NEW TO THIS EDITION

- Greater attention is given to the importance of incorporating an ecological perspective into development theories and practices.

- Chapter 7 on counter-movements has been rewritten to refocus on interventions that address three key issues: ecological degradation and resource depletion, emphasizing the work of social reproduction as largely performed by women, and the politics of food insecurity.

- Chapter 8 now shows the unevenness of globalization across world regions and how local citizens organize to protect their particular needs in those regions.

- Chapter 9 dispenses with the idea of the "sustainability project" and identifies three strands of "sustainable development" (private, public, grassroots) to underscore the extent and variability of this concept.

- Includes new coverage of cutting-edge topics such as:
  - New democratic movements
  - Development and the problem of the social/nature separation
  - Austerity politics in the Global North
  - Significance of climate change as a "market failure" and threat to human and environmental security
  - Land enclosure and the re-centering of agriculture as the foundation of human security
  - Green technologies, climate proofing, and business opportunities in global warming
  - Rising multi-polarity (BRICS, hegemonic disarray) and the new security mercantilism
  - Shared development and de-growth philosophies
  - Re-localization initiatives

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McMICHAEL

DEVELOPMENT and SOCIAL CHANGE

SIXTH EDITION

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A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

PHILIP McMICHAEL

DEVELOPMENT and SOCIAL CHANGE

SIXTH EDITION

For Karen, with love and gratitude

DEVELOPMENT and SOCIAL CHANGE

A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

SIXTH EDITION

PHILIP McMICHAEL

Cornell University

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Brief Contents

Detailed Contents

About the Author

Philip McMichael grew up in Adelaide, South Australia, and he completed undergraduate degrees in economics and in political science at the University of Adelaide. After traveling in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and doing community work in Papua New Guinea, he pursued his doctorate in sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He has taught at the University of New England (New South Wales), Swarthmore College, and the University of Georgia, and he is presently International Professor of Development Sociology at Cornell University. Other appointments include Visiting Senior Research Scholar in International Development at the University of Oxford (Wolfson College) and Visiting Scholar, School of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Queensland.

His book *Settlers and the Agrarian Question: Foundations of Capitalism in Colonial Australia* (1984) won the Social Science History Association's Allan Sharlin Memorial Award in 1985. In addition to authoring *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions* (2013), McMichael edited *The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems* (1994), *Food and Agrarian Orders in the World Economy* (1995), *New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development* (2005) with Frederick H. Buttel, *Looking Backward and Looking Forward: Perspectives on Social Science History* (2005) with Harvey Graff and Lesley Page Moch, *Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change* (2010), and *The Politics of Biofuels, Land and Agrarian Change* (2011) with Jun Borras and Ian Scoones.

He has served twice as chair of his department, as director of Cornell University's International Political Economy Program, as chair of the American Sociological Association's Political Economy of the World-System Section, as president of the Research Committee on Agriculture and Food for the International Sociological Association, and as a board member of Cornell University Press. He has also worked with the Food and Agricultural

Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Civil Society Mechanism of the FAO's Committee on World Food Security (CFS), the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), the international peasant coalition *Vía Campesina,* and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty.

He and his wife, Karen Schachere, have two children, Rachel and Jonathan.

Preface to the Sixth Edition

The sixth edition of this text updates and refines the narrative. The thread that weaves together this story is that *development* is a concept and practice stemming from the era of expansion of Europe into the Americas, Asia, and Africa, and as such embodies a power relationship. In its most elemental form, it views a very diverse world through a singular lens of cultural evolution, equating civilization with Europe and thereby discounting non-European cultures. At the same time, given the association of development with economic growth, the ecological foundations of human civilization have been seriously discounted. The long arc of development—from colonialism through the development decades to the era of globalization—is now bending toward recognition of the importance of cultural diversity and biodiversity for human and planetary sustainability. As a form of rule, development takes different forms in different historical periods, and these are laid out here as changing sets of political-economic and political-ecological relations, animated by powerful discourses of discipline, opportunity, and sustainability.

While this text may appear to be "one-sided" in its presentation, it may be because development has always been quite one-sided as a ruling discourse and set of practices. As such, it is examined here as a contested historical project, rather than something to take for granted—operating through relationships of power among and within countries and world regions. Modern social thought associates development with human progress, stemming from an Enlightenment ideal. It is, of course, an ideal not necessarily shared by the majority world and yet has become the dominant trope governing international relations via the project of development and its prioritization of the market as a civilizing force. The limits of this secular ideal, as it shaped modern social thought, are becoming increasingly clear today, as the accumulation of environmental uncertainty dramatically reveals development's shortcomings in overlooking the centrality of ecosystems to human life—and, therefore, reveals the illusion of unlimited economic growth. This text may have the

appearance of an economic argument, in part because development is generally associated with economic growth. To represent that view, as well as indicate where it comes from, it is necessary to trace its origins and evolution in recent world history. At the same time, it is important to defetishize the economic interpretation and reveal the social processes and ecological consequences of development, as well as the power relations ordering this historic enterprise and thence the world. This account of development focuses on these social and political transformations and the various ways in which development is realized through social and spatial inequalities. It also considers these processes from the perspective of social movements and how their resistances problematize, or question, the dominant vision of economism as a form of rule and as an increasingly evident threat to ecological stability.

The conceptual framework posits development as a political construct, devised by dominant actors such as metropolitan states, multilateral institutions, and political and economic elites to order the world and contain opposition. Development and globalization are presented as projects with coherent organizing principles (e.g., economic nationalism, market liberalization), yet unrealistic in their vision and potential for accomplishment since they are realized through inequality. The theoretical subtext of the development project is organized by extended Polanyian cycles of "market self-regulation" and resistance. In the mid-twentieth century, a form of "embedded liberalism" (market regulation within a maturing nation-state system to contain labor and decolonization movements) informed social–democratic (developmentalist) goals within a Cold War context of economic and military aid to the Third World. This "development era" ended with a "countermobilization" of corporate interests dedicated to instituting a "self-regulating market" on a global scale from the 1970s onward.

The dominant discourse of neoliberalism proposed market liberalization, privatization, freedom of capital movement and access, and so on. This globalization project had a "test run" during the debt regime of the 1980s and was institutionalized with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. A *further* countermobilization—to the deprivations of the globalization project—has gathered momentum through maturing global justice movements in the 1990s, the Latin American and Arab rebellions of the new century, and a growing "legitimacy deficit" for the global development establishment. This is symbolized in the collapse of the Washington Consensus following the 1997 Asian-originating global financial crisis, recovery of the trope of "poverty reduction" in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) initiative of 2000, stalemate at the WTO, and growing antipathy toward the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) among countries of

the global South. Neoliberalism is at a crossroads, complicated by serious security concerns with a social component (in mushrooming slums); an economic dimension (in both financial volatility and the casualization of employment); a political element (in acts of terrorism); and an ecological aspect (in the evidence of global climate change). How the current cycle of opposition and creative development alternatives will unfold is yet to be determined, but we may see a "sustainability project" emerge, including security concerns—largely of those with political and economic power—and grassroots initiatives toward rethinking the values that define development.

