

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2ND EDITION

SOCIAL THEORY *re-wired*

new connections to classical and contemporary perspectives

edited by wesley longhofer and daniel winchester

"This revolutionary text makes social theory more teachable. It has helped achieve one of my key goals: allowing students to see the relevance of theory to their own lives and the world around them. Particularly useful is the website. Student activities such as 'Writing Out Loud' and 'Interactive Readings' are extremely helpful. Teachers can comment on students' work individually within the website. The site allows instructors to devote more course time to the additional goals of the course."

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"This companion website is especially useful to make connections between abstract theoretical texts and real world events, research, and contexts that make the in-class material concrete and real for the students."

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Social Theory Re-Wired

This social theory text combines the structure of a print reader with the ability to tailor the course via an extensive interactive website. Readings from important classical and contemporary theorists are placed in conversation with one another through core themes—the puzzle of social order, the dark side of modernity, identity, etc. The website includes videos, interactive commentaries, summaries of key concepts, exams and quizzes, annotated selections from key readings, classroom activities, and more. See the website at www.routledgesoc.com/theory

New to the second edition:

- Expanded web content.
- Teacher/student feedback employed to clarify difficult concepts.
- Reframed contemporary section now offers readings by Robert Merton, Bruno Latour, David Harvey, Zygmut Bauman, and Anthony Giddens.

Wesley Longhofer is Assistant Professor of Organization and Management at Emory University.

Daniel Winchester is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Purdue University.

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Edited by **Douglas Hartmann**, *University of Minnesota* and **Jodi O'Brien**, *Seattle University*

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Social Theory Re-Wired: New Connections to Classical and Contemporary Perspectives, Second Edition edited by Wesley Longhofer and Daniel Winchester

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Social Theory Re-Wired

New Connections to Classical and Contemporary Perspectives

Second Edition

Edited by

Wesley Longhofer
Emory University

Daniel Winchester
Purdue University

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II. Mid-Century American Sociology

III. Recent Developments

Series Foreword

THIS INNOVATIVE SERIES IS for all readers interested in books that provide frameworks for making sense of the complexities of contemporary social life. Each of the books in this series uses a sociological lens to provide current critical and analytical perspectives on the best ideas in sociological thought with an aim toward publication education and engagement. These books are designed for use in the classroom as well as for scholars and socially curious general readers.

In *Social Theory Re-Wired* Wesley Longhofer and Daniel Winchester apply these principles to the ideas, concepts, and writings at the core of all sociological research and thought. The volume covers all of the classic authors and works in the cannon, highlights the work of several under-appreciated or even forgotten contributors, and introduces (judiciously) the most provocative and important of contemporary theories and theorists. These pieces are organized into sections that are fresh yet familiar, and framed with brief introductory essays that are down-to-earth without being dumbed-down, chock full of insightful points and examples from the latest in social media, popular culture, and politics in the U.S. and all over the globe. This impressive volume also offers a unique set of original interactive exercises and teaching tools that are guaranteed to enrich both the teaching and the learning of sociological theory.

It has been said that every generation of sociology researchers and students must win its theoretical inheritance anew. We believe this to be true, and expect that *Social Theory Re-Wired* will not only be an important resource for teaching and learning social theory, but should help shape how theory is understood and used in the field for years to come.

Douglas Hartmann
Valerie Jenness
Jodi O'Brien
Series Editors

Preface

SOCIAL THEORY IS ABOUT making connections—connections between abstraction and observation, concepts and evidence, the knowable and the unknown. It is about connecting our curiosities about the social world with concepts and frameworks to help make sense of them. Social theory is a lot like the thousands of copper cables and optical fibers that together bring a computer network to life. When its connections are hidden, we too often take the network for granted, and we are completely befuddled when the network changes, jams, or has a system error. But, when we untangle the network and understand its connections, we can begin to see how things work, what is running smoothly or going wrong, and how to plug old components into new ones with greater ease and with better results.

Social theory is also about conversations. Contrary to popular belief, theory is not about dusty tomes of esoteric garbling about capitalism and the division of labor. Social theory is a response to the big and important questions of our time. And, the theorists in this book are not just responding to their own social condition; they are also talking to each other, answering each other's questions and posing new ones. At the risk of sounding trite, social theory is more than a network of ideas—it is a *social network* connecting the creators of those ideas to each other and to us.

So this book is about connections and conversations. It is a re-wiring of social theory that makes it fresh again for the world of Instagram and Twitter. We have tried to re-wire it in a way that revisits classical conversations and connects them to contemporary ones in interesting and sometimes surprising ways. As you peruse the main table of contents, you will see a lot of familiar folks, both classical and contemporary, but they might be arranged in ways that are less recognizable, lumped together under categories like convergence, capital, shift, and meltdown. We did this because we wanted the ideas and conversations to travel across and beyond any individual theorist, even though some theorists were foundational in creating them. We have not hit the reset button on social theory, but we may have tapped the refresh button once or twice.

The book is designed for teaching social theory in creative ways, integrating original, printed texts with modern, digital applications. In addition to our unique collection of original excerpts, we have developed new interactive

online content for the second edition. This web-based material is chock full of additional information, activities, and teaching tips. The combination of print and digital makes this book a great addition to almost any social theory course. It's a blended format that comes out of our conviction that social theory courses often flounder not because the ideas are stale, but because the ideas haven't been presented in the best possible relationship to one another. In organizing the book in the way we do—making connections between classical and contemporary, print and digital—we think we can help social theory instructors take a step toward a better way. We hope that you will find it as fun to read and use as we did to make.

Organization of the Second Edition

Like the first edition, we have organized the book around five themes or conversations. Each theme includes an introductory essay by us as well as original readings from classical and contemporary theorists. The essays include vignettes on topics ranging from smart phones and social networking sites to the global financial crisis and the digital divide, as well as overviews of key concepts and ideas found in the readings. In the margins of each essay you will find "connections" to ideas introduced in other parts of the book or supplementary materials found on the website. We encourage students to read these essays before diving into the readings, as they help bring to life the complicated ideas found in the original texts. While, for the sake of clarity, we have kept the readings themselves free of marginal commentary, we also include "Connections" at the *end* of each reading with more tailored activities for students, including writing exercises, discussion questions, and additional online content.

The readings themselves are taken from the original sources. We have made an attempt, when possible, to select longer readings than are often found in a theory reader, keeping in mind that finding the right length is a difficult balance to achieve. Those of you familiar with the first edition may notice we subtracted a few readings and added others, including new selections from Robert Merton, Bruno Latour, David Harvey, Zygmunt Bauman, and Anthony Giddens. In adding these new selections, we think the second edition is both more balanced and more readable. We have summarized the readings and essays for each section below.

Section I—Emergence Through Convergence: The Puzzles of Social Order

We begin with the issue and enigma of social order and, in particular, Durkheim's ideas about solidarity and social facts. The introductory essay,

"This Deserted Island Is Out of Order," reflects on William Golding's brilliant *Lord of the Flies* and, in particular, how social order was created and later destroyed by the boys on the island. Excerpts from Durkheim include selections from his most famous works: *The Division of Labor in Society*, *Suicide*, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, and *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Also included in this section are pieces from Robert Merton on manifest and latent functions, Harold Garfinkel on the ordering of moment-to-moment interactions, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann on the "social construction of reality" and the institutionalization of everyday life, and Bruno Latour on the role of nonhuman actors in the construction of social order. These contemporary pieces extend Durkheim's ideas on how social institutions that get constructed by individuals eventually take on lives of their own, whether it is at the largest of scales like law and religion or at a scale much smaller, such as our day-to-day routines and conversations.

Section II—Networks of Capital: Dimensions of Global Capitalism

The second section begins with Karl Marx coming to grips with capitalism and the emerging class-based social order. The introductory essay, titled "Salvaging What Wall Street Left Behind," invites students to ponder what Marx might have said about the recent global financial crisis and one of its key culprits—credit default swaps. Excerpts from *The German Ideology* and *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (both written with Friedrich Engels), along with pieces from *Capital* and the *Manuscripts of 1844*, introduce Marx's ideas on historical materialism, commodity fetishism, and alienation. Contemporary extensions include Immanuel Wallerstein's work on the capitalist world system, Pierre Bourdieu's takes on forms of capital beyond the economic, David Harvey's materialist critique of postmodernity, and a piece from Manuel Castells on the rise of the network society. The Wallerstein, Harvey, and Castells readings update Marx for the age of globalization, while Bourdieu brings us back down to the role cultural capital plays in shaping the *habitus* of the individual.

Section III—Pathway to Meltdown: Theorizing the Dark Side of Modernity

Max Weber sets the stage for the third section, which moves attention away from class and order to the entrenchment of new forms of power, control, and rationality in modern society. "Your Smart Phone Might Be an Evil Genius" is the apropos title for the introductory essay, which discusses how the advancement of technology constrains us as much as it liberates us, not unlike Weber's notion of the "iron cage." The pathway toward increased rationality, Weber warned long ago, might also lead to meltdown. We include excerpts from his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* as well as essays on social

action, authority and domination, and bureaucracy. We then introduce two pieces from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory—Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* and Jurgen Habermas' *Toward a Rational Society*—and an excerpt from Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, all of which look at the subtle ways new kinds of power and surveillance become ingrained in modern society. Finally, we include a piece from Zygmunt Bauman on rationalization's sordid role in the organization and carrying out of modern genocide.

Section IV—Shifting the Paradigm: Excluded Voices, Alternative Knowledges

This section presents challenges to the supposedly stable categories of classical theory by introducing the work of critical race, feminist, and postcolonial scholars, beginning with an essay looking at how the digital divide shapes the knowledge we find on the Internet ("Webs of Knowledge in the Digital Divide"). The essay asks readers to consider questions about the social contexts of knowledge creation, and how unequal access to *what* we know and, more fundamentally, *how* we know about reality helps perpetuate social inequality and injustice. We set the stage with selections from two foundational scholars of race and feminist theory: W.E.B. Du Bois' *The Souls of Black Folks* and Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*. Additional excerpts include Frantz Fanon's powerful work on the racial discourses of colonialism, a selection from Edward Said's groundbreaking *Orientalism*, Michael Omi and Howard Winant on racial formation in the contemporary United States, Dorothy Smith's work on feminist standpoint theory, and Patricia Hill Collins' brilliant work on black feminist epistemology. Each of these contemporary theorists continues to unpack the place of lived experience and oppression in shaping social life and social theory, just as Du Bois and Beauvoir had decades earlier.

Section V—Rise of the Avatar: Connecting Self and Society

Finally, we turn to ideas on the construction and expression of identity in modern society, beginning with our introductory essay for this section titled "Through the Looking Glass of Facebook." Our essay asks an important question not just for social theory, but also for many college students today, whether they are enrolled in a theory course or not: Who would we be individually without the many communities—both online and offline—that support our identities and senses of self? And what are the social and individual consequences of the different versions (or avatars) of ourselves that we present to others on a daily basis? To dig deeper into these questions, we begin with George Herbert Mead's classic work on the self as a social object and two pieces by the great Georg Simmel on individuality and society: "The Metropolis and Mental Life" and "The Stranger." We then move on to Erving Goffman's more

contemporary but no less pioneering "The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life." The final three selections address more poststructuralist and postmodern takes on the issue of identity with excerpts from Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*, Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble*, and Anthony Giddens' *Modernity and Self-Identity*. From the modern to the postmodern, these readings uncover the social origins of identity and that which we often take for granted most—our own sense of self.

