## TENTH EDITION

TERRORISM
and Homeland Security

Jonathan R. White | Steven M. Chermak

Tenth Edition

Terrorism and Homeland Security

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Grand Valley State University

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Dedicated to:

Thomas A. Boogaart. Teacher, mentor, and friend.

Jon White

David H. Bayley. An extraordinary scholar and my mentor. Rest in Peace.

Steve Chermak

About the Authors

Jonathan R. White is professor of honors, emeritus, in the Frederik Meijer Honors College of Grand Valley State University. The founding director of GVSU's School of Criminal Justice, Dr. White was promoted to dean of social sciences and served there until he was summoned to the Bureau of Justice Assistance to direct the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program after the attacks of 9/11. He conducted counterterrorism training for law enforcement and military forces in Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and throughout the United States. A recognized expert on religious terrorism, Dr. White taught classes on national security, intelligence analysis, and counterterrorism in the Meijer Honors College.

Steven M. Chermak is a professor of criminal justice at Michigan State University and investigator for the National Counterterrorism, Innovation, Technology, and Education (NCITE) Center. Dr. Chermak's research on rare events focuses on terrorism, cyberterrorism, school shootings, and mass shootings. This research includes collaborations to develop four databases using open source materials. First, he and Professor Joshua Freilich (John Jay College of Criminal Justice) have collaborated to create the Extremist Crime Database—the first of its kind national database on criminal activities involving U.S. far-right, far-left, and jihadist extremists. Specifically, the database includes data on the violent and financial crimes of these extremists, characteristics of violent groups, and the nature of foiled plots. Second, he and Dr. Joshua D. Freilich and Nadine Connell developed The American School Shooting Study database. This database comprises all fatal and non-fatal shootings occurring on school grounds since 1990, and includes characteristics of incidents, perpetrators, and schools. Third, the Mass Shooting Database includes all mass shooting events occurring in the United States since 1990. Fourth, he is in the process of building a database of cyberterrorism incidents with funding from the NCITE Center and the Department of Homeland Security.

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Professor White began work on the first edition of this book 30 years ago and has reworked it several times to describe constant changes in causes, groups, tactics, and issues. Terrorists constantly employ new methods of murder and destruction as the face of terrorism changes. Yet, no matter how terrorism mutates, one aspect remains constant. Technology provides the means for a relatively small group of violent people to terrorize nation-states, including superpowers.

Professors who have used previous editions of this book have asked for changes and updates to this text. In addition, they have offered valuable critiques, suggestions for new material, and corrections of factual errors. Many of them asked me to reduce historical coverage and to increase discussions of trends and future directions. I hope this new addition meets their expectations, although I do utilize historical discussions to place contemporary events and probable future issues in context.

For this new edition, I brought on Professor Steve Chermak from Michigan State University to collaborate. Professor Chermak has been studying terrorism since the early 1990s and has a distinguished publication record on the topic. You will see how we have integrated much more contemporary research and supplemental material in this edition.

While this is a new edition, the purpose of the book remains the same. It is designed to introduce criminal justice and other social science students to the field of terrorism and homeland security. The book is also meant to provide a pragmatic background for the law enforcement, intelligence, and military communities. It is a basic, practical introduction for people who will or already do study the threat of terrorism. Many theories, polemics, and models are summarized and compared, but readers will find no grand theory. The purpose is to expose readers to a vast array of issues, campaigns, theories, and opinions.

As stated in the previous editions, issues surrounding terrorism are emotionally charged. Therefore, the information in this text is presented from a variety of positions. The purpose is to explain various points of view without taking sides. Students are exposed to differing interpretations of issues that have spawned heated controversies. Hopefully, the text presents enough information to allow students to make informed decisions.

New to This Edition

There are several new items in the tenth edition. Here is a summary of the major additions and updates.

In Every Chapter

- Learning Objectives tied to subsections of each chapter for enhanced student learning
- Updated analysis of recent cases of terrorism
- Updated research findings

Chapter 1

- Changing context of terrorism
- Current research on defining terrorism and targeted violence
- Discussion of how terrorism is different from other types of violence, such as mass shootings

Chapter 2

- Relating indicators of radicalization and terrorism to other forms of crime
- Discussion of current research on risk and protective factors related to radicalized opinions and radicalized actions

Chapter 3

- New efforts to deal with the financing of terrorism
- Evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-financing efforts
- Discussion of the relationship between product counterfeiting and terrorism

Chapter 4

- New evaluation of the impact of the Internet and social media on terrorism
- Research update on how terrorists use the Internet and social media for recruitment, radicalization, and operations planning

Chapter 5

- Recent research of the role of women in terrorist groups generally and as suicide bombers specifically
- Analysis of the use of thermobaric bombs

Chapter 6

- Updates on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA)

Chapter 7

- Updates on the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)

Chapters 8/9

- Updates on Hezbollah and Hamas
- New trends in terrorism in Israel and Palestine
- New background material on active terrorist groups
- Analysis of Hezbollah's changing political role in Lebanon and the Syrian Civil War

Chapter 10

- Significant expansion on discussion of domestic terrorism threats, updating the current terrorist threat environment
- Discussion of recent research on violent, financial, and planned terrorist attacks that have occurred in the United States

Chapter 11

- Discussion of history and current concerns with Al Qaeda and ISIS
- Research on number and types of attacks within the United States involving jihadists.

Chapter 12

- Discussion of the conceptualization of domestic terrorism and domestic violent extremism (DVE)
- Analysis of militia groups, sovereign citizens, and the reemergence of far right extremist groups as significant threats
- Discussion of research on lone wolf actors and how they are similar to and different from group-affiliated terrorists

Chapter 13

- Discussion of defining homeland security
- Current research on fusion centers and the intelligence process
- Updates on research on terrorism plots

Chapter 14

- Discussion of the use of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)
- Discussion of the relationship between immigration and terrorism

Chapter 15

- Updates to the USA Patriot Act and legal/political changes
- Evaluation of the expansion of executive powers

Chapter 16

- Discussion of the role of community policing in a homeland security framework

Organization of the Text

This text is designed to provide readers with basic information. The purpose is to provide the background for understanding terrorist movements in many parts of the world. Part I focuses on terrorism in an historical and social context. It begins with a chapter on shifting definitional issues. Chapter 2 examines practical aspects of criminology and how they apply to the terrorism context. This is followed by a discussion of criminology, processes of radicalization, and various types of terrorism. Chapter 3 is completely devoted to the financial aspects of terrorism. Included is a discussion of virtual economies. Chapter 4 has new information about the media and terrorism. One of the foremost changes is an examination of research on the new types of media that are influencing terrorist behavior. Chapter 5 has an enhanced discussion of gender roles and the increasing involvement of women in terrorism. It also discusses tactics and force multipliers.

The remainder of the book builds on the information in Part I. Part II focuses on international terrorism motivated by ethnicity and nationalism. Chapter 6 focuses on long term separatist terrorism and Chapter 7 focuses on

terrorism that is nationalistic and endemic. Chapter 8 provides information that is background to the Middle East and Chapter 9 discusses terrorism in Israel and Palestine.

Part III of the book continues the discussion of international terrorism focusing on ideological and religious terrorism. Specifically, Chapter 10 focuses on revolutionary terrorism and Chapter 11 discusses jihadist networks.

Part IV of the book examines domestic terrorism and homeland security issues. Specifically, Chapter 12 provides important information about the characteristics of terrorism in the United States, and Chapters 13 through 16 discuss the organizational, legal, and political issues related to homeland security.

Ancillary Materials

For the Instructor

MindTap for *Terrorism and Homeland Security* from Cengage Learning represents a highly personalized, online learning platform. A fully online learning solution, MindTap combines all of a student's learning tools—readings, multimedia, activities, and assessments—into a singular Learning Path that guides the student through the curriculum. Instructors personalize the experience by customizing the presentation of these learning tools for their students, allowing instructors to seamlessly introduce their own content into the Learning Path via apps that integrate into the MindTap platform. Additionally, MindTap provides interoperability with major Learning Management Systems (LMS) via support for industry standards, and fosters partnerships with third-party educational application providers to provide a highly collaborative, engaging, and personalized learning experience.

Instructor Resources. Additional instructor resources for this product are available online. Instructor assets include an Instructor's Manual, Educator's Guide, PowerPoint® slides, and a test bank powered by Cognero®. Sign up or sign in at www.cengage.com to search for and access this product and its online resources.

Online Instructor's Resource Manual. This supplement offers instructors learning objectives, key terms, lecture outlines, student projects, classroom activities, exercises, and video suggestions.

Online Test Bank. Each chapter of the test bank contains questions in multiple-choice, true/false, completion, and essay formats, with a full answer key. The test bank is coded to the learning objectives that appear in the text, and includes the section in the text where the answers can be found. Finally, each question in the test bank has been carefully reviewed by experienced criminal justice instructors for quality, accuracy, and content coverage so instructors can be sure they are working with an assessment and grading resource of the highest caliber.

Cengage Learning Testing Powered by Cognero. This assessment software is a flexible, online system that allows you to import, edit, and manipulate test bank content from the *Terrorism and Homeland Security* test bank or elsewhere, including your own favorite test questions; create multiple test versions in an instant; and deliver tests from your LMS, your classroom, or wherever you want.

Online PowerPoints. Helping you make your lectures more engaging while effectively reaching your visually-oriented students, these handy Microsoft PowerPoint® slides outline the chapters of the main text in a classroom-ready presentation. The PowerPoint® slides are updated to reflect the content and organization of the new edition of the text, are tagged by chapter learning objectives, and feature additional examples for application and discussion.

For the Student

MindTap for *Terrorism and Homeland Security*. MindTap from Cengage Learning represents a new approach to a highly personalized online learning platform. A fully online learning solution, MindTap combines all of a student's learning tools—readings, multimedia, activities, and assessments—into a singular Learning Path that guides the student through the curriculum.

Terrorism in Historical and Social Contexts

Chapter 1

The Shifting Definition of Terrorism

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

1   Explain why the definition of terrorism shifts over time.

2   Explain where the term *terrorism* originated and how the meaning changed during the history of the nineteenth century.

3   Explain how socialism, anarchism, and communism were mistakenly associated with terrorism.

4   Summarize the differing meanings of terrorism in Russia from the People's Will through the rise of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin.

5   Summarize the history of the Irish Republican Army's use of terror.

Anthony Correia/Shutterstock.com

FBI headquarters, Washington DC

D uring World War II, soldiers on several fronts often executed prisoners. It was a routine event on the East-ern Front, and Japanese and Americans killed captives on Guadalcanal. German SS troops executed more than 200 American captives during the Battle of the Bulge. We may call these actions murder today, but few people would use the term *terrorism* to describe them.

In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) (also known as the Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIL, and Daesh) released videos showing the beheading of American and British hostages. ISIS also filmed mass executions of Iraqi military prisoners. Most of the world's leaders called these murders, and American political leaders frequently refer to ISIS as a terrorist nation/state.

The difference between these two examples might cause heated and passionate debate because terrorism is difficult to define. Both of these actions involved a form of terror, but the term *terrorism* is applied strategically and selectively. In addition, the meaning of *terrorism* changes over time. The term was originally used to describe the actions of the French government. It would be applied to groups fighting against capitalism a few decades later and would be employed to describe both Russian revolutionaries and eventually the Soviet government. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the term became synonymous with nationalistic, revolutionary, radical religious, and nihil-ist groups.

Defining the term is not an academic exercise. The definition helps to determine policy, behavior, and interna-tional opinion. It becomes part of a nation's application of military force and its criminal justice system. Defining terrorism can literally be a matter of life and death. This chapter will focus on the problems of defining terrorism and offer a brief history of its shifting meaning.

