competition? Or is it a society based on a different set of values that are more consistent with social work values? Without such social ideals, what is it that inspires social work? What is its social raison d'être? Why doesn't the *Code* have a vision statement along the following lines?

> The vision of the profession of Social Work is to help create and contribute to a world where there are no great inequalities of wealth or income, where economic and political power is more evenly distributed, where human need is the central value of distribution of society's resources, where diversity of culture is celebrated, where people have greater control over their own lives, and where all persons are afforded maximum opportunity to enrich their physical, spiritual, psychological, and intellectual well-being.
> (taken from the *Vision Statement* of the Faculty of Social Work,
> University of Manitoba, http://law.robsonhall.com/chrr/experts/social-work/)

2.   *The client is no longer the primary professional obligation.* The *Code* states, "Social workers maintain the best interests of clients as *a priority* with due regard to the respective interests of others" (p. 3; emphasis added). In other words, the client is no longer the primary obligation of the social worker but just one "other" priority. Given that the best interests of the client often conflict with the interests of the agency (or of more powerful others), whose interests are likely to win out in such conflicts—the client's or one's employer?

3.   *The fallacy of equal opportunity or universal impartiality.* A regressive stance in the *Code* is found in "Value 4: Integrity in Practice," in which it is stated that "Social Workers strive for *impartiality* in their professional practice" (p. 6; emphasis added). Impartiality is a liberal-humanist notion that was adopted as a professional norm by mainstream social work dating back to at least 1958 when Wilensky and Lebeaux called for it to become part of the social work "professional self." The notion of professional impartiality specifies the desirability of providing social work services to people without regard to gender, class, race, sexuality, age, and so on. In other words, all people should be treated equally. However, as Galper pointed out in 1975, and as feminists and anti-racist writers argued in the 1980s and 1990s, although perhaps well-intentioned this mandate carries with it a limited notion of fairness. By treating people equally, we are assuming that the standard of equality is "equality of opportunity," thus ignoring important social differences. Equality of opportunity assumes that people start from the same place and compete equally for resources, including social welfare benefits and social work services. Persons and/or groups may be equal before the law, but not all people or groups start out at the same position, which means that not all people or groups are able to exercise their rights or access resources or use their opportunities to the same extent as more privileged groups. If some groups are in a better position to use opportunities because of their social position and the resources available to them, then notions of impartiality and equal opportunity discriminate against other groups (e.g., Indigenous groups, people living in poverty, racialized individuals, refugees, and disabled persons) who have been historically marginalized in our society. The whole fallacy of the impartiality position is that social groups differ with respect to their ability or capacity to use opportunities and to access services. To treat all social groups as if they were all the same is to maintain the inequalities that exist among them.

4.   *Acknowledgement of diversity.* Ethical Guideline 1.2 in the *Code*, titled "Demonstrate Cultural Awareness and Sensitivity," contains a subclause 1.2.2: "Social Workers *acknowledge* the diversity within and among individuals, communities and cultures" (p. 4; emphasis added). Given our so-called pluralistic or multicultural Canadian society and the fact that the present white majority is predicted to become a minority within 20 years, why does the *Code* not make a stronger and more positive statement about culture, such as "Social Workers celebrate and promote the diversity of culture"? Use of the word "acknowledge" could be interpreted to mean "recognize" only or "tolerate" rather than appreciate. Recognition or acknowledgement of diversity is part of the multicultural model of social work that now has more than 10 years of critique from the feminist, anti-racist, post-colonial, postmodern, Indigenous, and other progressive social work perspectives, and this model has been rejected in favour of an anti-oppressive or "politics of difference" approach to diversity (see Mullaly, 2010).

5.   *Limited self-determination.* The *Code* states under Ethical Guideline 1.3, "Promote Client Self-Determination and Informed Consent," that with respect to agency records, "Social Workers . . . provide them [clients] with honest and accurate information regarding . . . the client's right to view professional records and to seek avenues of complaint" (p. 5), but this does not go far enough. If we are talking about promoting or maximizing "client self-determination," the *Code* should stipulate that service users have the right to write their own recordings or tell their stories and have them placed in the file along with any other document they may wish to have placed there. By not clearly stating so, we continue to privilege professional knowledge over personal experience—something for which the profession has been criticized by various service user groups and contemporary social theorists.

Given this critique of the 2005 CASW *Code of Ethics*, what kind of code of ethics would suit social workers who are interested in fundamental social change (i.e., social transformation)? Jeffry Galper developed such a code back in 1975. More recently, two Australian progressive social workers, Heather Fraser and Linda Briskman (2004), developed a code that would be more relevant to progressive social work practice in the new millennium (Box 1.3). They point out that this code is not a definitive or final declaration but a way to open discussion with progressive social workers around the world. The code is presented here so that a comparison might be made with the CASW 2005 *Code of Ethics*.

Box 1.3 *Code of Ethics for Progressive Social Workers*

1.   We regard our primary obligation to be the welfare of all humankind, across the globe, not just those in our immediate vicinity.
2.   We understand the contradictions inherent in delivering social work services in a capitalist society. We know that the state can be both oppressive and supportive.
3.   We never claim to be "apolitical" or "neutral" and we define social justice in political, material and global terms, not just psychological terms.
4.   We respect the need for resources and decision-making processes to be fairly shared, and we realize that this will be hard to achieve given the current political order.
5.   We recognize the importance of language and try to show sensitivity through the words that we use. However, we realize that we might "get it wrong."
6.   We value processes as much as "products" or "outcomes" and we are—at the very least—skeptical of using violence to deal with conflict.
7.   We define power in possessive and relational ways. This means that while we are wary of calling anyone "powerless," we are also aware of the way dominant groups can exercise power over people who are oppressed on the basis of race, gender, class, ability, age, sexual orientation and geographical location.

8. Because we strive to live in a society where people are able to exercise their human rights, we try to democratize our professional relationships as well as our personal ones.
9. We do not see financial profit as the primary motive in life. Thus, we do not uphold the tenets of global capitalism nor do we value paid work over that which is unpaid.
10. While we appreciate the importance of group bonds, we are wary of the way nationalism can be used to deride and exclude others. In so doing, we seek to work with people from diverse backgrounds in equitable and culturally sensitive ways.
11. We value education for the ways it can be used to develop critical consciousness.
12. We respect the need for oppressed groups to sometimes "go it alone." Yet, we do not presume this will always be their preference. Instead, we are open to providing support/resources to oppressed groups in a manner that they suggest will be useful.
13. While developing knowledge that will be useful to social transformation, we speak up whenever we can about acts of unfairness that we see, using all sorts of media to broadcast our observations and ideas.
14. We recognize the potentially conservative nature of all methods of social work and strive to radicalize all forms of social work that we undertake. As we do this, we avoid individual acts of heroism or martyrdom, preferring instead to work in collaboration with others.
15. We do not see ourselves sitting outside society, or as liberators of the "needy" or the "downtrodden." Rather, we try to use the benefits derived from our professional status to work against the exploitation of individuals and groups.
16. We try to do all this in everyday, reflexive ways, without posturing as self-appointed experts.
17. Given the obstacles that confront us, we realize that fatalism, cynicism and despair may set in. To prevent this we try to keep a sense of humour, have fun with others and incorporate self-care activities into our lives.