The major revision here is threefold. First, Chapter 7 on countermovements refocuses on three key epistemic interventions regarding development's market-centrism: the lack of any systematic accounting for ecosystem degradation and resource depletion, the socially reproductive work performed largely by women, and food insecurity. These are ultimately "externals" to market relations, and as such, they give rise to a series of paradoxes, or contradictions, integral to development. Second, Chapter 8 updates the review of expressions of crisis in the globalization project, focusing on the cumulative social crisis across the world resulting from widespread austerity policies, associated legitimacy questions and initiatives, geopolitical multipolarity as the American century winds down, new developments in India and China, and the public health and ecological crisis. Third, Chapter 9 ("Sustainable Development?") features the climate challenge and three particular forms of response: business as usual, public interventions, and grassroots initiatives; together, these responses reveal an array of disparate attempts to manage the future, pointing toward a future environmental/climate regime.

The subject of development is difficult to teach. Living in relatively affluent surroundings, most university students understandably situate their society on the "high end" of a development continuum—at the pinnacle of human economic and technological achievement. And they often perceive the development continuum and their favorable position on it as "natural"—a well-deserved reward for embracing modernity. It is difficult to put one's world in historical perspective from this vantage point. It is harder still to help students grasp a world perspective that goes beyond framing their experience as an "evolved state"—the inevitable march of "progress."

In my experience, until students go beyond simple evolutionary views, they have difficulty valuing other cultures and social possibilities that do not potentially mirror their own. When they do go beyond the evolutionary perspective, they are better able to evaluate their own culture sociologically and to think reflexively about social change, development, and global inequalities. This is the challenge we face.

A Timeline of Development

WORLD FRAMEWORK	**Developmentalism (1940s–1970s)**
POLITICAL ECONOMY	State-Regulated Markets (Keynesianism) Public Spending
SOCIAL GOALS	Social Contract and Redistribution National Citizenship
DEVELOPMENT [Model]	Industrial Replication National Economic Sector Complementarity [Brazil, Mexico, India]
MOBILIZING TOOL	Nationalism (Post-Colonialism)
MECHANISMS	Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) Public Investment (Infrastructure, Energy) Education Land Reform
VARIANTS	First World (Freedom of Enterprise) Second World (Central Planning) Third World (Modernization via Development Alliance)

MARKERS

Cold War Begins (1946)	Korean War (1950–53)	Vietnam War (1964–75)
Bretton Woods (1944)	Marshall Plan (1946)	Alliance for Progress (1961)
United Nations (1943)	Non-Aligned Movement Forum (1955)	Group of 77 (G-77) (1964) World Economic Forum (1970)

FIRST DEVELOPMENT DECADE   SECOND DEVELOPMENT DECADE

1940   1950   1960   1970

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS	World Bank, IMF, GATT (1944) US$ as Reserve Currency	PL-480 (1954)	UNCTAD (1964) Eurodollar/offshore $ market

COMECON (1947)

Globalism (1980s–2000s)

Self-Regulating Markets (Monetarism)
Public Downsizing

Private Initiative and Global Consumerism
Multi-Layered Citizenship and Recognition

Participation in World Market
Global Comparative Advantage
[Chile, South Korea; NAFTA]

Markets and Credit
Financialization

Export-Orientation
Privatization
Entrepreneurialism
Public and Majority-Class Austerity

National Structural Adjustment (Opening Economies)
Regional Free Trade Agreements
Global Governance

Oil Crises (1973, 1979)		Cold War Ends (1989)	"New World Order"		Imperial Wars (2001–)		Islamic State (2013 – ?)
	Debt Regime		WTO Regime		Climate Regime		
New International Economic Order Initiative (1974)			Chiapas Revolt (1994)	World Social Forum (2001)			
Group of 7 (G-7) (1975)	Earth Summit (1992)	Kyoto Protocol (1997)	Group of 20 (G-20) (1999)	MDGs (2000)	Stern Report (2006)	IAASTD Report (2008)	SDGs (2015)

"LOST DECADE"   "GLOBALIZATION DECADE"

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●         ●         ●         ●         ●         ●         ●
1970      1980                1990                2000
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GATT Uruguay   NAFTA (1994)
Round (1986–1994)   WTO (1995)
IPCC (1988)
UNFCCC (1988)

Offshore Banking   Structural Adjustment Loans   "Governance"/HIPC Loans   Public Private Partnerships

Glasnost/Perestroika

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Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
ALBA	Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
AoA	Agreement on Agriculture (WTO)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BAIR	bureaucratic-authoritarian industrializing regime
BIP	Border Industrialization Program
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAFTA	Central American Free Trade Agreement
CBD	Convention on Biodiversity
CDM	clean development mechanism
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COP	Conference of the Parties
ECA	export credit agency
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America
EOI	export-oriented industrialization
EPZ	export processing zone
EU	European Union

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FDI	foreign direct investment
FLO	Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International
FTA	free trade agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GAD	gender and development
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDI	Gender Development Index
GDL	global division of labor
GDP	gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GEM	gender empowerment measure
GHG	greenhouse gas emissions
GlobalGAP	a retailer produce working group on Good Agricultural Practices
GNH	gross national happiness
GNP	gross national product
GPI	genuine progress indicator
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	heavily indebted poor countries
HYV	high-yielding variety
IAASTD	International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development
ICT	information and communication technologies
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDS	Institute for Development Studies
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFI	international financial institutions

IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Inter-Governmental Plan on Climate Change
IPR	intellectual property rights
ISI	import-substitution industrialization
LDC	least developed countries
LDCF	Less Developed Countries Fund
MA	Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East North African states
MICs	middle-income countries
NAC	new agricultural country
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAPA	national adaptation programme of action
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIC	newly industrializing country
NIDL	new international division of labor
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NTE	nontraditional export
OAU	Organization for African Unity
ODA	overseas development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RAI	responsible agricultural investment
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

SAL	structural adjustment loan
SAP	structural adjustment policies
SDG	sustainable development goals
SEZ	special economic zone
TFN	transnational feminist network
TIE	Transnationals Information Exchange
TNB	transnational bank
TNC	transnational corporation
TPN	transnational policy network
TRIMs	trade-related aspects of investment measures
TRIPs	trade-related intellectual property rights
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Convention on Climate Change
WEEE	waste from electrical and electronic equipment
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organization
WID	Women in Development
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

1

Development

Theory and Reality

Development, today, is increasingly about how we survive the future, rather than how we improve on the past. While ideas of human progress and material improvement still guide theory and policy making, how we manage "energy descent" and adapt to serious ecological deficits, climatic disruption, and social justice effects will define our existence. How will this change our understanding and practice of development?

A central issue is how effectively policy makers (in states and development agencies) recognize the need for wholesale public coordination of planning to minimize and adapt to inevitable climatic changes. Plenty of new ideas, practices, and policies are surfacing, but more as a cacophony rather than a strategic endeavor to reverse our **ecological footprint** (see Glossary/Index for bolded definitions). For example, while the Chinese government is strategic in promoting green technology, China—the major offshore assembly zone for global commodities—leads in global greenhouse gas emissions (one-third).[1] Climate summits tend to confirm ambivalence of governments held hostage to domestic growth policies—whether these governments are from the **global North** or the **global South**. Across this historic divide, there is now a shared global crisis of unemployment and debt, compounding the challenges of development futures with rising inequalities.

Not only are there increasingly evident biophysical limits to development as we know it, but development is now compromised by public austerity policies across the nation-state system, most recently evident in Greece.