Difficulties with Definitions

social construct: The way people view reality. Groups construct a framework around a concept, defining various aspects of their lives through the meanings they attribute to the construct.

academic consensus definition: A complex definition based on the work of Alex Schmid. It combines common elements of the definitions used by leading scholars in the field of terrorism.

social context: As used in this book, the historical, political, and criminological circumstances at a given point in time. It is the way people in a culture define actions and issues within a society's general outlook on reality. The social context affects the way terrorism is defined.

Terrorism is difficult to define because it is not a physical entity that has dimensions to be measured, weighed, and analyzed. It is a **social construct**; that is, terrorism is defined by different people within shifting social and political realities (Schmid, 1992). The term has spawned heated debate because it is nebulous and pejorative. As a result, there are many definitions of terrorism and no single accepted understanding.

Some scholars have opted for a simple definition stating that terrorism is an act or threatened act of violence against innocent people for political purposes (Laqueur, 1987, 1999). Some nations have criminalized terrorism, defining it as a violation of law (Mullendore and White, 1996). Alex Schmid tries to synthesize various positions in an **academic consensus definition** (see Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 1–38, 70–111). Schmid says most definitions of the term have two characteristics: (1) someone is terrorized and (2) the meaning of the term is derived from the terrorists' targets and victims. Many victims of government violence claim that repression is terrorism, while governments tend to define terrorism as subnational violent political opposition (Bady, 2003). There is no standard meaning of the term *terrorism*, and the term "lends itself to endless dispute but no resolution" (Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004, p. 778).

H. H. A. Cooper (1976, 1977b, 1978, 2001) first approached the problem by stating that there is "a problem in the problem definition." We can agree that terrorism is a problem, but we cannot agree on what terrorism is.

Definitions Influenced by Social Context

The **social context** surrounding the term *terrorism* influences how it is defined. Consider the following examples and the differing meanings of *terrorism*:

A. In early 2010, a retired FBI agent who specialized in counterterrorism returned from the U.S. State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program in Jordan. He was working with 27 Jordanian police officers—12 Christians, 12 Muslims (all Sunnis), and three agnostics. They never argued about religion, but they were appalled when he outlined the operational methods of Hezbollah. The reason: The Jordanian police officers vehemently stated that Hezbollah was not a terrorist organization. It was a militia fighting the Israeli Defense Forces. Hezbollah is a Shi'ite group, but that made no difference to the Sunni Muslim, Christian, and agnostic police officers. In their minds, Hezbollah was a legitimate militia resisting Israeli aggression.

B. In January 2015, three men claiming to belong to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and influenced by ISIS attacked the offices of *Charlie Hebdo,* a French satirical magazine based in Paris. They murdered 13 cartoonists who had satirized Islam and then killed two police officers. They would murder four more people before they were killed a few days later. Every government in the West and most governments around the world called this terrorism. More than 1 million people and 40 world leaders marched through Paris to show solidarity against terrorism. Yet, one

Islamic leader asked why the world made so much ado over the deaths of 17 people when hundreds of Muslims were being killed around the world every day. He said Western deaths were considered to be the result of terrorism, but Muslim deaths passed unnoticed.

C. The definition becomes even more complicated in war zones. In Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are fighting two major enemies, a loose association of Central Asian fundamentalist Muslims called the Students, or the Taliban, and another terrorist group known as al Qaeda. News reporters, politicians, and military officers often lump the two organizations into a single group of terrorists, but there are profound differences. Al Qaeda operates as an international terrorist group, while the Taliban forms divergent regional militias and uses **selective terrorism** to support guerrilla operations. More importantly, the theological tradition of the Taliban differs from al Qaeda's infatuation with a violent interpretation of a twentieth-century militant Egyptian theologian. Linking the two organizations under the single umbrella of terrorism results in a profound misunderstanding of the Afghan war (Christia and Semple, 2009).

D. On November 5, 2009, **Nidal Malik Hasan** went on a shooting spree at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people. There were many reports that Hasan had embraced radical Islam and that he had decided to attack soldiers at Fort Hood as part of a global jihad against the West (Simpson and Gorman, 2009). A former high-ranking intelligence officer immediately called this an act of terrorism, yet many government officials stated that it was the act of a mentally deranged soldier (Sherwell and Spillius, 2009). In this case, even the country that had been victimized by murder seemed unable to decide on a definition of terrorism.

E. There have been dozens of attacks by domestic right-wing extremists since a bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995. In addition, groups representing a violent interpretation of Christianity, anti-government groups, sovereign citizens, and members of the common-law court movement have killed more than 30 police officers in the past few years. When attacks against law enforcement officers occur, state, local, and federal authorities charge suspects with violations of statutory law. Neither the media nor the public routinely refer to those convicted of such crimes as terrorists, yet their actions are similar to attacks that are called terrorism overseas.

F. In 2017, a gunman opened fire from the 32nd floor of a hotel in Las Vegas, killing 60 and injuring almost 900 people. In 2018, an antisemitic attacker at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh killed 11 and injured 6. In 2019, a gunman killed 23 and wounded another 23 in El Paso, in a hate crime that targeted Hispanic immigrants. Often when events such as these or other mass shootings occur, policymakers, media personnel, or bystanders will refer to them as acts of terrorism. It is difficult to make the jump and refer to them as terrorism unless we can really understand the shooter's motive and establish some linkage to a broader political cause and part of some larger systematic campaign.

selective terrorism: A term used by Michael Collins during the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921). Collins did not launch indiscriminate terror attacks. Rather, he selectively targeted the British military, the police force it sponsored, and the people who supported the United Kingdom.

Nidal Malik Hasan: (b. 1970) an American soldier of Palestinian descent. Hasan was a U.S. Army psychiatrist who became self-radicalized and embraced militant Islam. In November 2009, he went on a shooting spree at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people and wounding almost three dozen others. He was wounded, arrested, and charged with several counts of murder.

The Importance of Defining Terrorism

Aside from the social context, the term *terrorism* is difficult to define because it is pejorative. It is loaded with politically explosive meanings. Therefore, the manner in which terrorism is defined has political consequences. Only nation-states have the freedom to apply the label to their enemies, and the term dehumanizes the people who receive the label. When people are deemed to be terrorists, governments give their security forces expanded powers of investigation, search, and detention. In many cases, they utilize military force to kill opponents without thought of capture or benefit of trial. For example, the United States has employed missile attacks from drones that not only kill terrorists but also destroy innocent civilians in the surrounding area.

Terrorists are treated differently from criminals and other enemies of the state. They are atypical criminals entitled to neither human rights nor civil liberties. This is especially true when terrorists operate from foreign bases. Representatives of the state may take actions outside the law because people supporting the state frequently believe that terrorists are somehow less than human. The state also has the power to look at all of its citizens and people from all parts of the world as potential terrorists. Therefore, governments can expand social control and limit civil liberties in response to terrorism (Cebeci, 2012).

Definitions of terrorism are also important because they impact policies. Haviland Smith (2008), a retired counterterrorist specialist from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), believes the United States has been less than effective in countering terrorism because of the way the terms *terrorism* and *insurgency* are conflated. Political leaders have used the terms interchangeably, but terrorism, he says, is generally a law enforcement and intelligence issue, while insurgencies are primarily military matters. In addition, the United States sends the wrong policy message to the world. If you are an insurgent against a repressive government that is friendly toward the United States, you can be called a terrorist. If you are an insurgent who attacks the United States Capitol in an attempt to overturn Donald Trump's defeat in the 2020 election, you might be called rioters, criminals, or terrorists. Conversely, if you are fighting against a government with an anti-American policy, you are a freedom fighter. This inconsistency has resulted in many poor policy decisions, according to Smith.

> **Self Check**
> > Why is terrorism difficult to define?
> > What does Cooper mean by saying there is a problem with the problem definition?
> > What examples illustrate contextual meanings of *terrorism*?

| **Learning 2 Objective** | Explain where the term *terrorism* originated and how the meaning changed during the history of the nineteenth century. |

Attempts to Define Terrorism

Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2006, pp. 5–6) surveyed many scholars who specialize in terrorism and looked for commonalities in the definitions they received. Not surprisingly, the use of force or violence appeared in 83.5 percent of the responses.

Political activities were mentioned in 65 percent of the definitions, while fear appeared in 47 percent. About one-third of the definitions mentioned differences between victims and targets, planned actions, and tactical methods. Interestingly, only 6 percent of the respondents pointed to endemic criminal activity in terrorism despite the fact that almost all acts of terrorism involve violations of criminal law.

Definitions and Policy

Ayla Schbley (2003) believes that it necessary to emphasize the criminal nature of terrorism and move the focus beyond debates about politics. If defined from a political perspective, justifying terrorism simply depends on a person's viewpoint. This is wrong, he writes, because violence targeting defenseless symbolic victims can never be justified by any legal authority. Terrorism is a crime. Therefore, he defines terrorism as any violent act upon symbolic civilians and their property.

Boaz Ganor (2002) sees attacks on civilians as the key element differentiating terrorists from legitimate revolutionaries. Ganor says that debates about the meaning of terrorism are centered in theory, but in the practical world, they need to be defined by terms that transcend theoretical issues. A clear definition is crucial for a nation's policy and for international cooperation. If the world community is not clear about the meaning of terrorism, terrorists will continue to operate under the guise of legitimacy.

Ganor also argues that confusion arises because policymakers in the West use incorrect terms and phrases to describe terrorism. The reality of terrorism is glossed over with casual references to "guerrillas," "the underground," and "national liberation." As a result, many Western governments get caught in a semantic trap and fail to develop a cohesive international policy against terrorism. Terrorists use the same labels to justify their activities.

The solution, Ganor believes, is to focus on noncombatant civilians. When civilians are the exclusive objects of attacks, the resulting actions are terrorism. Accordingly, he says that terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence against civilians or civilian targets to attain a political objective. Violence is the essence of terrorism, the aim is always political, and civilians are the targets. These features distinguish terrorism from insurgencies and guerrilla wars.

By utilizing the terminology of conventional and unconventional wars, Ganor believes it is possible to differentiate among multiple forms of violence. For example, "soldiers" target military objectives, even though civilians are frequently killed in subsequent fighting. "War criminals," however, target civilians, their prisoners, and other noncombatants. "Guerrillas" attack military and security forces as well as political leadership. Terrorists are different. They target civilians to send a symbolic message.

If Western governments would recognize the threat to civilians, several things could be accomplished, Ganor believes. Terrorism could be defined, and nations could craft international agreements for antiterrorist cooperation. In addition, legislation could be enacted, offensive action could be authorized, and punishment could be sanctioned. Nations that support terrorist groups could legitimately be identified and diplomatically isolated.

Eric Reitan (2010) approaches the problem differently. He argues that attacks on military and security forces can be acts of terrorism. Traditional definitions, he writes, do not distinguish terrorism from criminal violence or any form of war. Like Ganor, he

group target: A collection of a particular people who are attacked by terrorists simply because they belong to a particular group.

recognizes the importance of the target, but he expands the victims beyond civilians. Civilians, security forces, and political leaders are a "**group target**," he says. If forces outside the law attack them for political purposes, it is terrorism.

Sound policies, Reitan writes, demand that governments distinguish terrorism from all other forms of violence. The group target concept does that. For example, Timothy McVeigh parked a truck loaded with explosive fertilizer by the Murrah federal building on April 19, 1995. One hundred and sixty-eight people were killed, including many toddlers in a daycare center. He did so because he hated the American government and its symbols. Anyone belonging to or associated with the U.S. government was McVeigh's enemy, including any law enforcement or military personnel who happened to be in the building. Reitan believes that the Murrah building symbolized a group target to McVeigh.

Reitan concludes that group targeting is the distinguishing feature of terrorism. If an attack is launched against a target simply because it or its members belong to a particular group, the action is terrorism.

An Insurmountable Problem?

