M. Donald Hancock
Christopher J. Carman
Marjorie Castle
David P. Conradt
Mary N. Hampton
Raffaella Y. Nanetti
Robert Leonardi
William Safran
Stephen White
Michelle Hale Williams

Politics in europe

SEVENTH EDITION

Politics in Europe

Seventh Edition

Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE publishes more than 1000 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. Our growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company's continued independence.

Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

Politics in Europe

Seventh Edition

M. Donald Hancock
Vanderbilt University, USA

Christopher J. Carman
University of Glasgow, UK

Marjorie Castle
University of Utah, USA

David P. Conradt
East Carolina University, USA

Mary N. Hampton
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base

Robert Leonardi
LUISS, Italy

Raffaella Y. Nanetti
University of Illinois at Chicago, USA

William Safran
University of Colorado–Boulder, USA

Stephen White
University of Glasgow, UK

Michelle Hale Williams
University of West Florida, Pensacola

SAGE | CQ PRESS

Los Angeles | London | New Delhi
Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

FOR INFORMATION:

CQ Press
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320
E-mail: order@sagepub.com

SAGE Publications Ltd.
1 Oliver's Yard
55 City Road
London, EC1Y 1SP
United Kingdom

SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044
India

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd.
3 Church Street
#10-04 Samsung Hub
Singapore 049483

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Hancock, M. Donald, author.

Title: Politics in Europe / M. Donald Hancock, Christopher J. Carman, Marjorie Castle, David P. Conradt, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Robert Leonardi, William Safran, Stephen White, Mary Nelle Hampton, Michelle Hale Williams.

Description: Seventh edition. | Thousand Oaks, California: CQ Press, an Imprint of SAGE Publications, Inc., 2018. | Includes index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017046384 | ISBN 9781506399096 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH: Europe—Politics and government—1945-

Classification: LCC JN94.A91 H36 2018 | DDC 940.56/1—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017046384

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Acquisitions Editor: Scott Greenan
Editorial Assistant: Sarah Christensen
Production Editors: Nevair Kabakian and Jane Haenel
Copy Editor: Beth Ginter
Typesetter: Hurix Digital
Proofreader: Barbara Coster
Indexer: Robie Grant
Cover Designer: Candice Harman
Marketing Manager: Jennifer Jones

18 19 20 21 22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

PREFACE

This seventh edition addresses a number of significant issues within the context of long-term institutional stability and five-country studies plus the European Union.

Overarching themes include Europe's worst refugee crisis since the end of World War II, terrorist attacks in Paris and elsewhere, and political polarization between the democratic center and the radical, anti-immigrant right. Examples include a surge of electoral support for the Le Pen movement in France and even in traditionally democratically cohesive Sweden. A surge in electoral support for the right wing Alliance for Germany in the September 2017 election subsequently complicated legislative relations and the formation of a new government.

Successfully meeting the new-right challenge have been recent centrist electoral victories in the Netherlands, and most dramatically, in France. With the 2017 victory of Emmanuel Macron as new French president, and the sweeping victory by his pro-European Union supporters in the subsequent parliamentary elections, political power shifted from the traditional right to the center, beating back the far-right challenge of Le Pen's Far Right National Front.

Dramatic singular events included Britain's decision in a national referendum to leave the European Union (Brexit) and constitutional reforms redefining legislative powers in Italy.

Russia remains an outlier nation. President Vladimir Putin continues to pursue authoritarian policies at home and a strategy of asserting Russian national interests abroad, in Ukraine, the European Union, the Middle East, and the United States.

Another feature of this edition is the inclusion of a number of new tables in the Appendix that have been expanded to include additional new measures of system performance. To facilitate comparative analysis, they have been organized in five basic categories: geographical, demographic, economic, social, and political.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The seventh edition includes contributions by four contributors who helped update and expand several of the country sections. Among them is Michelle Williams (professor, University of West Florida). We wish to commend the collaborative efforts by Mary Hampton, a comparative and international political expert who teaches at The Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, Alabama, and Ian McAllister, a distinguished professor of political science at the National University in Australia, for their revisions of the chapters on Russia. We also wish to thank the contributions to revising the British chapters by Kathleen Volk Miller (professor, University of Drexel).

We are grateful for the research support provided by Kendra Posey, Mark Angell, Katherine Medler, Simon Westlake, and Frank Lester, head of government documents at the Vanderbilt University Central Library in Nashville, Tennessee. Thanks, too, to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for its international travel support.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

M. Donald Hancock is professor emeritus of political science at Vanderbilt University. He has previously taught at Columbia University, the University of Texas (UT) at Austin, and the Universities of Bielefeld and Mannheim in Germany. He is the founding director of two centers for European Studies—the first at UT Austin and the second, founded in 1981, at Vanderbilt. The latter is now designated the Max Kade Center for European and German Studies (which Hancock has also served as associate director for outreach activities). He is the coauthor (with Henry Krisch) of *Politics in Germany* (2009), and coeditor and coauthor of *Transitions to Capitalism and Democracy in Russia and Central Europe* (2000), *German Unification: Process and Outcomes* (1994), and *Managing Modern Capitalism: Industrial Renewal and Workplace Democracy in the United States and Western Europe* (1991). Hancock has served as cochair of the Council for European Studies and as president of the Society for the Advancement of Scandinavian Studies and the Conference Group on German Politics. He is currently working on a collaborative study of economic, societal, and military security in the Baltic region.

Christopher J. Carman is the Head of School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow and professor of Political Representation. He previously held positions at Strathclyde University and the University of Pittsburgh. He is the coauthor (with David Denver and Robert Johns) of *Elections and Voters in Britain* (2011) and coauthor (with David C. Barker) of *Representing Red and Blue: How the Culture Wars Change the Way Citizens Speak and Politicians Listen* (2012).

Marjorie Castle is associate professor (lecturer) in political science at the University of Utah. She is the author of two books on Polish politics: *Triggering Communism's Collapse: Perceptions and Power in Poland's Transition* (2003) and *Democracy in Poland* (2002), coauthored with Ray Taras.

David P. Conradt is professor emeritus of political science at East Carolina University. He has also taught at the University of Florida (Gainesville) and has held joint appointments at universities in Konstanz, Mannheim, Cologne, and Dresden. Among his recent publications are *The German Polity* (11th ed., 2016); *A Precarious Victory: Schröder and the German Elections of 2002* (2005); and *Power Shift in Germany: The 1998 Election and the End of the Kohl Era* (2000). He has also published a variety of articles and monographs on German political culture, parties, and elections, including "The Shrinking Elephants: The 2009 Election and the Changing Party System" (*German Politics and Society,* 2010), "The Civic Culture and Unified Germany" (*German Politics*, 2015). In 2005 the president of the Federal Republic awarded him the Merit Cross of the Federal Republic of Germany for his body of work.

