"*Police Innovation* adds to our understanding of how police agencies learn and adapt to our changing society. As these agencies strive to develop stronger relationships with their communities they must determine a return of investment of these and other innovations. The contrasting perspectives presented here can help researchers and practitioners understand the contours of these ideas, and the evidence behind them. *Police Innovation* is a must-read for those interested in developing programs and connecting the principles and practices of policing in the twenty-first century."
Geoffrey Alpert, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of South Carolina

Over the last forty years, policing has gone through a period of significant change and innovation. The emergence of new strategies has also raised issues about effectiveness and efficiency in policing, and many of these proactive strategies have become controversial as citizens have asked whether they are also fair and unbiased. Updated and expanded for the second edition, this volume brings together leading police scholars to examine these key innovations in policing. Including advocates and critics of each innovation, this comprehensive book assesses the impacts of police innovation on crime and public safety, the extent of implementation of these new approaches in police agencies, the dilemmas these approaches have created for police management, and their impacts on communities.

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Weisburd and Braga

POLICE INNOVATION

SECOND EDITION

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POLICE INNOVATION

Contrasting Perspectives

EDITED BY
David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga

SECOND EDITION



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Police Innovation

Contrasting Perspectives

Second Edition

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Introduction

Understanding Police Innovation

David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decades of the twentieth century, American policing went through a period of significant change and innovation. In what is a relatively short historical time frame, the police began to reconsider their fundamental mission, the nature of the core strategies of policing, and the character of their relationships with the communities that they serve. Innovations in policing in this period were not insular and restricted to police professionals and scholars, but were often seen on the front pages of America's newspapers and magazines, and spoken about in the electronic media. Some approaches, like broken windows policing – termed by some as zero tolerance policing – became the subject of heated political debate. Community policing, one of the most important police programs that emerged during this period, was even used to give its name to a large federal agency – The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services – created by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.

Police scholars have argued that this period of change was the most dramatic in the history of policing (e.g., see Bayley, 1994). This claim does not perhaps do justice to the radical reforms that led to the creation of modern police forces in the nineteenth century, or even the wide-scale innovations in tactics or approaches to policing that emerged after the Second World War. However, observers of the police have invariably been struck by the pace and variety of innovation in this period. Whether this period of change is greater than those of previous generations is difficult to know since systematic observation of police practices is a relatively modern phenomenon. However, by the first decade of the new century, a Committee of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that in recent years we have "witnessed a remarkable degree of innovation in policing" (Skogan & Frydl, 2004: 82).

In this second edition of *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, we bring together leading police scholars to examine the major innovations in

policing that began to emerge during the last decades of the twentieth century and have continued into the twenty-first century. We update our 2004 edition both by revising earlier contributions, and by adding six additional chapters that cover three new innovations that have emerged since our first edition was published. We now focus on eleven police innovations that are concerned with change in police strategies and practices. These include eight innovations that were examined in the first edition: community policing, broken windows policing, problem-oriented policing, pulling levers policing, third-party policing, hot spots policing, CompStat, and evidence-based policing. We also examine three new police innovations: procedural justice policing, predictive policing, and policing focused on new technologies – termed technology policing in our volume. This is, of course, not an exhaustive list of innovations in policing during this period. For example, we do not examine innovations in tactics and strategies that affected only specialized units or were applied to very specific types of crimes. Our approach is to identify innovations that had influence on the broad array of police tasks and on the practices and strategies that broadly affect the policing of American communities.

We title the chapters examining each police innovation reviewed in this volume under the headings "Advocate" and "Critic." In this context, our book seeks to clarify police innovation in the context of chapters written by those who have played important roles in developing innovation, and those who have stood as critics of such innovation. Nonetheless, we do not take a debate format in our book. Authors did not respond to each other's papers, but rather sought to present a perspective that would clarify the benefits of the innovation examined, or the potential problems that the innovation raises for policing. The critics often identify promising elements of innovation while pointing out the difficulties that have been encountered in the application of innovations in the field. The advocates often note the drawbacks of particular strategies, while arguing that they should be widely adopted. Accordingly, our chapters represent serious scholarly examination of innovations in policing, recognizing that established scholars may disagree about the directions that policing should take while drawing from the same empirical evidence.

By design, the essays in this volume take a "micro" approach to the problem of police innovation, focusing on the specific components, goals, and outcomes associated with a specific program or practice. In this introductory chapter, we take a "macro" approach to the problem of police innovation that allows us to see how innovation more generally emerged and developed during this period. We do not think that the dramatic surge in police innovation of the last few decades occurred as a matter of chance. Our approach is to see the development of innovation in policing as a response to a common set of problems and dilemmas. This approach can also help us to understand the broad trends of police innovation that we observe.

The development of the chapters for the second edition of this edited volume occurred during a time of renewed concern over the strategies and tactics used

by American police departments to control crime. Recent events involving the deaths of African-American men at the hands of police officers in Ferguson, MO; New York, NY; Chicago, IL; and elsewhere in the United States have exposed rifts in the relationships between the police and the communities they protect and serve. As suggested by the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015: 42), "[a]ny prevention strategy that unintentionally violates civil rights, compromises police legitimacy, or undermines trust is counterproductive." In public debate, specific kinds of police innovations have been nominated as contributing to poor police relationships with minority communities while others have been promoted as possible remedies to improve these strained relationships. In many of the revised and new advocate and critic contributions, authors consider how particular innovations may either improve or further damage police relationships with minority residents and communities more generally. These updated views on varying police innovations during this most recent crisis of confidence in American policing represent an important contribution of the second edition.

UNDERSTANDING INNOVATION AND POLICING

Many scholars seem to take for granted what strikes us as a central problem in understanding the broader phenomenon that our volume examines. Why did we observe a period of significant innovation in policing in the last decades of the twentieth century? One simple answer to this question would be to note that institutions change, and that when faced with new ideas that have potential to improve their functioning, they will naturally choose what is innovative. However, those who have studied the diffusion of innovation have been led to a very different view of the processes that underlie the adoption of new products, programs, or practices. Everett Rogers, who pioneered the scientific study of diffusion of innovation, argues, for example, that "more than just a beneficial innovation is necessary" to explain its widespread diffusion and adoption (1995: 8). Indeed, there are many examples of innovations that represent clear improvements over prior practice, yet fail to be widely adopted.

Rogers brings the example of the "Dvorak Keyboard," named after a University of Washington researcher who sought to improve on the "Qwerty" keyboard in use since the late nineteenth century. The "Qwerty" keyboard was engineered to slow down typists in the nineteenth century in order to prevent jamming of keys that was common in the manual typewriters of that period. However, as the engineering of typewriters improved in the twentieth century, there was no longer a need for a keyboard engineered to slow typists down. Indeed, it seemed natural that a better arrangement of the keyboard would be developed that would allow for quicker typing that would cause less fatigue. Dvorak developed such a keyboard in 1932 basing his arrangement of the keys on time and motion studies. Dvorak's keyboard was clearly an improvement on the Qwerty keyboard. It allowed for more efficient

and faster typing, and led to less fatigue on the part of typists. But, today, more than eighty years after Dvorak's development of a better and more efficient keyboard, the Qwerty keyboard remains the dominant method. Indeed, Dvorak's keyboard is merely an interesting historical curiosity.

The diffusion of innovation requires that there be a "perceived need" for change in the social system in which an innovation emerges (Rogers, 1995: 11). That need can be created by industries or interest groups, for example, through advertisements that lead consumers to believe that they must have a particular new product or service. Often in social systems, the recognition that something must change is brought about by a period of crisis or challenge to existing programs or practices (see e.g., Rogers, 1995; Altschuler & Behn, 1997). In this context, we think that the key to understanding the emergence of a period of rapid innovation in policing in the last decades of the twentieth century lies in a crisis in policing that emerged in the late 1960s. Identifying that period of crisis can help us to understand not only why we observe so much police innovation in recent decades, but also why that innovation follows particular patterns of change.

The Crisis of Confidence in American Policing

The decade of the 1970s began with a host of challenges to the police as well as the criminal justice system more generally (LaFree, 1998). This was the case in part because of the tremendous social unrest that characterized the end of the previous decade. Race riots in American cities, and growing opposition, especially among younger Americans, to the Vietnam War, often placed the police in conflict with the young and with minorities. However, American fears of a failing criminal justice system were also to play a role in a growing sense of crisis for American policing. In 1967, a presidential commission report on the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society reinforced doubts about the effectiveness of criminal justice in combating crime in the United States:

> In sum, America's system of criminal justice is overcrowded and overworked, undermanned, underfinanced, and very often misunderstood. It needs more information and more knowledge. It needs more technical resources. It needs more coordination among its many parts. It needs more public support. It needs the help of community programs and institutions in dealing with offenders and potential offenders. It needs, above all, the willingness to reexamine old ways of doing things, to reform itself, to experiment, to run risks, to dare. It needs vision. (President's Commission, 1967: 80–81)

Shortly after the presidential report on the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, the Kerner Commission on Civil Disorders published a report, which also raised significant questions about the nature of criminal justice in the United States, and the organization of American policing. However, in this case, it was the question of race, and the relationship between police and minority communities, that was to have center stage. The challenges to

patterns of American discrimination against African Americans were not focused primarily on the police, but the police, in addition to other criminal justice agencies, were seen as "part of the problem" and not necessarily working to help in producing a solution to difficult social issues:

> In Newark, Detroit, Watts and Harlem, in practically every city that has experienced racial disruption since the summer of 1964, abrasive relationships between police and Negroes and other minority groups have been a major source of grievance, tension and ultimately disorder. (Kerner Commission, 1968: 157)