Defining terrorism is important and it impacts policy, but H. H. A. Cooper's observation remains: There is a problem with the problem definition. The problem causes some researchers to suggest that the definitional dilemma may be insurmountable. Other researchers, analysts, and practitioners say the definition of terrorism is irrelevant. Some people even conclude that terrorism may be justified at times.

Jacqueline Hodgson and Victor Hodges (2013) write that defining terrorism is crucial because it identifies the people who are terrorists and it defines the specific acts that can be legitimately called terrorism. Yet, it is impossible to provide a precise definition of terrorism. Three factors inhibit efforts to describe terrorism. First, if the definition is too narrow and excludes attacks on state officials, security forces, or military targets, any resulting law or policy will be of little practical value. Conversely, if the definition includes the state and its personnel, the government can use its power to label legitimate freedom fighters as terrorists.

Hodgson and Hodges conclude that when political leaders are given the power to apply the label, they make judgments they are not qualified to make. Labels are applied inappropriately at times as a result, but the public must accept this because governments need antiterrorism policies and antiterrorism laws. Therefore, it is necessary to live with imperfection and to define the indefinable. As a result, enforcement will be discretionary and arbitrary, and at times, policies and actions will be unjust. They say there is no choice except to tolerate some form of injustice within policies, laws, and enforcement because doing so is necessary to take antiterrorist actions.

There is another approach. Over 30 years ago, Walter Laqueur (1987, p. 72) offered a simple definition of terrorism, and it is similar to the definition given by the RAND Corporation's longtime counterterrorism expert Brian Jenkins. Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force against innocent victims for political purposes. (You may notice how closely this resembles Boaz Ganor's definition. Ganor replaces *innocent* with *civilian*.) Yet, Laqueur seems not to worry about the definition. He adds a wry comment about the definition in a footnote. No doubt, he says, academics will write volumes about the

definition of terrorism in papers and maybe even entire books on the subject. Ironically, none of the publications will help anyone understand the topic.

The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2011; accessed February 2015) has an interesting entry in its discussion of the definition of terrorism. There may be situations where an action seems to be terrorism but is not. If terrorists can demonstrate that their actions will correct an evil action that is bad enough to justify stopping it with violence and the outcome is good enough to compensate for their actions, the perpetrators may not be committing an act of terrorism. This is true only if there is no other method for achieving the outcome and the targets are limited to military, security, and political actors. No other people or properties may be attacked. (Laqueur might add that these points provide material for an interesting intellectual debate, but they do not add one iota to our understanding of terrorism.)

Joshua Freilich and Steven Chermak have built the **Extremist Crime Database**—one of the leading databases on United States terrorism activities. The database includes homicides, bombings, arsons, financial crimes, and foiled plots, using inclusion criteria that avoid some of these definitional concerns. For an incident to be included in the ECDB, two criteria must be satisfied. First, *behaviorally* an illegal act must have been committed inside the United States. Second, *attitudinally* at the time of the incident at least one of the suspects who committed this act must have subscribed to a far-right, jihadi, or extremist animal or environmental rights belief system. Once the ideological motivation is established in conjunction with the breaking of the law, it is included in the ECDB.

Extremist Crime Database: A research database on the perpetrators, victims, events, and group characteristics of violent crimes, financial crimes, and failed/foiled plots committed by supporters of the domestic far-right, jihadists, and members of the Earth Liberation Front or Animal Liberation Front from 1990 through 2020.

> **Self Check**
> > What are the most common concepts in scholarly definitions of terrorism?
> > What is Ganor's definition of terrorism and how does it differ from other definitions?
> > How is the definition of terrorism important for national policy?

Shifts of Meanings in History

Entire nations change their approach to national security, intelligence, and law enforcement based on the way they define terrorism. This can be demonstrated by recent changes in American defense and law enforcement policies in response to terrorism, and this U.S. experience does not represent a new trend. When the term *terrorism* was first introduced in Western history during the late eighteenth century, governments adjusted their policies based on the way they defined the threat. They continued to do so for the next two centuries.

Terrorism did not begin in a vacuum. Many Americans became acutely aware of modern terrorism after the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and after the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Yet, modern terrorism began decades, even centuries, before these events. Terrorism, at least from the Western perspective, grew from the French Revolution (1789–1799), and the word was originally used to describe the actions of a government, not of a band of revolutionaries. Terrorism developed throughout the nineteenth century, changing forms and ideology. The meaning of terrorism

changed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as well. As Christopher Hewitt (2003, pp. 23–45) observes, the definition of terrorism and antiterrorist policies changes with political tides. The political atmosphere, in turn, changes with history.

The Origins of Terrorism in Western History

Terrorism began as government repression in France, but the French transformed its meaning by referring to Spanish guerrilla tactics in the Napoleonic Wars. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the word was used to describe the actions of revolutionaries. Nationalists copied revolutionary tactics in the early twentieth century, and they were deemed to be the new terrorists. The meaning of terrorism came full circle when Communists in the Soviet Union used terrorism to subjugate the population. After World War II, terrorism appeared in anticolonial movements, political extremism, and religion. All the differing forms of revolution and violence resulted in changing definitions and multiple policies.

The birth and evolution of the Western democracies also gave rise to a paradox, the relationship between democracy and terrorism. F. Gregory Gause III (2005) points to a variety of studies about this relationship, and he comes to a depressing conclusion: Terrorist attacks occur more frequently in democracies than in countries with any other form of government. Citing U.S. State Department statistics between 2000 and 2003, Gause finds that of nearly 530 attacks, almost 390 occurred in countries practicing full or limited democracy. This democracy factor would come into play in the nineteenth century and continue into the twenty-first century (see "Another Perspective: Terror and Democracy").

Reign of Terror: The name given to the repressive period in France (1793–1794). The revolutionary government accused thousands of French nobles and clergy of plotting to restore the monarchy. Executions began in Paris and spread throughout the countryside. Large mobs attacked and terrorized nobles in rural areas. Summary executions (executions on the spot without a trial) were quite common.

The French Revolution

The term *terrorism* appeared during the French Revolution (1789–1799). The revolution began with political and economic unrest in 1787, and the government was toppled in 1789. The revolutionary committee that controlled the new government executed the king in 1793, beginning a series of mass executions that lasted until the summer of 1794. Edmund Burke, a noted British political philosopher of the eighteenth century, used the word to describe the situation in revolutionary Paris. He referred to the violence as a **Reign of Terror**, and he used the word *terrorism* to describe the actions of the new government.

Another Perspective

Terror and Democracy

Many terrorism analysts believe that terrorists need democratic states to function. Totalitarian states, they argue, make it impossible to engage in covert activities. Terrorists need freedom of speech, freedom of thought, and freedom of action. Jenny Hocking (2004) takes the opposite view. In reaction to a terrorist attack in Bali, Indonesia in 2002, the Australian government followed the path of the United States, Hocking says.

Political rights have been trampled in the name of the war on terrorism. A counterterrorist network has invaded civil liberties in Australia, and the Australian Intelligence Security Service has been given permission to pry into the lives of law-abiding citizens. Terrorism is a threat, but overreaction to it also threatens democracies. The internment of terrorist suspects without charge or trial is a greater threat than terrorism.

Members and associates of the Committee of Public Safety were called terrorists by French nobles, their families, and sympathizers. They were responsible for 17,000 legal executions. Some scholars estimate that there were 23,000 additional illegal executions (Tilly, 2004).

Guerrillas and the Spanish Peninsula

In the Napoleonic Wars, the meaning of terrorism started to undergo a subtle transformation. Napoleon invaded **Spain in 1807**, and his army would face a type of threat that it had not experienced up to that point. Small bands of Spanish partisans began to attack French troops. Frequently armed and supported by the British Army, the partisans attacked the French in unconventional manners. They could not gather and face a French corps on a battlefield, but they could murder off-duty soldiers, attack supply columns, and engage in hit-and-run tactics. The Spanish called the partisans patriots, but the French referred to them as terrorists. Thus, the meaning of terrorism shifted away from governmental repression to the resistance of some people to governments. This transformed definition would be maintained through the nineteenth century (Tamas, 2001).

Guerrilla warfare did not originate in Spain, but it was particularly savage there. It served as an asymmetrical method of resisting the French Revolutionary Army. It began a decade before the invasion of Spain when armed citizens loyal to the king fought against the French Revolution. It continued in Spain, and David Bell (2007) says that it came to full fruition when the 1812 French invasion of Russia failed. Russian guerrillas decimated the massive French Army during its retreat from Moscow throughout the winter of 1812–1813. Few armies could resist Napoleon in the field, but groups of disbanded soldiers and armed citizens were another matter. Bell believes that this signaled an ideological transformation in the meaning of war. Whether his thesis is correct, one aspect of his argument is certain: These guerrilla movements helped set the stage for terrorism.

Spain in 1807: The Peninsular War (1808–1814) began when Spanish and French forces divided Portugal in 1807. Napoleon, whose army entered Spain in 1807, attempted to use his forces to capture the Spanish throne in 1808. British forces under Sir Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, joined Spanish forces loyal to the king of Spain and Spanish partisans to fight the French.

Self Check

> Do you think there is a relationship between terrorism and democracy?
> What did the term *terrorism* first signify in France?
> How did the meaning of terrorism change from the French Revolution through the Napoleonic Wars?

1848 and the Radical Democrats

The meaning of the term *terrorism* changed in Western minds essentially because of the nature of European violence in the 1800s. The French Revolution did not bring democracy; it brought Napoleon. The Napoleonic Wars continued until 1815, and then a new international order emerged. Although democracy continued to grow in the United States and in the United Kingdom, royalists reasserted their power in the rest of Europe. Under the surface, however, democratic ideas continued to grow. These ideas led to further political struggles and demands for freedom.

The democrats of the early 1800s were not united. Most of them believed in middle-class democracy, and they were reluctant to take to the streets if a legislative process

Learning 3 Objective Explain how socialism, anarchism, and communism were mistakenly associated with terrorism.

was available. They believed that they could create constitutional monarchies and evolve into a system of democracy as the United States had done. The main objective of most European middle-class democrats from approximately 1815 to 1848 was to obtain constitutions to ensure liberty. Several of the German states began writing constitutions, but they were thwarted by monarchal forces and decisively defeated between 1848 and 1849. Austrian and Russian monarchs simply controlled all governmental processes. In the wake of failure, disgruntled democrats began to speak of nonlegislative avenues for change.

Radical democrats demanded immediate and drastic change. They were not only interested in developing constitutions but also wanted to distribute evenly the wealth created by trade and manufacturing. Many **socialists**, including a group of socialists called **communists**, argued for centralized control of the economy. **Anarchists**, sometime allies and sometime foes of the socialists, sought to reduce or eliminate centralized government. The wealthy owners of industry, known as capitalists, were politically powerful, and many people from the middle class prospered when capitalist enterprises expanded. The capitalists opposed all forms of socialism and anarchy. Radical democrats felt that the capitalists were little better than the royalists. The radical democrats wanted all people to be equal, and they argued that democracy should be based not only on freedom but also on economic equality. This meant that the class structure and distribution of wealth had to be reorganized. This frightened the newly emergent capitalist and middle classes in the same way the French Revolution had scared European royalty. The radical democrats called for class revolution.

The revolution came in 1848. The conservative system established by governments after the Napoleonic Wars was antidemocratic. As constitutional movements failed in many countries, people grew restless. Parisians took to the streets in February 1848, and they overthrew the government. Many people in other European capitals followed suit, and by autumn, almost every major European country had experienced unrest or revolution. In some cases, as in Berlin—which was the capital of Prussia at the time—the army came to restore order. In other cases, such as France, a new republic was proclaimed. The middle class saw some gains, but most workers did not.