Source: Fraser & Briskman (2004).

Another example of a progressive code of ethics is that of the Radical Social Work Group (Morgaine & Capous-Desyllas, 2015). This organization, founded in 2008, is a New York City–based collective and community of social service workers and activists who organized for social justice and human rights. Its mission is to promote social change by challenging the systems of injustice that they and their service users face and to transform society by using radical social work principles and practices. This group lists the following values and points of unity that guide the practices of members of the Radical Social Work Group:

- We believe in anti-racist, anti-oppressive social work practice that challenges the institutions which social work contributes to.

- Base our work on the common values of human rights and social justice.
- Creating a space free of coercion; respecting one another's self-determination: politics, identity and choices.
- Moving beyond our fears and being independent of the institutions that use social work and social workers as a means of control.
- Creating a worldview that avoids designation of identity, stereotypes, or prejudgments.
- Be allies & honor culture, ethnicity, race, class, gender, sexual orientation, etc.
- We are committed to a true democracy; we are committed to transparency & consensus.
- Stay accountable to the people we work for, with each other, ourselves, and the planet.
- Work to move away from being "anti___" towards the creation of something.
- We understand that there's conflict and resistance in social work schools & programs to transform the field and combat conservatism.
- We will not reduce human beings to "cases" to be "managed," manipulated or coerced, or ourselves to mere "workers."

— From https://radicalsocialwork.org

We present these two progressive codes here to show: (1) how mainstream codes of ethics are inadequate for practices of progressive social work; and (2) that there are other social work writers and groups that are developing progressive codes of ethics.

The Fundamental Values of Social Work

Values consist of beliefs, preferences, or assumptions about what is good or desirable for people. They are not assertions or descriptions of the way the world is but rather of how the world ought to be. Values do not stand alone but exist in systems of thought and are organized in such a way that they have a relative importance to other values. Fundamental or primary values represent ideals or goals that a profession attempts to achieve—that is, the end product. Secondary or instrumental values specify the means to achieve these goals or desired ends.

There are many social workers who believe that codes of ethics focus on an individual professional's behaviour and that they serve to pathologize practitioners when many of the problems they encounter in promoting best practice may be structural (Dominelli, 2010). Workers are made to feel individually accountable for judgments made. The prominence of personal responsibility results in the creation of practitioners who work at developing strong decision-making skills. However, ethical dilemmas that involve structural inadequacies may be viewed as personal dilemmas rather than as part of broader societal factors. As a result, social work practitioners may view ethics as being primarily a personal rather than a communal responsibility, supported by codes that place the blame for inadequacies squarely on the shoulders of individual practitioners (Weinberg, 2010, p. 36). However, ethics is also concerned with oppression as a process within groups that has the power to limit the lives, experiences, and opportunities of groups in an unjust way.

> Matters of conduct, ethical judgment and decision making of individual professionals cannot be abstracted from the political and policy contexts in which they take place. Individual professionals are both influenced by and help create the ethical discourses of the organizations where they work and the policy frameworks within which they practice. There is a tendency in some of the ethics literature to focus on the individual practitioner making difficult ethical decisions in cases that are sometimes constructed in ways that are decontextualized, both from the character and motives of the individual people involved and from the organization, policy, political and social context (Banks, 2008, p. 1245).

The International Federation of Social Workers' (IFSW) definition of social work (2012) supports principles of human rights and social justice as being fundamental to social work. Although both the IFSW and the CASW codes of ethics identify the pursuit of social justice as a value, they present a limited and limiting view of social justice. That is, social justice is defined only in terms of distributing or redistributing society's resources (i.e., distributive or redistributive justice), which excludes doing anything about the social institutions, policies, processes, and practices responsible for the inequitable distribution in the first place. A (re)distributive view of social justice simply compensates victims of social injustice and does nothing to change a society characterized by inequality along lines of race, class, gender, age, sexuality, and so on.

Social Justice

In her classic book *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990), American philosopher and feminist Iris Marion Young contends that contemporary philosophical theories of justice do not conceive justice broadly enough. Instead, they restrict themselves to an interpretation of social justice as the morally proper distribution of benefits and burdens among all society's members. The benefits to be distributed would include both material resources, such as wealth and income, and non-material social goods, such as rights, opportunities, and power. Issues of distributive justice are analogous to persons dividing a stock of goods and comparing the amount or size of the portions. Injustice, according to this distributive notion of social justice, would be defined as a situation in which one group has a monopoly over a particular good. Equating the scope of social justice only with distribution is misleading in two ways: (1) the social processes and practices that caused the maldistribution in the first place are ignored; and (2) the limits of the logic of extending the notion of distribution to such non-material goods and resources as rights and opportunities are not recognized.

Young notes that the distributional view of justice assumes a social atomist or individualist perspective of people in that they are externally related to the goods they possess and only related to one another in terms of a comparison of the amounts of goods they possess. The institutional contexts within which distribution occurs are ignored. These institutional contexts include all social structures and practices, the rules and norms that guide them, and the language and symbols that mediate social interactions within them. This context affects distribution—what is distributed, how it is distributed, who distributes it, who receives it, and what the outcome is. An

example presented by Young (1990, p. 23) is economic inequality. Discussions of distribution often omit the decision-making structures that determine economic relations in society.

> Economic domination in our society occurs not simply because persons have more wealth and income than others, as important as this is. Economic domination derives at least as much from the corporate and legal structures and procedures that give some persons the power to make decisions about investment, production, marketing, employment, interest rates, and wages that affect millions of other people. Not all who make these decisions are wealthy or even privileged, but the decision-making structure operates to reproduce distributive inequality and the unjust constraints on people's lives.

Welfare capitalism and conventional social work have adopted the distributional concept of social justice in that their focus has been on the distribution and redistribution of income and other resources (often defined in terms of some kind of social minimum). Discussion has tended to centre on inequalities of wealth and income and the extent to which the state can or should alleviate the suffering of the poor and disadvantaged. Indeed, the immediate provision of basic goods and services for people suffering severe deprivation must be a first priority for any group or program seeking social justice. Any conception of justice must take into account the vast differences in the amount of material goods that exist in our society, where thousands starve and live on the streets while others can have anything they want (Young, 1990).

Limits of Extending Distribution to the Non-material

Advocates of the distributive theory of justice claim that any issue of justice, including such non-material things as rights and opportunities, may be treated as "goods" or some aggregate of things to be possessed and/or distributed and redistributed. Young argues that such treatment produces a misleading conception of the issues of justice involved because it reifies aspects of social life that are better understood as functions of rules, relations, and processes than as things. Distributing or redistributing rights and opportunities is not the same as distributing or redistributing income because rights and opportunities are not possessions. Some groups may have rights and opportunities that other groups do not have, but extending them to the groups that do not have them does not entail that the formerly privileged group must surrender some of its rights and/or opportunities as it does in the case of a redistribution of income. Rights are not things but relationships; rights are institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to others. "Rights refer to doing more than having, to social relationships that enable or constrain action" (Young, 1990, p. 25). In other words, people may have certain rights but be unable to exercise them because of particular constraints based on class, gender, race, and so on. For example, a person living in poverty may have a right to a fair trial but be unable financially to hire proper legal counsel.