Additional Table of Contents

The readings are organized by the themes above and should be viewed as collections of conversations between theorists and ideas. However, we also include a more traditional table of contents to assist instructors in designing a course to their liking. This additional table of contents is arranged according to theorist and theoretical tradition. Much of the companion website can also be organized along these dimensions to allow for greater fluidity between the printed pages and the digital ones.

Organization of the Website

We have recruited a stellar group of scholars to help bolster the web content for the second edition. It is now overflowing with student content as well as password-protected teaching materials and supplementary sources that instructors can use to design their courses. The web content provides opportunities for the student and instructor to engage one-on-one through written activities and assignments, and grades for assignments can be exported to most course management systems. Features of the website include:

Profile Pages

In the spirit of contemporary social networking sites, we have designed individual "profiles" for each theorist (e.g. Weber) or school of thought (e.g. Frankfurt School). These pages include a wealth of information ranging from biographical details and key concepts to external web content and learning activities, including short quizzes to help evaluate comprehension of key ideas and tips for reading the printed excerpts.

Interactive Readings

Reading social theory is no easy task. To make things easier, we have selected abbreviated excerpts of select passages for each section, put them online, and inserted interactive annotations linking key phrases or words to additional

content, such as definitions, examples, short assignments, and web content. These interactive readings extend the vision of *Social Theory Re-Wired* by helping make challenging theoretical ideas more relevant and understandable to contemporary students. We have created interactive versions of one classical and one contemporary reading from each section—check the "Connections" following each reading to see if it has an interactive version available.

Writing Out Loud

We have found in our own courses that freeform writing about difficult passages in the text increases comprehension and student engagement with the material. The website thus includes a space for students to engage freely with the excerpts by writing their own responses to questions and prompts about the readings. These responses can be saved and, if the instructor wishes, responded to and graded within the *Social Theory Re-Wired* website itself. Grades can then be exported to a course management system.

Assignments

Assignments are scattered throughout the *profile pages, annotated readings,* and *writing spaces*. Assignments can also be organized to match the two tables of contents presented in this reader so that students and instructors can easily view which ones have been assigned and completed.

Supplementary Sources (instructors only)

We also include an annotated collection of supplementary materials that instructors may draw upon to design their syllabus or lectures. These include summaries of written work from academic and popular presses; suggestions for additional readings, films, television shows, and websites that help illustrate key concepts; and classroom activities such as discussion topics and games. We also include nearly a dozen full-text excerpts from additional theoretical works that instructors may wish to assign or paste into their own course management systems, including work from Theodor Adorno, Anthony Giddens, Donna Haraway, Patricia Hill Collins, Michel Foucault, Georg Simmel, and others.

Test Materials (instructors only)

We have designed written exams and answer keys based on the content of the reader and the website, including multiple-choice questions and essay prompts. These materials are presented in a downloadable form so that instructors can reference them when designing their own exams.

Why This Book?

This book is intended for instructors constantly in search of new ways to make theory relevant for their students. The combination of a website and an anthology of original texts provides flexibility for instructors to design the course they have always wanted to teach. We have organized the content around what we think are the key conversations motivating social theory, but we invite instructors to come up with additional conversations of their own. This intellectual flexibility and rigor make *Social Theory Re-Wired* perfect for any social theory class, whether it is online, offline, or a hybrid course.

Whether students have come to the study of social theory with enthusiasm or trepidation, this interactive text will guide them through the webs and networks of social theory from its classic halcyon days to the vibrant and complex world of now. They should feel free to dig into the nitty-gritty of the original texts, grapple with the interactive readings online, and take notes in the margins (whether on the printed pages or the digital ones). To instructors and students both: Welcome to *Social Theory Re-Wired*. Plug in and start making connections.

Acknowledgments

WE WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND A heartfelt thanks to the teachers, mentors, and colleagues that continue to inspire our quest for a deeper theoretical understanding of the social world. In particular, we would like to thank the following individuals who were instrumental in bringing this project to realization: Doug Hartmann, Chris Uggen, Letta Page, and the best collection of reviewers two young authors could ask for when compiling a book like this one. We would also like to thank Steve Rutter, Dean Birkenkamp, Samantha Barbaro, Margaret Moore, and the rest of the staff at Routledge and Taylor & Francis, without whom this project would have remained on our shelves as a stack of loose papers and tangled ideas. Finally, and most importantly, we would like to thank our families and our partners, Sonya and Christie, who believed in not only this gig, but also our decision to drop everything and join the band for good.

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SECTION I

Emergence Through Convergence

The Puzzles of Social Order

Introductory Essay: This Deserted Island Is Out of Order

In William Golding's famous novel, *Lord of the Flies*, a group of young boys are marooned on a deserted island, the only survivors of a terrible plane crash. Stranded, scared, and with no adult supervision, the boys quickly assemble themselves and make plans for living on—and hopefully being rescued from—the island.

The beginning of the novel depicts how they organize themselves into a miniature society. They establish a division of labor with specific tasks and roles, some boys hunting for food, while others build shelters, and still others maintain a fire signal to alert potential rescuers of their whereabouts. They also organize themselves according to age, with the older boys—called "biguns"—taking charge and looking after the younger, smaller "littluns." They also choose leaders. A level-headed and democratic-minded boy named Ralph is elected leader of the group, a chubby, unpopular intellectual nicknamed "Piggy" becomes his trusted advisor, and the charismatic (and dangerous, as it turns out) Jack is appointed leader of the hunters.

The remainder of the novel details how this once nicely ordered society of tweeners falls apart. Ralph begins to lose political authority and control, Jack makes a dictatorial grab for power, and Piggy—well, in the interest of not being a total plot spoiler, let's just say Piggy and some other boys meet less than fortunate ends.

If you were one of the many students assigned Golding's gripping tale of "boys gone wild" as required reading in middle or high school, you know that it is a novel that hits on many themes: civilization and savagery, democracy and dictatorship, conformity and individuality, morality and the will to power. But, from a sociological point of view, *Lord of the Flies* is also a profound literary example of one of social theory's most fundamental themes—the problem, and puzzle, of social order.

For a "true life" *Lord of the Flies* story, check out the famous "Robbers Cave Experiment" by social psychologist Muzafer Sherif, listed in the Supplementary Sources section of the *Social Theory Re-Wired* website.

The plot of *Lord of the Flies* lays bare some of the most elementary features of social order, features that all of the social theorists in this section are trying in some way to understand and explain. One of the most important of these features is the paradoxical "dual nature" of social order. By this we mean, on one hand, social order is the creation of individuals. The stranded boys in Golding's novel devised their own social order; they elected their leaders, organized who would do what tasks when, and so forth. Yet, on the other hand, once this social order was created, it quickly took on a life of its own, exerting influence over the identities and actions of the very individuals who created it. Schoolboys became "leaders" and "hunters," a seashell became a sign of democracy, a pig's head became a religious sacrifice and, later on, the dreaded "Lord of the Flies" itself. Out of the *convergence* of individuals, we see the *emergence* of a social order far more complex, meaningful, and powerful than the sum of its individual parts.

While, fortunately, most of us will never be stranded on an island with spear-wielding preteens, the basic dual nature of social order is something we confront in every aspect of our lives—in our families, schools, workplaces, governments, on the web, even in our leisure activities.

To use just one example, think of the classroom you may be sitting in right now while reading this book. This social order that we label and recognize as a "classroom" would cease to exist without the ongoing and coordinated activities of thousands of people, including you. For the classroom to be a classroom, you and your classmates have to act like students; the person who assigned you this book like a professor; the people in the registrar's office need to make sure that you are "officially enrolled" as a student; the university administration has to monitor the performance of the many colleges and departments to maintain government accreditation; the state and federal governments need to allocate sizeable amounts of their budgets to higher education so schools can pay their employees and you can apply for student loans; the authors of this book need to make sure they continue to write about sociological matters like social order instead of a recipe for chocolate chip cookies—you see how much work all of this is?

Yet, simultaneously, the social order that makes up a classroom has an existence over and above the activities of all of the many individuals who comprise it. The "classroom" as a social form has been around well before any of us was born. And after well over a dozen years of acting like a student from kindergarten through college, you have internalized your role as a student and implicitly know how to act in a classroom. Unlike the kindergartener, no one has to tell you what's going on here. The classroom just simply exists as a fact of your everyday life. It is there, and remains so even if you decide to sleep in, skip class, drop out, or join a cult. It is what Emile Durkheim would call a "social fact," and what many other sociologists call a "social structure" or "institution." How social orders get constantly created by individuals,

but at the same time exist and have influences over and above the power of individuals, is one of the most intriguing puzzles of social order, and one with which each of the theorists in this section tries to come to grips.

Along with the intriguing dual nature of social order, *Lord of the Flies* also vividly demonstrates what happens when social order fails or falls apart. While social theorists don't think that social orders are always necessarily good (just see the next two sections of this book for some pretty scathing critiques of modern social orders), they almost always see them as necessary. Without social order, life becomes chaotic, meaningless, and directionless. Just think of what happens to communities after a natural disaster or war. For many of the theorists in this section, the necessity of social order for making sense of our lives is most evident when the social order starts to break down or weaken (see, for example, Durkheim's famous study of suicide in the following pages, or, for more humorous but no less telling examples, Garfinkel's famous "breaching" experiments). In fact, what may be most surprising about social order is that it is so ubiquitous and that its absence or breakdown is not more common.

Emergence only through convergence, individual meaning only through collective activity—such are the fascinating puzzles of social order that the theorists in the following pages help us better understand.

Classical Connections: Emile Durkheim

You can't talk social order without talking Emile Durkheim. A nineteenth-century French sociologist and one of the founders of the discipline, Durkheim's fundamental preoccupation was investigating and theorizing how societies hold—or fail to hold—together. Teaching and writing during a time of great political and economic change in France and the rest of Europe, Durkheim studied the structure and development of numerous social institutions, including law, crime and deviance, work, religion, politics, public morality, and education. For Durkheim, each of these played an essential role in the creation and maintenance of social order, or what Durkheim often called "social solidarity." Likening modern society to a vast and complex organism, a bit like a vast coral reef, Durkheim saw social structures as functioning to hold society together. This idea characterizes the whole of Durkheim's sociology, and makes him the foundational classical theorist of social order.

Log in to Durkheim's Profile Page on the *Social Theory Re-Wired* website to learn more about his life and work.

In the first part of this section, we present key excerpts from some of Durkheim's most famous and widely read works on social order, including *The Division of Labor in Society*, *Suicide*, and *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. But, before you plug in to these classic readings and learn about Durkheim's thoughts on social solidarity, anomie, collective representations, and more, it might be best to begin with the short excerpt from his *The Rules of Sociological*

Method. Here, Durkheim deals with what for him was the most fundamental question for sociology, namely "What is a Social Fact?"

For Durkheim, social facts are much more than simply facts about society. Rather, they expressed the emergent and constraining power of social order that we talked about earlier. In *The Rules*, Durkheim straightaway tells us that social facts are "manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him." In other words, social facts are things external to us, collective entities that have power over us, enabling us to do some things but constraining our ability to do others.

