THREATS TO HOMELAND SECURITY

REASSESSING THE ALL-HAZARDS PERSPECTIVE

SECOND EDITION

Addresses threats to homeland security from terrorism and emergency management from natural disasters

Threats to Homeland Security, Second Edition examines the foundations of today's security environment, from broader national security perspectives to specific homeland security interests and concerns. It covers what we protect, how we protect it, and what we protect it from. In addition, the book examines threats from both an international perspective (state vs non-state actors as well as kinds of threat capabilities—from cyber-terrorism to weapons of mass destruction) and from a national perspective (sources of domestic terrorism and future technological challenges, due to globalization and an increasingly interconnected world).

This new edition of *Threats to Homeland Security* updates previous chapters and provides new chapters focusing on new threats to homeland security today, such as the growing nexus between crime and terrorism, domestic and international intelligence collection, critical infrastructure and technology, and homeland security planning and resources—as well as the need to reassess the all-hazards dimension of homeland security from a resource and management perspective.

- Features new chapters on homeland security intelligence, crime and domestic terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, and resource management
- Provides a broader context for assessing threats to homeland security from the all-hazards perspective, to include terrorism and natural disasters
- Examines potential targets at home and abroad
- Includes a comprehensive overview of U.S. policy, strategy, and technologies for preventing and countering terrorism
- Includes self-assessment areas, key terms, summary questions, and application exercises. On-line content includes PPT lessons for each chapter and a solutions key for academic adopters

Threats to Homeland Security, Second Edition is an excellent introductory text on homeland security for educators, as well as a good source of training for professionals in a number of homeland security-related disciplines.

Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., is an Assistant Professor of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, SC where he teaches courses in Intelligence Operations, Intelligence Analysis, Terrorism and Political Violence, Security Management and Risk Assessment, Homeland Security, and U.S.-Latin American Relations in support of Information Systems Technology, Political Science, and Intelligence and National Security Studies degree programs. He spent 23 years in active duty as an Army Intelligence and Latin America Foreign Area Officer.

with website

A companion website with additional resources is available at
www.wiley.com/go/Kilroy/Threats_to_Homeland_Security

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EDITED BY

RICHARD J. KILROY, JR.

with website

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Threats to Homeland Security

Threats to Homeland Security: Reassessing the All-Hazards Perspective

SECOND EDITION

Edited by

Richard J. Kilroy, Jr.

Department of Politics
Coastal Carolina University
Conway, SC, USA

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

What made this book unique among homeland security texts when it was first published in 2008 was the truly interdisciplinary nature of the work, based on the academic and practical experiences of the authors who contributed chapters. The same holds true in 2018. Each author contributed their own perspectives while at the same time providing continuity of structure and format in order to support the overall goal of providing a reassessment of the "all-hazards" perspective. The authors of the revised text represent diverse academic disciplines in political science, public administration, security studies, engineering, and emergency planning. Some authors also bring practitioner experience in fields related to homeland security, such as emergency management, security management, military and homeland defense planning, intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, and public policy. The end result of the second edition of *Threats to Homeland Security* is a much richer, educational contribution to the broader field of homeland security studies as it currently exists today, as well as how it will likely evolve in the future.

Dr Jonathan M. Acuff is assistant professor of Intelligence and National Security Studies in the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, SC. His research and teaching interests include security studies, military innovation, strategy, and intelligence analysis. A former Army Reserve Officer, Acuff was a military analyst for the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle, Washington, where he worked on funded research projects for the Department of Homeland Security, US Pacific Command, and the Strategic Asia Program. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Washington.

Dr Christopher J. Ferrero is assistant professor of Intelligence and National Security Studies in the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University. He focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as Middle East politics. Prior to joining Coastal Carolina in 2016, Dr Ferrero held positions at the University of Virginia, Seton Hall University, and Syracuse University. From 2002 to 2006, he served as a WMD analyst for the Departments of State and Defense, primarily on ballistic missile proliferation and missile defense. He has appeared as a source for media outlets including NBC News and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. He received his PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia in 2011.

Dr Joseph Fitsanakis is associate professor of Intelligence and National Security Studies in the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, SC. Before joining Coastal, he founded

the Security and Intelligence Studies program at King University, where he also directed the King Institute for Security and Intelligence Studies. Dr Fitsanakis has written extensively on subjects such as international espionage, intelligence tradecraft, counterintelligence, wiretapping, cyber espionage, transnational crime, and intelligence reform. He is a frequent contributor to international news media and senior editor at intelNews.org, an ACI-indexed scholarly blog that is cataloged through the US Library of Congress. He received his PhD from the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh in the United Kingdom.

Dr Chad S. Foster is assistant professor in the Homeland Security Program at Eastern Kentucky University in Richmond, KY. He instructs and oversees courses that support the disaster management concentration in the program. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree from the US Military Academy and graduate-level degrees in public administration and urban and public affairs from the University of Louisville.

Dr Richard J. Kilroy Jr. is assistant professor of Intelligence and National Security Studies in the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, SC. He teaches courses related to intelligence analysis, intelligence operations, homeland security, and Latin American security issues. He is also a retired Army Intelligence and Foreign Area Officer who has served in various positions planning and implementing national and homeland security policy, to include standing up the Department of Defense's new US Northern Command after 9/11. His PhD is in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia.

Mr Steven Kuhr is head of Emergency Management and Continuity at Colorado Springs Utilities, which is among of the nation's largest utility public enterprises. Colorado Springs Utilities operates critical infrastructure across 11 Colorado counties. In this capacity Steven leads a team responsible for a comprehensive crisis management program by integrating the practices and principles of the emergency management, homeland security, and enterprise continuity domains for four utility sectors—electricity, natural gas, water, and wastewater services—for the City of Colorado Springs and a number of communities across the Pikes Peak Region. He is also an adjunct professor for the College of Security Studies at Colorado Technical University and a member of the Board of Directors of the InfraGard Denver Members Alliance. He has an extensive portfolio of emergency management and homeland security experience at the local, state, and private sector levels that spans three decades. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Emergency Management Administration from the State University of New York and a Master of Science in Homeland Security Management from the Homeland Security Management Institute at Long Island University.

Dr Daniel Masters is associate professor of international studies at the University of North Carolina at Wilmington. His area of expertise is national and international security, decision making and foreign policy, international political economy, and Middle Eastern, Russian, and

European political systems. His research interests relate to terrorism and security studies, with a particular focus on rebellious collective action. His PhD is from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Dr Stephan Reissman focuses on continuity of operations and preparedness issues in his position with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). He has extensive experience in emergency planning, preparedness, and response with federal (CDC, FEMA, DHS, and NOAA) and EMS agencies. He holds certifications as a Certified Emergency Manager, Master Exercise Practitioner, and Certified Business Continuity Professional. His PhD is in public affairs from the University of Colorado at Denver.

Dr Carmine Scavo is professor of political science and director of the Master of Public Administration program at East Carolina University in Greenville, NC. He teaches undergraduate courses in political science and graduate courses in public administration and security studies. His research has appeared in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Urban Affairs Review, and Public Administration Review* and in edited volumes. His PhD is from the University of Michigan.

Dr Alexander Siedschlag is professor of homeland security and public health sciences at Penn State (Penn State Harrisburg – School of Public Affairs, in a joint appointment with the Hershey College of Medicine). He also is chair of Penn State's intercollege Homeland Security Program. In research and teaching, he focuses on comparative homeland and civil security, security cultures, scenario foresight, and theories and methods of security studies. He has served as expert evaluator for US Department of Homeland Security and for European Union security research grant programs, as well as led security research projects in the European Union. This involved collaboration with FEMA's Strategic Foresight Initiative. Further, he has served as a senior guest lecturer at NATO School. His PhD is in political science from the University of Munich, Germany, and he in addition holds a "habilitation," or venia legendi, in political science from Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

Dr Jonathan Smith is professor and coordinator of the Intelligence and National Security Studies program in the Department of Politics at Coastal Carolina University in Conway, SC. He teaches courses in intelligence studies, national security strategy, and homeland security. He is also a retired naval intelligence officer who deployed in support of operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. His PhD is in political science (national security decision making) from the University of South Carolina.

PREFACE

When the first edition of *Threats to Homeland Security* was published in 2007, there was a dearth of academic literature available on the topic to support the demand on college campuses for classes related to homeland security and terrorism after 9/11. First attempts at meeting this void were texts in traditional fields of study, such as political science or criminal justice. Terrorism studies was still a little known field in security studies programs at some colleges, such as Georgetown University, which primarily looked at the subject from a theoretical or conceptual framework. Other approaches looked at the topic in terms of policy studies, such as national security policy or foreign policy courses, which expanded to include the subject of homeland security. The consensus though was for most writers to take an exclusive view of homeland security, focusing on terrorism as the primary threat.

After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast in August and September 2005, causing catastrophic damage and loss of life, similar to a terrorist attack, there was shift in homeland security toward a more inclusive view, which looked at threats from an all-hazards perspective. As a result there was a new emphasis placed on producing academic literature that emphasized natural disaster response and planning, primarily in the field of emergency management. New college curricula also developed in areas of "applied sciences" that now placed greater emphasis on studying the role of first responders, as well as state and federal government agencies in responding to natural disasters, as opposed to terrorist attacks. Community colleges, four-year undergraduate institutions, and even graduate schools began to develop degree programs related to emergency management and planning in order to build on the next inclusive view of homeland security.

It was in this context that the first edition of the text was named *Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards Perspective*. In other words, the goal in writing such a text was to provide students in a variety of academic disciplines and fields of study an integrated approach toward security studies and the continuing nature of security challenges to the nation through both a theoretical and practical lens. In the text, students and practitioners gained a comprehensive understanding of threats to the United States from an interdisciplinary perspective. By emphasizing the "all-hazards perspective," readers of the first edition gained a better understanding of a more inclusive view of the threats the nation faced at the time, with an expectation that these would be also be the types of "all-hazard" threats homeland security studies would need to address in the future.

Since that time, homeland security, as both an area of academic study and professional practice, has evolved considerably. Today, according to the University and Agency Partnership Initiative of the Center for

Homeland Defense and Security, there are more than 400 programs of study related to homeland security, from associate to doctoral degrees. There has been increased engagement between law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels to approach threats to public safety in new ways, to include the development of fusion centers and joint task forces. The federal government has increased the role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in confronting threats, both domestically and internationally. The Department of Defense, with the development of US Northern Command, has increased its homeland defense role to coordinate military support to other federal and state agencies to confront threats that are both naturogenic and anthropogenic. And, most recently, revelations about US intelligence agencies collecting data on US citizens have expanded the dialogue on the nature of terrorist threats, breaking down traditional barriers between domestic and foreign intelligence activities.