Similarly, opportunity refers to doing rather than to having. It is a condition of enablement rather than of possession and usually involves a system of social rules and social relations, as well as an individual's skills and abilities. Having opportunities may lead to securing material

goods such as food, shelter, and a job, but it is no guarantee that these goods and services will be secured. Just as people may have certain rights but are unable to exercise them, so too might people have certain opportunities but be constrained from using them because of particular social relations and practices. For example, in Canada we may say that Indigenous persons have the opportunity to obtain an education, but education occurs in a complex context of social relations. Indigenous people tend to have inferior schools, fewer material resources, and less access to tutors and computers, as well as the experience of culture shock in off-reserve schools. This is not to say that distribution is irrelevant to educational opportunities, but that opportunity has a wider scope than distribution (Young, 1990).

Certainly, then, the distributive theory of social justice contains a major limitation. By focusing on something that must be identifiable and assignable, it reifies social relations and processes and institutional rules. It gives primacy to substance over relations, rules, and processes by conceiving of people as social atoms, thus failing to appreciate that individual identity and capacities are themselves the products of social relations and processes (Taylor, 1985, cited in Young, 1990). Such an atomistic social ontology ignores or obscures the importance of institutional contexts, rules, social relations, and processes for understanding issues of social justice. An adequate conception of social justice must understand and evaluate these social phenomena as well as the substance of distribution (Young, 1990).

Heller (1987) suggests a conception of justice that includes social phenomena. She views justice as primarily the virtue of citizenship wherein persons collectively consider problems and issues facing them within their institutions and actions, under conditions free from oppression and domination, with reciprocity and mutual tolerance of differences. Young argues that this conception of justice shifts the focus from distribution issues to procedural issues of participation in deliberation and decision-making.

- A norm would be just only if people who follow it have an effective voice in its consideration and acceptance.
- A social condition would be just only if it enabled all people to meet their needs and exercise their freedoms.
- A social process would be just only if it were an inclusive process with respect to different social groupings.
- A social practice would be just only if it is in accordance with how people carrying it out would like to be treated themselves.

Social injustice from this perspective entails not only an unfair distribution of goods and resources but includes any norm, social condition, social process, or social practice that interferes with or constrains one from fully participating in society—that is, from becoming a full citizen. This concept of social justice is empowering because it goes beyond a concern with distribution to include the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation (Young, 1990). A society may be evaluated as just to the degree that it contains and supports the institutional conditions necessary for the promotion of the universal value that everyone is of equal intrinsic worth.

Egalitarianism

Although more than one meaning can be ascribed to the term "egalitarianism,"[3] the one that forms part of a progressive social work ideology is that of "social equality." David Gil (1976; 1998) has written eloquently and extensively on the notion of social equality from a social work perspective. He argues that if we wish to establish a society based on social equality, we need to explicate the meaning of this overused, yet elusive, concept. The central value premise of social equality is that every person is of equal intrinsic worth and should therefore be entitled to equal civil, political, social, and economic rights, responsibilities, and treatment.

Implicit is the belief "that every individual should have the right and the resources to develop freely and fully, to actualize his [or her] inherent human potential, and to lead as fulfilling a life [as possible] free of domination, control and exploitation by others" (Gil, 1976, p. 4). Social equality is a correlate of humanism because the dignity of the person cannot be achieved if some people have control over others, have preferred access to life chances, or have more power concerning public affairs: "Genuine democracy, liberty and individuality for all are simply not feasible without social equality" (Gil, 1976, p. 4). A society based on social inequality is based on the value premise that people differ in intrinsic worth and therefore are entitled to different rights and to as much power, control, and material goods as they can gain in competition with others. Humanistic ideals cannot be reached in such a society.

Social equality does not mean monotonous uniformity; rather, it aims at the realization of individual differences in innate potentialities, not at the division of available resources into identical parts for every member of society. The key element in arriving at a humanistic and egalitarian society is the development of a true collectivist spirit. This means taking seriously the fact that people form a social entity called a society when they live together. This does not mean uniform blandness or submission to the group, but it recognizes that decisions made in those areas affecting the whole must be subjected to collective thought and to collective action in the light of collective needs and resources.[4] Collectivism implies participatory decision-making, not hierarchical decisions made at the top and passed down. People should have a say in the decisions that affect any area of their lives—social, economic, political, work, the distribution of society's resources, and so on. This type of decision-making cannot occur in a society based on social inequality.

Humanism

The CASW *Code of Ethics* (2005, p. 4) states that "social work is founded on a long-standing commitment to respect the inherent dignity and worth of persons." Humanism (used interchangeably in the social work literature with the term "humanitarianism"[5]) is defined as "a system of views based on the respect for the dignity and rights of man [*sic*], his value as a personality, concern for his welfare, his all-round development, and the creation of favourable conditions for social life" (Saiflin & Dixon, 1984). This view of the person recognizes that the individual should be the focus of all societal decisions. A society based on humanism would not only recognize the universal nature of human need but would actively attempt to provide to everyone conditions

conducive to physical survival, mental health, self-respect, dignity, love, a sense of identity, the opportunity to use one's intellect, and happiness (Hardy, 1981a). Such a commitment must be based on social equality, cooperation, and collective orientation (Gil, 1976), and consideration of all economic decisions ought to be based on their implications for human welfare (Galper, 1975).

Goroff (1981) has articulated his view of a society based on humanism as one in which: (1) each individual is seen as a person with inherent dignity and worth and not as an object with utility; (2) relationships among human beings are non-exploitative, cooperative, and egalitarian; (3) resources created by human beings through their labour are distributed so as to provide each person with the goods and services to meet his or her needs without denying others theirs; and (4) each individual has equal opportunities to develop his or her fullest human potential. There is consensus in the social welfare and social work literatures that our present North American society does not contain these humanistic characteristics.[6]

Because it has been suggested by some writers on the subject of the philosophy of social work that the values of social work are firmly rooted in humanism (e.g., Payne, 1997; Ife, 1997), we should be aware of the limitations of humanism. A common criticism of humanism is that it is ahistorical and does not consider the social context of people's lives—that is, it overlooks the implications of inequalities (Clark & Asquith, 1985; Rojek, Peacock, & Collins, 1988) and does not contain a structural analysis of oppression (Ife, 1997). Certainly, notions of "acceptance" in social work have been influenced by humanism in that social work practice has often excluded concern for the material hardships of service users (Biehal & Sainsbury, 1991). Psychoanalytic, client-centred, and family therapies, for the most part, have focused on introspection, self-realization, and interpersonal dynamics rather than on the social context of people's lives. An example of overlooking material impoverishment and social context is the fact that poverty was rediscovered in the 1960s by people other than social workers.[7]

Another criticism of humanism comes from post-colonial writers (see Gandhi, 1998, for a discussion of this point), who point out that humanism is a Western concept that assumes a Western superiority over all other cultures and societies. As well, postmodernists criticize humanism (particularly radical humanism) for overlooking discourse, subjectivity, and subject position (Pease, 2003). However, the position adopted here is that there are different versions of humanism and that such forms as a critical humanism (Ife, 1997) or a radical humanism (Howe, 1987; Mullaly & Keating, 1991), which emphasize dominant ideology and consciousness, are essential for developing progressive forms of social work. Bob Pease (2003) argues that radical forms of humanism can contribute to progressive forms of social work practice if they are supplemented by critical theory traditions of materialist perspectives emphasizing material conditions and lived experiences, Marxist and feminist Freudian views emphasizing the unconscious and repression, and postmodern perspectives emphasizing discourse, subjectivity, and subject position. Also, radical humanism must be accompanied by another perspective on social interpretation and social change—that is, radical structuralism. An elaboration of these ideas is presented in Chapter 8.