The concerns of the commission reports in the 1960s and the sense of growing alienation between the police and the public in the latter half of that decade led policymakers, the police, and scholars to question the nature of American policing, and, in particular, the strategies that were dominant in policing since World War II. A National Research Council Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices termed these approaches in 2004 as the "standard model of policing" (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). Weisburd and Eck note:

> This model relies generally on a "one size fits all" application of reactive strategies to suppress crime, and continues to be the dominant form of police practices in the United States. The standard model is based on the assumption that generic strategies for crime reduction can be applied throughout a jurisdiction regardless of the level of crime, the nature of crime, or other variations. Such strategies as increasing the size of police agencies, random patrol across all parts of the community, rapid response to calls for service, generally applied follow-up investigations, and generally applied intensive enforcement and arrest policies are all examples of this standard model of policing. (Weisburd & Eck, 2004: 44)

A number of important questions about the standard model of policing had been raised in the 1960s. Nonetheless, there was little serious academic inquiry into the impact of policing strategies on crime or on public attitudes. The need for such research was apparent, and in the 1970s serious research attention was to begin. One important impetus for such studies of the police came from the federal government. With the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a research arm of the US Department of Justice was established, eventually to become the National Institute of Justice, which was to invest significant resources into research on police and other components of the criminal justice system. But important funding for research on policing was also to come from private foundations. Perhaps the most important contribution to policing was made by the Ford Foundation in 1970 when it established the Police Development Fund. The Fund, and the Police Foundation that it established, were to foster a series of large-scale studies on American policing. McGeorge Bundy, then-president of the Ford Foundation, argued in announcing the establishment of a Police Development Fund in 1970:

> The need for reinforcement and change in police work has become more urgent than ever in the last decade because of rising rates of crime, increased resort to violence and rising tension, in many communities, between disaffected or angry groups and the police. (Bundy, 1970)

With the establishment of the Police Foundation and the newly established federal support for research on the criminal justice system, the activities of the police began to come under systematic scrutiny by researchers. Until this time, there had been a general assumption that policing in the post–World War II era represented an important advance over previous decades, and was effective in controlling crime.

For example, perhaps the dominant policing strategy in the post–World War II period was routine preventive patrol in police cars. It was drawn from a long history of faith in the idea of "police patrol" that had become a standard dogma of policing for generations. George Kelling and his colleagues wrote in their introduction to the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, a study conducted by the Police Foundation:

> Ever since the creation of a patrolling force in 13th century Hangchow, preventive patrol by uniformed personnel has been a primary function of policing. In 20th century America, about $2 billion is spent each year for the maintenance and operation of uniformed and often superbly equipped patrol forces. Police themselves, the general public, and elected officials have always believed that the presence or potential presence of police officers on patrol severely inhibits criminal activity. (Kelling et al., 1974: 1)

Preventive patrol in police cars was the main staple of police crime prevention efforts at the beginning of the decade of the 1970s. As Kelling and colleagues noted in the Police Foundation report on the Kansas City study, "(t)oday's police recruits, like virtually all those before them, learn from both teacher and textbook that patrol is the 'backbone' of police work" (Kelling et al., 1974: 1). The Police Foundation study sought to establish whether empirical evidence actually supported the broadly accepted assumptions regarding preventive patrol. The fact that questions were raised about routine preventive patrol suggests that the concerns about the police voiced in the decade before had begun to impact the confidence of police managers. As Kansas City Police Chief Clarence M. Kelley, later to become director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), said in explaining the need for the Kansas City experiment: "Many of us in the department had the feeling we were training, equipping, and deploying men to do a job neither we, nor anyone else, knew much about" (Murphy, 1974: v).

To understand the impact of the Kansas City study on police managers and researchers, it is important to recognize not only that the study examined a core police practice but that its methodological approach represented a radical departure from the small-scale evaluations of police practices that had come earlier. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment was a social experiment in policing on a grand scale, and it was conducted in a new Foundation that had significant resources and was backed by the well-established and respected Ford

Foundation. Patrick Murphy, the distinguished police manager, and president of the Police Foundation at the time, suggests just how much the Foundation itself saw the experiment as a radical and important change in the quality of police research:[1]

> This is a summary report of the findings of an experiment in policing that ranks among the few major social experiments ever to be completed. The experiment was unique in that never before had there been an attempt to determine through such extensive scientific evaluation the value of visible police patrol. (Murphy, 1974: v)

This context, both in terms of the centrality of the strategy examined, the scale of the research, and the prestige of the institutions that supported the study, including the Kansas City Police Department and its chief, Clarence Kelley, were to give the findings of the study an impact that is in retrospect out of proportion to the actual findings. One study in one jurisdiction, no matter how systematic, cannot provide a comprehensive portrait of the effects of a strategy as broad as routine preventive patrol. Moreover, the study design was to come under significant academic criticism in later years (Minneapolis Medical Research Foundation, 1976; Larson & Cahn, 1985; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995). Nonetheless, in the context of the decade in which it was conducted, this study was to have a critical impact upon the police and police researchers. This was especially the case since the research findings were to be consistent with a series of other studies of core police practices.

Kelling and his colleagues, in cooperation with the Kansas City Police Department, took fifteen police beats and divided them up into three groups. In five of these, called "reactive" beats, "routine preventive patrol was eliminated and officers were instructed to respond only to calls for service" (Kelling et al., 1974: 3). In five others, defined as "control" beats, "routine preventive patrol was maintained at its usual level of one car per beat" (Kelling et al., 1974: 3). In the remaining five beats, termed "proactive" beats, "routine preventive patrol was intensified by two to three times its usual level through the assignment of additional patrol cars" (Kelling et al., 1974: 3). When Kelling and his colleagues published the results of their study in 1974, it shattered one of the bedrock assumptions of police practitioners – that preventive patrol was an effective way to prevent crime and increase citizens' feelings of safety. They concluded simply that increasing or decreasing the intensity of routine preventive patrol in police cars did not affect either crime, service delivery to citizens, or citizens' feelings of security.

Another large-scale study, conducted by William Spelman and Dale Brown and published in 1984, was also to challenge a core police assumption of that period – that improvement in rapid response to calls for service would lead to

[1] It is important to note that a number of large social experiments were conducted during this period (e.g., see Bell et al., 1980; Struyk & Bendick, 1981) and thus the Kansas City Preventive Patrol experiment can be seen as part of a larger effort to subject social programs to systematic empirical study.

improvements in crime fighting. This study was developed in good part because of the findings of a prior investigation in Kansas City that found little support for the crime control effectiveness of rapid response to calls for service (Kansas City Police Department, 1977). With support from the National Institute of Justice, Spelman and Brown interviewed 4,000 victims, witnesses, and bystanders in some 3,300 serious crimes in four American cities. This was another major study in terms of the resources brought to bear and the methods used. Again, it examined a strategy that was aided by technological advances in the twentieth century and that was a central dogma of police administrators – that police must get to the scene of a crime quickly if they are to apprehend criminal offenders. Spelman and Brown explained:

> For at least half a century, police have considered it important to cut to a minimum their response times to crime calls. The faster the response, they have reasoned, the better the chances of catching a criminal at or near the scene of the crime. (Spelman & Brown, 1984: xxi)

Based on the data they collected, however, Spelman and Brown provided a very different portrait of the crime control effectiveness of rapid response to calls for service:

> Rapid police response may be unnecessary for three out of every four serious crimes reported to police. The traditional practice of immediate response to all reports of serious crimes currently leads to on-scene arrests in only 29 of every 1,000 cases. By implementing innovative programs, police may be able to increase this response-related arrest rate to 50 or even 60 per 1,000, but there is little hope that further increases can be generated. (Spelman & Brown, 1984: xix)

These findings, based on a host of systematic data sources from multiple jurisdictions, provided little support for the strategy of rapid response as a police practice to do something about crime. Indeed, Spelman and Brown found that citizen reporting time, not police response time, most influenced the possibility of on-scene arrest. Marginal improvement in police response times was predicted to have no real impact on the apprehension or arrest of offenders.

The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment and the National Institute of Justice study of police response time were not the only studies to "debunk" existing police practices. James Levine, for example, analyzed national crime data on the effectiveness of increasing the number of police in an article published in 1975. His title sums up his findings: "The Ineffectiveness of Adding Police to Prevent Crime." Despite the fact that this effort and many others that challenged conventional police practices did not represent the kind of systematic data collection or analysis of the Police Foundation and National Institute of Justice studies, they followed a similar "narrative" which became increasingly common as the 1990s approached. Levine, for example, begins by noting the broad consensus for the principle that adding more police will make cities safer. He then goes on to note that "(s)ensible as intensified policing may

sound on the surface, its effectiveness in combating crime has yet to be demonstrated" (Levine, 1975: 523). Finally, drawing upon simple tabular data on police strength and crime rates over time, he concludes:

> It is tempting for politicians and government leaders to add more police: it is an intuitively sensible and symbolically satisfying solution to the unrelenting problem of criminal violence . . . The sad fact is, however, that they receive a false sense of security; in most situations, they are just as vulnerable with these extra police as without them. (1975: 544)

Follow-up investigations were also the subject of critical empirical research during this period. The standard model of policing had assumed that general improvements in methods of police investigations would lead to crime control gains both because more active offenders would be imprisoned and thus unable to commit crime, and because potential offenders would be deterred by the prospect of discovery and arrest (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). But, a series of studies in the 1970s and early 1980s suggested that investigations had little impact upon crime (Greenwood et al., 1975; Greenwood, Petersilia & Chaiken, 1977; Skogan & Antunes, 1979; Eck, 1983). This was the case in good part because many crimes, especially property crimes, were found unlikely to be solved by police investigations. These studies consistently showed that if citizens did not provide information about suspects to first responding officers, follow-up investigations were unlikely to lead to successful outcomes.