Mary N. Hampton is professor of national security at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, where she was the associate dean for academics from 2010 to 2014. She teaches electives on genocide, the transatlantic alliance, and Russian foreign policy. Prior to ACSC, Dr. Hampton was a professor of political science at the University of Utah for 14 years. She received her PhD from UCLA in political science. Her research focuses on international relations theory, European security, German security and foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, women and German politics, issues and identity in transatlantic relations, and U.S. foreign and security policy. Dr. Hampton has written and lectured extensively on NATO; European security; German foreign, domestic, and security policy; Russian foreign policy; U.S. foreign and security policy; and identity politics in international relations.

Robert Leonardi has been visiting professor in the School of Government at the LUISS University in Rome since 2010 and teaches in the field of European public policy. Previously he was a member of the European Institute at the London School of Economics (1991– 2010) and held the position of director general in the regional government of Sicily (2008– 2009), responsible for the Structural Funds and extra-regional affairs. He has served as a founding member and past president of the Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society and is a current member of the British Academy of the Social Sciences.

Raffaella Y. Nanetti is professor emerita of urban planning and policy (UPP) in the College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs, University of Illinois at Chicago, having served as the UPP director in the 1990s at the time of the creation of the new college. She was a member, with Robert D. Putnam and Robert Leonardi, of the study team that carried out the twenty-year longitudinal study of Italian regional and local institutions from which the concept of "social capital" was empirically derived (*Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy,* 1992). Since the mid-1990s she has worked on the application of the concept of social capital to the field of urban planning, focusing on social capital–building strategies to improve institutional performance and to promote and sustain local and regional development.

William Safran is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He has also taught at City University of New York and at the Universities of Bordeaux, Grenoble, and Nice in France and Santiago de Compostela in Spain. He has written numerous articles on French and European politics and on national identity and related subjects. His recent books include *The French Polity* (7th ed., 2009); *Language, Ethnic Identity, and the State* (2005); *The Secular and the Sacred: Nation, Religion, and Politics* (2002); and *Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies* (2000). He is the founding editor of the journal *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* and general editor of *Routledge Studies in Nationalism and Ethnicity.*

Stephen White is James Bryce Professor of Politics at the University of Glasgow and also visiting professor at the Institute of Applied Politics in Moscow. He was chief editor of the *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* until 2011 and is currently coeditor of the *Journal of Eurasian Studies.* His recent publications include *Putin's Russia and the Enlarged*

Europe (with Roy Allison and Margot Light, 2006), *Understanding Russian Politics* (2011), *Developments in Central and East European Politics 5* (coedited, 2013), and *Developments in Russian Politics 8* (coedited, 2014). He is currently working on the implications of EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement for Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and on changes in the political elite over the Putin and Medvedev presidencies. He was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2010.

Michelle Hale Williams is chair of the Department of Government and professor of political science at the University of West Florida. Her research interests include radicalism and extremism, radical right-wing parties, nationalism and ethnic politics, immigration and migration policy, political parties and party systems, political institutions, and European politics. Her books include *The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State Intermediation* (ed., 2013, Routledge) and *The Impact of Radical Right-wing Parties in West European Democracies* (2006, Palgrave). Her articles have appeared in *Party Politics, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Análise Social, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, German Politics, PS: Political Science and Politics,* and the *Journal of Political Science Education*.

INTRODUCTION: THE WHY, WHAT, AND HOW OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

COMPARATIVE POLITICS CLAIMS A VENERABLE TRADITION DATING from Aristotle's classification of Greek city-states according to the number of their rulers and the quality of their rule.[1] Throughout its evolution out of successive eras of classical and modern political philosophy into modern social science, comparative politics has served to promote a better understanding of diverse forms of politics. Comparative politics approximates laboratory conditions of systematic observation of political systems and subsystems across space and time by facilitating empirical, normative, and theoretical analysis of their similarities and differences. As Robert Dahl explains, empirical analysis focuses on descriptive data and typologies, normative study deals with the analysis of social values and preferences, and theoretical analysis seeks to formulate and test scientific propositions to promote better understanding of social phenomena and to predict behavioral consequences.[2]

Comparative politics emerged as a recognized subfield within the fledgling discipline of political science in the early part of the twentieth century.[3] Early Anglo-American practitioners concentrated on constitutional norms, institutional arrangements, and largely atheoretical descriptive studies of the established democratic systems of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and, for a time, Weimar Germany. Their European counterparts, in contrast, were more preoccupied with the critical analysis of social classes, elites, and ideologies as products of industrial and political development and their accompanying political conflicts.[4] A crisis of democracy and the rise of authoritarian–totalitarian regimes throughout much of Europe during the interwar period prompted the exodus of many continental scholars to Great Britain and the United States and the beginning of a synthesis of the Anglo-American and European approaches to social science.

As a result, post–World War II comparative scholarship became increasingly diverse and dynamic. The field was broadened to encompass the study of political parties, interest groups, elites and masses, citizen attitudes, and electoral behavior. Many of the most creative scholars focused their attention on problems of modernization, political leadership, and revolution in the developing countries of Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa in an effort to devise more rigorous concepts and methods of comparative analysis.[5] Among the important innovations was Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, and G. Bingham Powell's formulation of structural functionalism, a concept based on David Easton's earlier work on general systems theory.[6] Others were Almond and Sidney Verba's pathbreaking study of political culture in the United States, Mexico, and three European countries[7] and the rapid growth of survey research as a powerful instrument of political inquiry.

A behavioral revolution swept through social science and all its subfields, bringing with it new methodologies and a greater emphasis on theoretical analysis.[8]

A central feature of the postwar transformation of comparative politics was the burgeoning growth of area studies programs.[9] New centers for research and teaching were established throughout North America—and at a somewhat laggard pace in Europe—to promote greater academic and practical knowledge of Latin America, the communist bloc, Western Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. External funding for the centers was partially motivated by Cold War largesse on the part of governments, but much support was also generated by independent research institutions such as the Ford Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund. Area studies programs produced generations of scholars as well as young professionals training to enter public service.

EUROPEAN RELEVANCE TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Throughout the transformation of political science and related disciplines, European studies has remained a core component of comparative politics. A traditional rationale for the relevance of the European experience is the contributions of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, and other European countries to the basic philosophical, cultural, and institutional tenets of Western civilization. Immigrants from throughout Europe, including Russia and Central Europe, helped to create new nations in the United States, Canada, Israel, Australia, and elsewhere. On a personal intellectual level, many of their descendants understandably look to Europe to comprehend the significance of their national origins and the European roots of their own countries' constitutional and political development.

Europe also provides important insights into the comparative study of what Robert Dahl calls different "paths to the present."[10] The striking contrast between the success of Great Britain and Sweden in sustaining an evolutionary pattern of political change and the far more tumultuous trajectories of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Russia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provides crucial knowledge about underlying factors of system change and political performance.[11] During the postwar era, these historical differences have largely yielded to a series of "most similar cases" of political stability that are broadly comparable to other advanced industrial democracies in North America, parts of Asia, and most of the British Commonwealth—thereby providing additional rich comparative data. In comparison, the Russian Federation remains an authoritarian outlier.