In sum, humanism and social equality must form the twin pillars of an ideal social work society. These fundamental values, and not inequality, rugged individualism, and cutthroat competition, support the dignity and intrinsic worth of people. To realize these fundamental values,

society must be arranged according to the principles of collectivism, participatory decision-making, and cooperation and not according to the practices of exploitation, distribution of resources according to economic profit rather than social need, and hierarchical, elitist decision-making. A social work vision of society is based on the premise that the present set of social arrangements is not a natural phenomenon but is, instead, the result of person-made decisions. "People can be self-determining about social forms and can shape and reshape them to meet their current needs" (Galper, 1975, p. 151). In other words, given the political will, a society can develop a social order that promotes human welfare. In addition to meeting people's individual needs, it is part of the progressive social work mission to promote this political will. Gil (1990, pp. 20–21) reminds us that social work practice cannot be politically neutral: "it either confronts and challenges established societal institutions or it conforms to them openly or tacitly. [Social work] practitioners should avoid the illusion of neutrality and should consciously choose and acknowledge their political philosophy."

The Secondary (Instrumental) Values of Social Work

Social work's secondary or instrumental values stem from its fundamental values and contribute to the goal of social justice premised on humanism and egalitarianism. "They dictate the ways the [social] worker should interact with others in carrying out his [or her] professional activities so as to actualize the primary values, that is to achieve the desired ends or goals" (Pincus & Minahan, 1973, p. 39). Secondary values highlighted within the principles of the International Federation of Social Workers' *Statement of Principles* (2005) are respect, self-determination, and acceptance of difference. The operationalization of these three values is assumed to contribute to the situation in which the worth and dignity of people are realized. We affirm people's worth and dignity by showing respect for them, by allowing them maximum feasible self-determination, and by accepting their individualities.

Statham (1978, p. 34) argues that these instrumental values are meaningless in societies based on economic individualism rather than on social equality:

> Social workers affirm their belief in the worth of each person by virtue of their humanity and see them as having needs in common, but the society in which they operate distributes rewards unequally, not because of faulty mechanisms which can be remedied by social work or reform, but because the allocation of rewards is intended to operate in this way.

Do we not negate the respect we extend to clients in our interpersonal relationships with them if we accept a social order based on economic individualism with its inevitable consequences of poverty, homelessness, deprivation, and unemployment? By accepting a person's individuality, are we also accepting their social and economic conditions? And how can we practice self-determination with people who do not possess the economic and social resources necessary

for choices to be realized? Self-determination often has meaning only for those possessing the economic resources and social status necessary to implement choice. In a society based on inequality, self-determination is not possible for persons who are powerless "to resolve, by their individual efforts, the problems created, for instance, by inadequate income, housing, or by unemployment" (Statham, 1978, p. 27).

It would seem, then, that social work's instrumental values are illusory if, as Biehal and Sainsbury (1991, p. 249) suggest, "They are not seen in the context of people's lives—notably the context of differences in power." It is not enough to show respect and acceptance for people and offer them choices restricted by their social position in society. Cries for acceptance of rights for people are empty slogans if the reality of power (to exercise rights) is ignored. Social work must also be concerned with realizing a society that promotes social work values rather than one that negates or compromises them. It would seem that only a society founded on humanitarian and egalitarian ideals can accommodate these secondary values. Surely, an imperative for social work is to work toward the establishment of a social vision based on its own value position.

A Progressive Perspective of Social Work Ideology

An ideology is a consistent set of social, economic, and political beliefs. It serves as the foundation and determines the nature and world view of particular social paradigms. Social work has historically been practised in an arena of conflicting beliefs. There has always been some degree of conflict between the social, economic, and political beliefs of the larger society and those espoused by the social work profession in general and by the progressive sector of the profession in particular. Social workers currently operate at the meeting place of the conflict between the dominant values of liberal capitalism and the dominant social work values of humanism and egalitarianism.[8]

Many social workers also experience conflict within their own social, economic, and political beliefs. For example, social workers may subscribe to social beliefs about the dignity and worth of people but also subscribe to our present capitalist economic system based on competition and exploitation, without realizing the inherent conflict between their humanitarian social beliefs and their capitalist economic beliefs. As well, many social workers may believe that self-determination is a laudable goal but will not question our present system of representative democracy in which self-determination and meaningful participation are not options for large numbers of people.

Although social workers espouse many humanitarian and egalitarian beliefs, insufficient attention has been paid to integrating these beliefs in any consistent fashion. Thus, an articulation of social work ideology must entail a delineation of specific social beliefs, economic beliefs, and political beliefs that are consistent with one another. Otherwise, the present hodge-podge of beliefs will continue to present conflict, inconsistency, and uncertainty to social workers in their everyday practice and will do nothing in terms of informing social workers of the nature and form that society would assume if it were to be congruent with social work ideology.

Social Beliefs

David Gil (1976, p. 242) has described in humanistic and egalitarian terms the nature of the relationship between people and the society in which they live:

> All humans, everywhere, despite their manifest differences and their uniqueness as individuals, should be considered of equal intrinsic worth. Hence, they should be deemed entitled to equal social, economic, civil, and political rights, liberties and obligations. Societal institutions . . . should assure and facilitate the exercise of these equal rights, and the free, autonomous, and authentic development of all humans.

This view of people is one in which persons are considered social beings. John Friedmann (1973) contrasts this view of social beings with economic individualism, which perceives people as independent, gratification-maximizing individuals with no social responsibility for others. What distinguishes people as social beings from people as economic individualists is that the former view is based on the notion of community and the latter on the notion of the "rugged individual." Whereas the economic individualist equates public well-being with the mere aggregation of individual interests, the social view of persons recognizes public well-being as a more complex construct made up of not only the aggregate of its members but also the relationships among them.

Friedmann argues that the view of people as social beings is essentially moral whereas the view of people as economic individualists is essentially amoral. As a social being, a person is a thinking and feeling animal who stands in relation to others as a person. A person's recognition of the other person as one like them establishes the manner in which their relationship will be fulfilled. People will treat others as they themselves would want to be treated. A society built on the image of economic individualism would be simply "a bundle of functional roles . . . superordinated, subordinated, or equal and either useful to you or not," a relationship based on a "suspicion of mutual exploitation" (Friedmann, 1973, pp. 6, 5). In the economic individualist view, the notion of the public well-being is arrived at by summing the individual utilities in the marketplace. The worth of a person is judged mainly by what they earn and/or own. Community, which is the cornerstone of civilized life, is not possible with such an amoral foundation. "Without community, there can be no justice, and without justice, life becomes brutish and destructive of both the self and others" (Friedmann, 1973, p. 4).

Economic Beliefs

In *The Politics of Social Services* (1975), Jeffry Galper outlines a set of economic beliefs consistent with social work values. He contrasts these beliefs with the practices of competitive and capitalist economy, which is based on the criterion of profitability. Galper contends that if we are to be successful in creating a world conducive to human well-being, then we must find a way to dominate, rather than be dominated by, economics. Neither the invisible hand of the marketplace nor the

present partnership of government and big business ensures that social priorities will dominate economic decision-making.