In retrospect, many of these studies overstated what could be learned about standard police practices from the findings gained (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). And, in practice, there were evaluations in this period that produced more promising findings regarding standard police practices such as routine preventive patrol (e.g., see Press, 1971; Schnelle et al., 1977; Chaiken, 1978). Moreover, more recent research provides a more nuanced portrait of the crime control effectiveness of specific standard policing models.[2] Nonetheless, as the United States entered the decade of the 1990s, there appeared to be a consensus that traditional police practices did not work in preventing or controlling crime. As Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi wrote in their classic book *A General Theory of Crime* in 1990: "No evidence exists that augmentation of patrol forces or equipment, differential patrol strategies, or differential intensities of surveillance have an effect on crime rates" (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990: 270). David Bayley wrote even more strongly in 1994:

[2] This is the case, for example, in considering whether police staffing levels influence levels of crime. Econometric studies have begun to show significant crime prevention gains for increases in the number of police in a city (see, e.g., Evans & Owens, 2007; Machin & Olivier, 2011). However, the conclusion that these studies reflect the impact of the standard model of policing has been criticized because they often examine the boost in police resources that comes from support for community policing or other proactive policing strategies (Lee, Eck & Corsaro, 2016). More generally, we think that it is time for police scholars to renew efforts to evaluate the standard model of policing in the context of improved evaluation methods.

The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best-kept secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that they are society's best defense against crime ... This is a myth. First, repeated analysis has consistently failed to find any connection between the number of police officers and crime rates. Secondly, the primary strategies adopted by modern police have been shown to have little or no effect on crime. (Bayley, 1994: 3)

This view of the ineffectiveness of policing strategies was reinforced by official crime statistics. These statistics, widely available to the public, suggested that the police were losing the "war on crime." In particular, in America's largest cities, with their well-established professional police forces, crime rates, and especially violent crime rates, were rising at alarming rates. Between 1973 and 1990, violent crime doubled (Reiss & Roth, 1993). It did not take a statistician to understand that the trends were dramatic. For example, in Figure 1.1 we report the trends in violent crime rates by city size per 100,000 population. Clearly, crime was on the rise, and the trend had been fairly consistent over a long period. Thus, not only were scholars showing that police strategies did little to impact upon crime, but the overall crime statistics commonly used by the government and community to define police effectiveness were providing a similar message.



FIGURE 1.1 Total Violent Crime (trends in violent crime rates by city size)
Source: Reiss & Roth, 1993

CRISIS AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICING

It is against this backdrop that the innovations we examine in this volume have developed. Our view is that the challenges to police effectiveness, rising crime rates, and concerns about the legitimacy of police actions that began to develop in the late 1960s created a perceived need for change in what some have described as the industry of American policing (Ostrom, Whitaker & Parks, 1978; Skogan & Frydl, 2004). Unfortunately, there is no hard empirical evidence that would allow us to make this link directly, since the study of the adoption of innovation has only recently become a subject of interest for police scholars (e.g., see Weiss, 1997; Klinger, 2003; Weisburd et al., 2003). Accordingly, there have been few systematic studies of these processes and scholars were generally not concerned about the emergence of innovation as a research problem when these innovations were being developed.

Nonetheless, we think it reasonable to make a connection between the perceived failures of the standard model of American police practices and the experimentation with innovation, and openness to the adoption of innovation that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century. Certainly, such a link is made by many of those who fostered innovation in policing. For example, in his proposal for problem-oriented policing in 1979, Herman Goldstein referred directly to the growing evidence of the failures of traditional police practices:

> Recently completed research questions the value of two major aspects of police operations – preventive patrol and investigations conducted by detectives. Some police administrators have challenged the findings; others are awaiting the results of replication. But those who concur with the results have begun to search for alternatives, aware of the need to measure the effectiveness of a new response before making a substantial investment in it. (1979: 240)

William Bratton (1998a) in describing the emergence of CompStat in New York City also refers to the failures of traditional approaches, and the need for innovation that would allow the police to be more effective in doing something about crime problems:

> The effects of rapidly responding to crimes were muted because research showed it took people almost 10 minutes to decide to call the police in the first place. And police riding in air-conditioned squad cars, rapidly going from call to call, did not make people feel safer. In fact, it further separated the police from the public, the consumers of police services. Fortunately, the researchers and practitioners did not stop their work at finding what was not working, but began to look at how to think differently about crime and disorder and develop strategies that would work. (1998a: 31)

More generally, the turn of the last century was a period of tremendous change in police practices. This is perhaps most evident in the development of community-oriented policing, which was aided by financial support from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services established in 1994. As Wesley Skogan reports in this volume (Chapter 1), community policing in some form

has been adopted by most police agencies in the United States. In a Police Foundation survey conducted in 1997, 85 percent of surveyed police agencies reported they had adopted community policing or were in the process of doing so (Skogan, 2004). A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey conducted at the turn of the century found that more than 90 percent of departments in cities over 250,000 in population reported having full-time, trained community-policing officers in the field (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003).

The openness of police agencies to innovation is perhaps even more strongly illustrated by the sudden rise of CompStat as a police practice. CompStat was only developed as a programmatic entity in 1994, and was not encouraged financially by federally funded programs. Nonetheless, by the turn of the century, more than a third of larger police agencies had claimed to have implemented the program and a quarter of police agencies claimed that they were planning to adopt a CompStat program (Weisburd et al., 2003). In a recent review that covered many of the innovations we examine, the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Proactive Policing concluded that these approaches "are not isolated programs used by a select group of agencies but rather a set of strategies that have been diffused across the landscape of American policing" (Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018: 2–30).

A number of police scholars have suggested that the changes that such surveys observe are more cosmetic than substantive. Some studies have documented the "shallow" implementation of police innovations, and have suggested that in the end the police tend to fall back on traditional methods of conducting police work (e.g., see Clarke, 1998; Eck, 2000). For example, even in police agencies that have adopted innovations in problem-oriented policing, careful analysis of the activities of the police suggest that they are more likely to follow traditional police practices than to choose innovative approaches (Braga & Weisburd, Chapter 8 in this volume). Moreover, the main practices of the standard model of policing continue to dominate the work of most police agencies (Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Telep & Winegar, 2015).

While the depth of innovation over the last few decades remains a matter of debate, it is certainly the case that police agencies have become open to the idea of innovation, and that new programs and practices have been experimented with and adopted at a rapid pace over the last few decades. We think this openness can be traced to the crisis in police legitimacy and effectiveness that we have described.

UNDERSTANDING THE FORM AND CHARACTER OF POLICE INNOVATION

Recognizing the importance of the challenges to policing that began to emerge in the late 1960s can help us to understand not only the cause for a period of rapid innovation, but also the form and character of the innovations that we observe in this period and which are the focus of our volume. The innovations

we study here represent different forms of adaptation to similar problems. Overall, they seek to find a solution to a set of challenges to the effectiveness and legitimacy of policing we have reviewed.

Community policing, which is examined in the next section of our volume, is one of the first new approaches to policing to emerge in this modern period of police innovation. Community policing programs were already being implemented and advocated in the 1980s (e.g., Trojanowicz, 1982; Goldstein, 1987; Cordner, 1988; Green & Mastrofski, 1988; Weisburd & McElroy, 1988; Trojanowicz, 1989), and by the 1990s, as we have already noted, the idea of community policing had affected most American police agencies. At the outset, community policing did not define crime reduction as a central element of its success (see, e.g., Klockars, 1988; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986). Indeed, it can be seen more directly in its early development as a response to the crisis of legitimacy of policing that developed from conflicts between the police and minority communities, and the more general alienation we have described between the police and the public in the 1960s and 1970s. While it may be argued that the community and police service to citizens was always an important part of American police work (see, e.g., Wilson, 1968), community-based policing legitimated a set of roles for the police that had previously been marginal to the police function, at least in terms of evaluations of police performance.

Community policing represented a radical departure from the professional model of policing that was dominant in the post–World War II period. For decades, the police had assumed that the main task of policing was to fight crime, and that the police, like other professionals, could successfully carry out their task with little help and preferably with little interference from the public. The police were the experts in defining the nature of crime problems and the nature of the solutions that could be brought to do something about them. The community, in this context, did not have a central role in the police function, and the responsibility for crime problems lay squarely in the hands of the policing industry. In community policing, the community was to be a co-producer of public safety, and the priorities of the police were to be defined in consultation with the community.

Kelling and Moore (1988: 4) argue that "during the 1950s and 1960s, police thought they were law enforcement agencies primarily fighting crime." In the "community era" or community policing era, the police function broadens and includes "order maintenance, conflict resolution, provision of services through problem solving, as well as other activities" (Kelling & Moore, 1988: 2). The justification for these new activities was drawn either from a claim that historically the police had indeed carried out such functions, or that the community from which the police gained legitimacy saw these as important functions of the police. David Bayley notes that this approach "creates a new role for police with new criteria for performance":

If police cannot reduce crime and apprehend more offenders, they can at least decrease fear of crime, make the public feel less powerless, lessen distrust between minority groups and the police, mediate quarrels, overcome the isolation of marginal groups, organize social services, and generally assist in developing "community." These are certainly worthwhile objectives. But are they what the police should be doing? They are a far cry from what the police were originally created to do. (1988: 228)

As Bayley suggests, one way to understand the early development of community policing is to recognize that it responds to the question: What is the justification for the police if they cannot prevent crime? And in developing a response to this question, community policing responded to another key part of the crisis of American policing we described, the alienation between the police and communities, and especially minority and disadvantaged communities. While crime fighting has increasingly become a central concern in community policing over the last two decades, an important contribution of community policing to police innovation was its recognition that there were many critical community problems that the police could address that were not traditionally defined as crime problems. The expansion of the police function was to become an important part of many of the innovations that are discussed in this volume. This definition of new tasks for policing can be seen in part as a response to the failure of police to achieve the crime control goals of the professional model of policing.