Such policies, introduced to the global South from the 1980s, now shape northern societies and their interrelations. All over, the development ideal of a social contract between governments and citizens is crumbling as hard-won social rights and public entitlements erode, generating despair, disillusionment, or disorder as citizens protest cutbacks. Arguably, "development" is not only in crisis but is also at a significant turning point in its short history as a master concept of (Western-oriented) social science and cultural life.

This book is a guide to the rise and transformation of "development" as a powerful instrument of global social change over the last two centuries. From one (long-term) angle, it appears increasingly cometlike: a brilliant lodestar for ordering the world, but perhaps destined to burn out as its energy-intensive foundations meet their limits. From another (immediate) angle, the energy and inequality dilemma forces renewed critical thinking about how humans might live sustainably and equitably on the planet. These perspectives are the subjects of chapters to come. Here, we are concerned with the source and maturation of development as a master concept—both its promises and its paradoxes.

Development: History and Politics

Development had its origins in the colonial era, as European domination came to be understood as superiority and leadership along a development axis. Global in its origins, the meaning of *development* nevertheless compared European accomplishments with societies increasingly disrupted by imperial ventures. While such accomplishments came with substantial environmental and social—and often violent—upheaval, they have been represented in theory as a set of idealized outcomes to be emulated by other countries. Accordingly, development's ends justify its means, however socially and ecologically disruptive the process may be.

Here, Michael Cowan and Robert Shenton's distinction between development as an unfolding universal social *process* and development as a political *intervention* is useful. In the nineteenth century, development was understood *philosophically* as improving humankind (in the form of knowledge building, technological change, and wealth accumulation). In relation to this, European political elites interpreted development *practically*, as a way to socially engineer emerging national societies. Elites formulated government policy to manage the social transformations attending the rise of capitalism and industrial technologies, so development was identified with *both* industrialization *and* the regulation of its disruptive social impacts. These impacts began with the displacement of

rural populations by land enclosures for cash cropping, a process that generated "undesirables," such as menacing paupers, restless proletarians, and unhealthy factory towns.[2] Development, then, meant balancing technological change and the rise of new social classes, fashioning policies to manage wholesale social transformations. At the same time, such transformations became the catalyst of competing political visions—liberal, socialist, conservative—of the ideal society.

In Europe's colonies, the inhabitants appeared undeveloped—by self-referential (evolutionary) European standards. This ideological understanding of development legitimized imperial intervention, whether to plunder or civilize. Either way, the social engineering impulse framed European imperialism. Not only did massive colonial resource extraction facilitate European industrialization, but European colonial administrators also managed subject populations experiencing their own wrenching social transformations. Thus, development assumed an additional, normative meaning, namely, the "white man's burden"—the title of a poem by nineteenth-century English poet Rudyard Kipling—imparting honor to an apparently noble task. The implied racism remains a part of the normative understanding (and global consequence) of development.

Thus, development extended modern social engineering to colonies incorporated into the European orbit. Subject populations were exposed to a variety of new disciplines, including forced labor schemes, schooling, and segregation in native quarters. Forms of colonial subordination differed across time and space, but the overriding object was either to adapt or marginalize colonial subjects to the European presence. In this sense, development involved a relation of power. For example, British colonialism introduced the new English factory-model "Lancaster school" to the (ancient) city of Cairo in 1843 to educate Cairo's emerging civil service. Egyptian students learned the new disciplines of a developing society that was busily displacing peasant culture with plantations of cotton for export to English textile mills and managing an army of migrant labor, which was building an infrastructure of roads, canals, railways, telegraphs, and ports.[3] Through the colonial relation, industrialism transformed both English and Egyptian society, producing new forms of social discipline among working- and middle-class citizen-subjects. And while industrialism produced new class inequalities within each society, colonialism racialized international inequality. In this way, development introduced new class and racial hierarchies within and across societies.

While development informed modern narratives in the age of industrialism and empire, it only became formalized as a *project* in the mid-twentieth century. This period was the high tide of decolonization, as the Western

(British, Italian, German, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and Belgian) and Japanese empires succumbed to the moral force of anticolonial resistance and when a standardizing concept—development as an emancipatory promise—became the new global ontology (a way of seeing/ordering the world).

In 1945, the United Nations, with the intent of expanding membership as colonies gained independence as sovereign states, institutionalized the System of National Accounts. A universal quantifiable measure of development, the gross national product (GNP), was born. At this point, the colonial rule of *subjects* under the guise of civilizing inferior races morphed into the **development project**, based on the ideal of self-governing states composed of *citizens* united by the ideology of nationalism. And by the twenty-first century, the global development project focused on market governance of and by self-maximizing *consumers*. Given this trajectory, *development* is conventionally understood as economic growth and rising consumption.

Development Theory

Identifying development with rising consumption privileges the market as the vehicle of social change. The underlying philosophy—deriving from a popular (but limiting) interpretation of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*[4] and formalized in neoclassical economic theory—is that markets maximize individual preferences and allocate resources efficiently. Whether this theory reflects reality or not, it is a deeply held belief now institutionalized in much development policy across the world. Why is this the case?

Naturalizing Development

There are two ways to answer this question. First, a belief in markets is a central tenet of liberal Western philosophy. Hungarian philosopher Karl Polanyi noted that modern liberalism rests on a belief in a natural human propensity for self-gain, which translates in economic theory as the market principle—realized as consumer preference.[5] Self-gain, expressed through the market, drives the aspiration for improvement, aggregated as consumption. Second, as Polanyi noted, to naturalize market behavior as an innate propensity discounts other human traits or values—such as cooperation, redistribution, and reciprocity, which are different organizing principles by which human societies have endured for centuries. For Polanyi and other classical social theorists, pursuit of individualism via an economic calculus is quite novel in the history and makeup of human societies and quite specific to modernity, rather than being inherent in human social life.

While cooperative values are clearly evident today in human interactions, the aspiration for improvement, normalized now as a private motivation, informs development. That is, well-being and self-improvement center on access to goods *and* services through the marketplace. Dating from the mid-twentieth century, in an era of powerful anticolonial, labor, and citizenship movements, formulations of development paired private consumption with public provisions—infrastructure, education, health, water supply, commons, clean air, and so forth. The mid-twentieth century was the heyday of the welfare, or development, state. But from the last quarter of the twentieth century, provisioning has increasingly been subjected to **privatization**, as the market, rather than the state, becomes the medium through which society develops.

This outcome was prefigured in one of the most influential theories of development emerging in the post–World War II world. In 1960, economist Walt Rostow published *The Stages of Economic Growth*: *A Non-Communist Manifesto*,[6] outlining a development theory that celebrates the Western model of free enterprise—in contrast to a state-planned economy. The "stages" traverse a linear sequence, beginning with "Traditional Society" (agrarian, limited productivity) and moving through "Preconditions for Take-Off" (state formation, education, science, banking, profit-systematization), "Take-Off" (normalization of growth, with investment rates promoting the expanded reproduction of industry), and "Maturity" (the second industrial revolution that moved from textiles and iron to machine-tools, chemicals, and electrical equipment)—and finally to the "Age of High Mass-Consumption," characterized by the movement from basic to durable goods, urbanization, and a rising level of white-collar versus blue-collar work.