Furthermore, in the 10 years since publication of the first edition, there has been a sea change in domestic politics and international relations, which has shaken the foundations of states and societies globally. From the international economic crisis of 2008 and the Arab Spring of 2010 to the global emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, the world has become more, rather than less, dangerous. The former director of National Intelligence, James Clapper (2014), noted, "Looking back over my more than half a century in intelligence, I've not experienced a time when we've been beset by more crises and threats around the globe."

So, what's changed in the text? With 10 years having elapsed since the publication of the first edition, all the original chapters have been revised and in some cases completely rewritten. New chapters have been added to address threats to critical infrastructure, the role of intelligence in homeland security, and homeland security planning and resources. Each chapter also addresses the overall theme of the text in reassessing whether the all-hazards perspective should continue to guide homeland security studies from an academic viewpoint, as well as homeland security policy from a practitioner's viewpoint.

In Chapter 1, Richard J. Kilroy Jr. provides an historical overview of the development of national security policies and strategies based on the threats the United States has faced since its beginning. From its early foundations focused on isolationism and nonintervention to the evolution of geopolitics that moved the United States to becoming a global superpower during the Cold War, the nature of the threats to the country has influenced the high politics of security. In the previous edition, this chapter ended with a discussion of the new Global War on Terrorism, focused primarily on al-Qaeda. Since that time, the United States has withdrawn from Iraq, is drawing down in Afghanistan, and yet continues to face an expanding terrorist threat from new groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS). This chapter has been updated to reflect the changes in national security and homeland

security policies and strategy that occurred since the Obama administration came into office and changed the focus of national security away from fighting a Global War on Terrorism to focus on specific threats under the title of Overseas Contingency Operations, specifically using drone warfare to target terrorist leaders. It also touches on the early direction of the new Trump administration on national security in 2017.

In Chapter 2, Richard J. Kilroy Jr. explains the evolution from an "exclusive" view of homeland security, focused only on terrorist threats, to the "inclusive" view, which assessed all potential hazards as threats to the homeland. More recently there has been a some discussion about moving away from looking at homeland security from an all-hazards perspective, since it has tended to "water down" the threat of terrorism, as federal, state, and local agencies put every possible threat under the homeland security umbrella. From an emergency management perspective, local communities had to prepare for every possible contingency, which taxed resources and budgets. Federal homeland security funding began to dry up due to the budget crisis in 2008–2009. As a result, there was less of an all-hazards perspective to one of prioritizing the types of threats communities faced and to place their resources there. As a result, this chapter addresses these changes and the impact that moving away from an all-hazards perspective may have on the types of threats the United States faces today and in the future.

In Chapter 3, Chad S. Foster explores meanings and perspectives associated with homeland security. Questions addressed include: What are the historical traditions and prevailing theories associated with homeland security? What context is important for gaining an understanding of homeland security problems and approaches? What constitutes the homeland security enterprise, including the roles of federal, state, and local agencies? The revision to this chapter from the previous edition looks at the emergence of homeland security institutions and interests at all levels of government.

In Chapter 4, Alexander Siedschlag explores the all-hazards perspective to threat assessment, focused on management within the National Preparedness System. The chapter's focus was traditionally on prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery and the "disaster impact process," as well as risk and vulnerability assessments. In the revision to the chapter, Siedschlag focuses on threat assessments and how the United States assesses threats to national security, as well as homeland security. Understanding the threat assessment process is critical to influencing intelligence collection and also how federal, state, and local agencies can better allocate resources when focused on specific threats. Siedschlag explains how threat assessment aids the decision-making process and how it can be helpful in reducing costs to local communities by allowing first responders and emergency managers to focus on the mitigation, risk reduction, and preparedness programs their communities need most.

In Chapter 5, Steven Kuhr offers a new chapter focusing specifically on critical infrastructure protection. New technologies and the increased use of "systems of systems" approaches create new efficiencies and availability of basic services such as power generation, transportation, water, and communications. However, the very nature of these technical matrices and integration of systems create new vulnerabilities and risks to homeland security. The "Internet of things" is just one example of how technology is changing even the most mundane everyday functions of people and society. Kuhr explains that as critical infrastructures expand and become more connected, our dependency on the Internet and information systems to carry the codes, programs, and instructions to make it all work grows as well, increasing the need for communities to plan for disruptions to those systems, whether that comes from a naturogenic or anthropogenic threat.

In Chapter 6, Jonathan M. Acuff provides a discussion on state-sponsored terrorism, to include a historical perspective as well as definitions of terrorism, identifying terrorists, and acts of terrorism. He also looks at the role of states and international organizations (like the United Nations) to confront terrorism, further addressing the United States and its view of state sponsors of terrorism. In the revision to this chapter, he also discusses how states can use terrorism as a means to advance their foreign policies through the use of terrorist organizations in other countries (e.g., state sponsors) but also domestically to keep dissident groups in check and prevent a possible loss of power, as occurred in Turkey in 2016. Other examples provided in the chapter include the breakup of Syria and the rise of IS, as well as Russia's intervention in Ukraine and its support for separatist/terrorist movements in that country.

In Chapter 7, Joseph Fitsanakis builds on the previous chapter, focusing on the different types of terrorist groups or organizations that function as violent non-state actors. He describes the motivations, ideologies, identities, and other factors that have given rise to terrorist movements in the past, in the present, and possibly in the future. He also discusses the various tools, tactics, and techniques that terrorist groups have used throughout the ages. He further addresses efforts by states to counter terrorist threats and the different methods employed, such as suicide terrorism. When the last text was written, the focus was on al-Qaeda as a non-state violent actor and the various offshoots of this organization. Since then, IS has emerged as a significant terrorist threat, seeking to establish itself throughout the Middle East, as well as commit acts of terrorism in states outside the region.

In Chapter 8, Richard J. Kilroy Jr. explores the pervasiveness of the Internet and its impact on just about every aspect of one's personal and public life and the threats in cyberspace coming from a number of sources, to include criminals, terrorists, and even states. In the first edition of the text, this chapter focused specifically on cyber-terrorism and

cyber-warfare and addressed the US response to these types of threats provided by the government sector, to include the military. Since the first edition, there has been an exponential increase in the number and types of threats in cyberspace. Criminals, in particular, are growing in sophistication in their ability to hack into computer systems and steal personal and corporate information that threatens not only individuals but also national wealth and commerce. Revelations of China's growing cyber-warfare capability has also increased the threat of asymmetric warfare being waged in cyberspace, where a county's economic collapse would pre-stage a military attack (if even necessary). Kilroy provides a detailed look at the new dimension of threats in cyberspace with updated examples of recent cyber activity.

In Chapter 9, Christopher J. Ferrero describes the threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and radiological devices, and the potential terrorist targeting of critical infrastructure such as nuclear facilities and transportation hubs to achieve WMD-like effects. He covers the continuing threat of chemical weapons, as seen in the Syrian Civil War, and the increasing risk of biological weapons attacks by non-state actors who could use new do-it-yourself bioengineering tools to harm millions. He also addresses nuclear weapons, including the location and disposition of nuclear material and stockpiles, information on states' arms control commitments, and the terms of the Iran Nuclear Deal. He further provides information on how terrorist groups could create a WMD-like effect through the combination of nuclear or radiological substances with conventional explosives in what is known as a dirty bomb. The revised version of this chapter explores the concept of weapons of mass disruption, which suggests that terrorists can, through target analysis and selection, create a major crisis not by causing widespread death or physical destruction but by using these weapons and substances to contaminate or sabotage key infrastructure nodes, instill panic, and disrupt the flow of global commerce and public services.

In Chapter 10, Daniel Masters explores domestic terrorism in light of the new threat posed by both organized groups and individuals. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States by "lone-wolf" or self-radicalized individuals have further invigorated the debate. This significantly revised chapter not only addresses the threat posed by the different types of domestic terrorism but also expands that focus to look at the changing role of law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels to confront threats from domestic terrorism. Masters looks at the nexus between crime and terrorism as terrorist groups turn to crime to finance their operations, and criminal groups adopt terrorist tactics to spread violence and fear in order to dissuade governments from confronting them. Masters also explores the topic of mass shootings and the psychological impact these acts of hate can have as acts of terror.

In Chapter 11, Carmine Scavo focuses on how the information age, with the rise of the Internet and the media, has facilitated communication, leading both to better responses to natural disasters and to the spread of terrorist messages domestically and internationally. He explores the role of ideas and values in shaping culture and impacting societal responses to all hazards. These all serve as enablers of mass effects, meaning they can be used both by governments to increase the effectiveness of disaster response and by terrorist organizations for recruitment, fundraising, and support. In recent years, the rise of IS and the sophistication of its use of the Internet and social media, in particular, have presented a new challenge to states in countering terrorism and radical ideologies. Through these social networks, IS has been able to attract a large number of international fighters to its cause in Syria and Iraq. Since many of them hold passports and citizenship in Western countries, governments are concerned about what happens when these mercenaries return home. Scavo assesses the impact that the Internet and social media have had in contributing to the spreading of terrorist ideas and the radicalization of domestic terrorists.

In Chapter 12, Jonathan Smith adds a new chapter addressing the role of domestic intelligence in homeland security. Responding to the revelations about domestic intelligence collection on US citizens by the NSA, as a result of Edward Snowden's actions in 2013, Smith focuses on the relationship between intelligence collection and homeland security. The United States does not have a domestic intelligence organization, like the British MI-5. There was some discussion in 2002 that with the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), both the FBI and CIA be brought under the control of the new DHS; however, that was quickly dismissed due to the autonomy of these agencies and the different focus of each—one international and the other domestic. Yet, as Smith notes, that distinction has been based on the nature of the threats the nation faced with the CIA focused on external threats to national security, and the FBI focused on internal threats to homeland security (mostly being criminal threats). The nature of intelligence collection today and the use of new technologies and the Internet make those distinctions much more difficult, particularly with information technology. Smith also discusses the question that as the threats to homeland security evolve, should intelligence capabilities and resources as well? And if so, what are the threats to civil liberties and protections in democratic societies?