Galper (1975, pp. 142–143) argues that in our present economic system, the goods produced, the decisions made, and the number and nature of jobs available for people are determined on the basis of profitability. The consequences of this system are:

> an overabundance of goods that do not add up to a fundamental sense of well-being for most people, an absence of goods that we need but that are not profitable to produce, jobs that are destructive to people who hold them, a national psychology organized around competition and consumption, ecological destruction, and exploitation of large parts of the rest of the world to enable us to maintain our standards of material achievement. Human well-being is not, as it should be, the rationale for our actions.

Galper contrasts our present economic system with one in which all decisions of production are based on the criterion of human need. In other words, decisions about what should be produced and in what quantities, as well as when, where, and how, should be made according to their impact on our overall well-being. Galper uses two examples: (1) the decision to produce cars would not be made exclusively on the basis of their saleability but on the basis of such social criteria as the relative emphasis to be given to private versus public transportation, pollution, use of raw materials, safety, and the nature of the work experience for people; and (2) a new factory would be located not just according to the availability of raw materials, labour, and transportation, or for political gain, but according to the development needs of the various regions of the country. An economic system consistent with social work ideals would assure each person full economic rights, and the distribution of wealth, goods, and resources would be much more equitable than it is at present.

In sum, to be consistent with social work ideals, the economic system must be rationalized from a social perspective. It must be viewed as the means to achieve those social goals to which social work aspires, not as an end in itself. Goods must be produced for their utility rather than their profitability, and consideration should be given to all the costs (social, economic, ecological, and so on) of production. Finally, the distribution of wealth, rather than following social Darwinian notions, must be done according to social determinations—those factors that contribute to the well-being of all citizens, not just of those who own the means of production. These principles are, of course, contradictory to and inconsistent with the laissez-faire principles of our present liberal-capitalist economic system.

Political Beliefs

Social work subscribes to the democratic ideals of self-determination, participation, and an equal distribution of political power. In fact, much of social work practice is directed toward individuals and groups, helping them to gain or regain autonomy and control over their lives. However, there are basically two methods by which democracy can be practised: representative democracy and participatory democracy.

We all are used to the representative form of government. Pateman (1970, cited in Hardy, 1981b, p. 17) describes and analyzes this system of democracy:

> The characteristically democratic element . . . is the competition of leaders for the votes of the people at periodic, free elections. Elections are crucial to the democratic method for it is primarily through elections that the majority can exercise control over their leaders through loss of office. . . . The decisions of leaders can also be influenced by active groups bringing pressure to bear during inter-election periods. "Political equality" in the theory [of representative democracy] refers to universal suffrage and to the existence of equality of opportunity of access to channels of influence over leaders. . . . The level of participation by the majority should not rise much above the minimum level necessary to keep the democratic method working; that is, it should remain at about the level that exists in Anglo-American democracies.

Although this model of democracy is relatively efficient in terms of the time it takes to make decisions, its weaknesses have been well documented in the literature (Galper, 1975; Hardy, 1981b; Naiman, 1997; Wharf & Cossom, 1987). (1) Political elites at times make decisions that are not responsive to the wishes of the electorate. (2) Interest pressure groups may gain some sectional advantage at the expense of more general welfare. (3) Unorganized sections of society may be ignored or exploited by powerful, organized sections. (4) The right to vote every few years is inconsistent with the notion of democracy. (5) Such a system promotes and relies on a considerable degree of passivity in the majority of people. (6) In the absence of participatory principles, those who make decisions will be those who have benefited most from the system and, therefore, have the least commitment to changing it. "Though democratic in the way it is chosen, representative government has been shown to be elitist in the way that it operates" (Lees, 1972, p. 39).

By way of contrast, participatory democracy would produce a very different world (Hardy, 1981b). It would permit and encourage greater popular participation in non-governmental bodies like industry, trade unions, political parties, corporations, schools, universities, and the like (Lees, 1972; Naiman, 1997). In addition, it would delegate a larger share of public power to local communities small enough to permit effective and meaningful general participation in decision-making:

> Participation in politics would provide individuals with opportunities to take part in making significant decisions about their everyday lives. It would build and consolidate a sense of genuine community that would serve as a solid foundation for government. The first and most important step is to recognize that personal self-development is the moral goal of democracy and that direct popular participation is the chief means of achieving it. When this is generally accepted, then society can get on with the largely technical job of thinking up new and better means for increasing popular participation (Lees, 1972, p. 41).

Surely, given social work's values and ideals with respect to egalitarianism, self-determination, and so on, participatory democracy rather than representative democracy is the preferred form of democracy.

Summary of Social Work Ideology

The amalgam of the above social, economic, and political beliefs comprises social work's ideology. Social beliefs are based on the person as a social being. Economic beliefs are based on the notion that human well-being is the major criterion for economic decision-making. And political beliefs are based on people having the right and the responsibility to participate in those decisions that affect their lives. Taken together, these beliefs constitute social work's ideology for progressive social workers (see Table 1.2). This ideology comprises an interdependent, consistent, and mutually reinforcing set of ideas and ideals that should underpin the type of society that best promotes social work's fundamental values of humanism and egalitarianism.

Social Work and Social Problems

All social work activity is concerned with social problems—that is, with alleviating, eliminating, or preventing social problems and the deleterious effects they have on people. However, although poverty, mental health issues, and deprivation may constitute objective phenomena, the analyses, interpretations, and explanations of these phenomena are subjective. In other words, a social problem may be seen as a set of objective circumstances, but it includes a subjective interpretation. Such interpretations are defined largely in terms of ideology and group interests.

Table 1.2 Overview of Progressive Social Work Ideals and Beliefs

Social Beliefs	Humanitarianism (humanism)
	Community
	Equality
Economic Beliefs	Government intervention
	Social priorities dominate economic decisions
	Equitable distribution of society's resources
Political Beliefs	Participatory democracy (self-determination) in both governmental and non-governmental areas
View of Social Welfare	An instrument of equality, solidarity, and community
	Ideal = social welfare
Principles of Social Work Practice	Treat people with respect
	Enhance dignity and integrity
	Facilitate self-determination and self-realization
	Accept differences
	Advocate and promote social justice

For example, the existence of poverty will be explained differently by a conservative than by a Marxist, the former attributing poverty to a defective individual and the latter attributing it to a defective social arrangement (i.e., capitalism). The implication for social work is that the individual living in poverty would be treated in a punitive or remedial manner by a conservative social worker but would be treated as a victim of an oppressive social order by a progressive or critical social worker.

Although the values of social work are generally considered progressive and humanistic, its definitions or explanations of social problems have not always been progressive or humanistic. Because social work has been reluctant to elevate the discussion of its values to a societal level, there has been no agreed-upon goal or product with respect to the type and form of society social work is seeking. In the absence of a publicly articulated social vision, social work falls victim to the prevailing paradigm. That is, without a clear vision of itself and of the society within which it exists, social work has tended to accept as a given the current social order or paradigm. This means that social work "theory and practice become accommodated only to that which is possible within existing organizational constraints" (Moreau & Leonard, 1989, p. 235). With no alternative social order defined or articulated, social work becomes part of the existing social order, helping people to adjust to it or cope with it or attempting to make small changes within the system rather than attempting to make fundamental changes that transform the system.