Social facts can take many shapes and forms, ranging from the legal system and churches to social norms, languages, and family values. One of Durkheim's most famous books concerns the social fact of work and, more specifically, the social development of the division of labor. In the reading from *The Division of Labor in Society*, Durkheim asks how an advanced and complex division of labor affects the solidarity of societies. How can a modern social order continue to "hang together" once we have moved from a more "traditional" and "simple" division of labor to a hugely complex, industrialized system in which we all have our own specialized and differentiated roles and responsibilities? In a new capitalist world that celebrated individualism (Durkheim himself called it "the cult of the individual"), many worried that the social order was withering away or, like Karl Marx, thought it was becoming divided into the two opposing and increasingly antagonistic camps of capitalists and laborers.

Durkheim saw things differently. Rather than understanding the transition from a traditional to modern economic system as signifying a movement away from social order and toward increasing disintegration and conflict, Durkheim theorized that what we were witnessing was a move from one form of social solidarity to another. According to Durkheim, as societies grow and become more complex, they move along a path from "mechanical solidarity" (a form of social order and cohesion characterized by the sameness of individuals connected through common forms of work, religion, values, and education), to "organic solidarity," based on the differentiation of individuals who are connected through interdependence. Durkheim argued that in a modern, complex division of labor, solidarity was maintained not so much through shared labor, interests, and values, but through individuals' mutual reliance on others to perform their own specialized tasks (for example, while workers rely on factory owners to provide them with jobs, factory owners simultaneously rely on workers to produce the goods that they sell).

While Durkheim was more optimistic than many social theorists about the capacity for modern, capitalist societies to maintain social order and cohesion, he was not entirely sanguine about the matter. In the reading we have chosen from *Suicide*, Durkheim argues that many modern societies lack the kind of social integration and solidarity necessary to stave off "anomie,"

the inability of social ties and norms to regulate what he sees as the otherwise insatiable passions and aspirations of individuals left to their own devices. Without sufficient regulation of our desires, Durkheim believes, we remain constantly disillusioned and unsatisfied with our lives. Societies with lower levels of moral regulation, in turn, have higher suicide rates. In *Suicide*, Durkheim demonstrates how paying theoretical attention to social order can help us discern the social causes behind even the most seemingly individual actions.

For a disturbing, contemporary example of anomie and social disintegration, check out the documentary film, *The Lost Children of Rockdale County*, listed in the Supplementary Sources section.

In the final selection from Durkheim, you'll read an excerpt from one of the most widely-read and influential works in all of social theory, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. In *Elementary Forms*, Durkheim develops an extremely creative (and controversial) theory of the social origins of religion. For him, religion is nothing more than the collective representations of a society, or, as Durkheim says elsewhere, religion is society first becoming dimly aware and conscious of itself. There are no gods or deities in Durkheim's definition of religion—there is only society. That is, when religious groups worship their gods, they are really, without fully knowing it, worshipping the social order that binds them together. Despite being skeptical of the supernatural claims of religion, Durkheim, an atheist, was not anti-religion. He saw religion as a powerful and necessary social force, capable of establishing the cohesiveness of society by providing a set of shared symbols, beliefs, and rituals through which individuals could affirm their common bonds. In this way, for Durkheim, religion was and remains a very *real* thing—a preeminent social fact.

Check out the full-text excerpt from Mary Douglas on "Natural Symbols" (available in the "Additional Readings" section of the website) to give your students an idea of how Durkheim's theory of religion and ritual has been used by one of contemporary social theory's most prominent scholars.

Contemporary Extensions: Social Order Re-Wired

While Emile Durkheim provides the starting point for any theoretical conversation on social order, he is certainly not the last word. Contemporary theoretical perspectives on the puzzles of social order abound, and we have selected four readings from five profound (and more recent) social theorists to give you a flavor of how this discussion has been taken up and re-worked in recent times.

The first reading comes from an intellectual titan of mid-twentieth-century American sociology, Robert Merton. Merton was a student of Talcott Parsons and George Sarton at Harvard University in the 1930s, where Parsons and his colleagues developed the theory of structural functionalism. A central tenet of structural functionalism is that societies require particular "functions" in order to operate as stable systems. (For Durkheim, the division of labor functioned to generate social solidarity among its members.) In his piece, "Manifest and Latent Functions," Merton elaborates on this idea by distinguishing between those functions that are obvious and intended versus those that are more

invisible and unexpected. As an example, Merton gives us the case of Hopi rain dances, which are ostensibly intended to bring about rain if we were to gauge their function based on motivations alone. However, as Merton notes, meteorologists know that no such function is possible, and Merton concludes the rain dances function latently to fulfill the needs of the group instead. It is in this same reading that we learn of "unintended consequences," perhaps one of the central concepts in sociology writ large. According to Merton, identifying the unintended consequences of social action is the cornerstone of sociological inquiry, and is through such identification that the latent functions of a seemingly irrational act become known.

Learn more about ethnomethodology by connecting to the Mid-Twentieth-Century American Theory Profile Page.

In the second reading, you will continue this exploration into the functions of everyday life with the founder of ethnomethodology, Harold Garfinkel. Garfinkel understood ethnomethodology as a distinct approach to sociological inquiry, one that painstakingly analyzes and describes the various methods by which members of a social group maintain the orderliness and sensibility of their everyday worlds. If, for Durkheim, the reality of social facts was sociology's fundamental object of study, Garfinkel took it as his job to understand how this objective reality was constantly being produced, managed, and negotiated in the everyday activities and routines of ordinary people. In an excerpt from his *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, you'll learn about the many ways people (including yourself) maintain a sense of the social order and read humorous scenarios about what happens when that sense of everyday order is disrupted (if you've ever been asked as part of an Introduction to Sociology course to break a social norm by, say, singing in a crowded elevator, congratulations, you're a burgeoning ethnomethodologist!). More than any other social theorist, Garfinkel shows us how social order is an "ongoing accomplishment."

For vivid examples of breaching experiments (with a Marxist twist), watch some clips from Michael Moore's television series, "The Awful Truth," listed in Supplementary Sources.

In the next reading, French anthropologist, sociologist, and philosopher Bruno Latour introduces you to a door-closer. A prominent figure in the sociology of science, Latour (under a pseudonym, James Johnson) asks whether something as simple and overlooked as a door-closer plays a role in constructing society. According to Latour, the specific nonhuman system used to close the door to the room you are sitting in right now not only allows the door to function but also prescribes to us our social order. It allows people to enter without getting bloody noses and signals to the room's occupants the norms for who should or should not be in the room. For example, imagine how your current social situation might be defined differently if the door closed with a tight spring or didn't close at all? The article is a seminal work in actor-network theory developed by Latour and his colleagues in the 1980s, a theoretical perspective which called for a closer examination of the role of nonhuman actors in social relations. You may find connections to Garfinkel's ethnomethodology in Latour's exposition, as both readings expose the role of semiotics and small-scale interactions in the creation of social order. But,

Interested in thinking about how the advent of electronic media has changed our sense of social reality? Consider assigning portions of Joshua Meyrowitz's *No Sense of Place*, referenced in the Supplementary Sources section.

for Latour, it is not just humans who are doing the work here. Nonhuman actors—whether simple technologies like door-closers or complex ones like social media platforms—play an equally important, but often neglected, role. Latour asks us to open our eyes to the many ways nonhuman actors make our commonsense realities possible.

In the final reading, you'll find a sample from one of the most influential theories of how the reality of social orders comes into being. In *The Social Construction of Reality*, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann ask how an objective social order—a shared sense of factual reality—can emerge from the convergence of the minds, bodies, and interactions of individuals. Laying out a scheme that includes brilliant insights on human consciousness, habit, institutionalization, and the multiplicity of social realities, Berger and Luckmann give us a compelling way to understand how society actually becomes the objective reality of our everyday experience.

Students, apply your knowledge of Berger and Luckmann's theory to how the "reality" of online social networking sites like Facebook and MySpace gets constructed in the Writing Out Loud section of the website.

Plug In

Emergence and convergence, solidarity and anomie, social facts and social constructions—these are the terms of reference for understanding social order. Whether you want to better understand something as complex as the global capitalist market or something as mundane as that awkward conversation you had with your neighbor last week, whether you want to know more about how people can come together through the powers of modern technologies or how a primitive island society of English schoolboys can devolve into a murderous cult, you'll benefit from plugging in to these classical and contemporary perspectives on one of sociology's most persistent and important themes.

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1

The Rules of Sociological Method

Emile Durkheim

BEFORE BEGINNING THE SEARCH FOR the method appropriate to the study of social facts it is important to know what are the facts termed 'social'.

The question is all the more necessary because the term is used without much precision. It is commonly used to designate almost all the phenomena that occur within society, however little social interest of some generality they present. Yet under this heading there is, so to speak, no human occurrence that cannot be called social. Every individual drinks, sleeps, eats, or employs his reason, and society has every interest in seeing that these functions are regularly exercised. If therefore these facts were social ones, sociology would possess no subject matter peculiarly its own, and its domain would be confused with that of biology and psychology.

However, in reality there is in every society a clearly determined group of phenomena separable, because of their distinct characteristics, from those that form the subject matter of other sciences of nature.

When I perform my duties as a brother, a husband or a citizen and carry out the commitments I have entered into, I fulfil obligations which are defined in law and custom and which are external to myself and my actions. Even when they conform to my own sentiments and when I feel their reality within me, that reality does not cease to be objective, for it is not I who have prescribed these duties; I have received them through education. Moreover, how often does it happen that we are ignorant of the details of the obligations that we must assume, and that, to know them, we must consult the legal code and its authorised interpreters! Similarly the believer has discovered from birth, ready fashioned, the beliefs and practices of his religious life; if they existed before he did, it follows that they exist outside him. The system of signs that I employ to express my thoughts, the monetary system I use to pay my debts, the credit instruments I utilise in my commercial relationships, the practices I follow in my profession, etc., all function independently of the use I make of them. Considering in turn each member of society, the foregoing remarks can be repeated for each single one of them. Thus there are ways of acting, thinking and feeling which possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual.

Not only are these types of behaviour and thinking external to the individual, but they are endued with a compelling and coercive power by virtue of which, whether he wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon him. Undoubtedly when I conform to them of my own free will, this coercion is not felt or felt hardly at all, since it is unnecessary. None the less it is intrinsically a characteristic of these facts; the proof of this is that it asserts itself as soon as I try to resist. If I attempt to violate the rules of law they react against me so as to forestall my action, if there is still time. Alternatively, they annul it or make my action conform to the norm if it is already accomplished but capable of being

reversed; or they cause me to pay the penalty for it if it is irreparable. If purely moral rules are at stake, the public conscience restricts any act which infringes them by the surveillance it exercises over the conduct of citizens and by the special punishments it has at its disposal. In other cases the constraint is less violent; nevertheless, it does not cease to exist. If I do not conform to ordinary conventions, if in my mode of dress I pay no heed to what is customary in my country and in my social class, the laughter I provoke, the social distance at which I am kept, produce, although in a more mitigated form, the same results as any real penalty. In other cases, although it may be indirect, constraint is no less effective. I am not forced to speak French with my compatriots, nor to use the legal currency, but it is impossible for me to do otherwise. If I tried to escape the necessity, my attempt would fail miserably. As an industrialist nothing prevents me from working with the processes and methods of the previous century, but if I do I will most certainly ruin myself. Even when in fact I can struggle free from these rules and successfully break them, it is never without being forced to fight against them. Even if in the end they are overcome, they make their constraining power sufficiently felt in the resistance that they afford. There is no innovator, even a fortunate one, whose ventures do not encounter opposition of this kind.