In Chapter 13, Stephan Reissman adds a new chapter focused on homeland security planning and resources. As a final chapter to the text, Reissman provides an important discussion on the future of homeland security, as both a function of government planning, resourcing, and direction and of educational programs that have emerged related to teaching about homeland security. In 2018, some might have thought that homeland security would no longer be in vogue, the Department of

Homeland Security would dissolve, and agencies, such as the US Coast Guard, would return to the Department of Transportation. Terrorism would no longer be the focus of US security policies abroad, and the focus at home would be to treat terrorism, as in much of the rest of the world, as criminal acts rather than national security threats. Yet, today, the world seems less secure, terrorism has not gone away, and the loss of personal freedoms and civil liberties continues to be debated. The growth in educational programs alone, related to teaching homeland security, is a testimony that reports of its death are premature.

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RJK, Jr.
Conway, SC

ABOUT THE COMPANION WEBSITE

This book is accompanied by a companion website:

www.wiley.com/go/Kilroy/Threats_to_Homeland_Security

The instructor's website includes PPT slides for all chapters of the book, solutions to the Self-Check questions at the end of each major section of each chapter, and solutions to the Summary Questions at the end of each chapter.

In the student's website, I would recommend just including the Self-Check question solutions and the Summary Question solutions. I have used texts that have too much information for students who then use the "school solutions" rather than doing their own analysis.

1

THE CHANGING NATURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Understanding the Nature of Threats to Homeland Security and the US Response

Richard J. Kilroy, Jr.
Department of Politics, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC, USA

Starting Point

Go to www.wiley.com/go/Kilroy/Threats_to_Homeland_Security to assess your knowledge of the basics of national security and homeland security. *Determine where you need to concentrate your effort.*

What You'll Learn in This Chapter

- The definitions of national security and homeland security
- The key players who formulate national and homeland security policy
- How changing international and domestic security environments affect national and homeland security policies
- The threats in a post-9/11 world that impact national security policy issues
- Contemporary challenges to national and homeland security

After Studying This Chapter, You'll Be Able To

- Analyze security environments and assess national and homeland security policy choices during specific historical periods
- Distinguish between national and homeland security policy players within government and outside government
- Appraise the threat situation in the post-9/11 security environment
- Examine US national and homeland security and policy as a response to the changing security environment and threat perceptions

Threats to Homeland Security: Reassessing the All-Hazards Perspective, Second Edition.
Edited by Richard J. Kilroy, Jr.

Companion website: www.wiley.com/go/Kilroy/Threats_to_Homeland_Security

INTRODUCTION

Within the disciplines of political science and international relations, the study of war and conflict has been traditionally included under the umbrella of international security since the primary threats to states have been viewed as other states. The rise of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or criminal gangs, has broadened the concept of threats to a nation's security to include both domestic and international dimension. For example, the United States, throughout the nation's history, has faced a variety of **threats or adversaries** (foreign and domestic) possessing both capability and intent to do the nation harm. To counter these threats, various policy choices emerged, each reflecting the nation's security interests at different periods of time. As a result, the nation's political leaders developed **national security** policies, which are those policies that served to protect the United States, its citizens, and its interests through the threatened and actual use of all elements of national power.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the United States changed from a nation with the seventeenth largest military in the world to one of two military superpowers. It was the leader of the free world against a physical and ideological threat in the Soviet Union and communism. This change was not preordained, however, as strong domestic political challenges also shaped foreign policy outcomes. Fifty years after the end of World War II, the United States again found itself in a new kind of security environment with both domestic and international security implications. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the nation was faced with the new threat of terrorism at home. This led to the development of **homeland security** policies, which emerged following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), to encompass the collective efforts of local, state, and federal agencies to keep the country safe, initially against terrorism, but later expanded to include an all-hazards perspective. Sixteen years later, the threats to homeland security have further evolved, and the United States faces a prolonged conflict against the particular threat of terrorism, domestically and internationally.

In this chapter, you will analyze security environments and assess national and homeland security policy choices during specific historical periods. You'll also learn to distinguish between the various national and homeland security policy players both within and outside government. Finally, you'll appraise the threat situation in the contemporary security environment, as well as examine US national and homeland security policy as a response to the changing security environment and threat perceptions.

1.1 Foundations of American Security Policy

When the nation's founders were crafting a new system of government based on a republic (vs. a monarchy), they struggled over the concept of security. How much power should be vested in the central government versus the state governments? Should the United States have a standing army or rely on the state militias alone for the nation's security? The **Federalist Papers** (authored by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay) argued the need for a central government strong enough to protect the nation against the threats it faced at the time while also protecting states' rights and individual liberties. As James Madison noted in

Federalist No. 41, "The means of security can only be regulated by the means and danger of attack… They will in fact be ever determined by these rules and no others" (Hamilton et al. 1961, 257).

Upon achieving its independence from Great Britain, the United States faced the possibility of British reinvasion, attacks by other European colonial powers in the region, and challenges to commerce. Its national security policy reflected George Washington's admonition in his Farewell Address to avoid entangling alliances with European powers, which would draw the United States into Europe's sectarian wars. Thus, for over a century and a half, **isolationism**, a foreign policy based on avoiding alliances with other countries, produced an American national security policy of limited military power, depending instead on the ocean boundaries, diplomacy, and commerce to keep the country safe.

Prior to its entrance into World War I, US security interests were primarily focused regionally rather than globally. An example of a security policy reflecting this regional focus was the **Monroe Doctrine** of 1823. Although the United States did not have the military power to back up such a policy, the Monroe Doctrine reflected the principle that the United States should support the desire of the new democratic nations of the Americas to break from their colonial past and exist as free nations, secure from overt European influence. This principle was tested throughout the nineteenth century by various European powers, such as the French occupation of Mexico and the continuing Spanish and British presence, primarily in the Caribbean region. With the US defeat of Spain in 1898, however, the United States displayed the capacity to live up to its principles.

Why did the United States enter these new domains? For most of America's early history, security meant maintaining territorial integrity, but it also involved protecting American trade overseas. As the United States grew economically, so did other countries, so American traders found themselves clashing more frequently with foreign interests over resources and markets. The clashes could be simply commercial competition, but violence could break out with local populations, with other commercial enterprises, or with governments. Trade was not only enriching the country but also redefining the government's duty to protect American citizens to include events that were increasing in both scope and frequency.

1.1.1 Geopolitics at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

The emergence of American military power (primarily sea power) at the beginning of the twentieth century expanded US national security interests in the Western Hemisphere and beyond. Whereas the original Monroe Doctrine was a statement of principle, the **Roosevelt Corollary** (Figure 1-1) to the Monroe Doctrine under President Theodore Roosevelt signaled a more aggressive US security policy to exert its **hegemony** over the Western Hemisphere. The ability of the United States to project military power to other regions further increased our nation's ability to leverage other elements of national power, including the use of diplomacy, economic power, and informational power. The threat of military force therefore broadened the expression of national security interests, leading to a more expansionist role for the United States. Broadening the context of national security further affected US foreign policy interests toward Europe and European affairs. Whereas in the past the United States was comfortable in its isolationist role, in the early 1900s,

Figure 1-1

The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere (Charles Green Bush, 1842–1909). Uncle Sam—"What Particular Country Threatens Us, Theodore?," March 12, 1905, *New York World*. Source: Reproduced with permission of MS Am 3056 (489) Houghton Library, Harvard University.

the changes in the geopolitical makeup of Europe were directly affecting America's security at home.

The causes for World War I were complex, reflecting imperial competition, the rise of industrial economies and military-industrial complexes, the decline of the aristocracy, and the rise of nationalism, anarchism, and communism. Powerful political ideas and movements swept across the European continent, creating conditions for conflict and war. Although Woodrow Wilson ran for reelection in 1916 on the campaign slogan "He kept us out of war," in 1917, he came to the realization that national security required the United States to join with the **Entente Powers** (mainly France, Russia, Britain, and Italy) against the **Central Powers** (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria). A German submarine's sinking of the ***Lusitania***, an American ship loaded with supplies for Britain, underscored America's inability to cut itself off from countries at war. As Wilson noted, "I made every effort to keep my country out of war, until it came to my conscience, as it came to yours, that after all it was our war a well as Europe's

war, that the ambition of these central empires was directed against nothing less than the liberty of the world" (Foley 1969, 12).

World War I revolutionized the geopolitical landscape of Europe as empires were dissolved and new nation-states emerged. Wilson pressured the European powers to accept his famous 14 points, which called for **collective security** based on concerted international response to aggression. This laid the foundation for the League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations (UN). In effect, Wilson redefined national security policy from one based on neutrality to one based on continuing international cooperation. The US Senate refused to ratify the resulting treaty, however, and America retreated back to a period of isolationism and avoidance of European affairs. In addition, partly because of American reluctance but also because of the difficulty of constraining major powers, the League of Nations ultimately failed.

Also after World War I, the United States used naval disarmament as a means to increase international security, without having to enter into a collective security arrangement. Navies allowed the projection of power at that time, so limiting naval power also limited military potential. Proposed as an alternative to the League of Nations, Republicans in the US Senate promoted the Washington Naval Conference (1921–1922), limiting the size and growth of the world's major naval powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, and Italy. The treaty, however, delayed rather than ended such arms races.

Later, in the 1930s, Congress engaged in another effort to promote isolationism by way of the **Neutrality Acts**, laws forbidding American support for or involvement with countries at war. Under these laws, the *Lusitania* might never have been sunk, as it could not have carried supplies to Britain or even entered British ports. As a security issue, the laws represented a major challenge to presidential power, as they restricted the flexibility the president enjoys as commander-in-chief and as the chief architect of US foreign policy.

Between wars, ocean barriers and relatively secure borders continued to provide security for the United States. Canada to the north was a proven ally, requiring a minimal security presence. To the south, however, Mexico was emerging from a bitter civil war and internal revolution. In fact, before the US entry into World War I, the Mexican revolutionary leader Pancho Villa staged a series of attacks into the United States, the most famous being the Columbus, New Mexico, raid of March 19, 1916. This led to the legendary General Pershing expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Villa, and it also included a mobilization of a number of National Guard units to the border to provide security. The expedition ended in 1917 with US entry into World War I and diplomatic efforts between the American and Mexican governments to avoid further conflict. By the end of World War I, the Mexican revolution had moved toward stabilization under a new regime, which would eventually emerge as Mexico's dominant political party for the next 70 years.