Historical and postcommunist patterns of democratization constitute another compelling justification for the study of European politics. Transitions to democracy have assumed many forms, in Europe and elsewhere.[12] A minimal empirical definition is that democratization is a process by which a political system institutes effective procedures for the selection of leaders on the basis of free competitive elections.[13] Normatively, democratization also entails the institutionalization of constitutional norms embodying the rule of law, respect for minority rights, the peaceful resolution of conflict, institutional transparency, and executive-legislative-administrative accountability. To be effective and reasonably stable, a democracy must embrace elite-mass consensus on these basic principles. European

countries provide both positive models and cautionary tales of the democratization process in comparative perspective.

Globalization constitutes an additional compelling reason to focus attention on Europe. Within the world of nations, economic forms of globalization have deep roots. Authors of a survey by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have observed the following:

> Economic integration among nations is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the increasing integration of the world economy in recent decades can in many ways be seen as a resumption of the intensive integration that began in the mid-1880s and ended with World War I.[14]

During the postwar era, economic, social, and other forms of globalization accelerated at an exponential rate, propelled not only by an expansion of international trade and the internationalization of labor but also by the integration of world financial, investment, and energy markets. Mass values have also been globalized to a significant degree through the diffusion of international access to the Internet and mass exposure to movies and other forms of popular culture.

According to international empirical data compiled by the Technical University in Zurich (ETH), Sweden ranks highest among the country case studies included in this volume in a 2016 aggregate globalization index (in 8th place), followed at a distance by France (19th), the United Kingdom (20th), Poland (23rd), Italy (24th), Germany (27th), and Russia (45th). In comparison, Canada ranked 8th and the United States 34th. The Netherlands rank first on the aggregate list, followed by Ireland, Belgium, and Austria. (See Table I.1.)

Measures of economic globalization include trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign direct investments; social globalization consists of data on personal contacts (such as international tourism and foreign population), information flows, and cultural proximity (such as trade in books as a percentage of GDP); and political globalization is measured by the number of embassies in a country, membership in international organizations, participation in UN Security Council missions, and international treaties. The first column in Table I.1 is a composite of these three indices. For a more complete listing of nations according to their globalization rankings, see Table 14 in the Appendix.

A significant subset of economic and financial integration is the European Union, whose 28 member states have progressively eliminated tariffs and most other discriminatory barriers among themselves to the free movement of goods, services, and people. In the process, much of Europe has achieved unprecedented levels of material prosperity and regional peace under the authority of the European Union as a new center of international (primarily economic) power. Socially, Europeanization has been accompanied by national efforts to promote greater gender and sexual equality among citizens through reform legislation sponsored primarily by moderate left parties and abetted by European court decisions. Among the countries at the forefront of equalization reforms are Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.

At the same time, globalization has myriad debilitating consequences. Many of its critics have protested against globalization's discriminatory economic practices against developing countries through unruly street-level demonstrations during summit meetings

TABLE I.1 ■ Indices of Globalization, 2015

Globalization, Overall			Economic Globalization		Social Globalization		Political Globalization	
Rank	Country	Overall Score	Country	Economic Score	Country	Social Score	Country	Political Score
1	Belgium	90.47	Singapore	92.47	Norway	90.43	Italy	99.26
2	Netherlands	90.24	Hong Kong, China	90.07	Luxembourg	89.89	France	99.15
3	Switzerland	89.70	Netherlands	89.31	Switzerland	89.58	Germany	98.23
4	Sweden	88.05	Belgium	89.23	Denmark	88.30	Spain	98.04
5	Austria	87.91	Malta	86.73	Ireland	88.12	United Kingdom	97.82
6	Denmark	87.85	Ireland	86.19	United Kingdom	88.05	Netherlands	97.64
7	France	87.34	Luxembourg	85.49	New Zealand	86.88	Sweden	97.16
8	United Kingdom	87.23	Estonia	84.31	Austria	86.75	Belgium	95.80
9	Germany	86.89	Switzerland	83.82	Canada	86.48	Switzerland	95.69
10	Finland	85.98	Hungary	83.02	Belgium	86.29	Austria	95.62
11	Norway	85.81	United Arab Emirates	82.47	Finland	85.85	United States	95.43
12	Hungary	84.20	Denmark	82.21	Cyprus	85.81	India	95.31
13	Ireland	83.53	Czech Republic	81.69	Sweden	85.68	Turkey	93.99
14	Canada	83.45	Austria	81.36	Hong Kong, China	85.46	China	93.60
15	Czech Republic	83.41	Sweden	81.32	Germany	85.39	Canada	93.52
16	Spain	83.31	Latvia	81.01	Iceland	85.33	Argentina	93.10
17	Portugal	82.21	Mauritius	80.12	France	85.28	Egypt, Arab Rep.	93.06
18	Italy	82.15	Georgia	79.49	Israel	83.84	Denmark	93.04

19	Luxembourg	82.00	Finland	79.44	Netherlands	83.76	Finland	92.65
20	Estonia	81.97	Slovak Republic	79.05	Australia	83.39	Portugal	92.28
21	Slovak Republic	80.74	Bulgaria	77.77	Malta	83.30	Poland	92.15
22	Greece	80.31	Seychelles	77.64	Estonia	82.65	Greece	91.99
23	Singapore	80.01	United Kingdom	77.58	Aruba	82.06	Hungary	91.99
24	United States	79.95	France	77.57	Barbados	81.26	Romania	91.90
25	Slovenia	79.76	Portugal	77.30	Lithuania	80.86	Japan	91.48
26	Bulgaria	79.52	Germany	77.06	Slovenia	80.85	Australia	90.95
27	Australia	79.29	Lithuania	76.38	Malaysia	80.76	Norway	90.66
28	Malaysia	79.28	Panama	76.37	Singapore	80.63	Russian Federation	90.42
29	Croatia	79.04	Norway	76.34	United States	80.60	Czech Republic	90.22
30	Lithuania	78.78	Slovenia	75.66	Palau	80.33	Ukraine	90.19
31	Poland	78.72	Timor-Leste	74.97	Croatia	79.50	Korea, Rep.	90.12
32	New Zealand	78.00	Cyprus	74.93	Korea, Rep.	78.70	Mexico	89.36
33	Romania	77.88	Montenegro	74.69	Czech Republic	78.32	Indonesia	88.97
34	Malta	77.51	Qatar	74.44	Spain	78.23	South Africa	88.83
35	Japan	77.30	Bahrain	74.05	Slovak Republic	78.03	Nigeria	88.48
36	Korea, Rep.	76.67	Spain	73.44	Hungary	77.58	Morocco	88.31
37	Israel	75.73	Kiribati	72.97	Macao, China	77.31	Chile	88.29
38	Cyprus	75.60	Croatia	72.20	Greece	77.31	Bulgaria	87.08
39	Latvia	75.42	Romania	71.68	Italy	77.17	Pakistan	86.93

(Continued)

TABLE I.1 ■ (Continued)