Social work, by being part of the present paradigm and in the absence of an alternative, tends to take on the prevailing definitions or explanations of social problems. In Canada and the United States, social problems have been defined mainly within conservative-liberal perspectives. Most internally derived social work theory-building has been in the methods or means of social work practice rather than in the goals or desired ends of social work practice. As long as social work avoids the task of articulating its desired ends or vision, it will continue to treat objective social problems with the subjective prescriptions of the prevailing paradigm. To date in North America, most social work explanations of social problems and most social work interventions have been based either on "individual pathology" (conservative ideology) or "general systems/ecological explanations" (liberal ideology) of social problems. Such approaches, of course, do not guarantee that social problems experienced by large numbers of people will be dealt with adequately or effectively. Radical or critical explanations of social problems have only recently become part of the social work theory landscape, but they still occupy a minority position. This is because, to date, socialist/Marxist, feminist, anti-racist, anti-oppressive, and queer ideas and analyses have not been major parts of the prevailing paradigms in North America.

In sum, although social work espouses a set of values considered progressive, its approach to resolve social problems has not been progressive. In the absence of an articulated social vision or goal consistent with its value base, social work has accepted by default the mainstream definitions and explanations of social problems, which have come from the prevailing North American ideologies of conservatism and liberalism. The critical question arising from this situation is whether or not social work ideology is consistent with either conservatism or liberalism. Or is it more consistent with an ideology that does not prevail in North America? A related question is whether or not social work's progressive and humanistic ideology is consistent with or in conflict with its current theory base and practice.

The Ideal Social Welfare System: A Progressive View

Every industrial democracy in the Western world has developed a social welfare system to deal with the vagaries of the market economy. Although all states have policies of intervention, the forms of these interventions often differ, as do their purposes. Furniss and Tilton (1977) have aggregated the different forms of intervention into three models of social welfare states: the positive state, the social security state, and the social welfare state. These models are described below in terms of the type of intervention employed, the groups in society benefiting from the intervention, and the vision of society that inspires each model. The first two models correspond to Wilensky and Lebeaux's (1965) typology of the residual model (the positive state) and the institutional model (the social security state). The third model corresponds to Mishra's (1981) description of the structural model of welfare.

The Positive State or Residual Model of Welfare

The main goal of the positive state is to protect the interests of business from the difficulties of unprotected markets and from potential redistributive demands. The policy emphasis is on government–business collaboration for economic growth. Business yields much of its market decisions to government in return for financial assistance at home and political support abroad. The positive state aims at minimal full employment to keep consumption up, labour costs down, and labour unions weak. The current process of globalization is being driven, in large part, by values and principles of the positive state.

The preferred social welfare instrument is social insurance, which is consistent with economic efficiency and encourages "proper" work habits. As well, it functions as social control by tying people's eligibility for social insurance benefits to their participation in the labour market. The beneficiaries of the positive state tend to be those who, under conditions of laissez-faire individualism, prosper most readily. The vision of the positive state is not at all similar to that of social work. Rather, it is one of rugged individualism within the context of balanced economic growth and protection of business interests (Mishra, 1981). It is the model of welfare favoured by neo-conservatives. The United States best typifies this model.

The Social Security State or Institutional Model of Welfare

The key concept of the social security state is that everyone who is a casualty of the industrial order has a right to a guaranteed minimum of social security. This collective responsibility for individual maintenance recognizes that a society based on competitive capitalism cannot provide universal security and that the state has a duty to fill this void. Theoretically, it is possible to eliminate poverty by establishing the national minimum income at an adequate level. The vision of a social security state is based on government–business cooperation whereby the guaranteed national minimum is financed by pursuing an economic policy of maximal full employment and

public employment as a last resort. These economic and social policies are intended to be of direct benefit to every citizen and to overcome the limitations of social insurance provisions.

The social security state does not contain egalitarian social and economic ideals. The governing principle is "equality of opportunity" whereby all are equal in status before the law but unequal in material resources, life chances, and political power. It represents what Furniss and Tilton (1977) call "a modern and noble version of the Liberal ideal." Great Britain (before Thatcherism) and Canada and Australia (before Howard), to a lesser extent, typify the social security state, although there has been a drift toward the positive state in all three jurisdictions.

The Social Welfare State or Structural Model of Welfare

Unlike the goal of minimalist–full employment of the positive state or of maximalist–full employment of the social security state, the social welfare state has as its goal full employment. This requires government–union cooperation in the labour market. Equally important to the social welfare state are two other policies: environmental planning (in its most comprehensive form) and solidaristic wages. Environmental planning encompasses regulation of property to preserve amenities, prohibition of activities resulting in pollution, urban planning, and development of new communities. In short, this policy represents an effort to inject collective and social values into a society founded on the good life of the individual. The solidaristic wage policy counteracts the tendency toward concentration of assets and income, narrows differentials among groups of wage-earners, and extracts for labour a larger piece of the national income.

The social welfare state aims to promote equality and solidarity. It seeks more than a national minimum for citizens in attempting to achieve a general equality of living conditions. It substitutes public services, such as the public provision of health care, child care, and legal services, for social insurance programs. These services are available to all, not just to the underprivileged. The social welfare state envisions extending the locus of political and economic power and increasing citizen participation in all areas of living. It is similar to what Mishra (1981) calls the structural model of welfare. Although no country at present typifies the social welfare state, Sweden best approximates it among Western industrial democracies.

Social work must reject the positive state as a welfare system because it violates its fundamental values of humanism and egalitarianism and its corresponding set of social, economic, and political beliefs. The social security state contains some humanistic elements but lacks egalitarian ideals. The social welfare state, on the other hand, is most congruent with social work values, beliefs, and principles. Thus, progressive social workers must work toward and attempt to achieve this form of society if they are to remain true to their own ideals. However, the social welfare state or the structural model of welfare cannot be achieved in our present society because it rests on a set of values contradictory to those of neo-conservative or liberal capitalism.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the two major approaches to social work, the mainstream and progressive views, were presented. Using the progressive perspective as a point of departure, the argument here

is that social work needs a progressive vision of society and social work practice if it is to be true to its primary values of humanitarianism and egalitarianism. The 2005 CASW *Code of Ethics* contains little potential to develop such a view. The question for social work is which of the major societal paradigms is most congruent with a concept of social justice premised on creating societal conditions in which people are free from oppression and domination. In other words, is there a paradigm that approximates or is consistent with social work's primary values of humanitarianism and egalitarianism, as well as its secondary or instrumental values? These instrumental values include respect for the individual as a social being, the domination of economic decisions by societal decisions, participatory democracy, and a social welfare system that contributes to equality, solidarity, and community. The next four chapters will examine various social paradigms in an attempt to answer this question.

Critical Questions

1. What does a "progressive view" mean, and why is it important to social work?
2. Why does social work need a code of ethics?
3. Why does social work need a professional association? Why doesn't social work organize itself into a union instead of a professional association?
4. How do you respond to the charge that social workers advocate for more spending on social programs only to guarantee themselves jobs?
5. Why has social work not been able to exert a significant influence on social policy decisions?
6. How and in what direction do the media influence people's opinions about social work and social programs?