Here, then, is a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him. Consequently, since they consist of representations and actions, they cannot be confused with organic phenomena, nor with psychical phenomena, which have no existence save in and through the individual consciousness. Thus they constitute a new species and to them must be exclusively assigned the term *social*. It is appropriate, since it is clear that, not having the individual as their substratum, they can have none other than society, either political society in its entirety or one of the partial groups that it includes—religious denominations, political and literary schools, occupational corporations, etc. Moreover, it is for such as these alone that the term is fitting, for the word 'social' has the sole meaning of designating those phenomena which fall into none of the categories of facts already constituted and labelled. They are consequently the proper field of sociology. It is true that this word 'constraint', in terms of which we define them, is in danger of infuriating those who zealously uphold out-and-out individualism. Since they maintain that the individual is completely autonomous, it seems to them that he is diminished every time he is made aware that he is not dependent on himself alone. Yet since it is indisputable today that most of our ideas and tendencies are not developed by ourselves, but come to us from outside, they can only penetrate us by imposing themselves upon us. This is all that our definition implies. Moreover, we know that all social constraints do not necessarily exclude the individual personality.[1]

Yet since the examples just cited (legal and moral rules, religious dogmas, financial systems, etc.) consist wholly of beliefs and practices already well established, in view of what has been said it might be maintained that no social fact can exist except where there is a well defined social organisation. But there are other facts which do not present themselves in this already crystallised form but which also possess the same objectivity and ascendancy over the individual. These are what are called social 'currents'. Thus in a public gathering the great waves of enthusiasm, indignation and pity that are produced have their seat in no one individual consciousness. They come to each one of us from outside and can sweep us along in spite of ourselves. If perhaps I abandon myself to them I may not be conscious of the pressure that they are exerting upon me, but that pressure makes its presence felt immediately I attempt to struggle against them. If an individual tries to pit himself against one of these collective manifestations, the sentiments that he is rejecting will be turned against

him. Now if this external coercive power asserts itself so acutely in cases of resistance, it must be because it exists in the other instances cited above without our being conscious of it. Hence we are the victims of an illusion which leads us to believe we have ourselves produced what has been imposed upon us externally. But if the willingness with which we let ourselves be carried along disguises the pressure we have undergone, it does not eradicate it. Thus air does not cease to have weight, although we no longer feel that weight. Even when we have individually and spontaneously shared in the common emotion, the impression we have experienced is utterly different from what we would have felt if we had been alone. Once the assembly has broken up and these social influences have ceased to act upon us, and we are once more on our own, the emotions we have felt seem an alien phenomenon, one in which we no longer recognise ourselves. It is then we perceive that we have undergone the emotions much more than generated them. These emotions may even perhaps fill us with horror, so much do they go against the grain. Thus individuals who are normally perfectly harmless may, when gathered together in a crowd, let themselves be drawn into acts of atrocity. And what we assert about these transitory outbreaks likewise applies to those more lasting movements of opinion which relate to religious, political, literary and artistic matters, etc., and which are constantly being produced around us, whether throughout society or in a more limited sphere.

Moreover, this definition of a social fact can be verified by examining an experience that is characteristic. It is sufficient to observe how children are brought up. If one views the facts as they are and indeed as they have always been, it is patently obvious that all education consists of a continual effort to impose upon the child ways of seeing, thinking and acting which he himself would not have arrived at spontaneously. From his earliest years we oblige him to eat, drink and sleep at regular hours, and to observe cleanliness, calm and obedience; later we force him to learn how to be mindful of others, to respect customs and conventions, and to work, etc. If this constraint in time ceases to be felt it is because it gradually gives rise to habits, to inner tendencies which render it superfluous; but they supplant the constraint only because they are derived from it. It is true that, in Spencer's view, a rational education should shun such means and allow the child complete freedom to do what he will. Yet as this educational theory has never been put into practice among any known people, it can only be the personal expression of a *desideratum* and not a fact which can be established in contradiction to the other facts given above. What renders these latter facts particularly illuminating is that education sets out precisely with the object of creating a social being. Thus there can be seen, as in an abbreviated form, how the social being has been fashioned historically. The pressure to which the child is subjected unremittingly is the same pressure of the social environment which seeks to shape him in its own image, and in which parents and teachers are only the representatives and intermediaries.

Thus it is not the fact that they are general which can serve to characterise sociological phenomena. Thoughts to be found in the consciousness of each individual and movements which are repeated by all individuals are not for this reason social facts. If some have been content with using this characteristic in order to define them it is because they have been confused, wrongly, with what might be termed their individual incarnations. What constitutes social facts are the beliefs, tendencies and practices of the group taken collectively. But the forms that these collective states may assume when they are 'refracted' through individuals are things of a different kind. What irrefutably demonstrates this duality of kind is that these two categories of facts frequently are manifested dissociated from each other. Indeed some of these ways of acting or thinking acquire, by dint of repetition, a sort of consistency which, so to speak, separates them out, isolating them from the particular events which reflect them. Thus they assume a shape, a tangible

form peculiar to them and constitute a reality *sui generis* vastly distinct from the individual facts which manifest that reality. Collective custom does not exist only in a state of immanence in the successive actions which it determines, but, by a privilege without example in the biological kingdom, expresses itself once and for all in a formula repeated by word of mouth, transmitted by education and even enshrined in the written word. Such are the origins and nature of legal and moral rules, aphorisms and popular sayings, articles of faith in which religious or political sects epitomise their beliefs, and standards of taste drawn up by literary schools, etc. None of these modes of acting and thinking are to be found wholly in the application made of them by individuals, since they can even exist without being applied at the time.

Undoubtedly this state of dissociation does not always present itself with equal distinctiveness. It is sufficient for dissociation to exist unquestionably in the numerous important instances cited, for us to prove that the social fact exists separately from its individual effects. Moreover, even when the dissociation is not immediately observable, it can often be made so with the help of certain methodological devices. Indeed it is essential to embark on such procedures if one wishes to refine out the social fact from any amalgam and so observe it in its pure state. Thus certain currents of opinion, whose intensity varies according to the time and country in which they occur, impel us, for example, towards marriage or suicide, towards higher or lower birth-rates, etc. Such currents are plainly social facts. At first sight they seem inseparable from the forms they assume in individual cases. But statistics afford us a means of isolating them. They are indeed not inaccurately represented by rates of births, marriages and suicides, that is, by the result obtained after dividing the average annual total of marriages, births, and voluntary homicides by the number of persons of an age to marry, produce children, or commit suicide.[2] Since each one of these statistics includes without distinction all individual cases, the individual circumstances which may have played some part in producing the phenomenon cancel each other out and consequently do not contribute to determining the nature of the phenomenon. What it expresses is a certain state of the collective mind.

That is what social phenomena are when stripped of all extraneous elements. As regards their private manifestations, these do indeed having something social about them, since in part they reproduce the collective model. But to a large extent each one depends also upon the psychical and organic constitution of the individual, and on the particular circumstances in which he is placed. Therefore they are not phenomena which are in the strict sense sociological. They depend on both domains at the same time, and could be termed socio-psychical. They are of interest to the sociologist without constituting the immediate content of sociology. The same characteristic is to be found in the organisms of those mixed phenomena of nature studied in the combined sciences such as biochemistry.

It may be objected that a phenomenon can only be collective if it is common to all the members of society, or at the very least to a majority, and consequently, if it is general. This is doubtless the case, but if it is general it is because it is collective (that is, more or less obligatory); but it is very far from being collective because it is general. It is a condition of the group repeated in individuals because it imposes itself upon them. It is in each part because it is in the whole, but far from being in the whole because it is in the parts. This is supremely evident in those beliefs and practices which are handed down to us ready fashioned by previous generations. We accept and adopt them because, since they are the work of the collectivity and one that is centuries old, they are invested with a special authority that our education has taught us to recognise and respect. It is worthy of note that the vast majority of social phenomena come to us in this way. But even when the social fact is partly due to our direct co-operation, it is no different in nature. An outburst of collective emotion

in a gathering does not merely express the sum total of what individual feelings share in common, but is something of a very different order, as we have demonstrated. It is a product of shared existence, of actions and reactions called into play between the consciousnesses of individuals. If it is echoed in each one of them it is precisely by virtue of the special energy derived from its collective origins. If all hearts beat in unison, this is not as a consequence of a spontaneous, pre-established harmony; it is because one and the same force is propelling them in the same direction. Each one is borne along by the rest.

We have therefore succeeded in delineating for ourselves the exact field of sociology. It embraces one single, well defined group of phenomena. A social fact is identifiable through the power of external coercion which it exerts or is capable of exerting upon individuals. The presence of this power is in turn recognisable because of the existence of some pre-determined sanction, or through the resistance that the fact opposes to any individual action that may threaten it. However, it can also be defined by ascertaining how widespread it is within the group, provided that, as noted above, one is careful to add a second essential characteristic; this is, that it exists independently of the particular forms that it may assume in the process of spreading itself within the group. In certain cases this latter criterion can even be more easily applied than the former one. The presence of constraint is easily ascertainable when it is manifested externally through some direct reaction of society, as in the case of law, morality, beliefs, customs and even fashions. But when constraint is merely indirect, as with that exerted by an economic organisation, it is not always so clearly discernible. Generality combined with objectivity may then be easier to establish. Moreover, this second definition is simply another formulation of the first one: if a mode of behaviour existing outside the consciousnesses of individuals becomes general, it can only do so by exerting pressure upon them.[3]

However, one may well ask whether this definition is complete. Indeed the facts which have provided us with its basis are all *ways of functioning:* they are 'physiological' in nature. But there are also collective *ways of being*, namely, social facts of an 'anatomical' or morphological nature. Sociology cannot dissociate itself from what concerns the substratum of collective life. Yet the number and nature of the elementary parts which constitute society, the way in which they are articulated, the degree of coalescence they have attained, the distribution of population over the earth's surface, the extent and nature of the network of communications, the design of dwellings, etc., do not at first sight seem relatable to ways of acting, feeling or thinking.

Yet, first and foremost, these various phenomena present the same characteristic which has served us in defining the others. These ways of being impose themselves upon the individual just as do the ways of acting we have dealt with. In fact, when we wish to learn how a society is divided up politically, in what its divisions consist and the degree of solidarity that exists between them, it is not through physical inspection and geographical observation that we may come to find this out: such divisions are social, although they may have some physical basis. It is only through public law that we can study such political organisation, because this law is what determines its nature, just as it determines our domestic and civic relationships. The organisation is no less a form of compulsion. If the population clusters together in our cities instead of being scattered over the rural areas, it is because there exists a trend of opinion, a collective drive which imposes this concentration upon individuals. We can no more choose the design of our houses than the cut of our clothes—at least, the one is as much obligatory as the other. The communication network forcibly prescribes the direction of internal migrations or commercial exchanges, etc., and even their intensity. Consequently, at the most there are grounds for adding one further category to the list of phenomena already enumerated as bearing the distinctive stamp of a social fact. But as that

enumeration was in no wise strictly exhaustive, this addition would not be indispensable.