Governmental control was slowly restored in Europe between 1848 and 1849, but new class awareness and unrest emerged. The 1848 revolutions fostered working-class distaste for the distribution of wealth and power. George Woodcock (2004, p. 81) says that the 1789 French Revolution ushered in a new class structure, but it also resulted in a new economic system—capitalism—and a centralized state. The 1848 revolutionaries fought against the economic system. They lost and went underground.

This action, Michael Burleigh (2007) writes, signaled the beginning of modern terrorism. It started with the nation-state and the French Revolution, and organized governments used terrorism far more effectively than revolutionary groups. Yet, Burleigh says, secretive revolutionary groups formed the nexus of modern terrorism after 1848, a transformation that took place in Western Europe. Claudia Verhoeven (2009), on the other hand, moves the point of origin further east. She argues that modern terrorism began in Russia. Though Russia experienced its first terrorist campaign in the 1870s, several small groups organized individual cells a decade earlier. This, she concludes, represents the origin of modern terrorism. Regardless of geographical location, Burleigh and Verhoeven

radical democrats: Those who tried to bring democracy to all classes. They sought a more equitable distribution of wealth throughout all economic classes, believing that concentrated wealth and class inequities prevented societies from becoming truly democratic.

socialists: Radical democrats who sought wealth equality in capitalist societies. Some socialists sought governmental guarantees of living standards. Others believed that the state should control industry and divide profits among all members of society. Still others believed that people would form cooperative relationships on their own with no need of a government.

communists: Socialists who believed in a strong centralized economy controlled by a strong central government. Their ideas were summarized in *The Communist Manifesto*, written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1848.

anarchists: Those in the nineteenth century who advocated the creation of cooperative societies without centralized governments. There were many forms of anarchy. In the popular understanding of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anarchists were seen as violent socialist revolutionaries. Today, antiglobalists calling themselves anarchists have little resemblance to their earlier counterparts.

make the same point: When groups went underground after 1848, terrorism as it is known today came into its infancy.

Socialists

Three strains of radical democrats coalesced after the failed revolutions of 1848: communists, socialists, and anarchists (Figure 1.1). Socialists wanted to completely democratize society and assume control of industrial production. They believed that a strong state would ensure that profits from industry were distributed in an egalitarian manner. Communism represented a particular form of socialism, one that advocated a strong centralized government, the elimination of all classes except the working class, and a complete state monopoly over all forms of industrial and agricultural production. Socialists and communists agreed that wealth was not a private entitlement. It belonged to all workers. Although many socialists embraced communism, communists denounced socialists who failed to advocate for strong state controls. Many socialists emphasized democracy over the centralized power of communism (see Levin, 2003). The radical democrats believed political power should be held in common. Their concept of socialism was especially popular among some groups of displaced workers. Unfortunately, the upper and middle classes frequently believed terrorism and socialism were the same thing (A. Roberts, 2002).

Johann Most
German American radical. He advocates revolution in a New Jersey–based newspaper called Freiheit (Freedom).

Karl Heinzen
German radical. He flees to the United States after failed 1848 revolutions. His writings include a justification for political murder.

Mikhail Bakunin
Russian revolutionary. His ideas will inspire the People's Will.

Pierre Joseph Proudhon
French anarchist. He is appalled by violence and believes humans can live without governments in ideal communities.

Emma Goldman
Russian American socialist. Full of fiery rhetoric, she leaves the United States for Russia after the Revolution and returns disillusioned with communism.

Karl Marx
Founder of communism. With Friedrich Engels, he develops the theoretical basis of communism in a three-volume critique of capitalism.

Nikolai Morozov
Russian revolutionary. He is a leader of the People's Will.

Russia

Germany

France

U.S.A.

Atlantic Ocean

Figure 1.1 Anarchists and Socialists

One of the chief spokespersons and intellectuals in the socialist camp was the founder of communism, Karl Marx (1818–1883). He finished a Ph.D. in philosophy in 1841 and moved to Paris shortly thereafter. He met Friedrich Engels and formed a lifelong friendship. He outlined theories of socialism in several writings, including a three-volume critique of capitalism. Marx believed that social structure is arranged by the material circumstances surrounding human existence. People shape the environment through work and even produce more than they need. Marx referred to this extra production as *surplus*. In medieval societies, nobles controlled the surplus production created by peasants, but control shifted to capitalists with the end of the Middle Ages. Marx and Engels claimed that the capitalist economic system exploited the lower classes for the benefit of others. They called for a change in the system.

Despite the many labels applied to him and the derogatory statements of his enemies, Karl Marx was not a terrorist. Marx referred to "revolutionary" change, but he never clarified what he meant by revolution. Further, he did not advocate political bombing or assassination. In fact, on most occasions, he publicly condemned it. He believed socialism was to be a reflection of democracy, not violence. A massive seizure of power by the general population might be justified, but individual acts of murder were not.

The process of democratization was slow, however, and some of the radical democrats began to feel violent revolution was the only possible course of action. A few radical democrats went underground, choosing subversive violence as a means to challenge authority. They became popularly known as terrorists because they hoped to achieve social revolution by terrorizing the capitalist class and its supporters.

Anarchists

Anarchists shared many ideas with socialists about the egalitarian nature of society, but they disagreed on the function of the state. The term *anarchy* was not new. It originated some two thousand years earlier, when Greek philosophers spoke of eliminating governments, but the nineteenth-century anarchists were also concerned with the distribution of wealth. This frightened the upper classes, which already associated socialism with terrorism. Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) was one of the advocates of modern anarchism. His political activities eventually landed him in a French prison, but Proudhon was not a man of violence. He called for the extension of democracy to all classes, to be accomplished through the elimination of property and government. Property was to be commonly held, and families living in extended communes were to replace centralized government.

Proudhon disagreed with Karl Marx and other socialists about the role of government. Most socialists saw centralized government as a necessary evil. Like the democrats, the socialists believed government had to exist to protect the individual rights of citizens. Communists took the role of the state further, insisting on a strong central government. Proudhon, on the other hand, believed that all government was evil. Proudhon had revolutionary ideals, but he was a man of peace. He believed that anarchy would develop peacefully as people learned about the structure of governments and the capitalist economy. Not all of Proudhon's disciples were of the same peaceful bent. They came to see themselves as revolutionaries, and they would have growing influence on terrorism in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Violent Anarchism

Despite the rhetoric, both the socialists and anarchists engaged in more talk than action after the 1848 revolutions. Both groups debated the efficacy and morality of violence, and most of the people who called for revolution spoke of mass action, not individual violence. Walter Laqueur (1999, p. 12) says that the socialists and anarchists rejected terrorism on practical and theoretical grounds. Practically, terrorism could not promise strategic success, and many of the revolutionary theorists rejected violence in general. Marxists and anarchists favored strikes, demonstrations, and other mass actions.

Richard Jensen (2004) also believes that the initial calls in history for revolution cannot be associated with terrorism. Even though socialists and anarchists disagreed about the path for creating a new society, they avoided violence. Those who advocated violence usually did so only rhetorically; however, this changed in the 1880s as anarchists began assassinating heads of state. The media sensationalized anarchist events, leading people to conclude that anarchism was a vast international conspiracy of terror. By 1880, the press and politicians had collapsed all forms of socialism into the generic term *anarchism*, and anarchists were deemed terrorists in popular opinion.

How did this change occur? Jensen says that several factors merged to create a culture of terrorism among some members of the anarchist movement. He and other scholars outline some of the reasons, including the harsh economic conditions, repression by the government, changes in the nature of warfare, and adoption of new tactics (Laqueur and Alexander, 1987; Laqueur, 1999; Epstein, 2001; Woodcock, 2004; Clutterbuck, 2004; Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2004; Jensen, 2015). Taken together, these factors reveal a pattern in the transformation of some anarchists from rhetoric to violence.

Another factor influencing the adoption of violent action was the invention of dynamite. Alfred Nobel blended explosive material with chemicals, cotton, and refined clay to produce an explosive 20 times more powerful than black powder. To be sure, the power of dynamite was often overestimated—one anarchist claimed that 10 pounds of it could sink a battleship. But dynamite gave an individual or small group a psychological edge. For the first time in history, a small group had a technological force multiplier that allowed it to launch a major attack. Rhetoric gave birth to propaganda by the deed, but dynamite fostered the philosophy of the bomb.

Anarchism and Nationalism

If the 1800s witnessed the growth of anarchism, it also saw the growth of nationalism in the West. As anarchists called for an end to government, nationalistic organizations demanded the right to self-government. Many nationalists adopted the tactics of the anarchists to fight the foreign powers occupying their lands. Nationalistic groups throughout Europe turned to the philosophy of the bomb, and nationalist terrorists began to follow the pattern set by the violent anarchists.

Nationalistic groups did not view themselves as terrorists. They believed that anarchists were fighting for ideas. Nationalists believed that they were fighting for their countries. Anarchists were socially isolated, but nationalists could hope for the possibility of greater support. Governments labeled them terrorists, but nationalists saw themselves as unconventional soldiers in a national cause. Nationalists believed that they were fighting patriotic wars. They adopted only the tactics of the anarchists, not their ideology.

The nationalistic Irish Republican Army (IRA) grew from this period. Unlike anarchists, the IRA did not reject the notion of governmental control; rather, the IRA wanted to nationalize it. The IRA believed Ireland was entitled to self-government. Their weakness relative to the government's power caused them to use the terrorist tactics fostered by the anarchists. In the twentieth century, other nationalistic groups in Europe followed the example of the IRA.

Though two distinct positions had emerged, it is not possible to completely separate nineteenth-century anarchism and nationalism. Grant Wardlaw (1982, pp. 18–24) sees a historical continuity from anarchism to nationalistic terrorism. Richard Rubenstein (1987, pp. 122–125) makes this point by looking at contemporary anarchist and nationalistic groups. Rubenstein says that the stages terrorists must go through to employ violence are similar for both types of terrorism; the moral justification for anarchist and nationalistic terrorism is essentially the same.

Terrorism in the modern sense came from violent anarchists in the late 1800s. The anarchists were based in Western Europe, but they carried their campaign to other parts of the world. The most successful actions took place in Russia before the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. Anarchist groups assassinated several Russian officials, including the czar. Anarchism also spread to the United States. In America, it took the form of labor violence; American anarchists, usually immigrants from Europe, saw themselves as linked to organized labor. The anarchist movement in America did not gain as much strength as in Europe, and American anarchists were generally relegated to industrial areas. Right-wing extremism was not part of the anarchist movement, but by the mid-twentieth century, right-wing groups began to imitate the tactics of violent anarchists.

✓ Self Check

> Describe the various schools of revolutionary thought in the mid-nineteenth century.

> What impact did dynamite have on modern terrorism?

> Explain the surprising relationship between nationalism and anarchism.

Another Perspective

Noam Chomsky Examines Terrorism and Morality

Noam Chomsky (2002) approaches terrorism with two critical questions: (1) How should terrorism be defined? and (2) What is the proper response to it? He says that the problem of defining terrorism is complex, but there are many straightforward governmental responses. Almost all of these definitions cast terrorism within a moral framework; that is, terrorism becomes a criminal act where innocents are victimized. These circumstances require a government to act; yet, the response frequently evokes a paradox. Governments define terrorist acts as immoral, but they tend to respond by acting outside the bounds of morality. They justify their actions by citing the original immoral act of a terrorist group.

Chomsky finds this approach unacceptable. The same moral framework that allows a society to define an illegal act as terrorism requires that the response to terrorism be conducted within the bounds of morality. Terrorism, Chomsky says, is something "they" do to "us," and it is never about what "we" do to "them." Citing just-war doctrine, Chomsky says the response to terrorism cannot be terrorism. A moral truism states

that any illegal activity is immoral no matter how a state wishes to justify its response to an event.