Globalization, Overall			Economic Globalization		Social Globalization		Political Globalization	
Rank	Country	Overall Score	Country	Economic Score	Country	Social Score	Country	Political Score
40	Serbia	75.28	Greece	71.63	Qatar	77.11	Malaysia	86.50
	...		...		...		...	
44	Qatar	73.21	Italy	70.01	Montenegro	76.28	Slovak Republic	85.15
	...		...		...		...	
46	Uruguay	70.98	Poland	68.87	Brunei Darussalam	75.48	Thailand	83.96
47	Turkey	70.87	Macedonia, FYR	68.71	Poland	75.15	Tunisia	83.83
	...		...		...		...	
56	Russian Federation	69.06	Nicaragua	64.74	Seychelles	72.82	Iran, Islamic Rep.	80.12
	...		...		...		...	
63	Albania	67.19	United States	63.83	Bahrain	71.45	Tanzania	77.98
	...		...		...		...	
93	Barbados	59.94	Tonga	54.76	Russian Federation	65.81	Cuba	69.79
	...		...		...		...	
108	Zambia	55.30	Russian Federation	50.95	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	62.44	Costa Rica	65.99

Source: Adapted from *KOF [Confederate Technical University of Zurich) Index of Globalisation 2016,* http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2016/03/03/rankings_2016.pdf.

of government leaders from the richer nations. International acts of terrorism are a much more virulent form of deadly protest by nongovernmental actors intent on conducting religious, ethnic, and political warfare against Western nations and their citizens. The September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon; bombings in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Stockholm in 2010; and "lone-wolf" attacks in 2016–2017 in Paris, Nice, Brussels, London, and Stockholm are territorial extensions of what Samuel P. Huntington has depicted as an epic "clash of civilizations" between the democratic West and religious–ethnic insurgents in the Middle East and Asia.[15] Virulent manifestations of domestic violence by errant individuals include the mass slaying of 77 young Norwegians at a Labour Party island retreat by a self-proclaimed white supremacist in July 2011 and the attempted bombing of the Polish Parliament in November 2012 by a disgruntled scientist with professed ties with European nationalist groups. Another example are the Boston marathon bombings in April 2013 by two Islamic brothers who had emigrated with their parents in 2002 from violence-torn provinces in southwestern Russia. They allegedly acted to protest American military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Increased economic interdependence has also made nations highly vulnerable to recurrent cycles of domestic fluctuations in housing, investments, banking, market performance, and employment. A devastating example is the international economic crisis that began in 2008 and engulfed the United States, most of Europe, and many parts of the developing world. By 2009 the average annual growth rate had declined precipitously in virtually all advanced nations, accompanied by a general increase in unemployment and a surge in public indebtedness triggered by government actions to mitigate the effects of the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The crisis threatened the very viable of the eurozone within the European Union and even the integration process itself. (See Part 8 in this volume and Tables 4 and 11 in the Appendix.)

THE UNIVERSE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES

The Political Handbook of the World classifies 40 European countries as democracies as defined previously. Of this total, three countries are characterized as semi-democracies (Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia); *The Political Handbook* lists one European state as a nondemocracy (Belarus). Table I.2 provides an overview of basic similarities and differences among the 40 cases.[16] They are grouped, from top to bottom, in three categories: (1) West European countries that joined the European Community between 1951 and 2004; (2) newer members of the European Union (since 2004); and (3) nonmember nations. The United States and Canada are included in the third category for comparative purposes.

Table I.2 reveals a significant distinction among European nations with respect to the timing of their democratic transitions. Seven countries achieved democratization during the latter decades of the nineteenth century or the early part of the twentieth century. All of them are situated in Western Europe: France (except for the interregnum of German occupation and the authoritarian Vichy regime from 1941 to 1944), Great Britain, and four of the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden). Fourteen other West European nations experienced stable democratization either during the interwar period (Finland) or after World War II: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy,

TABLE I.2 ■ Typologies of European and North American Democracies

Country	Unitary/ Federal	Type of Government	Party System	Democratization
Europe of 15, 1951–2004				
Austria	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Interwar/postwar
Belgium	Federal	Constitutional monarchy-parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Interwar/postwar
Denmark	Unitary	Constitutional monarchy-parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Older
Finland	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Interwar
France	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty	Older/postwar
Germany	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar/postwar
Greece	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty	Postwar
Ireland	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar
Italy	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Interwar/postwar
Luxembourg	Unitary	Constitutional monarchy-parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar/postwar
Netherlands	Federal	Constitutional monarchy-parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Interwar/postwar
Portugal	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Postwar
Spain	Federal	Constitutional monarchy-parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar/postwar
Sweden	Unitary	Constitutional monarchy-parliamentary	Multiparty	Older
United Kingdom	Quasi-federal	Constitutional monarchy/ parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Older
New EU Member States, 2004–2007				
Bulgaria	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Postcommunist
Cyprus	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Postwar
Czech Republic	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Interwar/postcommunist

Country	Unitary/ Federal	Type of Government	Party System	Democratization
Estonia	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Hungary	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Latvia	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Lithuania	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Postcommunist
Malta	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Two party	Postwar
Poland	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Postcommunist
Romania	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Slovak Republic	Quasi-federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Slovenia	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Postcommunist
Non-EU European and North American States				
Albania	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Postcommunist
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Postcommunist
Croatia	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Postcommunist
Georgia	Federal	Presidential-parliamentary; semi-democracy	Multiparty-limited competition	Postcommunist
Iceland	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty-limited competition	Older/postwar independence
Macedonia	Unitary	Presidential-parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Montenegro	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist
Norway	Unitary	Constitutional monarchy-parliamentary	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Older/postwar
Russia	Federal	Presidential-parliamentary; semi-democracy	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist

(Continued)

TABLE I.2 ■ (Continued)

Country	Unitary/ Federal	Type of Government	Party System	Democratization
Serbia	Unitary	Parliamentary		Postcommunist
Switzerland	Federal	Council form-rotating presidency	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Older
Turkey	Unitary	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Interwar/postwar
Ukraine	Federal	Presidential-parliamentary; semi-democracy	Multiparty-hyper competitive	Postcommunist
United States	Federal	Presidential	Two party	Older
Canada	Federal	Parliamentary	Multiparty	Older

Source: Adapted from *Political Handbook of the World* (electronic version: cqpress.com, 2017).

Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and West Germany. Eight Central and East European countries have undergone postcommunist democratic transitions. The most successful cases are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine manifest less institutionalized forms of democracy because of irregularities in their electoral processes, authoritarian governance, and a weaker elite-mass democratic consensus.

The historical timing of democratic transitions has important consequences for the development of national political parties and electoral competition. As Richard Rose has pointed out in his comparative study of Europe's new democracies, the formation of modern political parties preceded full democratization in Great Britain and Scandinavia, whereas the emergence of democratic opposition movements to communism coincided with abrupt transitions to democracy in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe.[17] This contrast has yielded sharply different kinds of party systems in the two aggregates: class-based parties drawn at an early stage into democratic electoral competition in the former case, more fragmented party systems based on conflicting national memories, ethnicity, and more exclusive ideological appeals in the latter. These differences are partially reflected in the Party System column in Table I.2 above, which contains *The Political Handbook*'s summary distinction between different types of electoral competition: limited competition, hyper competitive, and two party. Much deeper political analysis is required in each case to elicit adequate levels of information and understanding of the effects of these different types.