In this Second Edition, we include a more recent innovation in policing, procedural justice policing, in Part II of our book. Like community-oriented policing, this approach did not emerge as an innovation focused primarily on crime control. Rather, like community oriented policing, it sought to respond to a crisis in the relationship of the police to the public. The recent National Academy of Sciences report on proactive police noted that the "United States has once again been confronted by a crisis of confidence in policing" (Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018: ch. 8). Reminiscent of the conflicts between minority communities and the police in the 1960s we have seen large protests against what communities see as unfair police treatment or police violence. Procedural justice policing is a direct response to this old and new crisis in American policing. But procedural justice policing does not simply seek to improve the relationships between the police and the public, it predicts that such changes will enhance crime control. Indeed, some of its advocates have argued that it will in the long run yield stronger crime prevention gains than more traditional innovations that focus directly on crime control:

We argue that these changing goals and style reflect a fundamental tension between two models of policing: the currently dominant proactive risk management model, which focuses on policing to prevent crimes and makes promises of short-term security through the professional management of crime risks, and a model that focuses on building popular legitimacy by enhancing the relationship between the police and the public and thereby promoting the long-term goal of police community solidarity and, through

that, public-police cooperation in addressing issues of crime and community order. (Tyler, Goff & MacCoun, 2015: 603)

This approach, like community policing, assumes that the police cannot succeed in their efforts to control crime without the support of the public. However, procedural justice policing focuses on how the police treat the public as individuals in everyday encounters, not on the coproduction of public safety. It expects public evaluations of police legitimacy to grow if the police give citizens a voice in police/citizen encounters; if they behave in a way that leads to citizens perceive their behavior as neutral in such encounters; if they treat citizens with dignity and respect; and if they behave in ways that lead citizen to assess their motives as trustworthy and fair. Procedural justice policing does not seek to define new strategic tactics of crime control. It does, however, seek to alter the relationships between the police and the public radically. In this policing model, changes in how police behave in encounters with citizens have the potential to alter not only the perceptions of the police of those directly affected but, through them, the community's perceptions of police legitimacy. With a change in such perceptions, they expect that individuals will be more willing to comply with police authority, and that they will cooperate more with the police by reporting crime and collaborating with the police in crime prevention. This police innovation, though a product of recent crises between the police and the public, also responds directly to the crisis of police legitimacy that helped spur police innovation four decades ago.

Broken windows policing, the subject of Part III of our volume, like community policing, also seeks to direct the police to problems that had often been ignored in standard police practices. The idea of broken windows policing developed out of a Police Foundation study, the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman & Brown 1981). From that study, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982) identified a link between social disorder and crime that suggested the importance of police paying attention to many problems that were seen in earlier decades as peripheral to the police function. Wilson and Kelling were impressed by the activities of the police officers who walked patrol in the Police Foundation study, and thought that what might be seen in traditional policing as inappropriate behavior actually held the key to public safety and crime reduction. Kelling and Coles write:

> Most New Jersey police chiefs were dismayed when they learned from program evaluators what (anonymous) officers, who were supposed to be "fighting crime," were actually doing while on foot patrol. For example, after being called a second time during the same evening to end brawls in the same bar, one foot patrol officer had had enough: although the "bar time" was some hours away, he ordered the bar closed for business as usual. The bartender grumbled, closed up, and opened the next day for business as usual. When this incident was recounted to the chief of the department in which it occurred – disguised to protect the confidentiality of the officer, so that the chief believed it happened in another department – he responded, "that wouldn't happen in my department, the officer would be fired." (1996: 18)

Wilson and Kelling argued that concern with disorder was an essential ingredient for doing something about crime problems. Indeed, the broken windows thesis was that serious crime developed because the police and citizens did not work together to prevent urban decay and social disorder:

> (A)t the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken *and is left unrepaired*, all of the rest of the windows will soon be broken. (1982: 31)

In the context of crime, Wilson and Kelling claim "that 'untended' behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls":

> A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in ... Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely here, rather than in places where people are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls. (1982: 31)

Broken windows policing encourages the police to be concerned with problems of disorder, and moves crime itself to a secondary or at least second-stage goal of the police. From the perspective of the crisis of policing we have described, broken windows policing again responds to the crisis of police effectiveness by expanding the goals of policing. On the one hand, it provides a theory for why police have failed in crime control in earlier decades. Crime is part of a developmental process and to reduce crime the police must intervene early in that process. On the other hand, it provides a new focus for policing – disorder – which allows the police to more easily focus prevention efforts, and through which they can more directly show success.

Problem-oriented policing, the subject of Part IV of our volume, also sought to broaden the problems that police approached. In Herman Goldstein's original formulation of problem-oriented policing in 1979, he argued that the "police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral problems that arise in the community" (1979: 242). However, in this case, the solution for the crisis of policing was not found in the definition of new tasks for the police, but rather in a critique of traditional police practice. Goldstein assumed that the police could impact crime and other problems if they took a different approach, in this case, the problem-oriented policing approach. Accordingly, a second response to the crisis we have described is not to accept, as some academic criminologists had, that the police could not do something about crime and thus to search to define other important police functions as central (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Bayley, 1994), but to argue that the strategies of the standard policing model were flawed and that new more effective models could be developed.

Problem-oriented policing sought to redefine the way in which the police did their job. Goldstein argued that the police had "lost sight" of their primary task, which was to do something about crime and other problems, and instead had become focused on the "means" of allocating police resources. He identified this pathology as a common one in large organizations, and sought, through the model of problem solving, to develop a more successful method of ameliorating crime and other community problems.

Other innovations in policing that emerged fully around the turn of the century also take the approach that the police can be effective in doing something about crime if they adopt innovative police practices. Pulling levers policing discussed in Part V capitalizes on the fact that a large proportion of violent crime is committed by a relatively small group of high rate offenders. It adopts a problem-oriented approach to deal with these offenders, but provides a broader and more comprehensive combination of strategies than more traditional problem-oriented policing programs. Pioneered in Boston to deal with an "epidemic" of youth violence (Kennedy, Piehl & Braga, 1996), the pulling levers approach begins by drawing upon a collection of law enforcement practitioners to analyze crime problems and develop innovative solutions. It seeks to develop a variety of "levers" to stop high rate offenders from continuing criminal behavior that include not only criminal justice interventions, but also social services and community resources.

Third-party policing discussed in Part VI of this volume, offers another solution to the failures of the standard policing model. It follows suggestions made by Herman Goldstein (1979) that the "tool box" of police strategies be expanded. In this case, however, the resources of the police are expanded to "third parties" that are believed to offer significant new resources for doing something about crime and disorder.[3] The opportunity for a third-party policing approach developed in part from more general trends in the relationship between civil and criminal law (Mann, 1992; Mazerolle & Ransley, Chapter 11 in this volume). The expansion of the civil law and its use in other legal contexts as a method of dealing with problems that were once considered to be the exclusive province of criminal statutes, created important new tools for the police. Third-party policing asserts that the police cannot successfully deal with many problems on their own, and thus that the failures of traditional policing models may be found in the limits of police powers. Using civil ordinances and civil courts, or the resources of private agencies, third-party policing recognizes that much social control is exercised by institutions other than the police and that crime can be managed through agencies other than the criminal law.

Hot spots policing discussed in Part VII, was first examined in the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995).

[3] The impetus for third-party policing does not necessarily come from the police. Mazerolle and Ransley (2006) argue that a variety of external demands have imposed third-party policing on the police industry.

The Minneapolis study was developed as a direct response to the findings of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. Drawing upon empirical evidence that crime was clustered in discrete hot spots (e.g., see Pierce, Spaar & Briggs, 1986; Sherman, 1987; Sherman, Gartin & Buerger, 1989; Weisburd, Maher & Sherman, 1992), Sherman and Weisburd argued that preventive patrol might be effective if it was more tightly focused.

> [If] only 3 percent of the addresses in a city produce more than half of all the requests for police response, if no police are dispatched to 40 percent of the addresses and intersections in a city over one year, and, if among the 60 percent with any requests the majority register only one request a year, then concentrating police in a few locations makes more sense than spreading them evenly through a beat. (1995: 629)

Hot spots policing does not demand that the police change their strategies, but requires that they focus them more carefully at places where crime is clustered.

In Part VIII of this volume, we examine predictive policing. The term predictive policing was first popularized in a symposium sponsored by the National Institute of Justice in 2009. William Bratton, then police commissioner of the LA police department, and the main developer of another innovation we will examine, CompStat, played a key role in raising this idea, again as a way for the police to focus in and improve on its crime control mission. Predictive policing is a strategy that uses predictive algorithms based on combining different types of data to anticipate where and when crime might occur and to identify patterns among past criminal incidents. The National Academies of Sciences Committee on Proactive Policing noted that "predictive policing overlaps with hot spots policing but is generally distinguished by its reliance on sophisticated analytics that are used to predict likelihood of crime incidence within very specific parameters of space and time and for very specific types of crime" (Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018: ch. 2).