Moreover, it does not even serve a purpose, for these ways of being are only ways of acting that have been consolidated. A society's political structure is only the way in which its various component segments have become accustomed to living with each other. If relationships between them are traditionally close, the segments tend to merge together; if the contrary, they tend to remain distinct. The type of dwelling imposed upon us is merely the way in which everyone around us and, in part, previous generations, have customarily built their houses. The communication network is only the channel which has been cut by the regular current of commerce and migrations, etc., flowing in the same direction. Doubtless if phenomena of a morphological kind were the only ones that displayed this rigidity, it might be thought that they constituted a separate species. But a legal rule is no less permanent an arrangement than an architectural style, and yet it is a 'physiological' fact. A simple moral maxim is certainly more malleable, yet it is cast in forms much more rigid than a mere professional custom or fashion. Thus there exists a whole range of gradations which, without any break in continuity, join the most clearly delineated structural facts to those free currents of social life which are not yet caught in any definite mould. This therefore signifies that the differences between them concern only the degree to which they have become consolidated. Both are forms of life at varying stages of crystallisation. It would undoubtedly be advantageous to reserve the term 'morphological' for those social facts which relate to the social substratum, but only on condition that one is aware that they are of the same nature as the others. Our definition will therefore subsume all that has to be defined it if states:

> *A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint;*

or:

> *which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations.*[4]

NOTES

1. Moreover, this is not to say that all constraint is normal. We shall return to this point later.
2. Suicides do not occur at any age, nor do they occur at all ages of life with the same frequency.
3. It can be seen how far removed this definition of the social fact is from that which serves as the basis for the ingenious system of Tarde. We must first state that our research has nowhere led us to corroboration of the preponderant influence that Tarde attributes to imitation in the genesis of collective facts. Moreover, from this definition, which is not a theory but a mere résumé of the immediate data observed, it seems clearly to follow that imitation does not always express, indeed never expresses, what is essential and characteristic in the social fact. Doubtless every social fact is imitated and has, as we have just shown, a tendency to become generalised, but this is because it is social, i.e. obligatory. Its capacity for expansion is not the cause but the consequence of its sociological character. If social facts were unique in bringing about this effect, imitation might serve, if not to explain them, at least to define them. But an individual state which impacts on others none the less remains individual. Moreover, one may speculate whether the term 'imitation' is indeed appropriate to designate a proliferation which occurs through some coercive influence. In such a single term very different phenomena, which need to be distinguished, are confused.
4. This close affinity of life and structure, organ and function, can be readily established in sociology because there exists between these two extremes a whole series of intermediate stages, immediately observable, which reveal the link between them. Biology lacks this methodological resource. But one may believe legitimately that sociological inductions on this subject are applicable to biology and that, in organisms as in societies, between these two categories of facts only differences in degree exist.

COMPANION WEBSITE

1. Go online to Write Out Loud about some contemporary social facts that are bigger than the sum of their parts.
2. Log on to Durkheim's Profile Page to learn more about the key role he played in establishing sociology as a discipline.
3. Check out the Profile Page for Mid-Century American Theory to learn more about Durkheim's functionalist legacy.

2

The Division of Labor in Society

Emile Durkheim

THE PROBLEM

Although the division of labour is not of recent origin, it was only at the end of the last century that societies began to become aware of this law, to which up to then they had submitted almost unwittingly. Undoubtedly even from antiquity several thinkers had perceived its importance.[1] Yet Adam Smith was the first to attempt to elaborate the theory of it. Moreover, it was he who first coined the term, which social science later lent to biology.

Nowadays the phenomenon has become so widespread that it catches everyone's attention. We can no longer be under any illusion about the trends in modern industry. It involves increasingly powerful mechanisms, large-scale groupings of power and capital, and consequently an extreme division of labour. Inside factories, not only are jobs demarcated, becoming extremely specialised, but each product is itself a speciality entailing the existence of others. Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill persisted in hoping that agriculture at least would prove an exception to the rule, seeing in it the last refuge of small-scale ownership. Although in such a matter we must guard against generalising unduly, nowadays it appears difficult to deny that the main branches of the agricultural industry are increasingly swept along in the general trend.[2] Finally, commerce itself contrives ways to follow and reflect, in all their distinctive nuances, the boundless diversity of industrial undertakings. Although this evolution occurs spontaneously and unthinkingly, those economists who study its causes and evaluate its results, far from condemning such diversification or attacking it, proclaim its necessity. They perceive in it the higher law of human societies and the condition for progress.

Yet the division of labour is not peculiar to economic life. We can observe its increasing influence in the most diverse sectors of society. Functions, whether political, administrative or judicial, are becoming more and more specialised. The same is true in the arts and sciences. The time lies far behind us when philosophy constituted the sole science. It has become fragmented into a host of special disciplines, each having its purpose, method and ethos. 'From one half-century to another the men who have left their mark upon the sciences have become more specialized.'[3]

[...]

FUNCTION OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR

Everybody knows that we like what resembles us, those who think and feel as we do. But the opposite phenomenon is no less frequently encountered. Very often we happen to feel drawn to people who do not resemble us, precisely because they do *not* do so. These facts are seemingly so much at odds that in every age moralists have hesitated about the true nature of friendship and have traced it now to the

one cause, now to the other. The Greeks had already posed the question. 'Friendship,' says Aristotle, 'gives rise to much argument. For some it consists in a certain resemblance, and those who resemble each other like each other: hence the proverbs, "like goes with like", and "birds of a feather flock together", and other similar sayings. But on the contrary, according to others, all those who resemble one another grate upon one another. Other explanations are sought at a higher level which are taken from a consideration of nature. Thus Euripides says that the parched earth is in love with the rain, and that the overcast sky heavy with rain pours down upon the earth in a fury of love. Heraclitus claims that one only accommodates to what one opposes, that the finest harmony is born from differences, and that discord is the law of all becoming'.[4]

What demonstrates these opposing doctrines is the fact that both forms of friendship exist in nature. Dissimilarity, just like resemblance, can be a cause of mutual attraction. However, not every kind of dissimilarity is sufficient to bring this about. We find no pleasure in meeting others whose nature is merely different from our own. Prodigals do not seek the company of the miserly, nor upright and frank characters that of the hypocritical and underhand. Kind and gentle spirits feel no attraction for those of harsh and evil disposition. Thus only differences of a certain kind incline us towards one another. These are those which, instead of mutually opposing and excluding one another, complement one another. Bain says, 'There is a kind of disparity that repels and a kind that attracts; a kind that tends to rivalry, and a kind that tends to friendship ... if what the one has, the other has not, but desires, there is a basis of positive attraction.'[5]

Thus the theorist with a reasoning and subtle mind has often a very special sympathy for practical men who are direct and whose intuition is swift. The fearful are attracted to those who are decisive and resolute, the weak to the strong, and vice versa. However richly endowed we may be, we always lack something, and the best among us feel our own inadequacy. This is why we seek in our friends those qualities we lack, because in uniting with them we share in some way in their nature, feeling ourselves then less incomplete. In this way small groups of friends grow up in which each individual plays a role in keeping with his character, in which a veritable exchange of services occurs. The one protects, the other consoles; one advises, the other executes, and it is this distribution of functions or, to use the common expression, this division of labour, that determines these relations of friendship.

We are therefore led to consider the division of labour in a new light. In this case, indeed, the economic services that it can render are insignificant compared with the moral effect that it produces, and its true function is to create between two or more people a feeling of solidarity. However this result is accomplished, it is this that gives rise to these associations of friends and sets its mark upon them.

The history of marital relationships affords an even more striking example of the same phenomenon.

Doubtless, sexual attraction is never felt save between individuals of the same species, and fairly generally love presumes a certain harmony of thought and feeling. It is nevertheless true that what imparts its specific character to this tendency and generates its specific force is not the similarity but the dissimilarity of the natures that it links together. It is because men and women differ from one another that they seek out one another with such passion. However, as in the previous case, it is not purely and simply contrast that causes reciprocal feelings to arise: only those differences that are assumed and that complement one another possess this power. In fact, men and women in isolation from each other are only different parts of the same concrete whole, which they reconstitute by uniting with each other. In other words, it is the sexual division of labour which is the source of conjugal solidarity, and this is why psychologists have very aptly remarked that the separation of the sexes was an event of prime importance in the evolution of

the sentiments. This is because it has made possible perhaps the strongest of all disinterested tendencies.

There is something else. The division of labour between the sexes is capable of being more, and capable of being less. It can relate only to the sexual organs and some secondary traits that depend on them, or, on the contrary, can extend to all organic and social functions. It can be seen historically as having developed precisely along the same lines and in the same way as marital solidarity.

The further we go back into the past, the more we see that the division of labour between the sexes is reduced to very little. In those distant times woman was not at all the weak creature that she has become as morality has progressed. Prehistoric bone remains attest to the fact that the difference between the strength of a man and a woman was relatively much less than it is today.[6] Even nowadays, in infancy and up to puberty, the skeletal frame of the two sexes is not appreciably different: its characteristics are principally female. If one accepts that the development of the individual reproduces in abridged form that of the species, we may justifiably conjecture that the same homogeneity was to be found at the beginnings of human evolution, and see in the female form a close image of what was originally that single, common type from which the male sex has gradually become distinct. Moreover, travellers report that among a certain number of South American tribes man and woman show in their general build and appearance a similarity greater than that found elsewhere.[7] Finally, Dr Lebon has been able to establish directly, with mathematical precision, this original resemblance between the sexes, in regard to the preeminent organ of physical and mental life, the brain. By comparing a large number of skulls selected from among different races and societies, he arrived at the following conclusion:

> The volume of the skull of a man or woman, even when subjects of the same age, size and weight are being compared, presents considerable differences in favour of the man, and this disparity likewise increases with the advance of civilization, so that, as regards the mass of the brain, and consequently of the intelligence, woman tends increasingly to become different from man. For example, the difference which exists between the average size of the brain between present-day Parisian men and women is almost double that observed between male and female skulls in ancient Egypt.[8]

A German anthropologist, Bischoff, has arrived at the same result in this respect.[9]

These anatomical similarities are concomitant with functional ones. In fact, in these same societies the female functions are not very clearly distinguished from the masculine ones, but the two sexes lead roughly the same kind of existence. Even now there is still a very large number of savage peoples where the woman takes part in political life. This has been observed especially among the Indian tribes of America, such as the Iroquois and the Natchez,[10] in Hawaii where she shares in the life of the man in countless ways,[11] in New Zealand and Samoa. Similarly we see very frequently the women going off to war with the men, stimulating them to fight, and even participating very actively in the fighting. In Cuba and Dahomey they are as warlike as the men, fighting side by side with them.[12] One of the distinctive attributes of a woman today, that of gentleness, does not originally appear to have been characteristic of her. Already among certain animal species the female is, on the contrary, noted for the opposite characteristic.

Among these same peoples marriage exists only in a very rudimentary state. Even if not yet demonstrated with certainty, it is even very likely that there was an era in the history of the family when marriage did not exist. Sexual relationships were made and unmade at will, the partners being bound by no legal tie. In any case we know of a family type relatively close to us[13] in which marriage is still only in a distinctly embryonic state, that is, the matriarchal family. The relationships between mother and children are very clearly defined, but

those between the two partners are very lax. They can cease as soon as the parties wish, or indeed may be entered into only for a limited period.[14] Marital fidelity is still not required. Marriage, or what is so termed, comprises solely obligations of a strictly limited nature, and these are very often of short duration, linking the husband to the wife's relations. Thus it amounts to very little. In any given society the set of legal rules that constitute marriage only symbolises the state of conjugal solidarity. If this is very strong, the bonds uniting husband and wife are numerous and complex, and consequently the marriage rules, whose purpose is to define them, are themselves very elaborate. If, on the other hand, the marital state lacks cohesiveness, if the relations between the man and the woman are unstable and sporadic, they cannot assume a very fixed form. Consequently marriage comes down to a small number of rules lacking rigour and preciseness. The state of marriage in societies where the two sexes are only slightly differentiated thus bears witness to the fact that conjugal solidarity is itself very weak.