Two other salient features of European democracies include the constitutional distinction between unitary and federal political systems and between parliamentary and "mixed" presidential–parliamentary systems. As shown in Table I.2, 23 of the 40

European countries have unitary political systems (i.e., political power is concentrated in the hands of national executives and legislatures), and 14 are federal systems (with power shared by national and regional or state governments). The United Kingdom and Slovenia can be considered "quasi-federal" because in both cases significant political powers have been "devolved" from the national level of government to regional assemblies. A second majority norm is the prevalence of parliamentary systems of government throughout Europe: Thirty countries are parliamentary democracies, and 10 are mixed systems with presidents exercising varying degrees of executive power alongside prime ministers who are accountable to parliament. France and Russia are notable examples. Switzerland has a unique council form of national government characterized by a rotating presidency.

The European Union constitutes a forty-first case of European democracy. The EU's equivalent of a constitution takes the form of a succession of treaties among its member states—most recently the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into effect in December 2009. Politically, the European Union is a confederal political system whose division of power between central community institutions and national governments resembles the historical precedent of the United States under the Articles of Confederation (1781–1789). The European Union has a distinctive form of executive authority consisting of an indirectly elected president of the European Council (which is made up of the heads of government or state of its member countries) and a rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers (composed of cabinet officials representing the member states). It also has a directly elected European Parliament that shares legislative powers with the various councils. Earlier criticisms of the EU's "democratic deficit" have yielded to greater accountability and transparency in its decision-making processes and use of power.

CHOICE OF CASES

Contributors to this volume concentrate their efforts on a sample of eight case studies from the larger universe of European politics. Their choice is based on a variety of considerations. The first is the traditional inclusion of France and the United Kingdom in most comparative courses on European politics. Both countries have made major contributions to the emergence of Western democracy and continue to play important political and economic roles in regional and world affairs. A second consideration is the significance of Germany as a compelling instance of fundamental system transformation over time. Theoretically and empirically, the German case offers crucial insights into the processes of socioeconomic and political development under successive historical conditions of regime discontinuity, postwar stability in the West, the failure of communism in the former German Democratic Republic, and unification in 1990. Third, the inclusion of Italy and Sweden provides important systemic contrasts with the more familiar case studies because of their distinctive patterns of alternating periods of earlier long-term political dominance by the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, respectively. In addition, Sweden manifests one of the world's most highly developed welfare system. Finally, Poland and Russia's transitions to democracy and a market economy pose fundamental questions about system transformation and performance.

Part 8 of this volume deals with the European Union. Since the early 1950s, institutionalized economic and political cooperation has transformed the European

TABLE I.3 ■ Democracy Index, 2017

Country	Rank	Overall Score	Electoral Process and Pluralism	Functioning of Government	Political Participation	Civil Liberties
Norway	1	9.87	10.00	9.64	10.00	9.71
Iceland	2	9.58	10.00	9.29	8.89	9.71
Sweden	3	9.39	9.58	9.64	8.33	9.41
Denmark	5	9.22	10.00	9.29	8.33	9.12
Finland	9	9.03	10.00	8.93	7.78	9.71
Germany	13	8.61	9.58	8.21	8.33	9.41
United Kingdom	14	8.53	9.58	7.50	8.33	9.12
Italy	21	7.98	9.58	6.43	7.22	8.53
France	29	7.80	9.58	7.50	7.78	8.53
Poland	53	6.67	9.17	6.07	6.11	7.65
Russia	135	3.17	2.17	1.79	5.00	4.41
North American Comparisons						
Canada	6	9.15	9.58	9.64	7.78	10.00
United States	21	7.98	9.17	7.14	7.22	8.24

Source: http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2017.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2017.

Community into an increasingly important regional and global actor. This transformation is manifest in the completion of an integrated Single Market and the attainment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) accompanied by the introduction of a common currency (the euro). A majority of EU member states have joined the eurozone since its inception in January 1999. The addition of the 12 new member states in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean since 2004 further enforces the EU's international economic status as both a partner of and competitor to the United States and its other principal trading partners, China and Russia. However, in June 2016, a majority of British citizens voted in a national referendum in favor of Britain leaving the European Union.

Among the country case studies, Sweden ranks third on a global scale of democracy compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, closely following two other Nordic states. Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy rank in the mid-teens and early twenties.

France is ranked at 29, Poland at 53, and Russia at 135. Canada and the United States are ranked at 6 and 21(tied with Italy), respectively (see Table I.3).

A COMMON ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A major issue in comparative political analysis concerns the most appropriate methodology for addressing interactive themes of economic, social, and political change. One approach, which is largely quantitative, utilizes as many case studies as possible to analyze such themes. Important examples of "large *N*" studies include Ronald Inglehart's global surveys of the "cultural shift" from predominantly materialist values emphasizing survival and economic security to postmaterialist values embracing a greater appreciation of environmentalism and human rights.[18] An alternative methodology is the utilization of "small *N*" studies to allow for greater in-depth analysis of particular cases. The authors in this volume have chosen the latter approach, emphasizing the use of political power in eight political systems on the basis of a common analytical framework designed to facilitate both single-case and cross-national analysis. These country and regional specialists have divided their analysis of seven important European nations and the European Union along the following lines:

- *The Context of _____ Politics.* These chapters describe the basic geographic and demographic factors, historical development, democratization, and political culture of each political system studied. The contextual chapters are intended to introduce students to each case study in turn.
- *Where Is the Power?* In these chapters, readers are introduced to the formal decision-making institutions and implementation structures, including national executives, parliaments, and the civil service. Fundamental differences distinguish the parliamentary systems of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, and Sweden; the mixed presidential–parliamentary systems of France and Russia; and the unique system of governance in the European Union. Other differences include unitary political systems in France, Poland, and Sweden; federalism in Germany and Russia; and "quasi-federalism" in Italy and the United Kingdom, both of which have devolved power to their regions. Because of its complicated institutions and decision-making processes, the European Union also can be classified as "quasi-federal."
- *Who Has the Power?* These chapters describe the central roles played by political parties, organized interest groups, and electoral behavior in the political process.
- *How Is Power Used?* Policy processes and policy outcomes are highlighted in these chapters, with an emphasis on the distinctive features of both. Process and outcomes are closely related, but specific political decisions reflect a distinctive range of value preferences produced by historical patterns of development; dominant ideologies; and whichever leaders, institutions, parties, interest groups, and citizen coalitions happen to be most influential in the policy process.
- *What Is the Future of _____ Politics?* These chapters address the pending effects of changing domestic, regional, and international conditions in each of the cases.

The emphasis on political power will enable students to compare more easily the seven countries and the European Union. Accompanying the country sections are photographs as well as tables and boxed summaries of their basic features. Taken altogether, the eight case studies contained in this volume address the most relevant questions of comparative political analysis: Who governs, on behalf of what values, with the collaboration of what groups, in the face of what kind of opposition, and with what socioeconomic and political consequences? The European experience reveals illuminating answers to these questions.