CompStat, discussed in Part IX, also responds to the failures of the standard model of policing by critiquing the ways in which the police carry out their tasks. However, in the case of CompStat, the focus is less on the specific strategies that the police are involved in and more on the nature of police organization itself. Herman Goldstein noted in 1979 that the failures of the standard model of policing could be explained by the fact that police organizations were poorly organized to do something about crime. CompStat was designed to overcome that limitation. It sought to empower the police command structure to do something about crime problems. William Bratton, the New York City police chief who coined the term and developed the program wrote:

> We created a system in which the police commissioner, with his executive core, first empowers and then interrogates the precinct commander, forcing him or her to come up with a plan to attack crime. But it should not stop there. At the next level down, it should be the precinct commander, taking the same role as the commissioner, empowering and

interrogating the platoon commander. Then, at the third level, the platoon commander should be asking his sergeants . . . all the way down until everyone in the entire organization is empowered and motivated, active and assessed and successful. It works in all organizations, whether it's 38,000 New York cops or Mayberry, R. F. D. (Bratton, 1998b: 239)

Evidence-based policing, discussed in Part X, also traces the failures of traditional policing practices to the ways in which the police carry out their tasks. It draws from a much wider set of public policy concerns, and a broader policy movement than other police innovations examined in this volume. There is a growing consensus among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers that crime control practices and policies should be rooted as much as possible in scientific research (Sherman, 1998; Cullen & Gendreau, 2000; MacKenzie, 2000; Sherman et al., 2002; Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011; Lum & Koper, 2017). Over the last two decades, there has been a steady growth in interest in the evaluation of criminal justice programs and practices reflected in part by the growth in criminal justice funding for research during this period (e.g., see Telep, Garner & Visher, 2015). Increasing support for research and evaluation in criminal justice may be seen as part of a more general trend toward utilization of scientific research for establishing rational and effective practices and policies. This trend is perhaps most prominent in the health professions where the idea of "evidence-based medicine" had gained strong government and professional support before the turn of the century (Millenson, 1997; Zuger, 1997), though the evidence-based paradigm has also developed in other fields (e.g., see Nutley & Davies, 1999; Davies, Nutley & Smith, 2000; Parsons, 2002; Victora, Habicht & Bryce, 2004). The evidence-based approach does not necessarily assume that the police can be more effective, but it argues that a reliance on evidence in the police industry is a prerequisite for the development of effective policing practices (Sherman, 1998). Weisburd and Neyroud (2011; see also Neyroud & Weisburd, 2014) argue that evidence-based policing is key to responding to the joint crises of effectiveness and police legitimacy in the context of increasing pressures to reduce funding for public services.

The final innovation we examine is also new to the Second Edition. Technologies in policing have advanced rapidly over the last few decades (Lum, Koper & Willis, 2016). Such technologies have not developed in a vacuum but have sought to reinforce police responses to the crises that motivated this now long period of developing police innovation to reduce crime and increase police legitimacy. Crime mapping, license plate reader technologies, and body cameras are all examples of technologies that have been integrated in policing with the goal of responding to challenges to police effectiveness in reducing crime, or increasing public trust in the police. This reliance on technology as a vehicle to improve policing seemed to us an important enough development to be included in a volume on key police innovations.

CONCLUSION

In our Introduction, we have traced the wide diffusion of innovations in the last decades of the twentieth century to a crisis of police practices that had begun to develop in the late 1960s, and has in specific ways reemerged in recent years (spawning new approaches that we have added to the Second Edition). We have argued that it is not accidental that so much innovation was brought to American policing during this period. Indeed, such innovation can be understood in the context of a series of challenges to American policing that created a perceived need for change among the police, scholars, and the public. We have also argued that the paths of police innovation can be understood in the context of the critiques that developed of standard policing models. In some cases, the innovations minimized the importance of crime fighting, which had been the focus of earlier policing models. Such innovations responded to the crisis of policing by defining a broader or new set of tasks that the police could perform more effectively. In many cases, such innovations focused on improving perceptions of police legitimacy and relationships more generally between the police and the public, another important component of the crisis we described. Other innovations, however, started with a critique of the methods used in the traditional policing models. These innovations assumed that the police could be more effective in preventing or controlling crime, if the tactics used were changed. These approaches, in turn, have been supplemented in recent years through such innovations as predictive policing, and new technologies have also been focused on efforts to improve police legitimacy (e.g., body cameras).

In the following chapters, prominent police scholars examine each of the innovations that we have discussed. The format of advocates and critics provides a broad framework for assessing these innovations and allows us to identify the major advantages and disadvantages of these approaches. In our conclusions, we try to draw more general lessons from these contributions, and discuss the possible directions that police innovation will take in the coming decades.

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PART I

COMMUNITY POLICING

1

Advocate

Community Policing

Wesley G. Skogan

The concept of community policing is very popular with politicians and the general public – so popular that few police chiefs want to be caught without some program they can call community policing. As early as 1997, a survey of police departments conducted by the Police Foundation found that 85 percent reported they had adopted community policing or were in the process of doing so (Skogan, 2005). The biggest reason they gave for not doing so was that community policing was "impractical" for their community. In my own tabulations of the data, this reply was mostly from small departments with only a few officers. Bigger cities included in the survey (those with populations greater than 100,000) all claimed to have adopted community policing – half (they recalled) by 1991 and the other half between 1992 and 1997. The most recent similar figures come from a national survey of departments conducted in 2013. In my tabulations, about 95 percent of the departments in cities of more than 250,000 in population that had an official mission statement included a commitment to community policing (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015).

What do cities that claim they are "doing community policing" actually do? They describe a long list of projects. Under the rubric of community policing, officers patrol on foot (in the 1997 survey, 75 percent listed this as a community policing activity), or perhaps on horses, bicycles, or Segways. Departments variously train civilians in citizen police academies, permanently assign officers to small geographical areas, open small neighborhood storefront offices, canvass door-to-door to identify local problems, publish newsletters, conduct drug education projects, and work with municipal agencies to enforce health and safety regulations. The 2013 survey found that two-thirds of larger departments utilized information from community surveys to assess the extent of neighborhood problems and evaluate their own performance (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015).

However, community policing is not defined by these kinds of activities. Activities, projects, and programs come and go, and they should as conditions change. Communities with different problems and varied resources to bring to

bear against them should try different things. Community policing is not a set of specific programs. Rather, it involves changing decision-making processes and creating new cultures within police departments. It is an organizational *strategy* that leaves setting priorities and the activities that are needed to achieve them largely to residents and the police who serve in their neighborhoods. Community policing is a process rather than a product. Digging beneath the surface, it is defined by three ideas: citizen involvement, problem solving, and decentralization. In practice, these three dimensions turn out to be densely interrelated, and departments that shortchange one or more of them will not be very effective.

This essay sets the stage for a discussion of community policing. It reviews the three core concepts that define community policing, describes how they have been turned into concrete community policing programs, and reports some of what we know about their effectiveness. It draws heavily on my experience evaluating community programs in several cities, as well as on what others have reported. It summarizes some of the claims made for community policing, and some of the realities of achieving them in the real world.

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

Community policing is defined in part by efforts to develop partnerships with community members and civic organizations that represent many of them collectively. It requires that police engage with the public as they set priorities and develop their tactics. Effective community policing requires responsiveness to citizen input concerning both the needs of the community and the best ways by which the police can help meet those needs. It takes seriously the public's definition of its own problems. This is one reason why community policing is an organizational strategy but not a set of specific programs – how it looks in practice *should* vary considerably from place to place, in response to unique local situations and circumstances.

Listening to the community can produce new policing priorities. Officers involved in neighborhood policing quickly learn that residents can be deeply concerned about problems that previously were not high on the police agenda. To a certain extent, they define things differently. The public often focuses on threatening and fear-provoking *conditions* rather than discrete and legally defined *incidents*. They can be more concerned about cars speeding down their residential streets and the physical decay of their community than they are about traditionally defined "serious crimes." They worry about graffiti, public drinking, and the litter and parking problems created by nearby commercial strips. The public sometimes defines their problem as people who need to be taught a lesson. In Chicago, a well-known social type is the "gangbanger," and people want them off the street. The police, however, are trained to recognize and organized to respond to crime incidents, and they have to know what people do, not their popular category. Given these differences,

community residents are unsure if they can (or even should) rely on the police to help them deal with these problems. Many of these concerns thus do not generate complaints or calls for service, and, as a result, the police know surprisingly little about them. The routines of traditional police work ensure that officers will largely interact with citizens who are in distress because they have just been victimized, or with suspects and troublemakers. Accordingly, community policing requires that departments develop new channels for learning about neighborhood problems. And when they learn about them, they have to have systems in place to respond effectively (Skogan et al., 1999).

Civic engagement extends to involving the public in some way in efforts to enhance community safety. Community policing promises to strengthen the capacity of communities to fight and prevent crime on their own. The idea that the police and the public are "coproducers" of safety, and that officers cannot claim a monopoly over fighting crime, predates the community policing era. The community crime prevention movement of the 1970s was an important precursor to community policing. It promoted the idea that crime was not solely the responsibility of the police. Now police find that they are expected to lead community efforts. They are being called upon to take responsibility for mobilizing individuals and organizations around crime prevention. These efforts include neighborhood watch, citizen patrols, and education programs stressing household target hardening and the rapid reporting of crime. Residents are asked to assist the police by reporting crimes promptly when they occur and cooperating as witnesses. Community policing often involves increased "transparency" in how departments respond to demands for more information about what they do and how effective they are. A federal survey of police agencies found that by 1999, more than 90 percent of departments serving cities of 50,000 or more were giving residents access to crime statistics or even crime maps (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001). Even where efforts to involve the community were already well established, moving them to center stage as part of a larger strategic plan showcases the commitment of the police to community policing.