This evolutionary sequence, distilled from the US experience, represents the consumer society as the terminal stage of a complex historical process. Rostow viewed the US model as the goal to which other (i.e., developing) societies should aspire, which partly explains his book's subtitle—expressing the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time. The theorization of development as a series of evolutionary stages naturalizes the process, whether it occurs on a national (development era) or an international (globalization era) stage. Mass consumption was a final goal to be realized through membership of the "free world" at the time, and by implication, US assistance would be available to spur the **Third World** of postcolonial, developing nations into progress along the stages.

However, note that Rostow's "development blueprint" depended on a political context. That is, markets required creating, securing, and protecting (by a **development state**). They could not be natural. And development was neither spontaneous nor inevitable; rather, it was shaped by social struggle,

and it required an institutional complex on a world scale (a **development project**) to nurture it along, complete with trade, monetary, and investment rules, aid regimes, and a military umbrella—all of which were supplied through postwar, multilateral institutions and bilateral arrangements led by the United States. In this way, a theory of spontaneous markets diverges from reality. But reality was nonetheless shaped by this theory—informing public discourse and translated into policy implementation via an increasing market calculus. This is a central paradox explored in this book.

Global Context

Reality is more complicated than it first appears. For example, Rostow's prescriptions artificially separated societies from one another. This may have expressed the idealism of mid-twentieth-century nationalism. But to assign stages of growth to societies without accounting for their unequal access to offshore resources discounted a fundamental historic relationship between world regions shaped by colonial and investment patterns. Not only did European powers once depend on their colonies for resources and markets, but these patterns continued in the postcolonial era. Because of continuing **First World** dependence on raw materials from the **Third World**, some societies were more equal than others in their capacity to traverse Rostow's stages, in part because resource extraction was one way, as we shall see in Chapter 4.

It was this reality that stimulated **dependency analysis** and **world-system analysis**. The concept of "dependency" (referring to unequal economic relations between metropolitan societies and non-European peripheries) emerged in the mid-twentieth century from several quarters—an empirical observation by economist Hans Singer that "peripheral" countries were exporting more and more natural resources to pay for increasingly expensive manufactured imports; an argument by Singer's collaborator, Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch, that Latin American states should therefore industrialize behind protective tariffs on manufactured imports; and earlier Marxist theories of exploitative imperialist relations between the European and the non-European world.[7] Dependency was, then, a relationship accounting for the development of Europe at the expense of the **underdevelopment** of the non-European world. Economist Andre Gunder Frank put it this way:

> [H]istorical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now-developed metropolitan countries. . . . When we examine this metropolis-satellite structure, we

find that each of the satellites . . . serves as an instrument to suck capital or economic surplus out of its own satellites and to channel part of this surplus to the world metropolis of which all are satellites.[8]

World-system analysis, advanced by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, deepened the concept of dependency by elevating the scope of the modern social system to a global scale. States became political units competing for—or surrendering—resources within a **world division of labor**. Here, regional labor forces occupy a skill/technological hierarchy associated with state strength or weakness in the capitalist world economy.[9] From this perspective, the "core" concentrates capital-intensive or intellectual production and the "periphery" is associated with lower-skilled, labor-intensive production, whether plantation labor, assembly of manufactured goods, or routine service work (e.g., call centers). As we shall see, this kind of geographical hierarchy is increasingly complicated by what journalist Thomas Friedman calls "flat world" processes, exemplified, for him, by India's embrace of information technology.[10]

While dependency broadens the analysis of development processes to world-scale relationships, challenging the assumption that societies are aligned along a self-evident spectrum of growth stages, it implies a "development-centrism"—where (idealized Western) development is the term of reference. In this regard, Wallerstein has argued that given the power hierarchy of the world system, (idealized Western) development represents a "lodestar," or master concept, of modern social theory.[11] As such, the privileging of Western-style development denied many other collective/social strategies of sustainability or improvement practiced by non-Western cultures. Nevertheless, while measuring all societies against a conception of (industrial) development may have seemed the appropriate goal for modernization and dependency theory at mid-century, from the vantage point of the *twenty-first century* it is quite problematic. The growing recognition that the planet cannot sustain the current Western-emulating urban-industrial trends in China and India is one dramatic expression of this new reality.

Agrarian Questions

Urbanization is a defining outcome of development and the "stages of growth" metaphor, where "tradition" yields to "modernity" as industrialization deepens and nurtures it. Political scientist Samuel Huntington, writing about the process of modernization in *Political Order and Changing Societies* (1968), claimed, "Agriculture declines in importance compared to commercial, industrial, and other nonagricultural activities, and commercial agriculture replaces subsistence agriculture."[12] While this theoretical

sequence is clearly in evidence and has informed policies discounting small-scale farming, there is a further question regarding whether and to what extent this is natural, or inevitable. And this in turn raises questions about the model of separate national development. In fact, the demise of millions of small producers has foreign, or international, origins—in the form of colonialism, foreign aid, and unequal market relations—expressing the global power relations identified by dependency and world-system analysts. How we perceive these changes is the ultimate question: We know, for instance, that agricultural productivity ratios across high- and low-input farming systems have risen from 10:1 before 1940 to 2,000:1 in the twenty-first century,[13] putting small producers (primarily in the global South) at a competitive disadvantage in the global market. Even as social changes occur within nations, does that mean the change is "internally" driven? Thus, if subsistence agriculture declines or disappears, is this because it does not belong on a society's "development ladder"?[14] Or is it because of an exposure of smallholders to forces beyond their control, such as unequal world market competition by agribusiness?

Small farming cultures are represented as development "baselines"—in theory and in practice, given modern technology's drive to replace labor and control production (with commercial inputs such as seed, fertilizer, and pesticides along with farm machinery). Unrecognized is the superior capacity or potential in surviving agrarian cultures for managing and sustaining their ecosystems compared to industrial agriculture, which attempts to override natural limits with chemicals and other technologies that deplete soil fertility, hydrological cycles, and biodiversity.[15] The current "global land grab" depends on representing land in the global South as "underutilized" and better employed by conversion to commercial agricultural estates producing foods and biofuels largely for export.[16] Such activities raise a fundamental question as to whether and to what extent development—as modeled—is inevitable or intentional, and national or international.

Ecological Questions

This example of conversion of farming into an industrial activity underscores a significant *ecological blindspot* in development theory. Where the passage from small farming to large-scale (commercial) agriculture is represented as improvement, or development, it is an insufficient measure if it does not take into account the "externals." These are the significant social and environmental impacts, such as disruption of agrarian cultures and ecosystems, the deepening of dependency on fossil fuel, and modern agriculture's responsibility for up to a third of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Such consequences challenge the wisdom of replacing a

long-standing knowledge-intensive culture/ecology (farming) with an increasingly unsustainable industrialized economic sector (agriculture).