On the other hand, as we approach modern times, we see marriage developing. The network of ties that it creates becomes ever more extensive, the obligations that it imposes increase. The conditions on which it may be entered into, and those on which it may be dissolved are stipulated with increasing precision, as are the consequences of such a dissolution. The duty of fidelity takes on an organised form; at first laid upon the wife alone, it later becomes reciprocal. When the institution of the dowry makes its appearance, very complex rules emerge fixing the respective rights of each partner regarding their individual fortunes. Moreover, we need only cast a glance through our legal codes to see how important is the place of marriage. The union of the two spouses has ceased to be ephemeral; no longer is it an external, temporary and partial contact, but an intimate association, one that is lasting, often even indissoluble, between two lives throughout their whole existence.

Beyond question, over the same period of time labour became increasingly divided up as between the sexes. At first limited to the sexual functions alone, it gradually extended to many other functions. The woman had long withdrawn from warfare and public affairs, and had centred her existence entirely round the family. Since then her role has become even more specialised. Nowadays, among civilised peoples the woman leads an existence entirely different from the man's. It might be said that the two great functions of psychological life had become as if dissociated from each other, one sex having taken over the affective, the other the intellectual function. Noticing how, among certain social classes the women are taken up with art and literature, just as are the men, one might, it is true, believe that the activities of both sexes are tending once more to become homogeneous. But even in this sphere of activity, the woman brings to bear her own nature, and her role remains very special, one very different from that of the man. What is more, if art and letters are beginning to become matters that occupy women, the other sex appears to be abandoning them so as to devote itself more especially to science. Thus it might well happen that this apparent reversion to a primeval homogeneity is no more than the beginning of a fresh differentiation.

[...]

We have not merely to investigate whether, in these kinds of societies, there exists a social solidarity arising from the division of labour. This is a self-evident truth, since in them the division of labour is highly developed and it engenders solidarity. But above all we must determine the degree to which the solidarity it produces contributes generally to the integration of society. Only then shall we learn to what extent it is necessary, whether it is an essential factor in social cohesion, or whether, on the contrary, it is only an ancillary and secondary condition for it. To answer this question we must

therefore compare this social bond to others, in order to measure what share in the total effect must be attributed to it. To do this it is indispensable to begin by classifying the different species of social solidarity.

However, social solidarity is a wholly moral phenomenon which by itself is not amenable to exact observation and especially not to measurement. To arrive at this classification, as well as this comparison, we must therefore substitute for this internal datum, which escapes us, an external one which symbolises it, and then study the former through the latter.

That visible symbol is the law. Indeed where social solidarity exists, in spite of its non-material nature, it does not remain in a state of pure potentiality, but shows its presence through perceptible effects. Where it is strong it attracts men strongly to one another, ensures frequent contacts between them, and multiplies the opportunities available to them to enter into mutual relationships. To state the position precisely, at the point we have now reached it is not easy to say whether it is social solidarity that produces these phenomena or, on the contrary, whether it is the result of them. Likewise it is a moot point whether men draw closer to one another because of the strong effects of social solidarity, or whether it is strong because men *have* come closer together. However, for the moment we need not concern ourselves with clarifying this question. It is enough to state that these two orders of facts are linked, varying with each other simultaneously and directly. The more closely knit the members of a society, the more they maintain various relationships either with one another or with the group collectively. For if they met together rarely, they would not be mutually dependent, except sporadically and somewhat weakly. Moreover, the number of these relationships is necessarily proportional to that of the legal rules that determine them. In fact, social life, wherever it becomes lasting, inevitably tends to assume a definite form and become organised. Law is nothing more than this very organisation in its most stable and precise form.[15] Life in general within a society cannot enlarge in scope without legal activity simultaneously increasing in proportion. Thus we may be sure to find reflected in the law all the essential varieties of social solidarity.

[...]

Thus our method is clearly traced out for us. Since law reproduces the main forms of social solidarity, we have only to classify the different types of law in order to be able to investigate which types of social solidarity correspond to them. It is already likely that one species of law exists which symbolises the special solidarity engendered by the division of labour. Once we have made this investigation, in order to judge what part the division of labour plays it will be enough to compare the number of legal rules which give it expression with the total volume of law.

To undertake this study we cannot use the habitual distinctions made by jurisprudents. Conceived for the practice of law, from this viewpoint they can be very convenient, but science cannot be satisfied with such empirical classifications and approximations. The most widespread classification is that which divides law into public and private law. Public law is held to regulate the relationships of the individual with the state, private law those of individuals with one another. Yet when we attempt to define these terms closely, the dividing line, which appeared at first sight to be so clear-cut, disappears. All law is private, in the sense that always and everywhere individuals are concerned and are its actors. Above all, however, all law is public, in the sense that it is a social function, and all individuals are, although in different respects, functionaries of society. The functions of marriage and parenthood, etc. are not spelt out or organised any differently from those of ministers or legislators. Not without reason did Roman law term guardianship a *munus publicum*. Moreover; what is the state? Where does it begin, where does it end? The controversial nature

of this question is well known. It is unscientific to base such a fundamental classification on such an obscure and inadequately analysed idea.

In order to proceed methodically, we have to discover some characteristic which, whilst essential to juridical phenomena, is capable of varying as they vary. Now, every legal precept may be defined as a rule of behaviour to which sanctions apply. Moreover, it is clear that the sanctions change according to the degree of seriousness attached to the precepts, the place they occupy in the public consciousness, and the role they play in society. Thus it is appropriate to classify legal rules according to the different sanctions that are attached to them.

These are of two kinds. The first consist essentially in some injury, or at least some disadvantage imposed upon the perpetrator of a crime. Their purpose is to do harm to him through his fortune, his honour, his life, his liberty, or to deprive him of some object whose possession he enjoys. These are said to be repressive sanctions, such as those laid down in the penal code. It is true that those that appertain to purely moral rules are of the same character. Yet such sanctions are administered in a diffuse way by everybody without distinction, whilst those of the penal code are applied only through the mediation of a definite body—they are organised. As for the other kind of sanctions, they do not necessarily imply any suffering on the part of the perpetrator, but merely consist in *restoring the previous state of affairs*, re-establishing relationships that have been disturbed from their normal form. This is done either by forcibly redressing the action impugned, restoring it to the type from which it has deviated, or by annulling it, that is depriving it of all social value. Thus legal rules must be divided into two main species, according to whether they relate to repressive, organised sanctions, or to ones that are purely restitutory. The first group covers all penal law; the second, civil law, commercial law, procedural law, administrative and constitutional law, when any penal rules which may be attached to them have been removed.

Let us now investigate what kind of social solidarity corresponds to each of these species.

MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY, OR SOLIDARITY BY SIMILARITIES

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own. It can be termed the collective or common consciousness. Undoubtedly the substratum of this consciousness does not consist of a single organ. By definition it is diffused over society as a whole, but nonetheless possesses specific characteristics that make it a distinctive reality. In fact it is independent of the particular conditions in which individuals find themselves. Individuals pass on, but it abides. It is the same in north and south, in large towns and in small, and in different professions. Likewise it does not change with every generation but, on the contrary, links successive generations to one another. Thus it is something totally different from the consciousnesses of individuals, although it is only realised in individuals. It is the psychological type of society, one which has its properties, conditions for existence and mode of development, just as individual types do, but in a different fashion. For this reason it has the right to be designated by a special term. It is true that the one we have employed above is not without ambiguity. Since the terms 'collective' and 'social' are often taken as synonyms, one is inclined to believe that the collective consciousness is the entire social consciousness, that is, co-terminous with the psychological life of society, whereas, particularly in higher societies, it constitutes only a very limited part of it. Those functions that are judicial, governmental, scientific or industrial—in short, all the specific functions—appertain to the psychological order, since they consist of systems of representation and action. However, they clearly lie outside the common consciousness. To avoid a confusion[16] that has occurred it would

perhaps be best to invent a technical expression which would specifically designate the sum total of social similarities. However, since the use of a new term, when it is not absolutely necessary, is not without its disadvantages, we shall retain the more generally used expression, 'collective (or common) consciousness', but always keeping in mind the restricted sense in which we are employing it.

Thus, summing up the above analysis, we may state that an act is criminal when it offends the strong, well-defined states of the collective consciousness.[17]

This proposition, taken literally, is scarcely disputed, although usually we give it a meaning very different from the one it should have. It is taken as if it expressed, not the essential characteristics of the crime, but one of its repercussions. We well know that crime offends very general sentiments, but ones that are strongly held. But it is believed that their generality and strength spring from the criminal nature of the act, which consequently still remains wholly to be defined. It is not disputed that any criminal act excites universal disapproval, but it is taken for granted that this results from its criminal nature. Yet one is then hard put to it to state what is the nature of this criminality. Is it in a particularly serious form of immorality? I would concur, but this is to answer a question by posing another, by substituting one term for another. For what *is* immorality is precisely what we want to know—and particularly that special form of immorality which society represses by an organised system of punishments, and which constitutes criminality. Clearly it can only derive from one or several characteristics common to all varieties of crime. Now the only characteristic to satisfy that condition refers to the opposition that exists between crime of any kind and certain collective sentiments. It is thus this opposition which, far from deriving from the crime, constitutes the crime. In other words, we should not say that an act offends the common consciousness because it is criminal, but that it is criminal because it offends that consciousness. We do not condemn it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we condemn it. As regards the intrinsic nature of these feelings, we cannot specify what that is. They have very diverse objects, so that they cannot be encompassed within a single formula. They cannot be said to relate to the vital interests of society or to a minimum of justice. All such definitions are inadequate. But by the mere fact that a sentiment, whatever may be its origin and purpose, is found in every consciousness and endowed with a certain degree of strength and precision, every act that disturbs it is a crime. Present-day psychology is increasingly turning back to Spinoza's idea that things are good because we like them, rather than that we like them because they are good. What is primary is the tendency and disposition: pleasure and pain are only facts derived from this. The same holds good for social life. An act is socially evil because it is rejected by society. But, it will be contended, are there no collective sentiments that arise from the pleasure or pain that society feels when it comes into contact with their objects? This is doubtless so, but all such sentiments do not originate in this way. Many, if not the majority, derive from utterly different causes. Anything that obliges our activity to take on a definite form can give rise to habits that result in dispositions which then have to be satisfied. Moreover, these dispositions alone are truly fundamental. The others are only special forms of them and are more determinate. Thus to find charm in a particular object, collective sensibility must already have been constituted in such a way as to be able to appreciate it. If the corresponding sentiments are abolished, an act most disastrous for society will not only be capable of being tolerated, but honoured and held up as an example. Pleasure cannot create a disposition out of nothing; it can only link to a particular end those dispositions that already exist, provided that end is in accordance with their original nature.

[...]