All of this needs to be supported by new organizational structures and training for police officers. Departments need to reorganize in order to provide opportunities for citizens to come into contact with their officers under circumstances that encourage these exchanges. There has to be a significant amount of informal "face time" between police and residents, so that trust and cooperation can develop between the prospective partners. To this end, many departments hold community meetings and form advisory committees, work out of storefront offices, survey the public, and create informational web sites. During the height of community involvement in Chicago's community policing effort, the city held about 250 small police–public meetings every month. These began in 1995, and, by the end of 2016, residents had shown up on more than one million occasions to attend almost 54,000 community meetings (author's tabulations). In some places,

police share information with residents through educational programs or by enrolling them in citizen-police academies that give them in-depth knowledge of law enforcement. By 1999, almost 70 percent of all police departments – and virtually every department serving cities of 50,000 or more – reported regularly holding meetings with citizen groups (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001).

What are the presumed benefits of citizen involvement? Community policing aims at rebuilding trust in the community and ensuring support for the police among taxpayers. This is clearly a difficult target. Opinion polls document that Americans have given up thinking that politicians and government adequately represent them. For example, in 1961, almost 80 percent of Americans reported that they "trust the federal government to do what is right just about always, or / most of the time." By 2015, that figure had dropped to 19 percent (Pew Research Center, 2015). Police come off better than most government bodies when Americans are asked how much confidence they have in them; during the 1990s and 2000s, police stood above the President, the Supreme Court and most national institutions. In June 2016, Americans were most confident in the military (73 percent had "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in them), but police came next, at 56 percent. About one-quarter of Americans had that much confidence in the criminal justice system, and only 9 percent rated members of Congress positively (Gallup, Inc., 2015).

Community policing is especially about recapturing the legitimacy that police have in large measure lost in many of America's minority communities. The same opinion polls show that African Americans and recent immigrants have dramatically less confidence in the police. A 2016 analysis of national trends in opinion found that, while 58 percent of White respondents had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in police, the comparable figure for African Americans was 29 percent. Blacks were much quicker to report that racial minorities were being treated unfairly by the police, and that police are corrupt (Gallup, Inc., 2016). Likewise, in surveys conducted in Chicago, African Americans and Hispanic immigrants were much more likely to believe that officers are brutal and corrupt (Skogan and Steiner, 2004). These groups are the only growing part of the population in a number of American cities, and civic leaders know that they have to find ways to incorporate them into the system. Police take on community policing in part because they hope that building a reservoir of public support may help them get through bad times when they occur (see the discussion of "nasty misconduct" below). Community policing might help police be more effective. It could encourage witnesses and bystanders to step forward in neighborhoods where they too often do not, for example. More indirectly, it might help rebuild the social and organizational fabric of neighborhoods that previously had been given up for lost, enabling residents to contribute to maintaining order in their community (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997).

An important spin-off of civic engagement is that the adoption of community policing almost inevitably leads to an expansion of the police mandate, and this

further expands the list of points on which it should be evaluated. Controlling serious crime by enforcing the criminal law remains the primary job of the police. But instead of seeing the police exclusively in these terms, and viewing activities that depart from direct efforts to deter crime as a distraction from their fundamental mission, advocates of community policing argue that the police have additional functions to perform, and different ways to conduct their traditional business. As a practical matter, when police meet with neighborhood residents in park buildings and church basements to discuss neighborhood problems, the civilians present are going to bring up all manner of problems. If the police who are present put them off, or have no way of responding to their concerns, they will not come back next month. Community policing takes seriously the public's definition of its own problems, and this inevitably includes issues that lie outside the traditional competence of the police. Officers can learn at a public meeting that loose garbage and rats in an alley are big issues for residents, but some other agency is going to have to deliver the solution to that problem. When police meet with residents in Chicago, much of the discussion focuses on neighborhood dilapidation (including problems with abandoned buildings and graffiti) and on public drinking, teen loitering, curfew and truancy problems, and disorder in schools. There is much more talk about parking and traffic than about personal and property crime, although discussion of drug-related issues comes up quite often (Skogan, 2006). The broad range of issues that concern the public requires, in turn, that police form partnerships with other public and private agencies that can join them in responding to residents' priorities. They could include the schools and agencies responsible for health, housing, trash pickup, car tows, and graffiti cleanups.

In practice, community involvement is not easy to achieve. Ironically, it can be difficult to sustain in areas that need it the most. Research on participation in community crime prevention programs during the 1970s and 1980s found that poor and high-crime areas often were not well endowed with an infrastructure of organizations that were ready to get involved, and that turnout for police-sponsored events was higher in places honeycombed with block clubs and community organizations (Skogan, 1988). In high crime areas, people tend to be suspicious of their neighbors, and especially of their neighbor's children. Fear of retaliation by gangs and drug dealers can undermine public involvement as well (Grinc, 1994). In Chicago, a study of hundreds of community meetings found that residents expressed concern about retaliation for attending or working with the police in 22 percent of the city's beats (Skogan, 2006). In addition, police and residents may not have a history of getting along in poor neighborhoods. Residents are as likely to think of the police as one of their problems as they are to see them as a solution to their problems. It probably will not be the first instinct of organizations representing the interests of poor communities to cooperate with police. Instead, they are more likely to press for an end to police misconduct. They will call for new resources from the

outside to address community problems, for organizations rarely blame their own constituents for their plight (Skogan, 1988). There may be no reason for residents of crime-ridden neighborhoods to think that community policing will turn out to be anything but another broken promise; they are accustomed to seeing programs come and go, without much effect (Sadd & Grinc, 1994). They certainly will have to be trained in their new roles. Community policing involves a new set of jargon as well as assumptions about the new responsibilities that both police and citizens are to adopt. The 2000 survey of police departments by the federal government found that "training citizens for community policing" was common in big cities; in cities of more than 500,000, 70 percent reported doing so (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013).

In addition, community policing runs the risk of inequitable outcomes. In an evaluation of one of the very first programs, in Houston, Texas, I found that White and middle-class residents received most of the benefits of the program. They found it easy to cooperate with the police, and shared with the police a common view of whom the troublemakers were in the community. Blue-collar African Americans and Latinos remained uninvolved, on the other hand, and after a year they had seen no visible change in their lives (Skogan, 1990). Finally, the investment that police make in community policing is always at risk. Nasty episodes of police misconduct can undermine those efforts. When excessive force or killings by police become a public issue, years of progress in police–community relations can disappear. The same is true when there are of revelations of widespread corruption.

On the police side, there may be resistance in the ranks. Public officials' and community activists' enthusiasm for neighborhood-oriented policing encourages its detractors within the police to dismiss it as "just politics," or another passing civilian fad. Officers who get involved can become known as "empty holster guys," and what they do gets labeled "social work." Police officers prefer to stick to crime fighting. (For a case study in New York City of how this happens, see Pate & Shtull, 1994.) My first survey of Chicago police, conducted before that city's community policing program began, found that two-thirds of them disavowed any interest in addressing "non-crime problems" on their beat. More than 70 percent of the 7,500 police officers surveyed thought community policing "would bring a greater burden on police to solve all community problems," and also "more unreasonable demands on police by community groups" (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Police are often skeptical about programs invented by civilians, who they are convinced cannot possibly understand their job. They are particularly hostile to programs that threaten to involve civilians in setting standards or evaluating their performance, and they do not like civilians influencing their operational priorities. Police can easily find ways to justify their aloofness from the community; as one officer told me, "You can't be the friend of the people and do your job."

On the other hand, some studies point to positive changes in officer's views once they become involved in community policing. Lurigio and Rosenbaum

(1994) summarized twelve studies of this, and found many positive findings with respect to job satisfaction, perceptions of improved relations with the community, and expectations about community involvement in problem solving. Skogan and Hartnett (1997) found growing support for community policing among officers involved in Chicago's experimental police districts, in comparison to those who continued to work in districts featuring policing as usual.

PROBLEM SOLVING AND THE COMMUNITY

Community policing also involves a shift from reliance on reactive patrol and investigations toward a problem-solving orientation. In brief (for it is discussed in detail in other chapters of this book), problem-oriented policing is an approach to developing crime reduction strategies. Problem solving involves training officers in methods of identifying and analyzing problems. It highlights the importance of discovering the situations that *produce* calls for police assistance, identifying the causes which lie behind them, and designing tactics to deal with these causes. Problem solving is a counterpoint to the traditional model of police work, which usually entails responding sequentially to individual events as they are phoned in by victims. Too often this style of policing is reduced to driving fast to crime scenes in order to fill out pieces of paper reporting what happened. Problem solving, on the other hand, calls for examining patterns of incidents to reveal their causes and to help plan how to deal with them proactively. Problem-oriented policing also recognizes that the solutions to those patterns may involve other agencies and may be "non-police" in character; in traditional departments, this would be cause for ignoring them. The best programs encourage officers to respond creatively to the problems they encounter, or to refer them appropriately to other agencies (Eck, 2004).

Problem-solving policing can proceed without a commitment to community policing. The latter stresses civic engagement in identifying and prioritizing neighborhood problems; without that input, the former frequently focuses on patterns of traditionally defined crimes that are identified using police data systems. Problem-oriented community policing sometimes involves community members or organizations actually addressing particular issues, not just identifying them, but more often it is conducted by the police and allied city agencies. However, community policing involves neighborhood residents as an end in itself, and, in evaluation terms, it is important to count this as a "process success." The problem with relying on the data that is already in police computers is that when residents are involved they often press for a focus on issues that are not well documented by department information systems, such as graffiti, public drinking, and building abandonment. Effective programs must have systems in place to respond to a broad range of problems, through partnerships with other agencies. The 2013 national survey of agencies found that in cities of more than 250,000 residents, about 70 percent

of departments reported they had formed problem-solving partnerships with community groups and local agencies (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015).