One key example of this ecological blindspot is its reproduction in the **Human Development Index (HDI)**, constructed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990. The HDI overcame the singular emphasis on economic growth as development, but carried forward the absence of the ecological dimension:

> The concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and progress. The real objective of development should be to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. Though this may appear to be a simple truth, it is often overlooked as more immediate concerns are given precedence.[17]

While the HDI is known for its more robust measurement of (human) development, its data sources have lacked environmental content. This is particularly so, given that humanity has now overshot the earth's biocapacity (see Figure 1.1). Focusing on the outcomes of development discounts

Figure 1.1   Humanity's Ecological Footprint

how we live on the earth—that is, measuring what practices are sustainable or not. It was only in 2011 that the UNDP began to embrace an ecological sensibility. Thus, the Human Development Report (2011) is "about the adverse repercussions of environment degradation for people, how the poor and disadvantaged are worst affected, and how greater equity needs to be part of the solution."[18]

Given the UNDP's reputation for questioning conventional wisdom, this new focus complements the *2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,* which noted that the last half century of human action has had the most intensive and extensive negative impact on world ecosystems ever, and yet this has been accompanied by continuing global gains in human well-being.[19] Known as the "**environmentalist's paradox**" (since we might expect ecosystem degradation to negatively affect human well-being), researchers have noted that *average* measures of well-being may reduce the validity of this claim, but perhaps more significantly, "technology has decoupled well-being from nature" and time lags will only tell.[20] In other words, mastery of nature may be effective in the short-term in generating rising consumption patterns, but also in masking the long-term health implications of ecosystem stress. What such research suggests is that development needs a robust sustainability dimension—as suggested at the end of this book in the section on sustainable development approaches.

DEVELOPMENT PARADOXES

The environmentalist's paradox, when inverted, is, in fact, a "development paradox." Former World Bank economist Herman Daly formulated this as an "impossibility theorem"—namely, that the universalization of US-style high mass-consumption economy would require several planet Earths. Either way, the *ultimate paradox here is that the environment is not equipped to absorb its unrelenting exploitation by the current growth model of endless accumulation*. In other words, development as we know it is undermining itself.

Three of the nine designated planetary operational boundaries have been crossed already—climate change, biodiversity, and the nitrogen cycle—while others such as fresh water use and oceanic acidification are at serious tipping points. Meanwhile, the costs of environmental degradation are borne disproportionately by the poor—the very same people targeted by the development industry. This is a key development paradox. Related to these

formulations is the notion (advanced by the World Bank in 1992) that economic growth is a condition for sustainable development, which the *UK Stern Review* of 2006 termed a paradox since the cost of climate change adaptation would be far greater if we wait for higher future levels of wealth to address the problem.

Some subsidiary paradoxes include such questions as these: Are low-carbon cultures that live with rather than seek to master nature backward? Are non-Western cultures judged poor in what makes Western cultures rich? Is frugality poverty? Why is malnutrition common to Western and non-Western cultures (see Figure 1.2)? Are non-Western cultures rich in what Western cultures are now poor (nonmonetized items such as open space, leisure, solidarity, ecological knowledge)? Should we measure living standards only in monetary terms?

Sources: Foster (2011); Stern (2006); Daly (1990).

Figure 1.2 Percentage of Population That Is Malnourished and Overweight

Source: Adapted from *New Internationalist* 353 (2003): 20.

Social Change

As we have seen, development theory provides a blueprint, and justification, for universalizing a European-centered process. European industrialization depended on displacing non-European industry and capturing non-European resources (labor, minerals, raw materials, and foodstuffs). Such colonial intervention was justified as a civilizing mission—asked what he thought of British civilization, the leader of India's independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi, reputedly replied, "It would be a good idea." Of course, colonial subjects resisted—for example, the successful late-eighteenth-century slave uprising in the French colony of Saint Domingue (forming the Haitian free state), but also the unsuccessful Amritsar rebellion, put down savagely by British forces in India in 1919. Such uprisings marked a long-term politics of decolonization, with colonial subjects gaining moral and material power as **countermovements** to European empires, which in turn became increasingly costly to maintain. Resistance to colonial relations—including substantial peasant mobilizations from China to Mexico to Kenya—was matched with labor uprisings and political organization during the late-colonial era. The British faced widespread labor strikes in their West Indian and African colonies in the 1930s, and this pattern continued over the next two decades in Africa as British and French colonial subjects protested conditions in cities, ports, mines, and on the railways.[21]

In other words, large-scale social changes accompanying industrial development involve definitive power struggles. Colonial rule generated a politics of decolonization, including class conflict, identity/cultural claims, and the desire for equality of treatment, including sovereignty. The **colonial project** was certainly anchored in class relations, as empires subordinated colonial labor forces and resources to service imperial needs. But this economic relation was accompanied by fundamental racial politics that both justified subjugation and fueled resistances in the name of human rights across the colonial world. These struggles ushered in a postcolonial era, which informed a mid-twentieth-century global development project, embedded in a system of sovereign nation-states forming the United Nations organization in 1945.

The divisive racial legacy of colonialism certainly did not disappear, but a very diverse world was bound together now by a universal principle: an international governmental structure enshrining the meaning and measurement of development as a *national standard*. This was institutionalized in the UN System of National Accounts, by which monetized economic activity was recorded as gross national product (GNP). Outside of the Communist bloc (also known as the **Second World**), as national economic growth and

income levels became the measure of development, so First- and Third-World societies came to be governed by the market (and its metrics), with varying degrees of public regulation.

The "market society" was the product of modern capitalism and commodification of the material world, expressed in monetary exchanges. As Karl Marx pointed out, even human labor power came to be commodified, as villagers lost their means of livelihood and were forced to work for monetary wages.[22] Karl Polanyi extended this observation to land and currency, noting that with the rise of nineteenth-century market society each of these substances came to be traded for a price. He argued that neither labor, land, nor money were *produced for sale,* and so were really "fictitious commodities." When these substances are treated as commodities, workers, farmers, and businesses are exposed to exploitative or uncertain conditions. That is, their labor, farming, or entrepreneurship experience competitive relations beyond their control by a market with seemingly independent authority. Accordingly, social countermovements would inevitably arise and advocate for protection from unregulated markets (a "double movement"). The resulting effect would be to re-embed markets within social/public controls. In Polanyi's account, this explains the origins of the twentieth-century welfare state, which became a model for the **development state**. It arose out of a European-wide social mobilization to protect the rights of workers, farmers, and businesses from the ill effects of unrestrained markets.[23]

The Projects as Historical Framework

Within the terms of this broad social-change theory, then, the postcolonial world order emerged from the combined force of decolonization politics and public initiatives to regulate capitalist markets (as distinct from the Communist model of a state-planned economy). Development as an ideal and as a policy carried forward the social welfare dimension, reinforced by the UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights (1948), by which governments were enjoined to protect civil rights through a **social contract** between state and citizen. This idealistic contract defined the era of the **development project** (1940s–1980), rooted in public regulation of markets as servants of states. The following era of the **globalization project** (1980s through the present) saw markets regain ascendancy—with states as servants—and the incorporation of the "good market, bad state" mantra into public discourse. The tension between these poles continues in what may become a **sustainability project** as the world transitions to a new project governed by environmental stress and climate uncertainty.