The definition of terrorism provides a moral constant. For example, if an official definition states that terrorism is the use of violence against innocent people to change political behavior, a state is morally obligated to live within the bounds of this definition. It cannot use violence against innocents to force its political will. If terrorism is a crime, the response to it must not be criminal if the response is to be morally legitimate. The contradiction comes, Chomsky concludes, because the United States operates within a moral definition of terrorism only when its own interests are served. As a result, oppression, violence, and illegal actions are rarely defined as terrorism when they are condoned by the United States or its allies.

Terrorism and Revolution in Russia, 1881–1921

The historiography of the Russian Revolution and the fighting that took place afterward have changed drastically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Histories written during the Cold War tended to be either pro- or anti-Communist. As documents and archives became available to Western writers after the collapse of the Soviet Union, views of Russia changed and new histories and biographies emerged. Sheila Fitzpatrick (2001) views the revolution from a perspective that begins with revolt and ends several years after the rise of Communism as **Joseph Stalin** (1878–1953) purged and executed his enemies in the 1930s. Robert Service (1995) concludes a three-volume biography of **Vladimir Lenin** (1870–1924) with a picture of a ruthless man who forged policy by force of will. Service's Lenin is a man who was not interested in power for its own sake and who genuinely wanted to create a better socialist state. Confrontations forced him to compromise in the end. Katerina Clark (1998) presents the tremendous cultural shifts from 1913 to 1931 by focusing on St. Petersburg from late czarist times until Stalin consolidated power. Christopher Read (1996) divides this era into two periods—the collapse of czarist Russia and the building of the new socialist order. Service (2005) brings another perspective, completely rewriting the history of Russia from the fall of the czar to the rise of **Vladimir Putin**.

At the time of the revolution, however, the West viewed the Communist state with horror. They equated all communism with anarchism and revolution. Class revolution became a reality in Russia, and the West feared that Russia would export revolution through terrorism. Late nineteenth-century Russia differed significantly from the other great powers of Europe. Class distinctions between nobles and peasants were virtually the same as they had been before the French Revolution, and Russian peasants were beset by poverty. Industry had come to some of Russia's cities, but Russia's economic and governmental systems were not adequate to handle the changes. Czar Alexander II (ruled from 1855 to 1881) vowed to make changes in the system, but when he attempted to do so, he found himself in the midst of revolutionary terrorism.

The People's Will

Three groups in Russia after 1850 felt that they could reform and modernize the Russian state, but they disagreed about how to do it. One group, whose views Czar Alexander shared,

Learning 4 Objective
Summarize the differing meanings of terrorism in Russia from the People's Will through the rise of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin.

Joseph Stalin: The dictator who succeeded Lenin. Stalin solidified Communist control of Russia through a secret police organization. He purged the government of all suspected opponents in the 1930s, killing thousands of people.

Vladimir Lenin: The Russian revolutionary who led a second revolution in October, bringing the Communists to power. Lenin led the Communists in a civil war and set up a dictatorship to enforce Communist Party rule in Russia.

Vladimir Putin: (b. 1952) a former KGB (Soviet secret police) officer and second president of the Russian Federation from 1999 to 2008. He served as Russia's prime minister after his second presidential term and returned to the presidency in 2012.

wanted to modernize Russia from the top down. Another group, the intellectuals, wanted Russia to become a liberal Western democracy. Violent anarchists took another path. They believed that Russian problems could be settled through revolution. Narodnaya Volya (the People's Will) advocated violent socialist revolution. When it launched a campaign of revolutionary terrorism in the 1870s, it faced confrontation with conservative elements such as the church, police, and military. Members of the People's Will came to believe that it was necessary to terrorize these conservative organizations into submission.

The motivations behind the People's Will evolved from Russian revolutionary thought. According to Laqueur (1999, pp. 15–16), the philosophy of anarchist terrorism in Russia was embodied by Mikhail Bakunin and Sergey Nechaev. Their revolutionary thought developed separately before they met each other in the 1860s, when they formed an intellectual union. Both spoke of revolt against the czar, and both endorsed violence as the means. Yet, even in the nation that would experience a violent anarchist campaign and eventually a communist revolution, Bakunin and Nechaev basically stuck to rhetoric.

Although they were ideologically linked to anarchism in Western Europe, they were distinct from their Western supporters. Russian anarchists were writing for a general population in the hope of sparking a democratic revolution. Laqueur says that their significance lies in their influence on later revolutionaries and the violence and assassinations those later revolutionaries committed. They were not radical revolutionaries in Laqueur's view.

Sheila Fitzpatrick (2001, pp. 19–21) presents a different view. Russian economic progress dominated the last part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. The problem was the attitudes of peasants and industrial workers. According to Marx, agrarian peasants did not have enough motivation to join the proletariat in revolution, but Fitzpatrick says that Russia was different. Revolutionary sympathy was high among the peasantry, giving them a closer relationship with many urban workers. Revolutionary rhetoric and writings had touched the lower classes, but Russian economic prosperity had not. The lower classes were receptive to revolution, although as Christopher Read (1996, p. 294) illustrates, no single theme dominated the revolutionaries until it was imposed by the state under Lenin.

Regardless of the debate, the writings of the Russians were powerful. Nechaev (reprint 1987, pp. 68–71) laid down the principles of revolution in the "Catechism of the Revolutionary." His spirit was reflected in writings of the late twentieth century. Rubenstein (1987) compared the "catechism" to Carlos Marighella's *The Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and found no essential differences. Both Laqueur and Rubenstein believe that Nechaev's influence lives on. Bakunin (1866, pp. 65–68) believed that the Russian government had been established on thievery. In "Revolution, Terrorism, Banditry," he argues that the only way to break the state's hold on power is revolt. Such rhetoric did not endear Nechaev and Bakunin to the czar, but it did make them popular with later revolutionaries. Laqueur (1999) concludes that such revolutionary pronouncements correctly belong with Russian expressionist literature, not terrorist philosophy.

These philosophies guided the People's Will. They murdered the police chief of Moscow and went on a campaign of bombing and killing. In May 1881, they succeeded in striking their ultimate target: They killed Czar Alexander II. Ironically, this brought about

their downfall. The People's Will was eliminated, Alexander III (ruled from 1881 to 1894) ended all attempts at reform, and revolutionaries went underground. Nicholas II (ruled from 1894 to 1917), who succeeded Alexander III, was instead the man who would be toppled by revolutionary forces.

Czar Nicholas and the Revolutions of 1905 and 1917

Nicholas faced his first revolution in 1905, after his army lost a war to Japan. In addition to losing the war, Russia was consumed with economic problems and bureaucratic inefficiency. A group of unemployed workers began demonstrations in St. Petersburg, and some enlisted men in the Russian Navy mutinied. Their actions were brutally suppressed by Nicholas's army and police forces, feeding the spirit of revolution that burned below the surface. Russian revolutionaries needed another national disaster to create the atmosphere for revolution. It came in 1914, when Russia entered World War I (1914–1918).

By 1917, the Russian people were tired of their economic woes and their czar. In February, a general strike in St. Petersburg turned into a revolution. Unlike in 1905, the Russian Army joined the workers, and a new Russian government was formed. They envisioned a period of capitalist economic expansion that would save the beleaguered Russian economy. **Workers councils (or soviets)** were established in major Russian cities.

The primary mistake of the February revolutionaries was that they kept Russia in the war, a decision that was unpopular with the Russian people. This had two immediate ramifications. It created unrest at home, and it inspired the Germans to seek a way to remove Russia from World War I. The Germans found their answer in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who orchestrated a second revolution in October 1917 and removed Russia from the war.

workers councils (or soviets): The lowest-level legislative body in the Soviet Union following the October Revolution. *Soviet* is the Russian word for "council."

Lenin and Trotsky

The Russian Revolution utilized terrorism in a new manner, and this had an impact on the way people viewed terrorism in the twentieth century. Lenin and one of his lieutenants, **Leon Trotsky** (1879–1940), believed that terrorism should be used as an instrument for overthrowing middle-class, or bourgeois, governments. Once power was achieved, Lenin and Trotsky advocated terrorism as a means of controlling internal enemies and as a method for coping with international strife. Russia was very weak after the revolution. It faced foreign intervention and was torn by civil war. By threatening to export terrorism, Lenin and Trotsky hoped to keep their enemies, primarily Western Europe and the United States, at bay.

With their threat, Lenin and Trotsky instilled the fear of Communist revolution in the minds of many people in the West. To some, terrorism and Communism became synonymous. Though the Russians, and later the Soviets, were not good at carrying insurrection to other lands, Western leaders nevertheless feared that Communist terrorists were on the verge of toppling democratic governments. Despite Lenin and his successor, Joseph Stalin, having the most success with another form of terror—murdering their own people—fear of Communist insurrection lasted well into the twentieth century, and some people still fear it. Even as the Soviet Union tottered into dissolution, Western analysts

Leon Trotsky: A Russian revolutionary who led foreign affairs in Stalin's government and later became the commander of the Red Army. He espoused terrorism as a means for spreading revolution. He was thrown out of the Communist Party for opposing Stalin and was assassinated by Communist agents in Mexico City in 1940.

still saw terrorism through the lens of Western–Soviet confrontation (see Livingstone and Arnold, 1986; Sterling, 1986). Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer (2006, pp. 20–23) believes that this perspective hinders the ability to comprehend terrorism today.

In fairness to analysts of the Cold War, Lenin's victory and subsequent writings have inspired terrorists from 1917 to the present. Although Communist terrorism was not part of an orchestrated conspiracy, it did influence behavior. Some terrorists scoured the works of Lenin and Trotsky, as well as other Russian revolutionaries, to formulate theories, tactics, and ideologies. Although not a simple conspiracy of evil, this influence was real and remains today.

✓ Self Check	> How did revolutionary thought develop in czarist Russia?
	> Describe the two revolutions under Nicholas II.
	> How did Lenin and Trotsky influence the direction of revolutionary thought?

Selective Terrorism and the Birth of the Irish Republic

Learning Objective 5 Summarize the history of the Irish Republican Army's use of terror.

In August 1969, the British Army was ordered to increase its presence in Northern Ireland in an effort to quell a series of riots. Although the army had maintained bases in Northern Ireland for some time, rioting in Londonderry and Belfast was suddenly far beyond the control of local police and the handful of British regular soldiers stationed in the area. On August 18, 1969, British Army reinforcements began arriving, hoping to avoid a long-term conflict. Their hopes were in vain. The meaning of terrorism in Ireland changed with history. Unlike revolutionary France, Europe in 1848, and the differing forms of terrorism in Russia, terrorism in Ireland developed over a number of centuries (Lee, 1983).

The Irish have never ruled their island as a single political entity, and they have experienced some type of foreign domination since a series of Viking incursions in 800 CE (Costigan, 1980; Cahill, 2003). The Vikings were driven out in the eleventh century, only to be replaced by invading Normans in the twelfth century (Simms, 2000). England began to colonize the northern part of Ireland in the late 1500s. This not only brought conflict between the colonizers and the colonized, it created a direct collision between Protestants and Catholics (Bradshaw, 1978; O Corrain, 2000; Curtis, 2000, pp. 16–18, orig. 1936; Herren and Brown, 2002). Finally, after the United Kingdom was formed in 1801, Ireland was literally absorbed by Great Britain (see Cronin, 1984; Foster, 2001, pp. 134–172). This last act created a new type of Irish person, the *Republican*, a citizen who wanted to be free of the British in a *Republic* of Ireland.

The Early Irish Republican Army

By the twentieth century, the struggle in Ireland had become a matter of divisions between Unionists, people who wanted to remain in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and Republicans, people who wanted independence. A host of other conflicts were associated with this confrontation, but the main one was the Unionist–Republican struggle.