2 Capitalism, Crises, and Paradigms

Subjects enter a social world they didn't make, but they are able to act upon it provided they can understand how it is made, and in so doing, develop a revolutionary praxis to free themselves.

—Peter Leonard (1997), paraphrasing Karl Marx

Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the economic, social, and political crises that occurred over the last quarter of the twentieth century and the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century as capitalism transformed from its postwar (1945–73) welfare state form to a globalized version, which, as will be argued, peaked around 1995. Starting with the oil crisis and the Yom Kippur (October) War between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1973, along with the inflation-fuelled Vietnam War, the chapter traces the latest mutation of capitalism, from when the nation-state was largely able to contain the worst excesses of capitalism by Keynesian interventions to the shift to a global economy. This process of economic globalization has reduced the autonomy of nation-states, limited the power of the trade union movement, resulted in a retrenched welfare state, and brought a crisis in confidence in social work among people both within and outside the profession. Some of the negative consequences of this new form of capitalism are presented. These consequences include vulnerability in the labour market, a re-emphasis of the subordinate positions of historically disadvantaged groups such as women and racialized individuals, draconian cuts in social services at a time of increased need, and an ineffective response by social work because it had no widely accepted theoretical analysis of the crises to respond to them. An overview of the "globalization thesis" suggests that globalization is normal, natural, inevitable, and irreversible and, therefore, should not be resisted.

Following a discussion of the various social, economic, and political crises that resulted from and/or were part of the globalizing of capitalism, we consider a number of hopeful signs that emerged during the decade of 1995–2006. Discussed are the successes of the anti-globalization movement, the "collapse of the globalism thesis," and the fact that the federal government, in Canada at least, went from a deficit to a surplus position in 1997 and had experienced eight successive budget surpluses in the billions of dollars. Government deficits could no longer be used as the reason or excuse for cutting back on social programs. However, these hopeful signs and an improved financial situation were erased by the 2008 worldwide financial crisis—the greatest

worldwide recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s—and by the Harper Conservative government's responses to this crisis in particular. A number of draconian economic, social, environmental, and political policies were enacted during its term of government (2006–15). An overview of these regressive policies and their social, economic, and political impact on Canada, along with an outlook on what might be expected from the Trudeau government (elected in October 2015), will be presented here. Also discussed in this chapter are some optimistic signs that have emerged recently in Canada and elsewhere and that should give hope to people who are concerned with social justice. They include the defeat of the Harper Conservative government, a renewed environmental movement, the anti-globalization movement, the collapse of the "globalism thesis," and the recent "Idle No More" movement, which is one of the largest Indigenous mass movements in Canadian history.

The crises of the last quarter of the twentieth century and first part of the twenty-first century have brought about considerable soul-searching in social work with respect to many of its comfortable assumptions about the nature of people, society, the state, and the relationships among them. And although some social workers have fallen back on victim-blaming explanations for social problems, with others having drifted toward new models of regressive and oppressive forms of social work such as the "competency movement" (to be discussed in a subsequent chapter) and still others having clung tenaciously to old models of practice, such as ecological perspectives and systems theory, there has been a significant call for new or alternative social work theory and practice models that are relevant to today's economic, social, political, cultural, and intellectual reality.

The two concepts adopted here as a point of departure in response to this call for alternative theories and models of practice are those of "ideology" and "paradigm." These are not new concepts, and, in fact, their use has been criticized by many groups and writers as being part of the modernist tradition, which has inherent oppressive qualities (discussed in subsequent chapters). However, an attempt is made here to use postmodern and other forms of modernist critique to inform all analyses based on the concepts of ideology and paradigm. Behaviour, social organization, social movements, and so on are often influenced by ideology. Thus, ideological positions with respect to politics, political parties, and social attitudes, including those toward the state and social welfare, are examined in this chapter. Finally, the concept of "paradigm" is explained in terms of how it helps to organize social thought in general and social work analysis, theory, and practice in particular.

The Changing Face of Capitalism

Keynesian (Welfare) Capitalism

Something significant has changed since the early 1970s in the way capitalism has been working, or not working. Although seldom steady and never free from tensions and conflicts, postwar capitalism managed to maintain an economic boom from 1945 until 1973. This long boom, to a certain extent, benefited unionized labour, raised material living standards for much of the population living in advanced capitalist countries, and provided a relatively stable environment for

corporate profit-making. The particular set of labour control practices, consumption patterns, and configurations of political and economic power that characterized postwar capitalism depended on a series of compromises on the part of its key players: the corporate sector, the trade union movement, and the nation-state. In his celebrated book, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1989), David Harvey outlines the nature of these compromises and the roles played by their major actors.

For its part, large corporate power was to assure steady increased investments that would enhance productivity, guarantee economic growth, and raise living standards for the general populace. This involved a commitment to ongoing technological development, mass fixed capital investments in plants and equipment, increased managerial experience in production and marketing, and mobilization of economies of scale through standardization of products. Scientific management—in the form of Taylorism[1] and Fordism[2]—of all areas of corporate activity became the cornerstone of bureaucratic rationality, and the massing of workers in large-scale factories became the modus operandi of productive processes. This, in turn, required hierarchical work relations and a deskilled workforce.

The trade union movements in North America, like those in most other advanced capitalist regions, have never been marked by total solidarity or homogeneity. There have always been radical working-class movements, but they have been in the minority and, like the larger trade union movement, have been brought under strict legal discipline by way of state industrial relations and labour legislation. Although unions may have won considerable power in the area of collective bargaining, they have done so in return for adopting a collaborative stance with the corporate and state sectors. That is, the trade union movement would collaborate with capitalist ownership and bourgeois governments and not pursue radical social or economic reform. In exchange for real wage gains and job security from employers and for social insurance and minimum wage benefits from the state, trade union leaders undertook to control their membership and collaborate with business in plans to increase productivity using scientific management principles and techniques.

The state, for its part, assumed a variety of obligations to both the corporate sector and workers. It was to create relatively stable consumer demand conditions by curbing business cycles of "boom and bust" through an appropriate mix of fiscal and monetary policies—that is, by applying Keynesian[3] economic principles. The state was to invest in areas such as transportation and public utilities, which are vital to mass production and mass consumption. Likewise, it was to ensure a certain level of social protection by providing programs of social insurance, health care, education, and housing.

In sum, "the long postwar boom . . . was built upon a certain set of labour control practices, technological mixes, consumption habits, and configurations of political-economic power" (Harvey, 1989, p. 124). This model of capitalism can reasonably be called "Keynesian capitalism" but is also known as "welfare capitalism" because it reflected a belief that a welfare state could exist within capitalism (although there are competing explanations as to the real function of the welfare state, i.e., social care vs social control). These competing views will be explored in some detail in later chapters of this book. The major assumption of this model was that of infinite economic growth manifested by the production and consumption of more and more products, which in turn would be followed by more and more jobs, increased profits, higher wages, and more government revenue for an ever-expanding welfare state. Furthermore, as noted by Mishra (1999),

Keynesian macroeconomic management presupposed a relatively closed national economy that could be regulated by the national government. Thus, although nation-states may have had close and cooperative relations with other nations in the postwar era, the nation-state itself was considered the basic unit of economic and political life (McBride, 2001).