We can therefore see what kind of solidarity the penal law symbolises. In fact we all know that a

social cohesion exists whose cause can be traced to a certain conformity of each individual consciousness to a common type, which is none other than the psychological type of society. Indeed under these conditions all members of the group are not only individually attracted to one another because they resemble one another, but they are also linked to what is the condition for the existence of this collective type, that is, to the society that they form by coming together. Not only do fellow-citizens like one another, seeking one another out in preference to foreigners, but they love their country. They wish for it what they would wish for themselves, they care that it should be lasting and prosperous, because without it a whole area of their psychological life would fail to function smoothly. Conversely, society insists upon its citizens displaying all these basic resemblances because it is a condition for its own cohesion. Two consciousnesses exist within us: the one comprises only states that are personal to each one of us, characteristic of us as individuals, whilst the other comprises states that are common to the whole of society.[18] The former represents only our individual personality, which it constitutes; the latter represents the collective type and consequently the society without which it would not exist. When it is an element of the latter determining our behaviour, we do not act with an eye to our own personal interest, but are pursuing collective ends. Now, although distinct, these two consciousnesses are linked to each other, since in the end they constitute only one entity, for both have one and the same organic basis. Thus they are solidly joined together. This gives rise to a solidarity *sui generis* which, deriving from resemblances, binds the individual directly to society. In the next chapter we shall be better able to demonstrate why we propose to term this solidarity mechanical. It does not consist merely in a general, indeterminate attachment of the individual to the group, but is also one that concerts their detailed actions. Indeed, since such collective motives are the same everywhere, they produce everywhere the same effects. Consequently, whenever they are brought into play all wills spontaneously move as one in the same direction.

It is this solidarity that repressive law expresses, at least in regard to what is vital to it. Indeed the acts which such law forbids and stigmatises as crimes are of two kinds: either they manifest directly a too violent dissimilarity between the one who commits them and the collective type; or they offend the organ of the common consciousness. In both cases the force shocked by the crime and that rejects it is thus the same. It is a result of the most vital social similarities, and its effect is to maintain the social cohesion that arises from these similarities. It is that force which the penal law guards against being weakened in any way. At the same time it does this by insisting upon a minimum number of similarities from each one of us, without which the individual would be a threat to the unity of the body social, and by enforcing respect for the symbol which expresses and epitomises these resemblances, whilst simultaneously guaranteeing them.

By this is explained why some acts have so frequently been held to be criminal, and punished as such, without in themselves being harmful to society. Indeed, just like the individual type, the collective type has been fashioned under the influence of very diverse causes, and even of random events. A product of historical development, it bears the mark of those circumstances of every kind through which society has lived during its history. It would therefore be a miracle if everything to be found in it were geared to some useful end. Some elements, more or less numerous, cannot fail to have been introduced into it which are unrelated to social utility. Among the dispositions and tendencies the individual has received from his ancestors or has developed over time there are certainly many that serve no purpose, or that cost more than the benefits they bring. Undoubtedly most of these are not harmful, for if they were, in such conditions the individual could not live. But there are some that persist although lacking in all utility. Even those that do undisputedly render a

service are frequently of an intensity disproportionate to their usefulness, because that intensity derives in part from other causes. The same holds good for collective emotions. Every act that disturbs them is not dangerous in itself, or at least is not so perilous as the condemnation it earns. However, the reprobation such acts incur is not without reason. For, whatever the origin of these sentiments, once they constitute a part of the collective type, and particularly if they are essential elements in it, everything that serves to undermine them at the same time undermines social cohesion and is prejudicial to society. In their origin they had no usefulness but, having survived, it becomes necessary for them to continue despite their irrationality. This is generally why it is good that acts that offend these sentiments should not be tolerated. Doubtless, by reasoning in the abstract it can indeed be shown that there are no grounds for a society to prohibit the eating of a particular kind of meat, an action inoffensive in itself. But once an abhorrence of this food has become an integral part of the common consciousness it cannot disappear without social bonds becoming loosened, and of this the healthy individual consciousness is vaguely aware.[19]

The same is true of punishment. Although it proceeds from an entirely mechanical reaction and from an access of passionate emotion, for the most part unthinking, it continues to play a useful role. But that role is not the one commonly perceived. It does not serve, or serves only very incidentally, to correct the guilty person or to scare off any possible imitators. From this dual viewpoint its effectiveness may rightly be questioned; in any case it is mediocre. Its real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common consciousness in all its vigour. If that consciousness were thwarted so categorically, it would necessarily lose some of its power, were an emotional reaction from the community not forthcoming to make good that loss. Thus there would result a relaxation in the bonds of social solidarity. The consciousness must therefore be conspicuously reinforced the moment it meets with opposition. The sole means of doing so is to give voice to the unanimous aversion that the crime continues to evoke, and this by an official act, which can only mean suffering inflicted upon the wrongdoer. Thus, although a necessary outcome of the causes that give rise to it, this suffering is not a gratuitous act of cruelty. It is a sign indicating that the sentiments of the collectivity are still unchanged, that the communion of minds sharing the same beliefs remains absolute, and in this way the injury that the crime has inflicted upon society is made good. This is why it is right to maintain that the criminal should suffer in proportion to his crime, and why theories that deny to punishment any expiatory character appear, in the minds of many, to subvert the social order. In fact such theories could only be put into practice in a society from which almost every trace of the common consciousness has been expunged. Without this necessary act of satisfaction what is called the moral consciousness could not be preserved. Thus, without being paradoxical, we may state that punishment is above all intended to have its effect upon honest people. Since it serves to heal the wounds inflicted upon the collective sentiments, it can only fulfil this role where such sentiments exist, and in so far as they are active. Undoubtedly, by forestalling in minds already distressed any further weakening of the collective psyche, punishment can indeed prevent such attacks from multiplying. But such a result, useful though it is, is merely a particular side-effect. In short, to visualise an exact idea of punishment, the two opposing theories that have been advanced must be reconciled: the one sees in punishment an expiation, the other conceives it as a weapon for the defence of society. Certainly it does fulfil the function of protecting society, but this is because of its expiatory nature. Moreover, if it must be expiatory, this is not because suffering redeems error by virtue of some mystic strength or another, but because it cannot produce its socially useful effect save on this one condition.[20]

[...]

SOLIDARITY ARISING FROM THE DIVISION OF LABOR, OR ORGANIC SOLIDARITY

The very nature of the restitutory sanction is sufficient to show that the social solidarity to which that law corresponds is of a completely different kind.

The distinguishing mark of this sanction is that it is not expiatory, but comes down to a mere *restoration of the 'status quo ante'*. Suffering in proportion to the offence is not inflicted upon the one who has broken the law or failed to acknowledge it; he is merely condemned to submit to it. If certain acts have already been performed, the judge restores them to what they should be. He pronounces what the law is, but does not talk of punishment. Damages awarded have no penal character: they are simply a means of putting back the clock so as to restore the past, so far as possible, to its normal state. It is true that Tarde believed that he had discovered a kind of civil penal law in the awarding of costs, which are always borne by the losing party.[21] Yet taken in this sense the term has no more than a metaphorical value. For there to be punishment there should at least be some proportionality between the punishment and the wrong, and for this one would have to establish exactly the degree of seriousness of the wrong. In fact the loser of the case pays its costs even when his intentions were innocent and he is guilty of nothing more than ignorance. The reasons for this rule therefore seem to be entirely different. Since justice is not administered free, it seems equitable that the costs should be borne by the one who has occasioned them. Moreover, although it is possible that the prospect of such costs may stop the overhasty litigant, this is not enough for them to be considered a punishment. The fear of ruin that is normally consequent upon idleness and neglect may cause the businessman to be energetic and diligent. Yet ruin, in the exact connotation of the term, is not the penal sanction for his shortcomings.

Failure to observe these rules is not even sanctioned by a diffused form of punishment. The plaintiff who has lost his case is not disgraced, nor is his honour impugned. We can even envisage these rules being different from what they are without any feeling of repugnance. The idea that murder can be tolerated sets us up in arms, but we very readily accept that the law of inheritance might be modified, and many even conceive that it could be abolished. At least it is a question that we are not unwilling to discuss. Likewise, we agree without difficulty that the laws regarding easements or usufruct might be framed differently, or that the mutual obligations of buyer and vendor might be determined in another way, and that administrative functions might be allocated according to different principles. Since these prescriptions do not correspond to any feeling within us, and as generally we do not know their scientific justification, since this science does not yet exist, they have no deep roots in most of us. Doubtless there are exceptions: We do not tolerate the idea that an undertaking entered into that is contrary to morals or obtained either by violence or fraud can bind the contracting parties. Thus when public opinion is faced with cases of this kind it shows itself less indifferent than we have just asserted, and it adds its disapprobation to the legal sanction, causing it to weigh more heavily. This is because there are no clear-cut partitions between the various domains of moral life. On the contrary, they form a continuum, and consequently adjacent areas exist where different characteristics may be found at one and the same time. Nevertheless the proposition we have enunciated remains true in the overwhelming majority of cases. It demonstrates that rules where sanctions are restitutory either constitute no part at all of the collective consciousness, or subsist in it in only a weak state. Repressive law corresponds to what is the heart and centre of the common consciousness. Purely moral rules are already a less central part of it. Lastly, restitutory law springs from the farthest zones of consciousness and extends

well beyond them. The more it becomes truly itself, the more it takes its distance.

This characteristic is moreover evinced in the way that it functions. Whereas repressive law tends to stay diffused throughout society, restitutory law sets up for itself ever more specialized bodies: consular courts, and industrial and administrative tribunals of every kind. Even in its most general sector, that of civil law, it is brought into use only by special officials—magistrates, lawyers, etc., who have been equipped for their role by a very special kind of training.

But although these rules are more or less outside the collective consciousness, they do not merely concern private individuals. If this were the case, restitutory law would have nothing in common with social solidarity, for the relationships it regulates would join individuals to one another without their being linked to society. They would be mere events of private life, as are, for instance, relationships of friendship. Yet it is far from the case that society is absent from this sphere of legal activity. Generally it is true that it does not intervene by itself and of its own volition: it must be solicited to do so by the parties concerned. Yet although it has to be invoked, its intervention is none the less the essential cog in the mechanism, since it alone causes that mechanism to function. It is society that declares what the law is, through its body of representatives.

However, it has been maintained that this role is in no way an especially social one, but comes down to being that of a conciliator of private interests. Consequently it has been held that any private individual could fulfil it, and that if society adopted it, this was solely for reasons of convenience. Yet it is wholly inaccurate to make society a kind of third-party arbitrator between the other parties. When it is induced to intervene it is not to reconcile the interests of individuals. It does not investigate what may be the most advantageous solution for the protagonists, nor does it suggest a compromise. But it does apply to the particular case submitted to it the general and traditional rules of the law. Yet the law is pre-eminently a social matter, whose object is absolutely different from the interests of the litigants. The judge who examines a divorce petition is not concerned to know whether this form of separation is really desirable for the husband and wife, but whether the causes invoked for it fall into one of the categories stipulated by law.

Yet to assess accurately the importance of the intervention by society it must be observed not only at the moment when the sanction is applied, or when the relationship that has been upset is restored, but also when it is instituted.