M. Donald Hancock
Vanderbilt University

NOTES

1. Aristotle, who lived from 384 to 322 BCE, compiled and studied the constitutions of more than 150 Greek city-states in his work *Politics*, which became a classical cornerstone of modern social and political science. For a modern translation, see Stephen Everson, ed., *Aristotle, The Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
2. Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis,* 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984).
3. Gabriel Almond provides a useful historical account of the emergence of political science in *Ventures in Political Science: Narratives and Reflections* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). See also Bernard Brown, "Introduction," in Bernard E. Brown, ed., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, 10th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thompson/Wadsworth, 2006), 1–18.
4. Classical European contributions to comparative politics include Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1984; originally published in 1892 as *De la division du travail social*); Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936, and London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1936; reprinted in 1985, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; originally published in 1929 as *Ideologie und Utopie*); and Max Weber, a prolific German scholar of bureaucracy, different forms of authority, the role of religion in political development, and numerous other topics. For a sample of his work, see H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). Bernard E. Brown provides an informative and thoughtful overview of historical and contemporary approaches to comparative politics in "Introduction: On Comparing Nations," in his edited volume *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*.
5. For a summary overview of innovation in postwar approaches to comparative political analysis, see Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981). Standard sources on the methodology of comparative research include Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics,* 2nd ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990); Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970); and Robert Holt and John Turner, eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York: Free Press, 1970).
6. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965), and Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).
7. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, An Analytic Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). See also its sequel collection of essays by various contributors, Almond and Verba, eds., *The Civil Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).
8. A critical assessment of the failure of the behavioral revolution to live up to many of its promises can be found in Lawrence C. Mayer, *Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise versus Performance* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Library of Social Research, 1989).

9. For a more extensive discussion of the role of area studies programs in comparative research, see Almond, *Ventures in Political Science.*

10. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis.*

11. See Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); and Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

12. See Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

13. This definition of democratization and democracy characterizes a number of texts in political science, especially in American politics. It is derived from Joseph Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,* which was originally published in 1942. It has been republished many times, including by Harper and Row (New York, 1976). Schumpeter was one of many European scholars who emigrated from Europe to the United States in the 1930s to escape National Socialism.

14. International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook* (Washington, DC: IMF, 1997), 45.

15. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1997).

16. Table I.2 does not include systems such as Liechtenstein, Morocco, or Vatican City.

17. Richard Rose and Neil Munro, *Elections and Parties in New European Democracies* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003).

18. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Countries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Inglehart, *Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-National Sourcebook: Political, Religious, Sexual, and Economic Norms in 43 Societies: Findings From the 1990–1993 World Values Survey* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For a discussion of methodological issues related to large *N* studies, see Robert W. Jackman, "Cross-National Statistical Research and the Study of Comparative Politics," *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (1985): 161–182.

PART 1

UNITED KINGDOM

Christopher J. Carman and Kathleen Volk Miller


International boundary
Territory boundary
Lieutenancy boundary
Capital city
Administrative seat
Largest cities (by population)
Shetland Islands
Orkney Islands
Outer Hebrides
ATLANTIC OCEAN
SCOTLAND
Ben Nevis
River Tay
Glasgow
Edinburgh
North Sea
UNITED KINGDOM
River Bann
NORTHERN IRELAND
Belfast
Slieve Donard
Scafell Pike
Irish Sea
Liverpool
IRELAND
Snowdon
ENGLAND
River Severn
Birmingham
WALES
Thames
London
Cardiff
Celtic Sea
English Channel
FRANCE

1.1 THE CONTEXT OF BRITISH POLITICS

BRITISH POLITICS HAS ENTERED AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY characterized by electoral flux, the advent of coalition governments, and a controversial national vote (known as Brexit) in favor of leaving the European Union (EU). These events challenge traditional views of British politics and society that have emphasized the absence of significant social cleavages other than social class and of the presence of a uniform set of political and social values that translated into homogeneity and political stability. The impression of stability was reinforced by the ability of two political leaders—Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair—each to remain in power for more than a decade. Further, even after the election of Blair's "New Labour" government to a third term in 2005, many Conservative policies remained in effect—enough, in fact, to prompt traditional supporters of Labour to argue that there has been too much continuity in British politics.

Yet by the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, many of the old certainties of British politics were called into question. National elections in 2010 and 2017 transformed the country that had exemplified Arendt Lijphart's ideal type of a "majoritarian democracy" into a Continental-style system of coalition politics (at least temporarily). A surge of regional nationalism in Scotland prompted a referendum in 2014 on whether to secede from the United Kingdom (UK). The vote failed by 55.3–47.8 percent, but a second referendum is scheduled in the early 2020s. The pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP) formed a government in 2014 and won an absolute popular majority in elections to the Scottish Parliament the following year.

Another departure from "politics as usual" was the unexpected outcome of a referendum in June 2016 on whether to remain in the European Union, which Britain had joined in 1973. A narrow majority of 51.1 percent of the electorate voted in favor of exit, prompting the British government to submit a formal request in March 2017 to leave the European Union once negotiations on terms of departure are complete.

Many factors went into the United Kingdom's decision to exit the European Union. Prominent among them are the United Kingdom's need to grapple not only with its own internal territorial diversity but also with the wider problems of being a midsize country in an increasingly globalized world.

BRITISH DIVERSITY

The social and political systems of the United Kingdom are substantially more diverse than they are frequently portrayed, and many of the factors that divide other democracies politically also divide the citizens of the United Kingdom. There are differences in religion,

TABLE 1.1 ■ Outcomes by Region in the 2016 British Referendum on Membership in the EU (Percentage)

Constituent Region	Leave	Remain
England	53.3	46.7
Wales	52.2	47.5
Scotland	38.0	62.0
Northern Ireland	44.2	58.8

Source: BBC, EU referendum, "The Result in Maps and Charts" 24 June 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028.

language, regional interests, and perceptions of issues that both mitigate and reinforce the traditionally dominant class divisions in British politics. Those divisive factors have become even more important, because immigration, Europeanization, continuing economic change, and the war on terror have tended to increase the salience of the existing social divisions and create new ones. The scandal over expenses claimed by members of Parliament (MPs) that erupted in 2009 highlighted traditional social class and elite–mass cleavages that simmer below the surface of British politics. Further, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government that formed after the 2010 general election adds an interesting complication to governance in the United Kingdom.

Sociopolitical discord is probably best illustrated by data from the Brexit referendum. Although Brexit was endorsed in the United Kingdom as a whole, the numbers were incredibly close. As illustrated in Table 1.1, a majority of voters in England and Wales favored Brexit, whereas majorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain in the European Union.