Here, we frame the story of development around the three projects: colonial, development, and globalization. This framework stresses that the meaning and practice of development changes with changing political-economic (and environmental) conditions. The transition from the development to the globalization project stemmed from a political reversal "from above" by increasingly powerful business and financial interests and their allies to reduce or eliminate public regulation of corporations and their ability to operate across national borders. Deregulation of markets has been the ultimate goal, legitimized by neoliberal economic theory. And subsequent controversies over the impact of globalization at the turn of the twenty-first century have been generated by social mobilization "from below," driven by economic destabilization and intensification of social inequalities as markets have been disembedded from social controls.[24]

These protests, dramatized in 2011 by the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement among others, draw attention to the **development paradox**, where poverty accompanies economic growth. This is evidenced in an Oxfam report that 2016 marked the threshold of the top 1 percent of the world's population owning more than 50 percent of global wealth,[25] as well as continuing a food crisis that renders almost a billion people chronically hungry.[26]

The current market malaise and combination of crises—food, energy, climate, social—suggests the world may transition toward another project, which I would term the *sustainability project*. The dynamic that links these projects, and accounts for their succession, can be thought of as a series of Polanyian "double movements": politicization of market rule (for or against) via social mobilization. The colonial project, accompanying the rise of capitalist markets, yielded to the development project, as social and decolonization countermovements challenged the ascendancy of the market in their respective territories. Then the development project yielded to a globalization project installed by a global power-elite to restore market sway and reduce the power of states and citizens to the status of servants and consumers respectively.

Currently, the crisis of the globalization project (addressed in Chapter 8) is stimulating a wide range of sustainability initiatives at all scales, geared to containing or reducing environmental degradation and climate warming. How these may coalesce into some kind of world ordering is not yet clear. Whether we will see or make a more authoritarian world order built on energy and climate security claims or some decentralized, ecologically based social organization are some of the possibilities that are informing debate

(see Chapter 9). In the meantime, we can situate our condition via some "development coordinates."

The Development Experience

Development is not an activity that other societies do to catch up to the "developed societies." That nomenclature is unfortunate, since it suggests a condition enjoyed by citizens of the global North that is the goal and envy of the rest of the world. Indeed, some argue that the West is busy "undeveloping," as jobs relocate to growth areas such as China and India, as northern public infrastructure decays, as social services such as education and health care dwindle, and as ecosystems degrade. From this perspective, development does not look like a linear process, nor is there a model outcome since it is an uneven global dynamic.

From a global perspective, development redistributes jobs to lower-wage regions. While transnational firms thereby enhance profitability, northern consumers (at least those with incomes) enjoy access to low-cost products that are produced offshore. In this sense, development has been identified—for its beneficiaries—as consumption. This, of course, corresponds with Rostow's final growth stage, but not as a national characteristic—rather as *a global relationship*. Much of what we consume today has global origins. Even when a product has a domestic "Made in . . ." label, its journey to market probably combines components and labor from production and assembly sites located around the world. Sneakers, or parts thereof, might be produced in China or Indonesia, blue jeans assembled in the Philippines, a cell phone or portable media player put together in Singapore, and a watch made in Hong Kong. The British savor organic vegetables from western China, the Chinese eat pork fed with South American soy, and North Americans consume fast foods that may include chicken diced in Mexico or hamburger beef from cattle raised in Costa Rica. And, depending on taste, our coffee is from Southeast Asia, the Americas, or Africa. We readers may not be *global citizens* yet, but we are certainly *global consumers*.

But global consumers are still a minority. While over three-quarters of the world's population can access television images of the global consumer, only half of that audience has access to sufficient cash or credit to consume. Television commercials depict people everywhere consuming global commodities, but this is just an image. We know that much of the world's population does not have Internet access (despite increasingly ubiquitous mobile phones), and we know that a relative minority of the world's population consumes a vast majority of global goods and services.[27] Distribution of, and

access to, the world's material wealth is extraordinarily uneven. Almost half of the ex-colonial world dwells now in slums. Over three billion people cannot, or do not, consume in the Western style. Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano makes this observation:

> Advertising enjoins everyone to consume, while the economy prohibits the vast majority of humanity from doing so. . . . This world, which puts on a banquet for all, then slams the door in the noses of so many, is simultaneously equalizing and unequal: equalizing in the ideas and habits it imposes and unequal in the opportunities it offers.[28]

And yet it is important also to note that while readers may be accustomed to a commercial culture and view it as the development "standard," other cultures and peoples are noncommercial, not comfortable with commercial definition, or are simply marginal (by choice or circumstance) to commercial life. Contrary to media images, global consumerism is neither accessible to—nor possible for—a majority of humans, nor is it necessarily a universal aspiration, whether by cultural choice for some peoples, or simply for others needing to make ends meet on a day-to-day basis.

Nevertheless, the global marketplace binds consumers, producers, and even those marginalized by resource consumption. Consumers everywhere are surrounded, and often identified by, world products. One of the most ubiquitous, and yet invisible, world products is coltan, a metallic ore used in consumer electronics, such as computers and cell phones, in addition to nuclear reactors. It comes predominantly from the Congo, where militarized conflict over this valuable resource has caused nearly four million deaths, and mining has negative environmental consequences for forests and wildlife. Such ethical issues, similar to those associated with "blood diamonds," have driven some electronics corporations to mine coltan elsewhere in Africa.[29]

The global economy is a matrix of networks of commodity exchanges. In any one network, there is a sequence of production stages, located in a number of countries at sites that provide inputs of labor and materials contributing to the fabrication of a final product (see Figure 1.3). These networks are called **commodity chains**. The chain metaphor illuminates the interconnections among producing communities dispersed across the world. And it allows us to understand that, when we consume a product, we often participate in a global process that links us to a variety of places, people, and resources. While we may experience consumption individually, it is a fundamentally social—and environmental—act.

Commodity chains enable firms to switch production sites for flexible management of their operations (and costs). Any shopper at The Gap, for

Figure 1.3   A Commodity Chain for Athletic Shoes

Distribution
North America,
Europe, etc.

Shoe Box
United States

Boxed Shoes
Indonesia

Tissue Paper
Indonesia

Shoes
Indonesia

Rainforest Trees
Indonesia

Tanned Leather
South Korea

Polyurethane
Air SAC
United States

Ethylene-Vinyl
Acetate Foam
South Korea

Synthetic Rubber
Taiwan

Cowhide
United States

Petroleum
Saudi Arabia

Benzene
Taiwan

Coal
Taiwan

Source: Adapted from Bill Ryan and Alan During, "The Story of a Shoe," *World Watch*, March/
April 1998.

example, knows that this clothing retailer competes by changing its styles on a short-term cycle. Such flexibility requires access through subcontractors to labor forces, increasingly feminized, which can be intensified or let go as orders and fashion changes. Workers for these subcontractors often have little security—or rights—as they are one of the small links in this global commodity chain stretching across an often-unregulated global workplace.

The world was shocked in 2010 when 18 Chinese migrant workers between 17 and 25 years old attempted suicide at Foxconn factories in three Chinese provinces. Foxconn recorded profits that year in excess of some of its corporate customers, such as Microsoft, Dell, and Nokia. Foxconn—responsible for producing the iPhone4, the iPod, and the iPad2—captures 50 percent of the world electronics market share in manufacturing and service.[30]

CASE STUDY   **Waste and the Commodity Chain**

The disconnect between development theory and the environment is dramatized by the problem of waste, concealed in plain sight. The fact that consumption simultaneously produces waste is neither something consumers want to acknowledge, nor does it feature in measures of economic growth. And yet waste in general, and electronic waste (e-waste) in particular, are huge and problematic by-products of our lifestyle. The household electronics sector is now the fastest growing segment of municipal waste streams, as computing and communication technologies rapidly evolve. The UN estimates the annual global generation of waste from electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) runs at a rate of between 20 million and 50 million tons. In 2009, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that e-waste could increase by 500 percent over the next decade in rising middle-income countries. The toxicity of this waste is extraordinary: From 1994 to 2003, for example, disposal of personal computers released 718,000 tons of lead, 287 tons of mercury, and 1,363 tons of cadmium into landfills worldwide.