Immediately prior to the start of World War II, the United States began aggressively developing its air and naval capabilities, allowing it to be able to project power where and when necessary. The United States also expanded its military overseas presence in places like the Philippines, Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico, the Midway Islands, and the Hawaiian Islands. Set up as strategic coaling stations, naval bases at these locations provided the US forward presence in areas it deemed to have strategic interests. At the same time, Britain and France, still suffering "war

weariness," were attempting to pull back from some of their overseas commitments and colonial holdings, leaving power vacuums that were quickly filled by Japan, Italy, and Germany, the countries that would be known as the **Axis Powers** during World War II.

1.1.2 National Security and World War II

World War II began in 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, followed by declarations of war by Britain and France. The United States did not officially enter the conflict until 1941, following Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. By its end in 1945, World War II had inflicted over 62 million casualties from at least 50 countries. Major operational campaigns occurred in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, as well as throughout Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia, Asia, China, Africa, and the Middle East. British and German vessels even fought near the tip of South America. The sheer magnitude of the conflict impacted people and nations throughout the world such that security took on new meaning for different nations. For the United States, it meant that the nation would never again be able to return to an isolationist foreign policy and its national security would be directly linked to that of Europe, Asia, and other regions of the world.

From 1939 to 1941, the United States maintained its neutrality with regard to World War II, despite Winston Churchill's pleas for a formal alliance with Britain. America demonstrated this neutrality by avoiding direct conflict, preferring to support the Allies through other means. For example, Franklin Roosevelt's lend/lease program provided Britain with essential war materials to continue military operations against Germany, even though this policy contravened the Neutrality Acts. This security strategy further provided for **prepositioning** or establishing bases and supplies in foreign countries to prepare a rapid response to future crises, anticipating the time when the United States would eventually join the conflict. For Roosevelt, the United States was the "arsenal of democracy," and it was only a matter of time before the United States would become directly involved in another land war in Europe, given the expanding German threat. However, domestic public opinion was mixed, as was that of Congress, given the large numbers of German and Italian immigrants in the United States. In fact, until the attack on Pearl Harbor, 64% of the American public still thought peace was possible without US intervention. Some revisionist historians argue that knowing this, Roosevelt provoked a Japanese attack to force Congress to declare war against Japan and the Axis powers (e.g., see Williams 1978). According to this argument, Roosevelt could then support Winston Churchill's "Germany first" strategy to save Europe before opposing the Japanese in Asia. These views are clearly in the minority, however, as most recognized military historians clearly place the blame on Japan for its preemptive strike on the US Pacific fleet in order to reduce resistance to Japan's imperial strategy to conquer Southeast Asia. Roosevelt and his top military advisor, General George C. Marshall, both supported the "Germany first" war plans, recognizing the immediate need for American military intervention in the European theater of operations. Roosevelt, exercising his prerogative as commander-in-chief, set the nation's strategic policies, ordering the military to begin combat operations in North Africa rather than plan for a direct attack on France. Codenamed Operation Torch, this campaign began in November 1942, signaling the beginning of American offensive efforts in the war (Brower 2002).

During World War II, Roosevelt and his successor Harry Truman left the operational wartime decision making to their military commanders. In the European theater, General Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded US and Allied military forces in North Africa, the Italian peninsula campaigns, and the crossing of the English Channel on D-Day (June 6, 1944) and forward to Berlin. Eisenhower, as the Supreme Allied Commander, determined security policy during the war in Europe, as did General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz in the Pacific. The Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was the President's principal military advisor at the time. He did not command forces, nor did he set operational policy decisions. Rather, the president and the Secretaries of War and the Navy set strategic security policies, which the military leaders then executed. Only later, during Korean War in the 1950s, when MacArthur challenged Truman's authority by questioning his strategic policies, did the president exercise his role as commander-in-chief to remove MacArthur from command.

US national security policy during World War II was, first and foremost, the defeat of the Axis powers, Germany and Italy first and then Japan. America applied all elements of its national power to that end. Even domestic politics took a backseat to foreign policy, as every American accepted the sacrifices required of a nation at war, to include certain deprivations of goods and services in support of the war effort. The largest domestic economic impact was the retooling of the industrial base from a consumer-based economy to a war-based economy, as America leveraged its economic and military power to achieve its national security objectives. The American public responded by investing in their country (buying war bonds), working in the factories (women joined assembly lines in record numbers), and collecting salvageable materials (children led collection efforts for scrap iron, rubber, and other items). During World War II, whether they were fighting the war in Europe, the Pacific, or the home front, most Americans felt they were directly contributing to the security goal of defeating their enemies. However, some groups, such as Japanese Americans, were not allowed to help due to fears over their true sense of loyalty to America versus Japan, and thus they were subjected to isolation in special camps during the war.

FOR EXAMPLE

Japanese Internment Camps

During World War II, the US government took the action of interring Japanese Americans from the West Coast in War Relocation Centers located away from the coastal areas in the west. Over 120 000 men, women, and children were sent to the centers. Over two-thirds of them were US citizens. President Roosevelt justified the action based on the threat of Japanese spies operating in those communities. The Supreme Court (*Korematsu v. United States* 1944) upheld Roosevelt's actions, stating that ethnic groups could be interned during a state of war because "[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions" (PBS n.d.) What is not as well known is that smaller groups of Italians and Germans living in the United States were also interred during the war, classified as "enemy aliens" (Siasoco and Ross 2006).

World War II ended in 1945 with the surrender of Germany, followed by Japan's surrender after the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The decision to use nuclear weapons for the first time was made by President Truman, knowing that short of a US invasion of the Japanese mainland, the war in the Pacific could drag out for years. Rather than accept the larger loss of American and Japanese lives from such a protracted conflict, Truman's use of this new technology was as much psychological as it was physical. Due to the magnitude of the destruction caused by nuclear weapons, the world was about to enter a new stage of both security and insecurity, as other nations sought to come under the nuclear umbrella and avoid conflict for fear it would escalate into global nuclear warfare.

SELF-CHECK

- Define national security.
- Which of the following was not one of the Central Powers during World War I?
  a. Germany
  b. Austria-Hungary
  c. Russia
  d. Bulgaria
- Italy was not one of the Axis Powers during World War II. True or false?
- The League of Nations would have replaced a collective security policy with one based on neutrality. True or false?

1.2 Security in the Cold War Era

At the end of World War II, the United States emerged as the strongest military and economic power in the world by virtue of having avoided the direct impact of the war, with the exception of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Most of Europe lay in ruins, however, as did much of Japan. Working with Great Britain and other countries, the United States created the **United Nations (UN)** and, through the **Bretton Woods Agreements**, key economic institutions that were intended to promote political and economic stability throughout the international system, including Europe and Japan. Believing the causes of World War II lay in political, economic, and social instability created by World War I, planners in 1945 sought to prevent the recurrence of those conditions.

Despite agreements made at Yalta between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, the Soviets moved quickly to fill the geopolitical vacuum of German defeat by occupying those countries they "liberated" during the war. The United States countered the Soviets by seeking to restore a balance of power to Europe through the combination of a continued US military presence in the region, as well as a large amount of direct economic aid to rebuild Europe. Conceived by US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the **Marshall Plan** provided funds supplied by the United

States to help rebuild non-Communist countries after World War II. The Plan provided means for West Germany, in particular, to recover from the devastation of World War II and emerge later as an ally in the Cold War.

Initially, President Truman assumed that Stalin, like most political leaders, was a pragmatist and that Soviet security policy would be motivated by a quid pro quo. Truman expected that Stalin would be willing to negotiate (horse trading, as Truman called it), assuming that Soviet behavior could be modified. However, George Kennan, a US government official stationed in Moscow, published works explaining the source of Soviet behavior toward the West and challenging Truman's perception. Kennan argued that the Soviets were not willing to work with the United States and other Western nations to share power. Rather, the Soviet goal was to destroy the West, and the only rational US security policy was one that stood up to Soviet aggression, willing to match force with force if necessary (History Guide n.d.). Whether it liked it or not, America would take on a leadership role in setting the international security agenda, as well as committing the resources necessary to serve as global guarantor of a new world order. Thus began the period that would come to be known as the Cold War.

FOR EXAMPLE

Mr X and Containment

George F. Kennan was a US Department of State official who was convinced that the Soviets viewed accommodation with the United States and other Western powers as a weakness and contradictory to their goal of expanding international communism. Kennan sought to communicate his views about the true nature of Soviet ambitions through what became known as his "long telegram" back to the State Department. In this official document, Kennan laid out the reasons why the United States needed to take a hard-line strategy toward Moscow and Soviet expansionism.

This official document become public in 1947, when it was published in an article titled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in *Foreign Affairs*. The author was called "Mr X," but experts knew it to be the work of George Kennan. In this article, Kennan explained the motivations behind Soviet behavior in foreign affairs. He argued that the Soviet state was totalitarian in its political structures as well as its ruling ideology, communism. Kennan believed communism to be antithetical to the West and a direct challenge to our nation's democratic principles, free-market capitalist economy, and cultural and spiritual beliefs. He warned that the United States should not regard the Soviets as partners in managing international security, but rather as competitors, always seeking an advantage on the world stage. As Kennan stated, "In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." The key word **containment** signified the principal national security policy pursued during the Cold War to prevent the spread of communism and Soviet influence throughout the world (History Guide n.d.).

1.2.1 Bipolarity Versus Multipolarity

Prior to World War II, the international security environment could be characterized as a **multipolar system**, a relationship among countries in the international system where no country dominated, with a number of nation-states (primarily European) possessing military power and capable of acting independently. Hans Morgenthau (1948) popularized the use of the term **balance of power**, where no one state had a monopoly of power and nations sought to maximize security either through alliances to compensate for weaknesses or through unilateral means when they perceived it be in their national interest to do so. Morgenthau believed that a multipolar system allowed for greater flexibility for nations, who could change alliances as necessary to maximize their power and security.

After World War II, the old vestiges of the European balance of power, based on a multipolar system, disappeared, as two new spheres of military power and influence emerged: the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Since both powers emerged as victors after World War II, each sought to consolidate its influence over parts of Europe, as well as former European colonial interests. The new security environment that developed was therefore characterized as a **bipolar system**, with other nation-states tending to align themselves with either the United States or the USSR. Those supporting the United States were primarily Western European nations, while Eastern European countries came under the influence of the USSR, mostly by force. Those in the US camp came to be called the First World or Free World nations, while those in the USSR camp came to be called the Second World or Communist bloc states.