Social action is in fact necessary either to lay a foundation for, or to modify, a number of legal relationships regulated by this form of law, and which the assent of the interested parties is not adequate enough either to institute or alter. Of this nature are those relationships in particular that concern personal status. Although marriage is a contract, the partners can neither draw it up nor rescind it at will. The same holds good for all other domestic relationships, and *a fortiori* for all those regulated by administrative law. It is true that obligations that are properly contractual can be entered into or abrogated by the mere will to agreement of the parties. Yet we must bear in mind that, if a contract has binding force, it is society which confers that force. Let us assume that it does not give its blessing to the obligations that have been contracted; these then become pure promises possessing only moral authority.[22] Every contract therefore assumes that behind the parties who bind each other, society is there, quite prepared to intervene and to enforce respect for any undertakings entered into. Thus it only bestows this obligatory force upon contracts that have a social value in themselves, that is, those that are in conformity with the rules of law. We shall even occasionally see that its intervention is still more positive. It is therefore present in every relationship determined by restitutory law, even in ones that appear the most completely private,

and its presence, although not felt, at least under normal conditions, is no less essential.[23]

Since the rules where sanctions are restitutory do not involve the common consciousness, the relationships that they determine are not of the sort that affect everyone indiscriminately. This means that they are instituted directly, not between the individual and society, but between limited and particular elements in society, which they link to one another. Yet on the other hand, since society is not absent it must necessarily indeed be concerned to some extent, and feel some repercussions. Then, depending upon the intensity with which it feels them, it intervenes at a greater or lesser distance, and more or less actively, through the mediation of special bodies whose task it is to represent it. These relationships are therefore very different from those regulated by repressive law, for the latter join directly, without any intermediary, the individual consciousness to that of society, that is, the individual himself to society.

[...]

IV

Since negative solidarity on its own brings about no integration; and since, moreover, there is nothing specific in it, we shall identify only two kinds of positive solidarity, distinguished by the following characteristics:

(1) The first kind links the individual directly to society without any intermediary. With the second kind he depends upon society because he depends upon the parts that go to constitute it.

(2) In the two cases, society is not viewed from the same perspective. In the first, the term is used to denote a more or less organised society composed of beliefs and sentiments common to all the members of the group: this is the collective type. On the contrary, in the second case the society to which we are solidly joined is a system of different and special functions united by definite relationships. Moreover, these two societies are really one. They are two facets of one and the same reality, but which none the less need to be distinguished from each other.

(3) From this second difference there arises another which will serve to allow us to characterise and delineate the features of these two kinds of solidarity.

The first kind can only be strong to the extent that the ideas and tendencies common to all members of the society exceed in number and intensity those that appertain personally to each one of those members. The greater this excess, the more active this kind of society is. Now what constitutes our personality is that which each one of us possesses that is peculiar and characteristic, what distinguishes it from others. This solidarity can therefore only increase in inverse relationship to the personality. As we have said, there is in the consciousness of each one of us two consciousnesses: one that we share in common with our group in its entirety, which is consequently not ourselves, but society living and acting within us; the other that, on the contrary, represents us alone in what is personal and distinctive about us, what makes us an individual.[24] The solidarity that derives from similarities is at its *maximum* when the collective consciousness completely envelops our total consciousness, coinciding with it at every point. At that moment our individuality is zero. That individuality cannot arise until the community fills us less completely. Here there are two opposing forces, the one centripetal, the other centrifugal, which cannot increase at the same time. We cannot ourselves develop simultaneously in two so opposing directions. If we have a strong inclination to think and act for ourselves we cannot be strongly inclined to think and act like other people. If the ideal is to create for ourselves a special, personal image, this

cannot mean to be like everyone else. Moreover, at the very moment when this solidarity exerts its effect, our personality, it may be said by definition, disappears, for we are no longer ourselves, but a collective being.

The social molecules that can only cohere in this one manner cannot therefore move as a unit save in so far as they lack any movement of their own, as do the molecules of inorganic bodies. This is why we suggest that this kind of solidarity should be called mechanical. The word does not mean that the solidarity is produced by mechanical and artificial means. We only use this term for it by analogy with the cohesion that links together the elements of raw materials, in contrast to that which encompasses the unity of living organisms. What finally justifies the use of this term is the fact that the bond that thus unites the individual with society is completely analogous to that which links the thing to the person. The individual consciousness, considered from this viewpoint, is simply a dependency of the collective type, and follows all its motions, just as the object possessed follows those which its owner imposes upon it. In societies where this solidarity is highly developed the individual, as we shall see later, does not belong to himself; he is literally a thing at the disposal of society. Thus, in these same social types, personal rights are still not yet distinguished from 'real' rights.

The situation is entirely different in the case of solidarity that brings about the division of labour. Whereas the other solidarity implies that individuals resemble one another, the latter assumes that they are different from one another. The former type is only possible in so far as the individual personality is absorbed into the collective personality; the latter is only possible if each one of us has a sphere of action that is peculiarly our own, and consequently a personality. Thus the collective consciousness leaves uncovered a part of the individual consciousness, so that there may be established in it those special functions that it cannot regulate. The more extensive this free area is, the stronger the cohesion that arises from this solidarity. Indeed, on the one hand each one of us depends more intimately upon society the more labour is divided up, and on the other, the activity of each one of us is correspondingly more specialised, the more personal it is. Doubtless, however circumscribed that activity may be, it is never completely original. Even in the exercise of our profession we conform to usages and practices that are common to us all within our corporation. Yet even in this case, the burden that we bear is in a different way less heavy than when the whole of society bears down upon us, and this leaves much more room for the free play of our initiative. Here, then, the individuality of the whole grows at the same time as that of the parts. Society becomes more effective in moving in concert, at the same time as each of its elements has more movements that are peculiarly its own. This solidarity resembles that observed in the higher animals. In fact each organ has its own special characteristics and autonomy, yet the greater the unity of the organism, the more marked the individualisation of the parts. Using this analogy, we propose to call 'organic' the solidarity that is due to the division of labour.

THE CAUSES

Thus it is in certain variations of the social environment that we must seek the cause that explains the progress of the division of labour. The results outlined in the preceding book allow us to induce immediately what these variations consist of.

In fact we have seen that the organised structure, and consequently the division of labour, develops regularly as the segmentary structure vanishes. It is therefore this disappearance that is the cause of this development; alternatively, the latter may be the cause of the former. This last hypothesis is not acceptable, for we know that the segmentary arrangement is an insurmountable obstacle to the division of labour and that the arrangement must have disappeared, at least in part, for the division of

labour to be able to appear. It can only do so when that arrangement no longer exists. Undoubtedly once the division of labour exists it can contribute to speeding up its disappearance, but it only becomes apparent after the segmentary arrangement has partly receded. The effect reacts upon the cause, but does not in consequence cease to be an effect. Thus the reaction that it exerts is a secondary one. The increase in the division of labour is therefore due to the fact that the social segments lose their individuality, that the partitions dividing them become more permeable. In short, there occurs between them a coalescence that renders the social substance free to enter upon new combinations.

But the disappearance of this type can only bring about this result for the following reason. It is because there occurs a drawing together of individuals who were separated from one another, or at least they draw more closely together than they had been. Hence movements take place between the parts of the social mass which up to then had no reciprocal effect upon one another. The more the alveolar system is developed, the more the relationships in which each one of us is involved become enclosed within the limits of the alveola to which we belong. There are, as it were, moral vacuums between the various segments. On the other hand these vacuums fill up as the system levels off. Social life, instead of concentrating itself in innumerable small foci that are distinct but alike, becomes general. Social relationships—more exactly we should say intrasocial relationships—consequently become more numerous, since they push out beyond their original boundaries on all sides. Thus the division of labour progresses the more individuals there are who are sufficiently in contact with one another to be able mutually to act and react upon one another. If we agree to call dynamic or moral density this drawing together and the active exchanges that result from it, we can say that the progress of the division of labour is in direct proportion to the moral or dynamic density of society.

But this act of drawing together morally can only bear fruit if the real distance between individuals has itself diminished, in whatever manner. Moral density cannot therefore increase without physical density increasing at the same time, and the latter can serve to measure the extent of the former. Moreover, it is useless to investigate which of the two has influenced the other; it suffices to realise that they are inseparable.

The progressive increase in density of societies in the course of their historical development occurs in three main ways:

(1) Whilst lower societies spread themselves over areas that are relatively vast in comparison with the number of individuals that constitute them, amongst more advanced peoples the population is continually becoming more concentrated. Spencer says: 'If we contrast the populousness of regions inhabited by wild tribes with the populousness of equal regions in Europe; or if we contrast the density of population in England under the Heptarchy with its present density; we see that besides the growth produced by union of groups there has gone an interstitial growth.'[25]

The changes wrought successively in the industrial life of nations demonstrate how general this transformation is. The activity of nomadic tribes, whether hunters or shepherds, entails in fact the absence of any kind of concentration and dispersion over as wide an area as possible. Agriculture, because it is of necessity a settled existence, already presumes a certain drawing together of the social tissues, but one still very incomplete, since between each family tracts of land are interposed.[26] In the city, although the condensation process was greater, yet houses did not adjoin one another, for joined building was not known in Roman law.[27] This was invented on our own soil and demonstrates that the social ties have become tighter.[28] Moreover, from their origins

European societies have seen their density increase continuously in spite of a few cases of temporary regression.[29]

(2) The formation and development of towns are a further symptom, even more characteristic, of the same phenomenon. The increase in average density can be due solely to the physical increase in the birth rate and can consequently be reconciled with a very weak concentration of people, and the very marked maintenance of the segmentary type of society. But towns always result from the need that drives individuals to keep constantly in the closest possible contact with one another. They are like so many points where the social mass is contracting more strongly than elsewhere. They cannot therefore multiply and spread out unless the moral density increases. Moreover, we shall see that towns recruit their numbers through migration to them, which is only possible to the extent that the fusion of social segments is far advanced.

So long as the social organisation is essentially segmentary, towns do not exist. There are none in lower societies; they are not met with among the Iroquois, nor among the primitive German tribes.[30] The same was true for the primitive populations of Italy. 'The peoples of Italy,' states Marquardt, 'originally used not to live in towns, but in family or village communities (*pagi*), over which farms (*vici,* οἴχοί) were scattered.'[31] Yet after a fairly short period of time the town made its appearance. Athens and Rome were or became towns, and the same transformation was accomplished throughout Italy. In our Christian societies the town appears from the very beginning, for those that the Roman Empire had left behind did not disappear with it. Since then, they have not ceased to grow and multiply. The tendency of country dwellers to flow into the towns, so general in the civilised world,[32] is only a consequence of this movement. But this phenomenon does not date from the present day: from the seventeenth century onwards it preoccupied statesmen.[33]

Because societies generally start with an agricultural period we have occasionally been tempted to regard the development of urban centres as a sign of old age and decadence.[34] But we must not lose sight of the fact that this agricultural phase is the shorter the more societies belong to a higher type. Whilst in Germany, among the American Indians and among all primitive peoples, it lasts as long as do these peoples themselves, in Rome or Athens it ceases fairly early on, and in France we may say that this agricultural state has never existed in a pure form. Conversely, urban life begins very early on, and consequently extends itself more. The regularly quicker acceleration of this development demonstrates that, far from constituting a kind of pathological phenomenon, it derives from the very nature of the higher social species. Even supposing therefore that today this movement has reached threatening proportions for our societies, which perhaps have no longer sufficient flexibility to adapt to it, it will not cease to continue, either through them, or after them, and the social types to be formed after our own will probably be distinguished by a more rapid and more complete regression of agricultural society.

(3) Finally, there is the number and speed of the means of communication and transmission. By abolishing or lessening the vacuums separating social segments, these means increase the density of society. Moreover, there is no need to demonstrate that they are the more numerous and perfect the higher the type of society.

Since this visible and measurable symbol reflects the variations in what we have termed moral density,[35] we can substitute this symbol for the latter in the formula that we have put forward. We must, moreover, repeat here what we were saying earlier.