Is this easy to do? It is at least as hard as involving the community, for bureaucracies are involved, and interagency cooperation can easily fail. For a long list of familiar bureaucratic and political reasons, other city and state agencies usually think that community policing is the police department's program, not theirs. They resist bending their own professional and budget-constrained priorities to accommodate police officers who call on them for help. Making this kind of inter-organizational cooperation work turns out to be one of the most difficult problems facing innovative departments. When the chief of an East Coast city was new, he told me that he could handle things in his department; his biggest fear was that his mayor might not handle the city's other agencies, and that they would not provide the kind of support that community policing requires. If community policing is the police department's program, it may fail. Community policing must be the city's program.

It is also hard to involve police officers in problem solving. Cordner and Biebel (2003) did an in-depth study of problem-solving practice in a major American city. Although the department had been deeply committed to problem solving for more than fifteen years, they found that street officers typically defined problems very narrowly (e.g., one address, or one suspected repeat offender); their analysis of it consisted of making personal observations from their car; they crafted solutions from their own experience; and two-thirds of the time their proposed solution did not go past arresting someone. The study concluded that, after fifteen years of practice, this department's glass was only half full. What observers would classify as "full scale" problem solving was rarely encountered. Even the advocates of problem solving (you will hear from them in later chapters) admit that it requires a great deal of training, close supervision, and relentless follow-up evaluation to make it work. However, one important organizational function that often gets shortchanged is training. Training is expensive and officers have to be removed from the line – or paid overtime – to attend. And few departments are adequately staffed with supervisors who themselves were full-fledged problem solvers (Eck, 2004).

Community policing has also revived interest in systematically addressing the task of crime prevention. In the traditional model of policing, crime prevention was deterrence based. To threaten arrest, police patrol the streets looking for crimes (engaging in random and directed patrol), they respond quickly to emergency crime calls from witnesses and victims, and detectives then take over the task of locating offenders. Concerned residents, on the other hand, do not want the crime that drives these efforts to happen in the first place. Their instinct is to press for true prevention. Police-sponsored prevention projects are in place throughout the country. Problem solving has brought crime prevention theories to the table, leading police to tackle the routine activities of victims and the crucial roles played by "place managers" such as landlords or shopkeepers, and not just offenders (Eck & Wartell, 1998; Braga et al., 1999). When

community policing came to Chicago, one of the first actions of a new district commander was to convince a bank to open an ATM machine in his police station, so residents had a safe place to go to transact business. An emphasis on "target hardening" has gotten police involved in conducting home security surveys and teaching self-defense classes. But when communities talk about prevention, they mostly talk about their children, and ways of intervening earlier with youths who seem on a trajectory toward serious offending. Much of the of work preventing the development of criminal careers lies with agencies besides the police, including family courts, children's protection agencies, parents, peer networks, and schools. To their efforts, the police add involvement in athletic and after school programs, DARE presentations in schools, special efforts to reduce violence in families, and initiatives that focus attention on the recruitment of youths into gangs.

DECENTRALIZATION

Decentralization is an organizational strategy that is closely linked to the implementation of community policing. Decentralization can be pursued at two levels. Typically, more responsibility for identifying and responding to chronic crime and disorder problems is to be delegated to mid-level commanders in charge of the geographical districts or precincts that make up a city. Departments have had to experiment with how to structure and manage a decentralization plan that gives mid-level managers real responsibility, and how to hold them accountable for measures of their success. Here, community policing intersects with another movement in policing (and the subject of another pair of chapters in this book), the emergence of a culture of systematic performance measurement and managerial accountability.

The idea is to devolve authority and responsibility further down the organizational hierarchy. Departments need to do this in order to encourage the development of local solutions to locally defined problems, and to facilitate decision-making that responds rapidly to local conditions. There may be moves to flatten the structure of the organization by compressing the rank structure, and to shed layers of bureaucracy within the police organization to speed communication and decision-making. In Chicago, most of the department's elite units – including detectives, narcotics investigators, special tactical teams, and even the organized crime unit – were required to share information and more closely coordinate their work with the geographical districts. The department's management accountability process called them on the carpet when they failed to serve as "support units" for uniformed patrol officers (Skogan, 2006). To flatten the organization, Chicago abolished the civil service position of captain, leaving the department with just three permanent ranks (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).

At the same time, more responsibility for identifying and responding to community problems may be delegated to individual patrol officers and their

sergeants, who are in turn encouraged to take the initiative in finding ways to deal with a broad range of problems specific to the communities they serve. Structurally, community policing leads departments to assign officers to fixed geographical areas, and to keep them there during the course of their day. This is known as adopting a "turf orientation." Decentralization is intended to encourage communication between officers and neighborhood residents, and to build an awareness of local problems among working officers. They are expected to work more autonomously at investigating situations, resolving problems, and educating the public. They are being asked to discover and set their own goals, and sometimes to manage their work schedule. This is also the level at which collaborative projects involving both police and residents can emerge. In 2013, a national survey of police departments found that assigning officers geographically was virtually the norm in cities over 250,000 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015).

This pattern of dual decentralization is adopted not only so that police can become more proactive and more preventive, but also so that they can respond efficiently to problems of different magnitude and complexity. Under the professional model, marching orders for the police traditionally come from two sources: 911 calls from the public concerning individual problems, and initiatives or programs originating at police headquarters or even City Hall. Every experienced officer can tell stories of the crazy things officers sometimes have to do because "downtown" announced a citywide initiative that was irrelevant for their district. A Chicago commander once described to me how he was punished (he lost a day's pay) because – as a district commander – he assigned two officers to identifying abandoned cars and getting them towed, rather than the maximum of one officer that the rule book mandated. He used this story to good effect whenever officers complained in a meeting that the department was getting away from its traditional practices because of community policing.

Decentralization, paired with a commitment to consultation and engagement with local communities, also allows the police to respond to local problems that are important to particular communities. Police were not organized to respond to the organized groups and community institutions that make up "civil society." Now surveys of departments indicate that, as part of a community policing initiative, virtually all larger departments now consult local advisory boards representing specific communities.

Is decentralization easy to pull off? It is at least as hard as problem solving, and politically risky to boot. For all of the adoption of specific programs, researchers who track trends in police organization are skeptical that there has been much fundamental "flattening" of police hierarchies – which is, after all, about their jobs (Maguire et al., 2003; Greene, 2004). Resistance to reform does not just come from the bottom of the organization. Junior executives at police headquarters may resist having authority taken from them and pushed to lower levels in the organization. Managers at this level are in a position to act as

a filter between the chief and operational units, censoring the flow of decisions and information up and down the command hierarchy (for a case study of how this can undermine community policing initiatives, see Capowich, 2005). This is one reason why special community policing units are often run from the chief's office, or housed in a special new bureau; this enables the department to get neighborhood officers on the street while bypassing the barons who dominate key positions at headquarters. Too often they are command- and control-oriented and feel most comfortable when everything is done by the book. Discussions of community policing often feature management buzz words like "empowerment" and "trust," and this makes them nervous because they also worry about inefficiency and corruption.

And, of course, these concerns are real. One of the dilemmas of community policing is that calling for more operational and street-level discretion runs counter to another trend in policing, which is to tighten the management screws and create an increasingly rule-bound corner in order to control police corruption and violence. Police do misuse their discretion, and they do take bribes. Ironically, however, *many* of the recent innovations discussed in this book go the other way; they recognize, widen, and celebrate the operational independence of individual officers. Community policing recognizes that problems vary tremendously from place to place, and that their causes and solutions are highly contextual. We expect police to use "good judgment" rather than somehow enforce "the letter of the law." Community policing stresses that workers at the very bottom of the organization are closest to the customer, and are to use their best judgment about how to serve the neighborhoods where they are assigned. It calls for the bottom-up definition of problems. Decentralizing, reducing hierarchy, granting officers more independence, and trusting in their professionalism are the organizational reforms of choice today, not tightening things up to constrain officer discretion.

Decentralization almost certainly puts new responsibilities on the shoulders of front-line supervisors, the sergeants, and others who watch over the daily activities of working officers. Traditionally, their role was to watch for infractions of the rule book. However, translating organizational policy into practice has become more complex than that. The chapters in this book provide an inventory of the many, and more complicated, things society is asking officers to do, and in this environment their immediate supervisors need to become teachers, coaches and mentors, as well as disciplinarians. Examining one of the first experiments with community policing, Weisburd, McElroy, and Hardyman (1988) observed that successful sergeants had to develop work plans, prioritize problems and encourage their officers to take the initiative, and then assess their successes and failures in light of the diverse and very particular problems facing the beats in which they worked. Recognizing this, when Chicago launched its community policing initiative, they paid special attention to sergeants. Sergeants received more training than anyone else in the organization, in order to backstop their teaching and coaching capabilities.

Beat officers working around the clock were assigned the same sergeant, whose tasks including building their team spirit, encouraging cross-shift communication among them, staffing monthly beat community meetings, and seeing to it that the formal plan they were to develop for their beat was put in motion (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).