George Kennan's notion of containment was a national security strategy for handling the bipolar system. Other possible strategies ranged from returning to isolation to initiating total war, where all national resources would be employed to destroy the Soviets. Containing Soviet expansion would be a long-term policy and would be very expensive, but it seemed the best way of pressuring the Soviets while minimizing costs at home. The array of threats included conventional and nuclear war in Europe, direct attacks with nuclear weapons on the United States and the USSR, proxy wars where the two major powers supported competing sides in wars of national liberation, and also espionage and subversion in the two countries.

To manage this bewildering array of threats, Congress passed the **National Security Act of 1947**. This act turned the Army Air Corps into the US Air Force and merged the War Department and Navy Department, creating the Department of Defense. The act also created a civilian organization, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to manage overseas intelligence gathering and conduct **clandestine and covert operations** against foreign governments. The Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received responsibility for domestic counterintelligence. Several influences drove the effort: the new Soviet threat, the intelligence failure that had permitted the attack on Pearl Harbor, and concerns about Communist groups operating inside the United States. Finally, some argue that the act was created to reduce turf wars between the Army and Navy.

The primary international security structures that emerged after World War II reflected the interests of these two power blocs representing the bipolar system. To counter the overwhelming conventional military force buildup by the Soviets in Eastern Europe, the United States led the development of the **North Atlantic**

Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. This collective defense organization was established as a political and military alliance, with each member nation pledging that an attack on any one of them would be regarded as an attack against all and bring the collective response of all member nations. The original 12 members of NATO were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Between 1949 and the end of the Cold War in 1991, four other nations were also admitted to NATO: Greece, Turkey, West Germany, and Spain. These 16 nations, led by the United States, comprised the "West" and its military response to the "East," which was led by the USSR. In response to the formation of NATO, the Soviets sought to counter the collective military powers of the West by forming the **Warsaw Pact** in 1955, composed of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union (Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2

The European context of the Cold War. Source: Adapted from Rumer (2016).

Besides NATO and the Warsaw Pact, other regional security alliances also formed during the Cold War, including the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and Organization of American States (OAS). Other Communist countries, such as Cuba, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), were also considered to be in the Soviet sphere of influence, but they did not enter into formal alliances such as occurred with those nations under the US sphere of influence. Most Third World countries were faced with a stark choice of association with one or the other superpower, dividing most of the world into two competing camps.

This change from multipolarity to bipolarity was a significant shift in the way international politics worked. The balance of power system described by Morgenthau, where countries would make alliances in order to prevent any one country from gaining too much power, had broken down during World War I. Woodrow Wilson's idea of collective security would have had every country unite against aggression, replacing the balance of power system. Without this system, however, bipolarity arose in the absence of multipolarity. Bipolarity was based on two competing groups of countries, or "blocs." Competition became what the Soviets called managing the **correlation of forces**, a measure of comparative military power of member nations (see Table 1-1), where the two blocs were locked in combat like two wrestlers grappling for an advantage over each other. Over time, some countries might move from one bloc to the other, changing relative power, until one side had a clear advantage. Throughout this period of Cold War competition, the United States and USSR spent lavishly on weapons and political influence to ensure their own success.

Eventually, the bipolar system broke down, not from the direct tensions between the superpowers, but from the internal fragmentation of the two power blocs. The most important changes emerged in the 1960s, when France left NATO and the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) quarreled with the Soviets. In the latter instance, the two nations fought a low-level border war in the early 1970s. President Nixon visited the PRC around that time, and the resulting relationships moved closer to the shifting patterns of the earlier multipolar system.

1.2.2 Containing Communism

During the Cold War era, Kennan's view of the Soviet Union was essentially correct, but managing the threats posed by the USSR proved difficult. This section examines the different threats mentioned previously and subsequent responses. Keep in mind that the choices were highly politicized, reflecting concerns about the desirability of peace and war and also how best to allocate defense dollars.

1.2.2.1 Conventional and Nuclear War in Europe

When tensions with the Soviets began, defense planners presumed that war would be fought in Germany and surrounding areas. Some planners wanted American forces to be limited, acting as a trigger for nuclear war, while others wanted NATO forces to be adequate for defeating a Soviet invasion. Compromises led to forward-basing substantial amounts of supplies, along with over one million American personnel. Included in this force was a substantial collection of short- and medium-range

Table 1-1: Approximations of NATO versus Warsaw Pact Military Power—Contrasting Views

	Warsaw Pact count	*NATO count*
Tanks		
Warsaw Pact	59 000	52 000
NATO	31 000	16 000
Armored personnel carriers		
Warsaw Pact	70 000	55 000
NATO	47 000	23 000
Artillery systems		
Warsaw Pact	72 000	43 000
NATO	57 000	14 000
Combat aircraft		
Warsaw Pact	7 900	8 200
NATO	7 100	4 000
Helicopters		
Warsaw Pact	2 800	3 700
NATO	5 300	2 400
Ground forces		
Warsaw Pact	3 600 000	3 100 000
NATO	3 700 000	2 200 000

Source: Department of Defense (1989).

nuclear weapons, and the order of battle was reorganized for fighting on a nuclear battlefield.

An important part of planning for national security was that if America should be fighting a war in Europe, it might be seen by other opponents as an opportunity to attack elsewhere. Just as World War II was fought in several theaters simultaneously, America needed to prepare for similar conditions in the future.

Some of these forces remain in Europe today, available for assignment elsewhere. Their numbers were drawn down over time, and their equipment and munitions were redirected for conflicts elsewhere, including Vietnam and Iraq. In one of the last major threats of the Cold War, the Soviets began basing intermediate-range (1000 miles) missiles in the early 1980s. American intentions to counter with similar missiles produced a treaty to eliminate these weapons from Europe. This part of the Cold War was finally winding down.

1.2.2.2 Nuclear Threats to the United States and USSR

In 1945, the United States was the only country with nuclear weapons, but Soviet spies managed to steal the technology. Thus, by the middle of the 1950s, both countries had hydrogen bombs, also known as thermonuclear weapons. The only long-range delivery platforms, though, were bomber aircraft. Suddenly, however, in 1957, the Soviets orbited a satellite, Sputnik, meaning that they had missile technology that would allow an attack on the United States without the use of airplanes. The United States thus developed a nuclear triad, composed of long-range strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarines, all of which were capable of delivering nuclear warheads. The US nuclear strategy leveraged technology, increasing its nuclear weapons capability with improved accuracy in striking targets (referred to as the **circular error probability (CEP)**) and also the use of **multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)**, which allowed missiles to have more than one warhead. The Soviets relied more on "throw weight," using a brute force strategy—in other words, the more warheads the better, with accuracy not being as important.

Throughout the Cold War, there was always concern on both sides over how accurate each nation's intelligence assessments were with regard to actual nuclear weapons counts and capabilities. As a result, on two occasions, the two **superpowers**, the United States and USSR, came close to actual nuclear war. In the first instance, during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the Soviets tried to base short-range missiles in Cuba. For many years, it was thought that the United States had forced the Soviets to back down. It was later discovered that the crisis was resolved by a quid pro quo of American missiles being removed from Turkey. The second occasion was during the Arab–Israeli War of 1973.

It's important to note that the possibility of nuclear war was the first major direct threat to the continental United States in decades. Further, it augmented the civil defense planning at home that began during World War II, which required the creation of shelters and food stocks for emergencies. Further, the arms race and consequent intelligence-gathering efforts produced dramatic technological advances, changing perceptions about war and war fighting by adding satellite imagery, computer analysis, and advanced communications to the mix.

The possibility of nuclear war, however, was a divisive issue for many people. Americans became divided over whether the country's leaders could, in good conscience, use such weapons, and they pressed for actions through the United Nations (UN) instead of relying on domestic politics. Others argued with equal fervor that as long as other nations had such weapons, the United States must have them as well. Such fears among the five countries that had nuclear weapons in the 1960s produced treaties to limit **proliferation**, or the supplying of other countries with the technology to build their own nuclear weapons. Eventually, using a policy called **détente** (a relaxation of tensions), the Nixon administration in the 1970s began negotiating treaties that would slow the arms race and subsequent administrations would negotiate actual reductions in nuclear weapons. President Reagan in the 1980s achieved great success in negotiation through a two-track approach. On one side, he negotiated aggressively, calling for dramatic reductions in stockpiles of nuclear weapons. On the other, he pressed for advanced technology,

including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Also known as Star Wars, the SDI relied on the use of ground- and space-based systems to protect the United States from attack by nuclear missiles. In light of these actions, the Soviets could either negotiate or face economic failure by trying to keep up with American efforts.

1.2.2.3 Proxy Wars

The United States and the Soviet Union never actually fought each other during the 45 years of the Cold War. Military advisors, money, and equipment were delivered far and wide, however. For instance, the Soviets and the Peoples' Republic of China supported North Korea's invasion of South Korea, and Cuban advisors operated in Angola and Central and South America. For a time, Americans were in Ethiopia and Russians were in Somalia, until civil wars in those countries caused the two to switch sides. The last major anti-communist operation was in the island of Grenada in 1983, which was being used as a staging area for supplies for insurgents in the Western Hemisphere.

During the Cold War era, the largest commitment of American forces was in Vietnam, where the conflict dragged on for over 10 years, from the Kennedy administration into the second Nixon administration. Eventually, domestic opposition forced American withdrawal. The Soviets ran into similar problems in the late 1970s when they invaded Afghanistan, encouraging the rise of radical Islamic groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, a contributing factor was the money spent on such foreign adventures. Such proxy wars also had profound effects on US domestic politics, forcing the end of the draft and the move to an all-volunteer military and additionally contributing to reluctance among some Americans to engage in overseas operations. Despite this tendency, both Republican and Democratic presidents continued to commit troops overseas.

The proxy wars added a new layer of responsibility for military planners. Not only did they need to plan for conventional and nuclear wars, but they were also required to create doctrine to manage low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and circumstances calling for rapid troop deployments. The Green Berets, for example, were created not simply to fight an unconventional war, but to organize local populations against a common enemy.