Alongside social and regional diversity, the setting of British politics embraces some seemingly contradictory elements that make the management of government much more of a balancing act than might be thought at first glance. In fact, the genius of British politics in maintaining a stable political system over several centuries is not the good fortune of operating in a homogeneous society but the development of a set of institutions, values, and customs that permit the pragmatic acceptance of diversity and an effective accommodation to change. Historically, these changes were rather gradual, but the pace of transformation accelerated in the late twentieth century. This chapter explores several contradictory elements within the environment of British politics and their relationship to the functioning of the political system, and illustrates why the United Kingdom eventually decided to continue to secede from the European Union. These contradictions also illustrate why the Brexit decision continues to be so controversial and met with so much dissension.

A UNITED KINGDOM OF FOUR COUNTRIES

Diversity in British politics stems in part from the fact that the United Kingdom is a multinational state composed of four parts. This section begins, therefore, by introducing

some nomenclature with real political importance. The proper name of the nation usually referred to as Great Britain is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Great Britain, in turn, is a geographic, as well as cultural, identifier referring to the island that comprises England, Wales, and Scotland. All are constituent parts of the United Kingdom, albeit rather unequal partners in terms of population and economic productivity. More than 84 percent of the total population of the United Kingdom lives in England, 9 percent in Scotland, 5 percent in Wales, and the remainder in Northern Ireland. More than 90 percent of total wages and salaries in the economy are paid in England, with only 1 percent going to residents of Northern Ireland.

The three non-English components of the United Kingdom, sometimes called the Celtic fringe, joined with England at various times and various ways.[1] Wales was added first, by conquest, in the early fourteenth century. The English and Scottish crowns were united in 1603 when the Scottish king, James VI, also became King James I of England. The parliaments of the two countries were joined by the Act of Union in 1707. This unification did not, however, alleviate the conflict between the northern and southern portions of Great Britain. Scottish uprisings in 1715 and again in 1745 resulted in English occupation of Scotland and the outlawing of some Scottish customs such as the kilt and bagpipes. But these restrictions were removed, at least informally, by 1822, and manifestations of Scottish nationalism, despite being prominent, have been substantially less violent since that time.

The desire of some Scots (and substantially fewer Welsh) for greater autonomy or even independence has been apparent for quite some time. A nationalist party began to run some candidates in Scottish elections during the 1880s and gained one seat in a by-election in 1945. Since 1967 the SNP has been able to secure representation in Parliament in every election. During the 1970s, the pressure for independence was sufficiently strong to force a referendum on the issue of home rule. That referendum failed, but the issues of self-determination and autonomy did not go away.[2] As the United Kingdom continued to elect Conservative national governments through the 1980s and early 1990s, the push for home rule among the mostly Labour-voting Scots grew in intensity. Another referendum in 1997 approved the devolution of some powers to a Scottish parliament, which formally took office in July 1999. Although its relationship with the British national Parliament at Westminster is complicated at best, the Scottish Parliament exercises primary legislative authority over most domestic policy areas within Scotland. Following a review[3] commissioned by the main pro-Union parties in the Scottish Parliament (Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democratic), the UK Parliament granted the Scottish Parliament further powers. Most significantly, its very limited fiscal powers expanded in 2015 to retain a proportion of the income tax raised in Scotland.

Wales also received its own assembly in 1999, although that body has had substantially fewer powers than the Scottish Parliament. However, in a 2011 referendum the Welsh voted to expand the powers of their assembly, giving it direct legislative authority over devolved policy domains.[4] Devolution in Wales remains less extensive than in Scotland, but a review commissioned by the UK government looks set to recommend further powers over domestic policy areas for the Welsh assembly. This review has already recommended that the Welsh assembly be given fiscal powers similar to those already granted to Scotland.[5] Wales, with little "bargaining power" due to lack of population and low economy, must remain part of the United Kingdom and prepare to leave the European Union.

The involvement of the British government in Ireland has had a long and tortuous history. English armies began invading Ireland in 1170; the island was finally conquered in 1603 and was formally joined with Great Britain to form the United Kingdom in 1800. The unity created was more legal than actual, and Irish home rule was a persistent political issue during the second half of the nineteenth century. Political arguments were accompanied by increasing violence and then by armed uprisings against British rule. The most famous of these was the Easter Uprising of 1916, which marked the onset of years of serious violence. After a long period of negotiation, the twenty-six southern counties of Ireland were granted independence in 1922 as the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland), and six northern counties in Ulster remained part of the United Kingdom. But this partition did not solve the "Irish Question." The ongoing tensions and outbreaks of violence in Northern Ireland between Catholics seeking to join with the rest of Ireland and Protestants desiring to maintain unity with the United Kingdom have been a problem for British governments since the beginning of the "troubles." The London government did try in various ways to establish a political settlement—all in the general context of Ulster remaining within the United Kingdom. For a short time it devolved substantial rule to Belfast and experimented with arrangements for power sharing with Catholic groups. But none of the plans was successful, and they were followed by a return to direct rule and the large-scale use of British troops in Ulster.

In February 1995, Prime Minister John Major and John Bruton, the Taoiseach (prime minister) of Ireland, reached an agreement establishing the conditions for initial negotiations for an enduring settlement.[6] Among the agreement's points, the most important was a democratic means of negotiating a more enduring solution to the ongoing dispute. More immediately, the agreement meant that after several decades of doing so, British soldiers stopped patrolling the streets of Belfast. If nothing else, this halt removed a symbol of the troubles and a continuing irritant for the Roman Catholic population.

A highly significant step toward resolving the question of Northern Ireland was the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, signed by Prime Minister Blair, the Irish prime minister, the leaders of Sinn Fein (the political arm of the Irish Republican Army [IRA]), and the Ulster Unionists. The agreement called for electing a new assembly for Northern Ireland, establishing institutions formed from both the nationalist and Unionist communities, and creating a joint consultative body between Dublin and Belfast to address issues that affect all of the island of Ireland. The most fundamental point was that a greater measure of self-government was to be returned to the province. A referendum on the agreement passed overwhelmingly in Northern Ireland and even more so in a simultaneous vote in the Republic of Ireland.

Peace seemed to be returning to Northern Ireland. Elections were held for the assembly in the spring of 1999, and in July the executive assumed office, with David Trimble, an Ulster Unionist, as first minister. The executive also included members of several important parties in the province, including Sinn Fein. Initial optimism over the government proved short-lived, however, when the peace process stalled over the question of decommissioning weapons held by the IRA and the Protestant paramilitaries. In response, London restored direct rule over the province. The political impasse was tentatively resolved when Sinn Fein, in an unprecedented move, called on the IRA in October 2001 to begin decommissioning its weapons. Trimble, who had resigned in July, was reelected first minister in November. After these steps, there was little movement in the peace process until July 2005, when the IRA announced that it was officially ending its "armed campaign" and ordered its units

to "dump" their weapons.[7] The Protestant paramilitaries then followed suit.[8] The peace and reconciliation process again moved ahead in 2007, when a power-sharing government was established in Belfast between Ian Paisley, hard-core Protestant Unionist and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, and Martin McGuinness, avowed Catholic republican and leader of Sinn Fein, respectively serving as leader and deputy leader of the Northern Ireland executive.[9] These once sworn adversaries became the face of a more unified and conciliatory Northern Ireland government. Several nights of rioting in Belfast in July 2010 and again in January 2013, however, revealed that Northern Ireland still had a long way to go before it could resolve the sectarian and political tensions that had driven the conflict. The question that remains unsettled for Northern Ireland in the aftermath of Brexit is whether there should be a "hard border" between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, or whether Northern Ireland should reunify.