It may be difficult to pull off decentralization to the turf level because it takes too many people. Community policing is labor intensive, and may require more officers. Police managers and city leaders will have to find the officers required to staff the program. Finding the money to hire more officers to staff community policing assignments is hard, so departments may try to downsize existing projects. This can bring conflict with powerful unit commanders and allied politicians who support current arrangements. Research on changes in police organizational structure did find that their "spatial differentiation" increased during the 1990s, with the spread of storefront offices and the creation of more and smaller district stations (Maguire et al., 2003), but there was a price to be paid for this. Police departments also face "the 911 problem." Their commitment to respond to 911 calls as quickly as possible dominates how resources are deployed in every department. Community policing has encountered heavy political resistance when the perception arose (encouraged, to be sure, by its opponents) that resources previously devoted to responding to emergency calls were being diverted to this "social experiment."

Decentralization is also difficult to manage because evaluation of the effectiveness of many community policing initiatives is difficult. The management environment in policing today stresses "accountability for results" (Willis, Mastrofski & Kochel, 2010). In this model, units are not rewarded for their activities, however well meaning, but for declining crime. However, the public often wants action on things that department information systems do not account for at all. In decentralized departments, residents of different neighborhoods make different demands on police operations. They value the time officers spend meeting with them, and they like to see officers on foot rather than driving past on the way to a crime scene. Agencies committed to both community policing and CompStat-style accountability assessment seem to have to run their associated operations independently, so contrary are their managerial demands (Willis, Mastrofski & Kochel, 2010). As a result, both individual and unit performance is harder to assess in community policing departments (see also Mastrofski, 1998).

CAN IT WORK?

Because many different projects and activities take place under this conceptual umbrella, it has long been difficult to come to an overall assessment regarding whether or not community policing works. A further complexity has been that community policing aims at affecting different and more diverse outcomes than those that are targeted by routine proactive policing projects. Often these

targets are not to be found in standard policing databases, increasing the complexity and expense of conducting studies of community policing effectiveness. The long-term character of many of the concerns addressed by community policing, and the patience that they require in dealing with them, provide additional challenges, as few studies have tracked community policing for longer than a year or so. Studies of the effectiveness of its major features across a broad range of outcomes took some time to accumulate.

The best evidence available on the impact of community policing was systematically reviewed in a report appearing in 2014 (Gill et al., 2014). It came to mixed conclusions. Across the evaluations that could be identified for analyses there was little sign that conventional measures of crime were much impacted by the effort, including in the subset of interventions that included a specific problem-solving component. Fear of crime showed mixed results depending on how it was measured, but overall was not greatly affected. However, survey measures of the extent of social and physical disorder – neighborhood problems that frequently go unrecognized without community input – were positively affected by community-oriented interventions. A 2017 review by a panel of the National Research Council concurred with this, noting that the highly variable set of activities undertaken as part of community policing initiatives can make it difficult to generalize about its possible effects on crime (Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018).

That said, I do not know of a single police department that adopted community policing because they thought that it was a *direct* route to getting the crime rate down. In any event, crime has dropped dramatically across the United States, while police continue to face a legitimacy crisis of major proportions. In addition to crime, efforts to evaluate it need to focus as well on the important community and governance processes that it is intended to set in motion, because they represent potentially important "wins" on their own. The extent of the public's trust and confidence in police is an obvious first issue. Here the reviewers found more evidence that community policing could make a difference. Satisfaction with the police went up significantly in three-quarters of the neighborhoods where it was tested. Measures of the legitimacy of the police improved in six of the ten studies in which it was assessed. The report concluded that community policing had clear effects on quality-of-life and "citizen-focused" outcomes that research suggests could have longer-term effects on crime through their community-building effects, if they could be tracked over time (Gill et al., 2014). The report did not consider possible racial and ethnic differences in outcome patterns, despite the fact that this is among the most significant policing issues of our time. For example, my own long-term evaluation of ten years of citywide community policing in Chicago found that resident's views of their police improved over time, in the end by 10–15 percentage points on measures of their effectiveness, responsiveness, and demeanor. Importantly, Hispanics, African Americans, and Whites all shared these improved views (Skogan, 2006).

Evaluators also should look into the "mobilizing" effects of programs, including the extent of parallel community self-help efforts and extending even to the possible development of organizational and leadership capabilities among newly activated residents. Most observers would agree that community factors are among the most important determinants of safety, not the vigor of police enforcement activities, and that is an important rationale for a community-building approach. Sociological research indicates that "collective efficacy" (a combination of trust among neighborhood residents and the expectation that neighbors will intervene when things go wrong) plays an important role in inhibiting urban crime. However, the same work indicates that it is mostly White, home-owning neighborhoods that currently have it, and researchers have yet to document how neighborhoods that do not have collective efficacy can generate it for themselves (Skogan, 2012). Many probably need help, and that is where community policing could step in. The 2017 National Research Council report – which found only mixed evidence, but not much of it – described how this *might* work:

> Many expect that community-oriented policing should bring police and citizens closer together in common cause and should strengthen communication among various community groups as well as between police and public. It should invest residents with the necessary skills, resources, and sense of empowerment to mobilize against neighborhood problems. (Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018, 6–7)

Some survey studies, but not all, find a link between positive views or experiences with police and perceptions of stronger community responses to crime, but the jury is still out on the causal link between the two (Kochel, 2017). Certainly the community-building spirit of community policing, and its accomplishments in involving residents in anti-crime activites, point in this direction, and this should be an important focus of evaluation in this area. That it is actually focused on community building is another reason why evaluation studies need to be long term, able to assess the underlying logic of community policing: that focused police and city efforts can help revitalize community processes like collective efficacy. However, none of the comparisons of program and control areas considered in the most systematic review of community policing research looked at the effect of programs over a period longer than one year.

PROSPECTS

One unanswered question is whether community policing can survive the dual blows of plummeting federal financial support, plus the effects of the fiscal crises that engulfed many cities and their pension funds. Under the 1994 Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act, the federal government spent billions of dollars to support community policing. Federal agencies sponsored demonstration projects designed to spur innovation and promote

the effectiveness of community policing, and they promoted it heavily through national conferences and publication. The Act specified that one of the roles of these new officers should be "to foster problem solving and interaction with communities by police officers," and it also funded the creation of regional community policing centers around the country. But even where commitment to community policing is strong, maintaining an effective program can be difficult in the face of competing demands for scarce resources (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2011). Critics call for returning to the "core functions" of policing, and even supporters of community policing have acquiesced to cutbacks in neighborhood units and closed storefront offices. Training appears to be continuing, at least selectively. In 2013, all or almost all new recruits in cities over 250,000 in population were receiving community policing training, but in-service retraining of experienced officers was much less frequent (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015).

Another issue is whether community policing can continue to survive CompStat. As I noted earlier, many of its features push in the opposition direction. To a significant extent, in the current management environment, what gets measured is what matters. The accountability process is about harnessing hierarchy to achieve top management's objectives, which are in turn driven by the data they have at hand, and those data usually say little about community priorities. Police researchers attribute many of the problems of contemporary policing to the mismatch between the formal hierarchical structure of police organizations and the true nature of their work, which is extremely decentralized, not amenable to "cookie cutter" solutions to problems, dependent on the skills and motivation of the individual officers handling it, and mostly driven externally by 911 calls rather than management strategies. Perhaps the accountability process has ridden to the rescue of the traditional hierarchical structure, trying again to impose that hierarchy on work that does not fit its demands.

The two certainly collide. James Willis and colleagues (2010) explored how community policing and CompStat might manage to coexist. They found that, at best, agencies attempting to deploy both essentially ran them in separate worlds. They concluded,

> By operating them as systems mostly buffered from each other, the departments avoided having to confront in highly visible ways the dilemmas that would inevitably arise where the doctrines of the two reforms were at odds ... In contrast, a more integrated CompStat/community policing model would require much more radical changes to existing organizational routines, and such changes may have greater costs and risks and meet with considerable resistance from threatened parties. (Willis et al., 2010: 978)

Faced with this pressure, there is a risk that the focus of departments will shift away from community policing, back to the activities that better fit recentralizing management structures.

There are additional counter trends. One is renewed pressure from the federal government to involve local police extensively in enforcing immigration laws. This is often stoutly resisted by chiefs of police, who claim that it would be a great setback to their community involvement and trust-building projects with the burgeoning immigrant populations of many cities. We shall see if they can continue to resist (Skogan, 2009). Community policing also competes for attention, resources, and political interest with a number of "wars." These include the war on drugs, the global war on terror ("GWAT"), and zero-tolerance misdemeanor enforcement being pursued in the misguided belief that this is somehow broken windows policing (for more on broken windows, see the next section of this book). Most recently, stop and frisk has become the crime-prevention strategy of choice in American policing (see Chapter 9 and 10 of this book). The threats this policy poses for effective community policing include the high volume of unwarranted stops that generates, the extreme concentration of stops in minority communities, and the focused impact of these on the legitimacy of policing, and perhaps of the state. And the contrary effects all of these pale in significance in comparison to that of officer pushback against this and related reforms. When community policing, procedural justice initiatives, and other community-facing strategies come into conflict with police politics and culture, the latter threaten (in the words of President Obama's police reform commission) to "eat policy for lunch" (President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015: 11).

In summary, reform is difficult, and fragile. It is important to note that reports from cities that have – reluctantly, they say – cut back on their community policing units usually claim that they will continue doing it anyway, because it has become part of their agency's regular way of doing business. This signals that they see it as one of their significant claims on legitimacy. It is also entrenched in many places. Compared to many innovations considered in this book, community policing is a relatively old idea, but it is one that has legs. Community-oriented policing has taken off across the world, reshaping public service in many nations. In the end, it will be politics, in the form of broad grassroots support for community policing and elite concern regarding the continuing legitimacy crisis that threatens the stability of polity, that will rescue it.

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