Michael Scheuer (2006, pp. 20–23), former director of the CIA's bin Laden unit, believes that the focus on history is often misplaced. There are two types of terrorist "experts," he contends—retired governmental and military officials, and informed commentators. The latter group is made up of academics and journalists. Scheuer believes that these people are far from experts because not only do they fail to understand history, but they are also stuck in a time frame. Media consciousness about terrorism developed and grew in the 1970s. Two issues dominated terrorism at that time: the Cold War and violence around Israel and Palestine. Expertise about terrorism came from studying both the emergence of theory, with its roots in the West, and the anticolonial movements associated with the early part of the Cold War. Terrorism was a historical phenomenon, an outcome of confrontations that grew from the influence of Western history. Ideological groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Brigades came from political battlefields. Nationalistic groups such as the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA) were motivated by patriotism, but they adopted leftist agendas and the tactics of leftist terrorists. The anti-Western attitude of Palestinian groups like Hezbollah and the Abu Nidal Organization was tinged with a left-wing philosophy and a style of operation similar to their counterparts in ideological and nationalistic movements. Western expertise was honed over two decades, from 1970 to 1990, Scheuer says, and it has very little to do with terrorism today.

Jihadist terrorism comes from a different tradition. It does not rely on political and theoretical developments in the West, and although jihadists frequently embrace the cause of the Palestinians, they do not seek to establish an independent Palestinian state or replace a destroyed Israel with a new Arab country. They come from a religious tradition dating from the twelfth century in the Western calendar, and they operate in a manner far different from terrorist groups in the late twentieth century. Expertise on the old-style groups is not applicable to the jihadists, Scheuer concludes. So-called terrorism experts are outdated. They are stuck in the past and examine modern terrorism through a perspective "yellowed with age."

Consider these issues in terms of future developments:

- Unlike most criminals, terrorists study the past to develop tactical models. Is there merit in studying the history of terrorism? If so, what is the time frame for beginning such study?
- Does the history of terrorism teach lessons across cultures? Are there certain aspects of terrorism that remain constant across time and location?
- How is the form of twenty-first century terrorism different from its previous manifestations? How is it similar?

The Unionists often had the upper hand because they could call on support from the British-sponsored police and military forces. The Republicans had no such advantage, and they searched for an alternative.

Costigan (1980) believes that the Republican military solution originated when the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) formed in the 1850s. Support came from exiles and emigrants around the world. Irish Catholics had emigrated from their homeland to the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, but they never forgot the people they left behind. Irish immigrants in New York City created the Fenian Brotherhood as a financial relief organization for relatives in the old country. After the U.S. Civil War, some Irish soldiers returning from the U.S. Army decided to take the struggle for emancipation back to Ireland. Having fought to free the slaves, they believed that they should continue the struggle and free Ireland. They sponsored a failed revolt in 1867, and others launched a dynamite campaign in London a decade and a half later. Although the IRB pledged to work peacefully, it gradually evolved into a revolutionary organization.

J. Bowyer Bell (1974) has written the definitive treatise on the origins and development of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). He states that it began with a campaign of violence sponsored by the IRB in the late 1800s. Spurred on by increased nationalistic feeling in the homeland and the hope of home rule, the IRB waged a campaign of bombing and assassination from 1870 until 1916. Its primary targets were Unionists and British forces that supported the Unionist cause. Among their greatest adversaries was the British-backed police force in Ireland, the **Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC)**.

Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC): The police force established by the United Kingdom in Ireland. It was modeled after the London Metropolitan Police, but it represented British interests. After the Free State was formed, the RIC became the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). In turn, the RUC gave way to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) as part of Irish and British attempts to bring peace to Northern Ireland after 1995.

The activities of the IRB frightened Irish citizens who wanted to remain united with Great Britain. For the most part, these people were Protestant and middle class, and they lived in the northern counties. They gravitated toward their trade unions and social organizations, among them the Orange Lodges, to counter growing IRB sympathy and power. They enjoyed the sympathy of the British Army's officer corps. They also controlled the RIC.

The Fenians of the IRB remained undaunted by Unionist sentiment. Although Irish Unionists seemed in control, the IRB had two trump cards. First, IRB leadership was dominated by men who believed each generation had to produce warriors who would fight for independence. Some of these leaders, as well as their followers, were quite willing to be martyred to keep republicanism alive. In addition, the IRB had an organization. It not only served as a threat to British power, it also provided the basis for the resurgence of Irish culture.

The Easter Rising

At the turn of the twentieth century, no person embodied Irish culture more than Patrick Pearse (1879–1916). The headmaster of an Irish school, Pearse was an inspirational romantic. He could move crowds to patriotism and inspire resistance to British policies. He was a hero among Irish Americans, and they sent hundreds of thousands of dollars to support his cause. He told young Irish boys and girls about their heritage, he taught them Gaelic, and he inspired them to be militantly proud of being Irish. He was also a member of the **Supreme Council of the IRB**. When the possibility of home rule was defeated in the British parliament, Republican eyes turned to Pearse.

Supreme Council of the IRB: The command center of several Republican terrorist organizations, including the Irish Republican Army, the Official Irish Republican Army, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The name was transposed from the Irish Republican Brotherhood.

By 1916, the situation in Ireland had changed. The British had promised home rule to Ireland when World War I (1914–1918) came to an end. Whereas most people in Ireland believed the British, Unionists and Republicans secretly armed for a civil war between the north and the south. They believed a fight was inevitable if the British granted home rule, and each side was determined to dominate the government of a newly independent Ireland. Some Republicans were not willing to wait for home rule.

With British attention focused on Germany, leaders of the IRB believed that it was time for a strike against the Unionists and their British supporters. On Easter in 1916, Patrick Pearse and James Connolly (1868–1916) led a revolt in Dublin. Pearse believed that the revolt was doomed from the start, but he also believed that it was necessary to sacrifice his life to keep the Republican spirit alive. Connolly was a more pragmatic socialist who fought because he believed a civil war was inevitable.

The 1916 Easter Rising enjoyed local success because it surprised everyone. Pearse and Connolly took over several key points in Dublin with a few thousand armed followers. From the halls of the General Post Office, Pearse announced that the revolutionaries had formed an Irish republic, and he asked the Irish to follow him. The British, outraged by

what they saw as treachery in the midst of a larger war, sent troops to Dublin. The city was engulfed in a week of heavy fighting.

Whereas Pearse and Connolly came to start a popular revolution, the British came to fight a war. In a few days, Dublin was devastated by British artillery. Pearse recognized the futility of the situation and asked for terms. Bell (1974) points out the interesting way Pearse chose to approach the British: He sent a message using a new title for himself, commanding general of the IRA, to the general in charge of the British forces. The IRB had transformed itself into an army: the IRA.

If Connolly and Pearse hoped to be greeted as liberators, they greatly misjudged the mood of Ireland. Had the British played to Irish sympathy, they might have stopped violent republicanism. Their actions, however, virtually empowered **Sinn Fein**. The British handed down several dozen death sentences for the Easter Rising. Hundreds more people received lengthy prison sentences. Pearse became an Irish legend. Standing in front of a firing squad, he gave an impassioned plea for Irish independence. Connolly, who had been badly wounded, was tied to a chair and placed before a firing squad. Public sympathy shifted to the rebels.

Two important people managed to escape the purge. Eamon de Valera (1882–1975) received a prison sentence instead of death because of questions about his nationality. He had been born in New York City and was brought to Ireland at an early age. Michael Collins (1890–1922), who was in a cell where prisoners slated for execution were being segregated from those selected for internment, walked to the other side of the cell and found himself among the internment group. It saved his life. De Valera would emerge as a revolutionary and political leader, and Collins would become the leader of the IRA.

Sinn Fein: The political party of Irish republicans. Critics claim it represents terrorists. Republicans say it represents their political interests. Despite the debate, Sinn Fein historically has had close connections with extremism and violence.

The Black and Tan War, 1920–1921

Sinn Fein, the political party of Irish republicanism, continued its activities in spite of the failure of the Easter Rising. When World War I ended, many of the Republicans were released. There were several moderates in Ireland, represented by the Parliamentary Party, and they sought to reopen the issue of home rule. They believed that this was the only nonviolent way to approach the Irish question. Bew (1999) says that the moderates were

Another Perspective

State Repression

Edward Herman (1983) says terrorism should be defined in terms of state repression. During the Cold War, the United States supported several Latin American dictatorships because the dictatorships were anti-Communist. These governments, which had some of the worst human rights records in history, routinely jailed, tortured, and executed political opponents. The United States not only ignored the repression, it also funded the activities and trained the repressive military and police forces. When the amount of human suffering from these dictatorships is compared to violence caused by insurgent terrorism, the pain caused by modern terrorism shrinks to insignificance. The "real terror network," Herman argues, is found in repressive government. University of Virginia sociologist Donald Black (2004) summarizes the paradox evident in Herman's earlier work. Counterterrorism, he says, is more violent than terrorism.

also willing to cede the northern province, Ulster, to the Protestants who wished to remain united with Great Britain. If the Protestants were forced into a united Ireland, they reasoned, violence would continue.

Bew believes Sinn Fein took advantage of the moderate position and championed the cause of a united Ireland. The ideologues of republicanism expressed themselves in extremist terms. They not only rejected home rule but demanded a completely **Free State** devoid of any British participation in Irish politics. For Sinn Fein, anything but a united Ireland was out of the question. The British government also vacillated. Conservatives, especially the military officer corps, were reluctant to abandon the north either to home rule or to an independent Ireland, whereas others sought to solve the Irish problem with some sort of home rule. Bew argues that Sinn Fein moved into the arena by discrediting the Parliamentary Party. Moderation fell by the wayside as extreme republicanism increased.

Selective Terror

Michael Collins was appalled by the amateur tactics of the Easter Rising. Revolution, he believed, could be successful, but it would not develop from a popular uprising. It needed to be systematic, organized, and ruthless. After being released from prison as part of a general amnesty, Collins studied the tactics of Russia's People's Will and the writings of earlier anarchists and terrorists. Collins developed a strategy called selective terrorism. Devising a plan that would later influence terrorists as diverse as the proto-Israeli group Irgun Zvai Leumi and Ernesto "Che" Guevara's Communist revolutionaries in Cuba, Collins reasoned that indiscriminate terror was of no value. Random or large-scale attacks would alienate public opinion. Conversely, launching an attack and waiting for the population to spontaneously rise to rebellion was equally futile. To be effective, terrorism had to selectively and ruthlessly target security forces and their symbols of authority.

After months of planning, recruiting, and organizing, Collins launched a new form of the IRA. He began by gathering intelligence, learning the internal workings of British police headquarters, and obtaining a list of intelligence officers. The first attacks were devastating. Using the information from the extensive preparation, Collins's men ambushed off-duty police and intelligence officers and murdered them. They then began attacking police stations. IRA terrorists would emerge from a crowded sidewalk, throw bombs and shoot police officers, then melt back into the crowd before authorities could respond. A master of strategy, Collins continued a campaign of terror against Unionists and the RIC.

The British responded by sending a hastily recruited military force, called the Black and Tans because of their mismatched uniforms, and Ireland became the scene of a dreadful war. Each side accused the other of atrocities, but both parties engaged in murder and mayhem. The conflict became popularly known as the Tan War or the Black and Tan War. It was a fierce struggle between the IRA's selective terrorism and British repression. It ended with independence for the southern provinces and British control of Northern Ireland. Failure to win freedom for the entire republic cost Michael Collins his life. It also served as the main source of terrorism directed at the United Kingdom through most of the twentieth century.

Free State: The name given to the newly formed Republic of Ireland after Irish independence.

Self Check

> How did the IRB evolve toward militancy?
> How did the Easter Rising impact republicanism?
> What is the meaning of "selective terror," and how did Collins employ it?