Global Capitalism

Cracks were already appearing in the postwar Keynesian capitalist economy by the early 1970s. The Vietnam War fuelled inflation both in the United States and abroad. The sharp recession of 1973 that resulted from the OPEC oil crisis saw a quadrupling in the price of oil brought about by the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbours. These events set in motion a whole set of processes that shattered the "grand corporate–labour–state accord" that underpinned Keynesian capitalism. Suddenly, the economy was no longer growing (Lightman, 2003). The corporate sector was the first to act and began a process whereby capitalism shifted away from its Keynesian form, with national governments managing their respective economies, to a global form in which national governments have less control over their own national economies. In the face of unstable economic growth, inflation, and a worldwide recession, the corporate sector began to rationalize and restructure its operations. Technological change, automation, downsizing, mergers, acceleration of capital turnover, and moves to countries with cheaper and more manageable labour became the strategies for corporate survival (Harvey, 1989). These changes have re-emphasized the vulnerability of historically disadvantaged groups, particularly women, children, immigrants, racialized groups, and people living in poverty. The changes in the organization of the labour market and industry have also weakened the trade union movement, which has lost core, full-time members in the face of the transition to a more flexible labour force (i.e., an increased reliance on part-time, casual, and subcontracted workers). The labour movement has also experienced some political repression through legislative curbs on union power and by the geographical relocation of many businesses to underdeveloped countries. And, of course, with a weakened and reduced trade union movement, class consciousness is reduced as well.

Governments also felt the effects of the transformation in capitalism. The "stagflation" (a combination of high inflation and high unemployment) that occurred in the mid-1970s could not be explained by Keynesian economic theory and did not seem amenable to the usual practices of government intervention. Also, partly because of economic decline, governments began to receive less tax revenue than in the past but were confronted with growing numbers of people hurt by the recession and subsequent corporate restructuring who were in need of government-sponsored social programs. Critics of Keynesianism argued that governments that continue to provide services at a cost higher than a country's economic growth invite a serious fiscal crisis of overload. Faced with mounting deficits, governments could either raise taxes and extend the tax base (as some European countries did) or reduce government expenditures. Right-wing governments were elected in 1979 in Britain, in 1980 in the United States, and in 1984 in Canada. All three governments voiced similar priorities to deal with their respective economic crises. Thatcher's Conservatives stressed the values of "self-reliance," Reagan's Republicans aimed "to get big government off the backs of people," and Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives declared

that "Canada was open for business." These governments chose to reduce expenditures rather than raise taxes, and all three targeted the welfare state as a major area of cost containment and/or cost reduction. Subsequent governments of nominally different political stripes in each of these countries have continued with cost-containment policies. Australia, under the Hawke and Keating Labour governments, although implementing such policies a little later and a little more slowly, went down the same road, but with the Howard Liberal government elected in 1996 that country pursued the same course at a much more accelerated rate. As a result of these policy choices, the welfare state in all four countries underwent (and continues to undergo) a "crisis of legitimation."[4] That is, it is seen as an unaffordable luxury by many people and organizations of the New Right (i.e., a range of right-wing groups and organizations that advocate free-market principles, anti-welfare policies, and the supremacy of individual rights over those of the common good). Survival in the global economy now seems to take precedence over meeting human and social needs.

The Globalization Thesis

There is by now a vast literature on globalization, and no attempt will be made to summarize it. Instead, a critical view of the dominant explanation for the present course of globalization and its accompanying discourse of inevitability will be provided, along with some of the social and economic effects resulting from globalization. It should be noted here, however, that the concept of globalization and the explanation for the process that it has taken are contestable. For example, globalization is viewed by some (e.g., big business) as a positive phenomenon; others view it as a negative phenomenon (e.g., many persons who hold social programs dear); still others view it as neither inherently positive nor negative (e.g., Lightman, 2003; Mishra, 1999). An example of the latter view is provided by Lightman (2003), who argues that globalization processes can be positive or negative. He contends that the European Union (EU) is an example of positive economic integration because the participating nations built into their treaty social protections for workers. An example of negative economic integration, according to Lightman, is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which is based on free-market principles and does not include any direct social or political concerns. The position taken here concurs with that of Lightman (2003) and Mishra (1999), which is that globalization is neither inherently good nor evil. Rather, the problem is the dominant ideology underpinning the specific forms and processes of globalization. To date, globalization has been led by the United States and is based largely on that nation's dominant ideology of free markets, individualism, a minimal welfare state, and meeting corporate interests.

From the above, it is obvious that there is no single universal definition of globalization. Globalization may be viewed as primarily an economic process involving cross-border transactions in goods and services, international capital flows, and the rapid spread of technology. This view has been adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Ferguson, Lavalette, & Mooney, 2002). Most social welfare and social work writers, however, view globalization as a much more complex phenomenon involving not only economic factors but also cultural, political, and ideological processes (see, for example, Ferguson et al., 2002; George & Wilding, 2002;

Mishra, 1999). It is nonetheless important to understand the dominant view of globalization because this view is used by corporations, governments, and others to rationalize reductions in social services spending. A critique of this dominant view will be presented in a subsequent section of this chapter. The following outlines nine components of what Ferguson et al. (2002) call the "globalization thesis."

The Triumph of Capitalism over Socialist Alternatives

The first major component of the dominant explanation of globalization, as identified by Mishra (1999), is the collapse of communism and the retreat of the socialist alternative. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the twentieth century signified for many the emergence of a new world order in which capitalism had triumphed—we had reached what Fukuyama (1992) described as the end of history because there was no further basis for any ideological struggles against capitalism. "Globalization and the triumph of the market would benefit us all" (Ferguson et al., 2002, p. 136).

The Ideological Foundation of Globalization

A second major component of the current form and process of globalization is its ideological foundation—neo-conservatism or neo-liberalism. (Although these terms are often used inter-changeably, which causes some confusion to students of social work and social policy, there are differences between the two, which are outlined in Note 5. We choose to use the term "neo-conservatism" for reasons given in this endnote. The main difference between the two is that neo-conservatism refers to a complete set of social, economic, and political beliefs [these beliefs are presented in Chapter 8], whereas neo-liberalism is mainly an economic doctrine. However, we recognize that many writers use the term "neo-liberalism" to mean essentially the same set of ideas.) "Contemporary globalization expresses, promotes and legitimates a particular ideology—neoliberalism [or neo-conservatism]—which has had . . . a profound effect on social policy" (George & Wilding, 2002, p. 56).[5] The values of economic growth and private gain are extolled at the expense of broader economic and social development (George & Wilding, 2002). There is broad consensus in the literature that neo-conservative ideology has been driving the present course of globalization since the 1970s. Mishra (1999), for example, points out that what neo-conservatism presents as ideology, globalization makes into a virtue and a necessity. John Gray (1998) argues that the global economy did not emerge spontaneously but that human agency played a critical role in engineering its development. Emphasizing the roles of Thatcher and Reagan, he argues that globalization was part of a deliberate (neo-conservative) ideological project to destroy the Keynesian state interventions that had dominated economic and social affairs at the national level during the postwar years.

Economic Determinism

An important component of globalization is that its logic and ideology are framed within a particular *discourse*[6] that justifies this new global capitalism—a discourse of economic determinism.