1.2.2.4 Espionage and Subversion during the Cold War

The Cold War created difficult times for managing domestic security, as political and normative goals clashed with the needs of security. The Soviet Union operated an active program of spying and subversion in the United States, and the FBI replied with an intense counterespionage program. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Alger Hiss and other government officials were convicted of spying for the Soviets. Senator Joseph McCarthy held hearings to investigate how Soviet spies were able to penetrate so deeply into government during the 1950s, and he also pursued subversives in the media and government. Eventually, important political actors concluded that McCarthy was going too far and was ignoring constitutionally guaranteed rights for the accused, and they forced McCarthy to back down. This debate between individual rights and national security remains a hotly contested topic to this day.

As the Cold War continued, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were joined by additional specialized agencies, such as the National Security Agency,

which monitors radio and other communications. During the 1960s, these agencies had a fairly free hand in pursuing intelligence problems. In the 1970s, however, Congress set up the Church Commission to draw up rules restraining the intelligence community. According to this commission, clandestine and covert operations would require written presidential approval in the future. Although some people use these terms interchangeably, clandestine operations are secret efforts to gather information, while covert operations are intended to influence how governments behave. Covert operations would include bribes, subversion and psychological operations, and support for insurgent forces, with the intent not to reveal the source of the operation.

Finally, while the United States was dealing with spies, Europe was struggling with bands of terrorists, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Brigades, operating independently of the Soviet Union. The Weathermen, Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), Black Panthers, and other extremist groups began plotting terrorist activities in the United States as well. Cooperation between American and European intelligence and police forces became a critical effort for addressing these threats.

1.2.3 Non-Communist Threats

International communism presented the greatest, but by no means the only, threat to the United States during the Cold War. The US government preferred, however, to focus on the major threat, hoping that the others would remain minor problems. Nonetheless, wars of national liberation and revolutions in the developing world drew resources away from the main problem, as did frequent conflicts about religion and territory in the Middle East. Conflicts between Arabs and Israelis broke out four times between 1948 and 1973; these conflicts were as much about who controlled Palestine as what religion should be followed. The Carter administration withdrew support for the Shah of Iran in 1978, a move that resulted in Iran being taken over by religious extremists. A group of students seized the US Embassy in that country late in 1979, creating the famous Iran hostage crisis. American efforts at negotiation and at rescue failed, though the hostages were released at the beginning of the Reagan administration. These problems caused the government to again rethink how to manage special operations and rapid deployment.

During the 1980s, efforts at projecting power met with mixed success. American intervention in Lebanon failed after the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. A terrorist attack on a nightclub in Berlin in 1986 was found to have been planned by Libya; President Reagan retaliated by bombing many targets in Libya (called Operation El Dorado Canyon), eliminating Libya's military potential (but not its support for terrorism) for years to come. These and other attacks reflected state-sponsored terrorism (see Chapter 6), where governments encouraged extremists. An increasing problem, however, was the radical Islamists, consisting of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Wahhabists in Saudi Arabia, both of which were factions from the majority Sunni sect of Islam, as well as the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, who are part of the Shiite minority. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda come from the Wahhabist movement. They supported efforts to drive Western influences from the Middle East and to replace existing Middle Eastern governments with newer, more radical ones.

Two points are important here. First, although many problems occurred in the Middle East during this time, they were not specifically problems with Islam.

Second, while the cases listed here involved conflict, there were also extensive efforts to encourage peaceful resolution to problems. For example, the Camp David Accords of 1979 settled conflict between Israel and Egypt and established a long-term relationship between the United States and Egypt. Although problems with groups and governments in the Middle East were present, those groups and governments did not represent a monolithic threat. However, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and the subsequent rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini, did usher in a new era of state sponsorship of terrorism, with the rise of Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and other groups espousing radical Islamic ideologies that have both regional and global impact today.

SELF-CHECK

- Define balance of power.
- The principal national security policy pursued during the Cold War was called:
  a. Containment
  b. Isolationism
  c. Expansionism
  d. Unilateralism
- Covert operations seek to cover their sources. True or false?
- Terrorism is a product only of religious extremism. True or false?

1.3 Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Pre-9/11

The government of the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 when a coup by communist hard-liners failed. The Soviet economic relationship with Eastern Europe had already been abandoned, and the leader of the new democratic government, Boris Yeltsin, moved quickly to turn the old USSR into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), relieving the Russian Republic of responsibility for governing the Ukraine, Belarus, and other parts of the federal (Soviet) union. The Cold War was over, and for a brief moment, some scholars argued that the world had become a **unipolar system** characterized by one superpower—in this case, the United States.

This milestone in history complicated, rather than reduced, the national security debate. Some people foresaw an end to conflict and a "peace dividend" from the reduced need for major weapons systems and a large standing army. Americans could come home. Others argued that the UN would take on a greater role in sustaining world peace, and it would need American and NATO support. Some of these people suggested that NATO's mission, the defense of Europe, should be redefined to engage in worldwide humanitarian assistance. Still others argued that economic globalization would bind together the commercial interests of the entire

world, so that the United States would still be heavily involved in world affairs, but not as a military power.

1.3.1 Changing Threats

During the 1990s, most of the old threats from superpower tensions were dramatically reduced or eliminated. New regional organizations had been established to settle conventional disputes in Europe, and NATO was negotiating with former Soviet bloc countries about joining the organization. The United States and the Soviet Union had signed agreements that dramatically reduced their nuclear arsenals. The proxy wars were now simply local and regional conflicts rather than extensions of Soviet and American policy. Espionage remained an issue, but it was the Peoples' Republic of China, rather than the Russia, that was to attract the most frequent complaints.

Non-Communist threats remained, however, and were growing in scope. A number of minor powers sought **weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)**, which included **chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons**. Such weapons would give them an advantage in regional power struggles and could possibly deter the United States and other powers from threatening them. The availability of these weapons could also make terrorist groups more dangerous, so monitoring was enhanced. In 1998, for example, India and Pakistan both tested nuclear devices, attracting severe criticism from the rest of the world. Likewise, intelligence gathered by several countries indicated that during the 1990s, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were producing an array of WMDs as well as developing missiles to carry them.

During this period, the intelligence community suffered from certain organizational shortcomings that undermined broad cooperation, so it was fortunate that terrorist groups were unable to acquire WMDs. However, terrorist attacks using conventional explosives and methods on the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks on American embassies in Tanzania and in Kenya in 1998, the Khobar Towers apartment complex bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 were indications of a growing terrorist threat. An attack by homegrown terrorists on a federal office building in Oklahoma and the use of poison gas on the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo both in 1995 further indicated that it was not just Islam that was the source of extremist threats.

1.3.2 New Conflicts, New Responses

There were many competing perceptions of the proper foundations for American national security planning during the post-Cold War, pre-9/11 era. These included joint efforts with the UN and other international organizations, a general reduction of American involvement overseas, and ad hoc coalitions to address specific problems. In choosing a national security strategy, the US government needed to consider domestic concerns, the interests of its allies, and the perspectives of its opponents. Thus, security planners needed to consider how a given action might affect voters in Illinois, government officials in Beijing and London, Muslims in Cairo, dictators in Iraq, and insurgents in Colombia. The end of the Cold War made these opinions loom in importance, as the Soviet threat had previously provided an excuse for setting many of these issues aside.

The first test of this new security situation occurred in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Through the UN Security Council, President George H. W. Bush organized an international coalition to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. This intervention became only the second instance of the UN using its enforcement powers against an aggressor, the first having been the response to North Korea in the 1950s.

From this point onward, the performance of international coalitions became more erratic. In 1992, American forces joined a UN effort to provide emergency food relief in Somalia. In 1994, a civil war in Rwanda turned into genocide, or widespread politically motivated murder, but the United States refused to become involved in or to push for UN intervention in what it thought to be no more than a domestic conflict. Despite increasing evidence of genocide, which would eventually leave over 800 000 people dead, governments and key UN officials including Secretary General Kofi Annan sided with the US position. Stung by criticisms of this inaction, in 1995, the United States participated in a UN intervention to stop violence in the breakaway Republic of Bosnia, where Muslims and ethnic Croatians fought Bosnian Serbs who were being supported by the army of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia). American efforts produced the Dayton Accords, a compromise between competing sides that at least stabilized circumstances. Interventions in a political crisis in Haiti in 1995 and against ethnic cleansing in the Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999 were added to the array of interventions. The last began as a UN response to the crisis, but it eventually became a NATO operation.

FOR EXAMPLE

US Intervention in Somalia

As a result of civil war in the early 1990s, over 350 000 Somalis died and over 1.5 million faced starvation. In December 1992, at the end of his administration, President George H. W. Bush committed 28 000 US military forces to the humanitarian mission to "stop the dying" in Somalia by aiding in relief efforts. However, as a result of the security environment in the country and attacks by armed militia groups, which impeded the mission, the US military took more offensive actions against Somali warlords by attempting to disarm them and capture key leaders, such as Mohamed Farrah Aidid.

In one military operation, made famous by the book (Bowden 1999) and movie *Black Hawk Down*, US military forces were caught in a firefight with the Somalia militias, resulting in the deaths of 18 US Rangers and other Special Operations Forces flying support missions. French television crews showed one dead US Ranger being dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu. The impact of those images on the American public eventually caused the Clinton administration to pull US military forces out of Somalia and turn over the mission to a United Nations force. It also contributed to the reluctance of the United States to respond with a military intervention to the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994.

On a positive note, some problems were dramatically reduced during this time. The United States negotiated a trade deal with Mexico, and Canada called the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Other Central and South American countries began promoting free trade and democratic government as well. Countries were adopting American practices to promote mutually beneficial exchange and general prosperity. Instead of shipping weapons, countries were shipping automobile components. While drug trafficking and internal violence remained problems in some countries, the future in the Americas looked promising.

1.3.3 Reorganization of National Security Policy

The reorganization of American national security policy that took place during the 1990s actually began in the closing days of the Cold War. Many important changes sprang from the legal reviews required by the Senate Church Commission and also from the **Defense Reorganization Act of 1986**, also known as the Goldwater–Nichols Act after its two congressional sponsors. The earlier **National Security Act of 1947** had not ended the political competition between the branches of the military, which became evident during the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran in 1980 as well as military operations against Grenada in 1983. The Defense Reorganization Act required systematic joint planning efforts, including a Joint Strategic Planning System, to augment existing defense planning and contingency planning programs. It also required a quadrennial defense review process and eventually led to the establishment of the US Special Operations Command.