Emphasizing the Points

The United States has changed national security and law enforcement policies based partially on the way it defines terrorism. This is a situational definition, however, because the meaning of terrorism has changed through history. The ideas behind modern democracies were contained in the Enlightenment, giving birth to revolutions in the American colonies and in France. Terrorism was a product of the class-based revolution in France, and the term described the actions of the government. It would go through many changes in meaning until it once again was used to describe government repression. Many of the chapters in Part 2 will summarize recent regional histories to show how the definition continues to fluctuate.

Summary of Chapter Objectives

Learning 1 Objective

Explain why the definition of terrorism shifts over time. Terrorism is a social construct and not a physical entity. The term evokes a variety of politically charged responses. The term *terrorism* is defined within social and political contexts, and it means different things in different time periods. The meaning even changes within a historical time frame as contexts change. Definitions of terrorism are important because they guide policy, but there are differing frameworks for definitions. Some approaches emphasize the criminal nature of terrorism. Others focus on the types of targets that terrorists select. While many academics offer definitions, they are probably not as important as policy definitions.

Learning 2 Objective

Explain where the term terrorism originated and how the meaning changed during the history of the nineteenth century. The term *terrorism* originated during the French Revolution. It described the actions of the government. In the nineteenth century, the French applied it to guerrillas in Spain, and it was used to describe the actions of radical democrats in the 1848 revolutions. By the century's end, it was used as a label for anarchists and nationalists.

Learning 3 Objective

Explain how socialism, anarchism, and communism were mistakenly associated with terrorism. Socialism refers to controlling an economy by direct democracy and utilizing economic profits to ensure the well-being of citizens. Anarchism is a philosophical concept that originated in ancient Greece. In the nineteenth century, anarchists generally disavowed the power of national governments. Some anarchists were violent, engaging in bombing and assassination. Communism in its ideal form is socialism with economic production and profits being owned by the state and distributed equally among the workers.

Learning 4 Objective

Summarize the differing meanings of terrorism in Russia from the People's Will through the rise of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. Modern revolutionary terrorism is closely associated with a series of revolutionary activities that began with the People's Will and continued through the Russian Revolution. After the Communists seized power, they returned to the practice of the French revolutionaries and used terrorism to maintain political power.

Learning 5 Objective

Summarize the history of the Irish Republican Army's use of terror. Irish revolutionaries fought for independence for several centuries. The Irish Republican Brotherhood was created in the mid-nineteenth century. They soon adopted the tactics of the 1848 revolutionaries, waging a campaign of terror that culminated in the Black and Tan War. After the failure of the Easter Rising, Michael Collins used *selective terrorism.* His intention was to target specific government officials and supporters. He sought to terrorize them until they accepted IRA terms.

Key Terms

Social construct, p. 4

Academic consensus definition, p. 4

Social context, p. 4

Selective terrorism, p. 5

Nidal Malik Hasan, p. 5

group target, p. 8

Extremist Crime Database, p. 9

Reign of Terror, p. 10

Spain in 1807, p. 11

Radical democrats, p. 12

Socialists, p. 12

Anarchists, p. 12

Communists, p. 12

Joseph Stalin, p. 17

Vladimir Lenin, p. 17

Vladimir Putin, p. 17

Workers' Councils (or Soviets), p. 19

Leon Trotsky, p. 19

Royal Irish Constabulary, p. 22

Supreme Council of the IRB, p. 22

Sinn Fein, p. 23

Free State, p. 24

Practical Criminology, Radicalization, and Types of Terrorism

Learning Objectives

■ ■ ■

After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

1   Explain the value of practical criminology for law enforcement and security forces.

2   List the differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals.

3   Explain radicalization.

4   Describe three different types of terrorism.

5   Describe the manner in which guerrillas and insurgents use terrorism.

KKK rally at the State House in Annapolis MD

On Sunday August 5, 2012, Wade Michael Page walked into a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. He began shooting. Six worshipers were killed inside the temple. Three other Sikhs, including the temple president, were injured trying to stop him. He then followed fleeing people into the parking lot, where he killed two more victims. As police responded, he shot and wounded one of the officers. The police were able to stop him by shooting and killing him. No one knows why he did it.

This was one of many mass-shooting events in the past decades. Each murderer had a unique background and access to firearms. As details emerged on the Page case, investigators found that he had connections to white supremacist groups and a background in violent racist music. He was a neo-Nazi involved in the white supremacy movement, would engage others in the movement via online websites and racist forums, and played in a variety of bands.

The Southern Poverty Law Center (2012) reported that Page began his path to violent racism while serving in the U.S. Army in the 1990s. He gravitated toward hate music and eventually identified with the white supremacy movement. He expressed a vitriolic hatred of Muslims after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and perhaps he thought he was attacking a mosque. Wearing colorful turbans over uncut hair as part of their religious tradition, Sikhs are sometimes confused with Muslims. Yet, Page made no threats and left no statement about his motive.

Investigators could not find the reason for Page's actions. Criminologist Pete Simi, who has written extensively about white supremacists and specifically neo-Nazis, interviewed Page for a research study prior to this shooting. He mentioned the time he spent in the military and his participation in the white power music scene as being particularly important, but also mentioned that he had racist tattoos, liked guns, had a drinking problem, and was usually unemployed—all factors that make him seem extreme when compared to the general population. Professor Simi made the point, however, that "there wasn't anything that stood out, that really made me think that he was more of a

threat than other people who hold these beliefs" (Peralta, 2012). One aspect of his behavior was clear. He had traveled down an ideological path that ended with murder. He had acted alone and ended the lives of his victims as a lone attacker. Some researchers and analysts have a name for Page's journey to hate and murder. They call it radicalization. They also use a special term to describe such attacks: lone wolf terrorism.

The Criminology of Terrorism

There are two branches of criminology in the practical world of criminal justice. The word *criminology* in an academic setting evokes images of psychological and sociological theories in the minds of researchers and teachers. This is classic criminology, which traces its origins to **Cesare Beccaria** and uses the most modern theories of individual and group behavior. When the word is mentioned in a law enforcement agency, a different image appears. Practical criminology focuses on the common actions of lawbreakers. Police officers are not as concerned with theories of criminality as they are with the practical aspects of criminal behavior. They want to know what criminals do so that they can understand their patterns of action, and deter them from committing a crime or catch them after the crime is committed (see Figure 2.1).

> **Learning Objective 1** Explain the value of practical criminology for law enforcement and security forces.

> **Cesare Beccaria:** (1738–1794) one of the founders of the discipline of criminology. His work *Of Crimes and Punishments* (1764) is the classic Enlightenment study of the discipline.

The purpose here is to consider this second branch of criminology, the applied actions in crime prevention and apprehension. This distinction is important because although terrorists commit crimes as they struggle for a cause, they differ from ordinary street criminals. Terrorists have organizational structures, belief systems, and/or motivational values that separate them from ordinary criminals. The behavioral differences are even more pronounced during political insurrections. When guerrillas employ terrorism, they usually do so within the context of a political and military strategy. Law enforcement personnel should recognize the differences between typical criminal behavior and terrorist activity if they want to prevent crime and apprehend criminals. Law enforcement officials are frequently the first governmental agents on the scene of a terrorist incident. If they fail to recognize that the scene may be something more than an ordinary crime, they may well miss the point of the investigation.

One of the issues that has dominated the discipline of criminal justice over the past few decades is the debate about the academic function of the discipline. Some scholars favor a theoretical approach to the field, while others believe that professors with previous professional experience are better suited to address the discipline. This debate takes place not only on college campuses but in the workaday world of criminal justice as well.

Here are some examples of the differences between practitioners in the field and theoretical social scientists:

Professionals—tend to focus on criminological findings that will result in crime fighting and solutions for community problems.

Professionally oriented social scientists—tend to conduct studies that will help professionals reduce crime.

Theoretically oriented social scientists—tend to focus research on increasing the body of scientific knowledge regardless of application.

In reality, all three approaches are necessary and valued. Each "type" of criminology has a valid purpose.

Figure 2.1 Theory Versus Practice

For example, should malicious destruction of property always be classified as a simple misdemeanor or felony? If someone unlawfully enters a farm, destroys cages, and frees the animals, is this simply malicious destruction? Many law enforcement officers would answer *yes*; but consider the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). In instructions to members and sympathizers, the ALF advocates the systematic destruction of farms that produce fur for clothing. Their website gives potential recruits tactics for the most effective destruction of mink farms. (See http://www.animalliberationfront.com/index.html.) If a deputy sheriff or state trooper happens on such an attack, it will probably be classified as malicious destruction of property, even though it may well be part of a larger operation.

Another challenge for law enforcement is that it is practically important to develop unique strategies and processes to respond to terrorism effectively, but most terrorism and extremist activity is charged in the criminal justice system like any other crime. Extremist offenders may be charged with a variety of offenses, from homicide, to aggravated assault, to material support, but not with terrorism specifically per se. Christopher Hasson, both a U.S. Coast Guard lieutenant and white supremacist, stockpiled explosives and weapons in order to kill politicians and media representatives. His targets included House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Senators Cory Booker and Chuck Schumer, and Supreme Court justices. His plan was to kill as many targets as possible, and he was called a terrorist by prosecutors and the media, but he was only specifically charged with gun and drug offenses (Michaels, 2019).

In terms of terrorism, law enforcement agencies, intelligence organizations, and military forces need to take a practical criminological approach to terrorism. This is especially true for state and local agencies because individual officers are usually the first people to arrive on the scene of a terrorist incident, and if terrorists are active, they frequently have unexpected encounters with law enforcement prior to and after an incident. Troopers, deputies, patrol officers, and investigators will be more effective if they develop practical criminological skills. Recognizing the characteristics of terrorist behavior, and how these characteristics are different from ordinary criminals, improves prevention and investigation.

Differences Between Criminals and Terrorists

Learning
2
Objective
List the differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals.

Terrorist investigations do not follow the pattern of most criminal investigations because terrorists seldom behave like normative street criminals. Consider how terrorist organizations are different than street gangs. Decker and Pyrooz (2011) observe that gang organizational structure is looser, gangs focus on short-term goals and short-lived cooperation, membership is fluid and turnover is great, geographic diversity is limited, and the focus lies almost solely on profit margins. Terrorist organizations, in contrast, are less concerned about profit, many focus on longevity and making impacts over time, recruitment and retention focuses on ideological connections, and targets are more widely dispersed.

Similarly, D. Douglas Bodrero (2002), the former commissioner for the Department of Public Safety in Utah and a former member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism, offers a comparative analysis between terrorist behavior and that of ordinary criminals. Bodrero argues that typical criminals are opportunistic. This means that criminals tend to be impulsive. Most street criminals do not plan their crimes extensively, instead reacting to easy opportunities on the spur of the moment. Criminals are usually not committed to a cause. Even career criminals do not believe in crime as an ideology or religion. Crime is just a method for obtaining goods. Because of this lifestyle, criminals tend to be self-centered and undisciplined. Except for a small proportion of career criminals, ordinary street criminals are untrained. Their goal is to make a profit and get away.

Bodrero and most police officers base crime prevention and apprehension strategies on these assumptions about street criminals for one simple reason: They work. By protecting (or hardening) targets, denying opportunity, and conducting aggressive patrols, many ordinary street crimes like burglary can be suppressed (W. Harris, 1998). Policing hot-spots is widely adopted and highly regarded, and focusing police resources on specific areas or problems can substantially reduce crime and disorder (Braga, 2005). In addition, making police an extension of the community can reduce crimes that seem to defy suppression, such as domestic violence (Trojanowicz et al., 1998). By using criminal intelligence files to keep track of known felons, repeat offenders, criminal associations, and crime patterns, police suppress criminal activity. Police search for hangouts of local criminals, they know their friends and family, and they maintain sources of information about suspicious activity. These procedures not only serve as the basis of community policing; they are the essence of criminal investigation.