Cellular, or mobile, phones (1.2 billion sold globally in 2007) leach more than 17 times the US federal threshold for hazardous waste. And yet the noxious ingredients (including silver, copper, platinum, and gold) are valued on second-hand markets, just as discarded e-waste may be recycled for reuse in poorer markets—sometimes by businesses such as Collective Good, which donates a portion of the profits to the Red Cross or the Humane Society. Refurbishing phones occurs from Ghana to India, where labor costs are lower and environmental

regulations are less. About 70 percent of the world's discarded e-waste finds its way through informal networks to China, where it is scavenged for usable parts—often by children with no protection—and abandoned to pollute soil and ground-water with toxic metals. Africa is one of the largest markets for discarded phones, while China sells between 200 million and 300 million phones annually to deal-ers in India, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Thailand, from where they may pass on to buyers in Laos, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Just as water seeks its own level, unregulated markets enable toxic waste to leach into the global South. While there are regulations regarding hazardous waste, the 170-nation agree-ment called the Basel Convention is ambiguous on the question of restricting the movement of e-waste from North to South.

Why is the current fixation on the virtual, or "dematerialized," information economy unable to recognize the dependence on offshore manufacturing and disposal of waste—both of which pose social and environmental hazards?

Sources: Schwarzer et al. (2005); Widmer et al. (2005); Mooallem (2008); Leslie (2008); Salehabadi (2011).

Not everything we consume has such global origins, but the trend toward these worldwide supply networks is powerful. Our food, clothing, and shel-ter, in addition to other consumer comforts, have increasingly long supply chains. Take food, for example. Britain was the first nation to deliberately "outsource" a significant part of its food supply to its empire in the 1840s. In spite of the fact that the British climate is ideal for fruit production, 80 percent of pears and almost 70 percent of apples consumed by Britons now come from Chile, Australia, the United States, South Africa, and throughout the European Union.[31] The Dutch concept of "ghost acres" refers to addi-tional land offshore used to supply a national diet. Britons are estimated to use about 4.1 million hectares of ghost acres to grow mainly animal feed.[32] Ghost acres include "food miles," prompting the remark, "This form of global sourcing . . . is not only energy-inefficient, but it is also doubtful whether it improves global 'equity,' and helps local farmers to meet the goals of sustainable development."[33] In other words, much commercial agriculture today is dedicated to supplying the global consumer rather than improving production for domestic consumers. It is extroverted, rather than introverted as in the Rostow schema.

Half of all [Guatemala's] children under five are malnourished—one of the high-est rates of malnutrition in the world. Yet the country has food in abundance.

It is the fifth largest exporter of sugar, coffee, and bananas. Its rural areas are witnessing a palm oil rush as international traders seek to cash in on demand for biofuels created by US and EU mandates and subsidies. But despite being a leading agro-exporter, half of Guatemala's 14 million people live in extreme poverty, on less than $2 a day.[34]

Globalization deepens the paradox of development by virtue of its sheer scale. Integrating the lives of consumers and producers across the world does not necessarily mean sharing the benefits of development globally. The distance between consumers and producers and their environments means it is virtually impossible for consumers to recognize the impact of their consumption on people and environments elsewhere. At the other end, producers experience the social distance in the difficulty in voicing concerns about working conditions or the health of their habitats. Bridging this distance has become the focus of initiatives such as **fair trade,** or brand boycotts organized by activist movements or **nongovernmental organizations** (NGOs), to enhance transparency with information to support more responsible consumption (paradoxically perpetuating dependency on tropical exports versus local food system development).

CASE STUDY   Consuming the Amazon

In a report, *Eating Up the Amazon,* Greenpeace noted, "Europe buys half the soya exported from the Amazon state of Matto Grosso, where 90% of rainforest soya is grown. Meat reared on rainforest soya finds its way on to supermarket shelves and fast food counters across Europe." As the Greenpeace website claimed, "Nuggets of Amazon forest were being served up on a platter at McDonald's restaurants throughout Europe." Following this dramatic report, McDonald's slapped a moratorium on purchasing soya grown in newly deforested regions of the rainforest and entered into an alliance with Greenpeace, and other food retailers, to develop a zero deforestation plan, involving the government in monitoring the integrity of the forest and of its inhabitants, some of whom had been enslaved and subjected to violence. The global soy traders—Cargill, ADM, Bunge, Dreyfus, and Maggi—made a two-year commitment to the alliance.

What is all this about? Like many NGOs, Greenpeace made the unseen relations embodied in chicken nuggets explicit. Documenting the ways in which the Brazilian soy boom—with all its social and environmental consequences—is a product of the fast-food diet, Greenpeace brought to light what is routinely

made invisible by the impersonal marketplace. By tracing the soy chain—with the aid of satellite images, aerial surveillance, classified government documents, and on-ground observation—Greenpeace reconstructed the geography of the soy trade, bringing the ethical dimensions of their diet to consumers' notice. While traders can escape the notice of the consuming public, retailers have become "brand sensitive" in an era in which information technology has created a new public space, and consumers have the ability to choose not to consume products that come with baggage.

What is the value of fast food compared with the value of preserving one of the richest and most biologically diverse rainforests on the planet—especially given that the scientific journal *Nature* recently warned that 40 percent of the Amazon rainforest will disappear by 2050 if current trends continue? And what is it about the market that conceals the consequences of our consumer choices?

Source: Greenpeace, *Eating Up the Amazon,* 2006. Available at www.greenpeace.org.

SUMMARY

Development, conventionally associated with economic growth, is a recent phenomenon. With the rise of capitalism, European rulers pursued economic growth to finance their needs for military protection and political legitimacy. But "development," as such, was not yet a universal strategy. It became so only in the mid-twentieth century, as newly independent governments embraced development as an antidote to colonialism, with varying success.

The mid-twentieth-century **development project** (1940s–1970s) was an internationally orchestrated program of *nationally sited* economic growth across the Cold War divide, involving financial, technological, and military assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union. In United Nations terms, development was a timely ideal, as formerly colonized subjects gained political independence, and all governments were enjoined to implement a human rights-based social contract with their citizens, even as this ideal was unevenly practiced. This book traces the implementation of this project, noting its partial successes and ultimate failure, in its own terms, to equalize conditions across the world, and the foreshadowing of its successor, the globalization project, in laying the foundations of a global market that progressively overshadowed the states charged with development in the initial post–World War II era.

The **globalization project** (1970s–2000s) superimposed open markets across national boundaries, liberalizing trade and investment rules and privatizing public goods and services. Corporate rights gained priority over the social contract and redefined development as a private undertaking. The neoliberal doctrine ("market freedoms") underlying the globalization project has been met with growing contention, symbolized by the antineoliberal social revolt in Latin America over the last decade, recent Middle East and southern European rebellions against authoritarianism and austerity, and the growing weight and assertiveness of the more state-regulated economies of China (and India) in the world political economy. Polanyi's double movement is alive and well.

Whether the global market will remain dominant is still to be determined. In the meantime, an incipient **sustainability project**, heavily influenced by the climate change emergency, may be forming, with China leading the green technology race and a myriad of environmental and justice movements across the world, pushing states, business leaders, and citizens toward a new formulation of development as "managing the future" sustainably (in contrast to "improving on the past," as in modernization).