A more important change was the requirement for the administration to produce a National Security Strategy (NSS) that would describe strategic concerns in order to reconcile planning for current and future threats. When the Cold War ended, Congress wanted to know what threats remained and what the priorities were. The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations provided these documents every other year on average. The 1997 NSS gave a good sense of the transformation in how the nation's leaders perceived security, with a strong focus on the need for interagency integration (e.g., between the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency) to combat problems like terrorism, drug trafficking, and international organized crime. Thus, the NSS discussed the importance of **non-state actors**, or people or organizations that exercise political influence, either domestically or internationally, even though they do not represent sovereign governments. Promoting democracy, trade, arms control, and the information infrastructure were seen as essential for sustaining peace and stability in the world at large. The security provided by tanks and missiles in the past had become part of a much broader security effort.

Finally, during this period, the government began to move away from security planning based on world war-level thinking. A commission was set up to study which military facilities were still needed, withdrawing resources from communities throughout the country. The usefulness of new weapon and support systems also came under scrutiny. These matters became political footballs: the B-2 bomber looked too expensive, but then it was noted that parts were manufactured in over 400 congressional districts. The Marine Corps' Osprey aircraft was cancelled repeatedly as a technical failure, only to be resurrected by Congress. As these examples show, many of the players involved in security planning may have had different concerns at heart when policy was created.

SELF-CHECK

- Define unipolar system.
- Which of the following terrorist incidents against US interests did not occur between 1990 and 2000?
  a. Khobar Towers bombing
  b. First World Trade Center bombing
  c. US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania
  d. Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon
- Al-Qaeda is an example of a non-state actor. True or false?
- Crimes against humanity always result in US intervention. True or false?

1.4 National Security and Terrorism: Post-9/11

On 9/11, terrorists seized control of passenger aircraft and flew two of them into the two towers of the World Trade Center and a third into the Pentagon. A fourth aircraft crashed in rural southern Pennsylvania as passengers fought to overwhelm the hijackers. Close to three thousand people died in the attacks, making 9/11 the worst loss of life in a single day in the United States since the Battle of Antietam in 1862 (Civil War Trust n.d.). For a brief time, most Americans as well as people from other countries were unified by the horror of the attack. How had it happened? Who was responsible? What should be done to prevent similar attacks in the future? The warnings of many specialists in terrorism had come to pass, and Americans needed to rethink national security yet again.

The "how had it happened?" component of the 9/11 attacks proved straightforward. A group of well-financed terrorists had come to America, taken some flying lessons, then, at an agreed-upon time, boarded aircraft and seized control. The terrorists were identified with a loose association of Muslim extremists called al-Qaeda. Operating under the direction of Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian, al-Qaeda's stated goal was to restore the purity of Islam. This goal required at the very least driving Americans out of the Middle East and then overthrowing governments sympathetic to the West in the region. To this end, it was believed that al-Qaeda was responsible for many terrorist incidents in the 1990s as well.

Intelligence community analyses from the 1990s indicated that al-Qaeda had substantial financial resources and enjoyed support from several countries. Muslim fundamentalists called the Taliban had seized power in Afghanistan and were providing a safe haven for al-Qaeda. Iraq, though it was under UN sanctions, was sponsoring terror attacks in Israel and was also believed to be linked to al-Qaeda. Thus, terrorism reflected more than one group of people, and it presented a variety of targets and dangers.

Other chapters in this book present distinctions among these threats as well as specific responses. The remainder of this chapter, however, discusses some key

considerations regarding understanding threats in the context of national and homeland security and preparing responses to those threats that will be presented in greater detail later.

1.4.1 Globalization and Geopolitics

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, **globalization**, the increasing economic and social interdependence among countries, created many opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange. Many argued that this change would increase stability and peace in the world through the development of complex interdependencies. Yet, interdependence also creates vulnerabilities, opening countries to short- and long-term risks. For example, if a country has a civil war, any investments from outside may be lost. Further, each country has its own form of government and its own interests. Will interdependence bind a potential adversary to peaceful behavior, or just make it stronger and create more damage when it turns on us? Scholars differ significantly on this question. One issue that they do agree on is that globalization can present a challenge to cultural integrity and national identity, creating a backlash. Terrorism by radical Islamists and other forms of extremism represent this backlash. Finding an appropriate response becomes a matter of building a coalition among seemingly competing views.

First, let's consider the threats. Terrorism problems are part of a much larger set of challenges that the United States faces, reflecting the "preventing similar attacks" issue. As trade and other forms of international cooperation increase, the importance of specific circumstances also grows. In addition, given the interconnectedness of global economies, trade, politics, and security issues, the ability of a non-state actor to use **asymmetric warfare**, or non-conventional warfare tactics and techniques

FOR EXAMPLE

Asymmetric Warfare Isn't New

Asymmetric warfare includes the use of terrorism and could involve the use of various WMDs (or technologies capable of producing a WMD effect). Yet, as Thomas Barnett (2005) and others have argued, asymmetric warfare is not completely new. These tactics and techniques have existed for millennia—remember the Trojan horse? For the most part, they reflect Eastern rather than Western military thought. What has changed, though, is the belief that we are now entering into a new historical phase of conflict, called fourth-generation warfare (Hammes 2004), in which **asymmetrical warfare** can be understood as "evolved irregular warfare" with a new emphasis on factors other than military power, such as moral force and sociological factors.

Terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda and now IS, apply asymmetrical tactics when they use non-conventional means to attack Western interests (car bombs, suicide bombers, truck drivers, etc.). The "tools" available to terrorists are described in detail in Chapters 8 and 9, with a special focus on those tools that can cause the most damage.

employed by a less powerful force against a more powerful nation like the United States, continues to grow as technology creates vulnerabilities.

Second, **geopolitics**, the political impact of geographical relationships, plays a key role in globalization's interdependence. Oceans protected the United States in its early history, but expanding trade links mean many American interests are far from the center of American power. For example, China is far away and still has a Communist government overseeing the capitalist aspects of its economy. If China decided to cut off or dramatically alter its economic relations with the United States, what could the United States do about it? Further, China sees some of its near neighbors, such as Taiwan and Japan (which are some of America's closest allies in the region), as rivals. An incident early in 2001 underscored this problem: a Chinese fighter aircraft collided with an American reconnaissance aircraft, killing the Chinese pilot and forcing the American plane to land on Chinese territory. The airplane and crew were returned after intense negotiations, but many felt the United States had been forced to concede too much. However, the fact that the event occurred far from the United States and close to China made other alternatives short of war unlikely. In the South China Sea in 2016, China challenged US interests and allies by increasing its naval presence throughout the region.

Domestic and international coalitions form around different interpretations surrounding this interplay of geopolitics and globalization. For example, in what was called the Bush Doctrine, national security was based on an aggressive response to perceived threats. First, certain repressive regimes, which former President George W. Bush referred to as "the axis of evil," present significant dangers to the rest of the world. These countries—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—were suspected of developing WMDs, and they are also located in places where they can harm American interests. North Korea, for example, has been developing missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads that can hit Japan and Taiwan and have the potential to hit the West Coast of the United States. Iran and Iraq are both in a position to disrupt the flow of oil from the Middle East and to threaten Israel. One of the more substantial concerns was that WMDs would find their way into the hands of terrorists. Finally, all three countries are geographically close to China and Russia, both of which are potential sources of materials for WMDs.

A second principle of the Bush Doctrine was **preemption**, which is taking action against a state or non-state actor ***before*** it becomes too dangerous a threat. As always, experts disagree as to when preemption becomes necessary. Third, under this doctrine, moral values had a stronger place in evaluating the actions of others. Finally, according to this belief system, the linchpin to world peace is creating peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, something that will require substantial political change among the latter.

The Bush Doctrine enjoyed support at first, but the coalition necessary for successful policy was weakened by a number of circumstances. First, notions like preemption were questioned by people who see terrorism as a crime to be dealt with by legal processes rather than a security matter to be dealt with by military force. Second, many observers feared that the doctrine might lead to unilateral actions in which the United States ignores the voices of its friends overseas, undermining the gains in cooperation from globalization. Although President Bush used a multilateral approach with North Korea, critics fear that the nation's efforts in

dealing with Iraq and Iran will leave the United States isolated from its allies. Third, the absence of WMDs in Iraq seriously undermined the credibility of American efforts there, breaking the domestic coalition that supported the Second Gulf War. Although geopolitical concerns about oil and moral concerns about Saddam Hussein's repressiveness were important, the presence of WMDs made the threat to the United States from Iraq both greater and more direct.

The domestic political debate surrounding these issues continues. If the interdependence of globalization governs national policies, these concerns will ultimately be reduced. If Morgenthau's balance of power is the norm, however, then these remain significant problems for the United States in defining national security interests.

1.4.2 The Bush Administration's Global War on Terrorism

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon produced significant changes in the way agencies monitored and responded to potential and actual threats. The 2002 NSS provided direction for responding to terror as an issue, laying the foundation for increased coordination among agencies responsible for security. Later, the 2006 NSS added support for pursuing preemptive war.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the United States planned and executed the campaigns in what has since become called the **Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)**. The main target was Afghanistan, the home of the Taliban regime and the base of operations for al-Qaeda. It was also believed to be the last known location of al-Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden, at the time. The GWOT began in earnest with the start of **Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)** in October 2001, in which military operations commenced against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Initially proposed as Operation Infinite Justice, Operation Enduring Freedom actually comprised military operations in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and the Horn of Africa, with the target being terrorist groups believed to be associated with al-Qaeda. OEF also involved actions taken domestically by the Department of Defense in support of the new homeland defense mission. One example was the formation of Joint Task Force–Olympics, the military's contribution to providing security against a possible terrorist threat to the Olympic Games held in Salt Lake City, Utah, in January 2002.

After helping establish a non-militant Islamic government in Afghanistan, the United States turned its sights on Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein. The Second Gulf War (Operation Iraqi Freedom) commenced in April 2003, but the goal this time was not simply removing Iraqi troops from Kuwait (as it was during the First Gulf War in 1990), but rather regime change and the overthrow of Hussein. The US invasion of Iraq was an example of preemptive war, aimed at neutralizing Hussein's regime and its suspected ties to terrorist organizations, including as a potential source of WMDs for terrorist organizations. Despite the failure of the invasion to produce any hard evidence of stockpiling of WMDs or further evidence of Iraq's ties to al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations, the Bush administration supported the war by promoting the liberation of Iraq as a key foreign policy goal in the Middle East, which would lead to further success in the GWOT. US forces remained in Iraq and Afghanistan throughout the George W. Bush administration (Figure 1-3).