Bodrero (2002) says terrorist behavior differs from standard patterns of criminal behavior because terrorists are highly motivated and loyal to a particular cause. Whereas ordinary criminals are opportunistic, terrorists are focused. They may select targets of opportunity, but the targets have symbolic value. Terrorists use crime to make a symbolic statement about a political cause. If criminals are uncommitted and self-centered, terrorists find strength in a cause and the ideology or religion behind the cause. They are supported by an organization and sent on a mission. They are team oriented even when they act as individuals. For example, suicide bombers do not act alone; their preparation involves teamwork. Being part of something greater than themselves becomes the basis for action. Even in the case of lone wolves, the ideology is all-consuming. They might act alone, but deep-seated beliefs cause loners to feel that their actions are part of the vanguard of a movement. Terrorism is an organizational process, whether support is real or implied through ideology, and there are growing online networks to support and facilitate these activities (Schweitzer, 2000; Khashan, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2005; Azam, 2005).

Ideology and religion are not limited to suicide bombers; they also influence individuals who will become terrorists for a single event. For example, Buford Furrow entered a Los Angeles Jewish daycare center in August 1999 and began shooting people. He was a lone wolf. He had no extensive logistical network or support organization. Yet, Furrow was consumed by an ideology of hate and a religion that demonized Jews. He was not an uncommitted opportunistic criminal acting alone. He was an agent of an ideology on a

divine mission. Again, as Bodrero (2002) indicates, this is not the pattern of typical criminals. Bodrero says that criminals are undisciplined, untrained, and oriented toward escape. Terrorists are exactly the opposite. They have prepared for their mission, they are willing to take risks, and they are attack oriented. Lone wolves might be untrained, but they are prepared and attack oriented.

In summary, terrorists and criminals exhibit practical behavioral differences. These include:

1. Criminals are unfocused. Terrorists focus their actions toward a goal.
2. Criminals may live in a criminal underworld, but they are not devoted to crime as a philosophy. Terrorists are dedicated to a cause.
3. Criminals will make deals to avoid punishment. Terrorists rarely cooperate with officials because they do not wish to betray their cause.
4. Criminals usually run when confronted with force. Terrorists tend to attack.
5. Criminals strike when the opportunity to do so is present. Terrorists strike symbols after careful planning.
6. Criminals rarely train for crime. Terrorists prepare for and rehearse their operations.

These differences influence the ways criminal intelligence is gathered and the process of criminal investigations. Terrorism investigations involve long-term observation, informant development, and evidence collection. They usually involve a lengthy process of piecing together elements of a complex criminal conspiracy (see Lee, 2005; Dyson, 2008).

The significance of Bodrero's argument can be measured in the investigative response to terrorism. When investigating a crime, police officers can take advantage of the behavioral characteristics of typical criminals. The most hardened criminals will usually act in their own self-interest, and they will make deals to receive a lesser sentence. When searching for a fleeing felon, law enforcement officers find it productive to question known associates and keep family and friends under surveillance. These tactics do not work in countering terrorism. Law enforcement, military, and security officials need to focus on ideology, group and individual behavior, and sharing information over broad geographical regions to successfully investigate terrorism.

Self Check

> What is "practical criminology"?
> Why does law enforcement focus on practical interpretations of criminology?
> What are the differences between terrorists and criminals?

Radicalization

Learning Objective 3 Explain radicalization.

routes to terrorism: As used by John Horgan, refers to the psychological and social factors that motivate people to join and remain in terrorist groups.

John Horgan (2009) argues that many psychological approaches have mistakenly focused on the root causes of terrorism. Such studies miss the point. Rather than searching for the "roots of terrorism," Horgan believes researchers should search for the **routes to terrorism**. In other words, Horgan is concerned with the psychological processes that lead people to terrorist groups, the issues that keep them in groups, and support mechanisms for people who want to leave.

It is not a crime to harbor extreme views, and, in fact, such views are constitutionally protected. A high percentage of extremists who are active in far left, far right, or jihadist

movements may embrace the ideology and symbols of a particular movement, but do not break the law. Law enforcement has to establish probable cause that a criminal violation has occurred, and intelligence information on an individual can only be collected after establishing a criminal predicate (Carter, 2020). Most active extremists do not end up committing terrorist acts. The challenge for law enforcement is focusing on those individuals and groups that do.

The process of becoming a terrorist involves three distinct phases. In the first phase, a person must decide to become a terrorist, and this is followed by the second phase, a decision to remain in a terrorist group. Both of these decisions return to the arguments about justifying violence, but there are points where people decide that they can no longer accept terrorism. Horgan believes this leads to a third phase, disengagement—the behavior of people who decide to abandon terrorism. Horgan believes that pathways toward and away from terrorism are more important than searching for a definitive profile of terrorist behavior.

If Horgan is correct, his research suggests that a more effective approach is to identify actions and policies that may help prevent the desire to join or remain in a group. This may include understanding the differences between extremists who are actively engaged in a group but do not break the law and those extremists who turn to violence. It also suggests a need to understand and support the factors involved in deciding to leave a group.

Practical Criminology and Radicalism

Radicalization involves the processes that change a person's socially acceptable behavior into terrorism. John Horgan (2009, p. 155) states that it is unrealistic to assume that programs or policies can prevent radicalization. He also notes that most of the people who hold radical views are not violent. **Violent radicalization** is the problem of terrorism, Horgan believes. Movement toward violence is a social and psychological process influenced by peer groups and terrorist causes. Brian Jenkins (2009) believes that since it is a process, people moving toward violent radicalization exhibit observable signs. Family members, peers, and people closely associated with an individual may witness the behavioral changes. If this is true, others may observe them, too.

The term *radicalization* is used by law enforcement, intelligence, military, and other agencies. Popular media employ it frequently. Yet, there is not complete agreement about the meaning of the term. Some people even question its existence (Porter and Kebbell, 2011). However, if researchers like John Horgan and Brian Jenkins are talking about radicalization, it has an applied meaning. In terms of practical criminology, radicalization can be seen as a *process* that *causes* violence.

Radicalization is believed to cause terrorism when the motivation for political change combines with the process of developing deep-seated doctrines that lead toward violent action. It occurs on an individual level when a person decides to join a group and on a group level when an organization decides to employ terrorism (Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass, 2014). Peter Neumann (2007), who heads an organization designed to study radicalization in the United Kingdom, says that such an approach allows the examination of the political, economic, and social factors that underpin political violence.

radicalization: As used in this context, refers to the psychological process of adopting extremist positions.

violent radicalization: Refers to the process of adopting extremist positions and engaging in violence based on a new set of beliefs.

Increasingly, scholars have begun devising models that highlight risk and protective factors significant in pushing extremists to and pulling extremists away from violence (Borum, 2011a; 2011b; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Wolfowicz et al., 2020). For example, Karagiannis (2012, p. 110) highlights the importance of an individual level factor, inspirational preaching. This mechanism refers to preachers who use the power of religious beliefs "to … change perceptions of reality and inspire individuals to act [violently]." Often these ideas are transmitted via the Internet, pamphlets, DVDs, and other similar ways. Silber's (2012) analysis of 16 case studies of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAM) plots found that the Internet, videos, and publications had radicalized many participants. One plot participant stated that his "reading of Signposts by Sayyid Qutb provided an intellectual framework to legitimize his more militant views…. [it was a] must read" (p. 39). Scholars have found that books like *The Turner Diaries* and *Mein Kampf* have similarly inspired some far-rightists to commit violence.

Other studies point to the importance of families and friends in the radicalization process. Individuals who joined the jihad out of friendship often did not have radical violent beliefs and only subsequently embraced the extremist ideology after being taught to do so (Hamm, 2007). Similarly, McCauley and Moskalenko's (2011) radicalization book identified 12 mechanisms that they argued move individuals to ideologically motivated violence. One mechanism is "love." Some terrorists are not radicalized by ideology, but are rather motivated by friends, lovers, or family.

Another mechanism that McCauley and Moskalenko highlight is personal grievance where a person is upset about state-actions that harmed them, their family, or their friends. Case studies of AQAM leaders such as Al Zawahiri and Al Zawqawi have concluded that the torture they suffered in Egyptian and Jordanian prisons, respectively, influenced their radicalization. Similarly, they point to the mechanism of "unfreezing," important life events (like the death of a loved one, or the ending of close friendships or marriages) that alter a person's social connections leading them to embrace new social ties.

alienation: Happens when an individual or group becomes lost in the dominant social world. A person or group of people is alienated when separated from the dominant values of society at large.

Another concept closely associated with radicalization is **alienation**, a term used in several branches of the social sciences, as well as in other disciplines such as theology. Many sociologists define alienation as a process by which an individual or group becomes separated from the values, norms, and mores of the dominant social world. This leads to self-estrangement. The concept was initially popularized by Karl Marx's work on economic alienation, and many sociologists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries expanded his approach, focusing on concepts like social isolation, lack of meaning, and normlessness.

Many terrorism analysts began looking at radicalization and alienation in the first part of the twenty-first century; their focus tended to be on individuals attracted to Islamic extremism. Many who joined the global jihad from Europe were recent migrants who felt alienated and disconnected from Western society. Some researchers found that individual decisions were less important than the social-psychological patterns of an entire group. Members of groups became radicalized together. A clique of friends moved collectively toward terrorism, and individual identities were absorbed and redefined when the clique joined a terrorist movement (Borum, 2004; Sageman, 2004, pp. 152–156; Horgan, 2005, pp. 80–105). Further analysis indicated that paths to radicalization developed differently for different causes and different types of groups.

Ethnic, nationalistic, political, and religious terrorists were radicalized in a multitude of ways (Post, 2007).

The Process of Radicalization

A number of researchers believe that members of terrorist groups go through decision-making processes while they are being violently radicalized (Sageman, 2004, pp. 152–156; Borum, 2004; Ryan, 2007; Post, 2007; Hoffman, 2009; Rinehart, 2009; Kershaw, 2010; Ganor, 2011). Research in the area has been expanding over the past decade, and there are many emergent findings. One position maintains that radicalization can be understood as a process of socialization: It is the result of learning to engage in radicalized violence (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2011). Case studies provide rich data to determine individual paths (Ganor, 2011; Vidino, 2011). Another area of growing research is the process of de-radicalization. Although more data is needed, some preliminary findings suggest that if a person can go through a process of radicalization, the person can reverse the path and become de-radicalized (Gunaratna and Ali, 2010; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). Empirical evidence is still emerging, however, and our understanding of radicalization is incomplete (Dalgaard-Nielson, 2010).

Marc Sageman (2004) was one of the first analysts to suggest that radicalization could be modeled and observed. Sageman presents radicalization as a six-step framework. It starts with alienated young men who find other groups of alienated young men and is shown in Figure 2.2. They "discover" religion as a way of giving meaning to their lives. Terrorism enters the equation if the newfound religious orientation turns to violence. Regardless, it remains difficult to join a terrorist group. These young men must meet a broker, an activist who knows actual terrorists, and be accepted by an actual terrorist group.

Sageman's framework applies to groups of males, but radicalization also occurs among women. Some recent research suggests that women are attracted to religious study groups as a social outlet in traditional cultures in which they are not given the same opportunities as men. The group gives them a means of social expression and acceptance apart from the male-dominated culture. Radicalization depends on the nature of the study group and the beliefs of dominant males in their lives. If these groups and dominant

STEP 1 Alienated young man

STEP 2 Meets other alienated young men and forms bond

INTERIM They become a "Bunch of Guys"

STEP 3 Groups gravitate toward religion

INTERIM They outdo each other in zeal to express love for the group

STEP 4 Religion interpreted in militant terms

INTERIM Most groups stop at this point

STEP 5 Militant group meets terrorist contact

STEP 6 Militants join terrorists as a group decision

Figure 2.2 **Summarizing Sageman's Model**