Finally, development, as we know it, is not the same across time, nor is it the same across space. It is uneven within and among societies. It has been, and will continue to be, contentious. This book seeks to make sense of this by emphasizing development paradoxes and providing students with a "birds-eye" (global) perspective on development controversies not easily seen from the ground.

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PART I

The Development Project
(Late 1940s to Early 1970s)

2

Instituting the
Development Project

As we have seen in Chapter 1, "development" emerged as a comparative construct, in context of European colonization of the non-European world. Not only did the extraction of colonial resources facilitate European industrialization, but this process also required colonial administrators to manage subject populations adjusting to the extractive economy and mono-cultures, administering colonial rule for their masters, and experiencing physical as well as psychic displacement. Here, development assumed an additional meaning: the proverbial "white man's burden," underscoring its racial dimension.

Non-European cultures were irrevocably changed through colonialism, and the postcolonial context was founded on inequality. When newly independent states emerged, political leaders had to negotiate an unequal international framework not of their making, but through which their governments acquired political legitimacy. How that framework emerged is the subject of this chapter. But first we must address the historical context of colonialism.

Colonialism

Our appeal to history begins with a powerful simplification. It concerns the social psychology of European colonialism, built largely around stereotypes that have shaped perceptions and conflict for at least five centuries.

(*Colonialism* is defined and explained in the "What Is Colonialism?" box, and the European colonial empires are depicted in Figure 2.1.) One such perception was the idea among Europeans that non-European native people or colonial subjects were "backward" and trapped in stifling cultural traditions. The experience of colonial rule encouraged this image, as the juxtaposition of European and non-European cultures invited comparison, but through the lens of Europe's missionary and military–industrial engagement. This comparison was interpreted—or misinterpreted—as European cultural superiority. It was easy to take the next step, viewing the difference as "progress"—something colonizers had—to impart to their subjects.

WHAT IS COLONIALISM?

Colonialism is the subjugation by physical and psychological force of one culture by another—a colonizing power—through military and economic conquest of territory and stereotyping the subordinated cultures. It predates the era of European expansion (from the fifteenth century to the twentieth century) and extends to Japanese colonialism in the twentieth century and, most recently, Chinese occupation of Tibet and Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. Colonialism has two forms: colonies of settlement, which often eliminate indigenous people (such as the Spanish destruction of the Aztec and Inca civilizations in the Americas); and colonies of rule, where colonial administrators reorganize existing cultures by imposing new inequalities to facilitate their exploitation. Examples of the latter were the British creating local landlords, *zamindars*, to rule parts of India; confiscating personal and common land for cash cropping; depriving women of their customary resources; and elevating ethnoracial differences, such as privileging certain castes or tribes in the exercise of colonial rule. Outcomes are, first, the cultural genocide or marginalization of indigenous people; second, the introduction of new tensions around class, gender, race, and caste that shape postcolonial societies; third, the extraction of labor, cultural treasures, and resources to enrich the colonial power, its private interests, and public museums; fourth, the elaboration of ideologies justifying colonial rule, including racism and notions of backwardness; and fifth, responses by colonial subjects, ranging from death to internalization of inferiority to a variety of resistances—from everyday forms to sporadic uprisings to mass political mobilization.

Figure 2.1 European Colonial Empires at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

Such a powerful misinterpretation—and devaluing—of other cultures appears frequently in historical accounts. It is reflected in assumptions made by settlers about indigenous people they encountered in the Americas and Australasia. Europeans perceived Native Americans and aboriginal Australians as people who did not "work" the land they inhabited. In other words, the native populations had no right of "property"—a European concept in which property is private and alienable. Their displacement from their ancestral lands is a bloody reminder of the combined military power and moral fervor with which the European powers pursued colonization. It also foreshadowed the modern practice of rupturing the unity of the human and natural world, a unity characterizing some non-European cultures.

In precolonial Africa, communities relied on ancestral ecological knowledge and earth-centered cosmologies to sustain themselves and their environment. These methods were at once conservative and adaptive because, over time, African communities changed their composition, scale, and location in a long process of settlement and migration through the lands south of the equator. European colonists in Africa, however, saw these superstitious cultures as static and as only occupying—rather than improving—the land. This perception ignored the complex social systems adapted first to African ecology and then to European occupation.[1] Under these circumstances, Europeans viewed themselves as bringing civilization to the nonwhite races. French historian Albert Sarraut, ignoring non-European inventions such as gunpowder, the compass, the abacus, moveable type printing, and the saddle, claimed,

> It should not be forgotten that we are centuries ahead of them, long centuries during which—slowly and painfully, through a lengthy effort of research, invention, meditation and intellectual progress aided by the very influence of our temperate climate—a magnificent heritage of science, experience, and moral superiority has taken shape, which makes us eminently entitled to protect and lead the races lagging behind us.[2]

The ensuing colonial exchange was captured in the postcolonial African saying "When the white man came, he had the Bible and we had the land. When the white man left, we had the Bible and he had the land." Under colonialism, when non-Europeans lost control of their land, their spiritual life was compromised insofar as it was connected to their landscapes. It was difficult to sustain material and cultural integrity under these degrading extractive processes and conditions. At the same time, European colonization of natural resources converted land, water, cultivars, and food into economic categories, discounting their complex regenerative capacities and ecological interdependencies.

Development, European-style, thus came to be identified as the destiny of all humankind. The systematic handicapping of non-Europeans in this apparently natural and fulfilling endeavor remained largely unacknowledged, just as non-European scientific, ecological, and moral achievements, and legacies in European culture, were generally ignored.

WHAT ARE SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF PRECOLONIAL CULTURES?

All precolonial cultures had their own ways of satisfying their material and spiritual needs. Cultures varied by the differentiation among their members or households according to their particular ecological endowments and social contact with other cultures. The variety ranged from small communities of subsistence producers, who lived off the land or the forest, to extensive kingdoms or states. Subsistence producers, organized by kin relations, usually subdivided social tasks between men, who hunted and cleared land for cultivation, and women, who cultivated and processed crops, harvested wild fruits and nuts, and performed household tasks. These cultures were highly skilled in resource management and production to satisfy their material needs. They generally did not produce a surplus beyond what was required for their immediate needs, and they organized cooperatively—a practice that often made them vulnerable to intruders because they were not prepared for self-defense. Unlike North American Indians, whose social organization provided leadership for resistance, some aboriginal cultures, such as those of Australia and the Amazon, lacked leadership hierarchies and were more easily wiped out by settlers. By contrast, the Mogul empire in seventeenth-century India had a complex hierarchical organization, based on local chiefdoms in which the chief presided over the village community and ensured that surpluses (monetary taxes and produce) were delivered to a prosperous central court and "high culture." Village and urban artisans produced a range of metal goods, pottery, and crafts, including sophisticated muslins and silks. Caste distinctions, linked to previous invasions, corresponded to divisions of labor, such as trading, weaving, cultivating, ruling, and performing unskilled labor. Colonizers typically adapted such social and political hierarchies to their own ends—alienating indigenous cultures from their natural ecologies and their political systems from their customary social functions, incubating tensions that have been inherited by postcolonial states.

Sources: Bujra (1992); Rowley (1974).