Figure 1-3

Global War on terrorism medal. Source: Department of Defense (2015).

Global War on Terrorism Service (GWOT-S) Medal: Approved Operations

Operation	*Inclusive dates*
Airport Security Operations	September 27, 2001–May 31, 2002
Noble Eagle	September 11, 2001–TBD
Enduring Freedom	September 11, 2001–TBD
Iraqi Freedom	March 19, 2003–Aug 31, 2010
New Dawn	September 1, 2010–Dec 31, 2011
Inherent Resolve	June 15, 2014–TBD
Freedom's Sentinel	January 1, 2015–TBD

Source: Department of Defense (2015).

1.4.3 The Obama Administration's New National Security Strategy

Once Barack Obama came into office in January 2009, he made it a priority to set a deadline for withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States would no longer fight a "Global War on Terror." Instead, the focus would be confronting the specific terrorist threat posed by a**l-Qaeda and its affiliated movements (AQAM)**. The 2010 National Security Strategy reflected President Obama's new focus on confronting the terrorist threat abroad through the use of military forces conducing **Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)** rather than large military force deployments and occupations (NSS 2010). The United States completed its military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, with President Obama stating that "we're leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq" (Salam 2014). Yet, the Iraqi government and military would prove incapable of dealing with the new threat posed by Sunni extremists who emerged from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq after his death in 2006. Within three years of the US military withdrawal, Iraq, as well as Syria, would be confronted by a new threat called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or, more simply, the **Islamic State (IS)**.

The Obama administration initially refused to use drones to confront IS in Iraq, after the US withdrawal. Only when IS began to capture cities, such as Fallujah, which US forces fought to control during the Iraq War, did the United States respond with military support to the Iraqis to include the use of Special Operations Forces as advisers to the Iraqi military and the direct use of US-controlled drones. As IS continued to capture and hold territory in Iraq and Syria, the United States and coalition partners would begin direct airstrikes in both countries to attack IS forces.

As a result of events in Iraq, President Obama decided to delay the withdrawal of US forces in Afghanistan and even increased the US military presence in that country, as al-Qaeda and the Taliban's resurgence threatened to overturn the US-supported Afghan government and military. Despite a pledge to end the war in Afghanistan during his two terms in office, in 2016, after 15 years of conflict, the United States still maintains about 10 000 military personnel in the country. In his 2015 National Security Strategy, President Obama further stated that the United States, along with its NATO partners, will continue "a limited counterterrorism mission against the remnants of core al-Qaeda and maintain our support to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)" (NSS 2015, 10).

In 2016, President Obama expanded military operations against IS to include Libya, authorizing the deployment of Special Operations Forces advisors and later direct combat aircraft strikes against IS targets. The direct involvement of US military personnel in Libya was significant in expanding US support for the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), which was still not a recognized government by many states (Walsh 2016). The Obama administration had previously approved a direct role for the US military in Syria, limited to flying combat aircraft missions against IS targets in that country. As of this date, no US ground forces were operating in Syria. These actions were a significant departure from President Obama's early policies of reducing the US military presence in the Middle East to combat terrorist groups, relying primarily on the use of armed drone aircraft to target suspected terrorists.

FOR EXAMPLE

Use of Drones by the Obama Administration

The use of armed drones to conduct targeted killings of suspected terrorists was started under President George W. Bush, as part of the Global War on Terror. When Barack Obama came into office, drones became the weapon of choice in his administration's counterterrorism policy. In the first three years of his administration, the use of drones by both the CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSCOC) increased significantly (44–240), expanding to multiple countries, to include Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as increasing the targeting of low-level terrorists and not just key leaders. A drone strike authorized by President Obama killed Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2011. Al-Awlaki was an Islamic cleric (and US citizen) credited with radicalizing a number of terrorists, to include Major Nidal Hasan, a US Army officer who killed 13 at Ft. Hood, Texas, in 2009, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian who tried to blow up a Detroit-bound international flight with an underwear bomb on Christmas Day 2009 (Miller 2011).

In 2016, the Obama administration released part of its secret "playbook" for drone warfare, which listed 473 total drone strikes authorized by President Obama from 2009 to 2015. In those strikes, the report stated that 2581 enemy combatants had been killed. The report also admitted that 64–116 civilians had also been killed in those strikes (Hennigan 2016).

1.4.4 Homeland Security and National Security

It is unlikely that the 9/11 attacks could have been prevented. Although some clues were available, an analysis of policies and procedures indicates that government agencies were unable to share key information, despite the intentions established in the 1997 NSS. For example, considerations of legal due process and civil liberties kept the FBI and CIA from sharing information. The FBI could gather information only with proper warrants and only about domestic lawbreaking, with the goal of presenting evidence in a court of law. The CIA's attention was on foreign matters, and it wanted to keep materials and the methods for getting them secret.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in response to the demands of Congress, the concerns of the American people due to the threat of terrorism, and the 2002 NSS, which committed the United States to fight a "Global War on Terrorism" at home and abroad. DHS merged 22 federal agencies with over 170 000 employees under one cabinet-level office. The FBI and CIA remain outside of the Department of Homeland Security, but greater levels of information sharing have been established. In 2016, DHS had grown to over 240 000 with an equal number of contracted employees supporting the Department (Lipowicz 2010). Given President Obama's reference in the 2015 NSS to the "persistent threat posed by terrorism today," (7) it appears that Homeland Security is here to stay.

The Bush administration produced a National Strategy for Homeland Security in May 2002, before it produced its first National Security Strategy in September

2002. The National Strategy for Homeland Security was updated in 2007, listing the following four goals (NSHS 2007):

1. Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks.
2. Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources.
3. Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur.
4. Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success.

President Obama chose not to issue a separate Homeland Security Strategy when he came into office in 2009. Instead he chose to include Homeland Security within his National Security Strategy, initially released in 2010 and updated in 2015. He produced a National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011), as a continuation of President Bush's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003). Obama also supported and expanded organizations created after 9/11, such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

With the election of President Donald Trump in November 2016, the United States entered into a new period of uncertainty in its national and homeland security policy. Domestically, the Trump campaign rhetoric focused on immigration policies and "building a wall" between the United States and Mexico to keep illegal immigrants out of the country (McCaskill 2016). It also questioned the NATO alliance and trade policies, which indicated the United States might be entering into a new isolationism. Once taking office in January 2017, President Trump found implementing such campaign promises much more difficult. Besides not being able to get Mexico to "build a wall," his other efforts to control immigration and limit travel to the United States from seven Muslim countries ran afoul of US courts. In his first trip to Europe in May, he failed to reassure NATO leaders that the United States was still a supporter of Article 5 and the concept of collective defense (Glasser 2017). As of July 2017, the Trump administration had yet to articulate a new National Security or Homeland Security Strategy.

SELF-CHECK

- Define asymmetric warfare.
- One example of a US government response, organizationally, after the 9/11 attacks, was the formation of the Department of National Security. True or false?
- Which of the following countries was not identified by President Bush as part of the "axis of evil"?
  a. Iraq
  b. Libya
  c. Iran
  d. North Korea
- The use of drones in the targeted killing of suspected terrorists declined during the Obama administration. True or false?

SUMMARY

Maintaining American national security blends several important questions, basically asking who, why, when, and how. The "who" reflects the balance among political opinions. We can speak of this as the domestic audience: when the government develops a policy, how do people feel about it? Conservatives and liberals alike may press for peace or demand war, though for different reasons. Much depends on the "why." If a problem arises in the international system, does the response involve getting American citizens to safety, or does it demand cooperation or involvement in the affairs of other countries?

The "when" is not simply the time in history during which a problem occurs. A critical "when" issue for policymaking involves whether a problem is temporary or long term. The Cold War lasted from 1946 to 1991. Was containment a good idea? When containment policy was established, it was by no means clear when the Cold War would end. Finally, the "how" reflects how the response will be managed. When America fought World War II, it was probably the largest organizational problem in our history, yet it was managed by competing government departments acting on extraordinary powers only granted to them for the duration of the crisis. It is only later that interdepartmental and interagency coordination become routine. The success of any program, however, is its ability to address the crisis at hand. Whatever the who, why, when, and how, government must adapt so as to bring appropriate organization to the problem at hand.

During the course of the last 70 years, America's security environment has undergone several key transformations. First, the creation of international institutions such as the United Nations has increased interdependence among nations. Second, the means of attack and defense have changed from rifles and battleships to WMDs, making even small groups potentially very dangerous. Third, new threats have arisen in the place of old threats, such as that once posed by the USSR. The circumstances of these new threats reflect long-standing concerns and analytical frameworks, such as geopolitics and power relationships. Fourth, as various threats have grown more complex, it's become necessary to develop new organizations, processes, policies, and strategies to manage the threats, as well as to increase the coordination among these elements. Of course, there are currently a number of competing perspectives within the American political system about what constitutes a threat and what the appropriate responses to these threats should be. The waxing and waning of these perspectives means managing national and homeland security will be a source of controversy for years to come.

In this chapter, we addressed all of these issues by taking a detailed look at the changing nature of national security throughout US history. More specifically, we analyzed various security environments and national security policy choices during specific historical periods. We also learned to distinguish between national security policy players within and outside of government and appraised the threat situation in post-9/11 America. In addition, we examined US national security strategy and homeland security policy as a response to today's changing environment and threat perceptions.

KEY TERMS

Al-Qaeda and its affiliated movements (AQAM)	Term used by the Obama administration to specifically target the terrorist threat posed by those groups connected to al-Qaeda, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Asymmetrical warfare	The use of unconventional tactics by weak states against stronger states. These tactics are often difficult for the stronger state to counter because of legal, moral, or other restrictions on what kind of violence the state may use in response to such tactics.
Axis Powers	The alliance among Germany, Japan, and Italy during World War II.
Balance of power	International relations theory where no one state has a monopoly of power and nations seek to maximize security either through alliances to compensate for weaknesses or through unilateral means when they perceive it be in their national interest to do so.
Bipolar system	A relationship among countries in the international system in which two countries dominate and other nation-states tend to align themselves with either of the two, such as the United States and the USSR during the Cold War.
Bretton Woods Agreements	Series of post-World War II agreements that created key economic institutions intended to promote international economic stability and trade, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
CBRNE	Abbreviation for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons.
Central Powers	The alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria in World War I.
Circular error probability (CEP)	Term that describes the accuracy with which nuclear weapons strike their targets.