Preserving the unity of the United Kingdom does not prevent the expression of differences among its constituent parts—and to some degree those differences are enshrined in law and the political structure. Before devolution, each of the three non-English components of the United Kingdom had a cabinet department responsible for its affairs. Most laws were passed by Parliament with separate acts for England and Wales, for Scotland, and for Northern Ireland. This differentiation stems, in part, from the fact that both the Scottish and Ulster legal systems are substantially different from the English (and Welsh) systems, and legislation had to be tailored to conform to those differences.

With the devolution of many issues to the new legislative bodies in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, this system was amended, although not simplified. In Scotland most domestic matters—such as agriculture, education, criminal law, social welfare, health care, and the environment—are handled by the Scottish Parliament, while the British Parliament at Westminster retains the right and responsibility to regulate all policy areas that have national and international implications. The fact that the Scottish "domestic" and UK "national and international" policy areas are not strictly mutually exclusive areas of authority has caused several disputes within and between the parliaments.[10] However, broadly, intergovernmental relations between the UK government and the devolved regions have been marked by pragmatism on both sides, rather than open conflict.[11]

This point is an important backdrop to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum debates. The one aspect that is agreed by both the nationalists and the unionists is that the independence vote is likely only to be the start of an extended set of negotiations, whether Scotland votes to become independent or not. In the event of a yes vote, negotiations will begin on how Scotland would transition to full independence. A no vote would ensure Scotland remains part of the United Kingdom, though it is possible that there would be an eventual agreement to ensure devo max, or substantially more fiscal devolution from Westminster. Relations between Westminster and the National Assembly for Wales (Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru) in Cardiff are somewhat less strained. The passage of the 2011 devolution referendum in Wales, however, raises the possibility of increasing tensions, as Welsh policy could begin to diverge from England when the Welsh assembly begins to exercise primary legislative authority over devolved policy areas.

Prior to the imposition of direct rule in Northern Ireland in 1972, Stormont, the Northern Ireland Assembly, had a major role in policymaking for that province, and a separate Northern Ireland civil service continues to implement the policies of the government in London. After direct rule, the role of Stormont was virtually eliminated, but one part

of the proposed settlement with the Roman Catholic groups was the restoration of some powers to a legislature in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland's experiences with some of the areas of self-government have, however, revealed cracks in the power-sharing arrangements put in place by the Good Friday Agreement. With almost all of the parties in Stormont having ministers in the Northern Irish government, there are few parliamentarians to fill out the role of the "loyal opposition" and question the actions of the executive.[12]

Law, language, and religion differ in the four parts of the United Kingdom. Scottish law is derived in part from French and Roman law, as well as from common law. Various legal procedures and offices differ between English and Scottish practice. Language is also different in various parts of the United Kingdom. Welsh is recognized as a second language for Wales (and all official government documents in Wales must be published in both English and Welsh), although only about 20 percent of the population can speak Welsh and a mere 1 percent speak it as their only language. Some people in Scotland and Northern Ireland speak forms of Gaelic, but it has not been accorded formal legal status, perhaps because only just over 1 percent of the population speaks fluent Gaelic. The Scottish Parliament does, however, allow its members (members of Scottish Parliament, or MSPs) to address the Parliament in Gaelic or Scots (providing they give the presiding officer prior notice) and publishes most of its official documentation in both English and Gaelic.

The established religions of the parts of the nation vary as well: the Church of England (Anglican) in England and the Church of Scotland (Presbyterian) in Scotland. Wales and Northern Ireland do not have established churches because of their religious diversity. The diversity in Wales between Anglicans and various "chapel religions" (Methodism in particular) has not produced the dire consequences of the differences between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, but it has been a source of political diversity and somewhat different patterns of voting in the principality than in England.[13] These traditional religious divisions are becoming less important as church membership declines, but they are being replaced by differences with non-Christian religions, especially Islam.

Finally, the four components of the United Kingdom differ economically. This difference is less true of their economic structures than of their economic success. Unemployment levels are on average higher in the non-English parts of the United Kingdom (especially Northern Ireland) than in England. Another measure of economic success, average personal income, is lower in all three parts of the Celtic fringe than in England and by a large margin for Northern Ireland. Differences in the proportion of the working population employed in manual jobs, or even in the proportion employed in agriculture, are relatively slight between England and the Celtic fringe. The major difference in employment patterns is the substantially higher rates of public employment in the Celtic fringe, especially in Northern Ireland. All that said, it is difficult to talk broadly about "England" as a whole when referring to the economy since, in economic terms, the divide is between the south of England and the rest of the country. Unemployment rates in some parts of northern England are as high as or even higher than in Scotland or Wales, whereas the southwest and southeast have at times in the recent past experienced shortages of workers (see Table 1.2). London is a special case, having boroughs with some of the lowest (2.5 percent) and highest (11.3 percent) unemployment rates in the country. All these economic differences have political importance, because they create a sense of deprivation among non-English groups within the United Kingdom, as well as among residents of northern England. Not surprisingly, these areas have tended to vote heavily for the Labour Party.

TABLE 1.2 ■ Unemployment Rates by Region: United Kingdom, 2013 (Percentage)

England	
Northeast	10.1
Northwest	8.3
Yorkshire and Humberside	9.2
West Midlands	9.1
Southeast	6.8
East Midlands	7.7
Southwest	6.2
East England	6.9
London	8.9
Scotland	7.3
Wales	8.2
United Kingdom	**7.9**

Source: Office for National Statistics, "Regional Labour Market Statistics, April 2013," May 15, 2013, www.ons.gov.uk/ons/ dcp171778_306657.pdf.

Although the differences among the four nations of the United Kingdom are manifested politically, fortunately they are seldom with the violence of Ulster politics. Scottish nationalism did not die entirely after the Act of Union but has experienced cyclical declines and surges. Votes for the SNP surged from 1959 to 1974: The SNP at least doubled its vote in every election during that period. In the 1970s and 1980s, the SNP's growth rate slowed, however. The party received more than 6 percent of the Scottish vote in the October 1974 Westminster election, but only 14 percent in 1987, some 13 years and three elections later. In the Westminster elections of 1992, 1997, and 2001, the SNP held steady with slightly more than 20 percent of the Scottish vote (1992, 21.5 percent; 1997, 22.04 percent; 2001, 20.06 percent).With the redrawing of the constituency boundaries in Scotland for the 2005 elections (and Scotland's drop from 72 MPs to 59 MPs), the SNP garnered almost 18 percent of the Scottish vote. Although this figure seems to be a drop for the SNP, because of the new constituency boundaries and the fewer number of Scots being sent to Westminster it actually represents a net gain of two seats for the SNP. In 2010 the SNP held this result with 20 percent of the vote and six seats in Westminster.

Support for the SNP within Scotland, however, may be greater than it appears when simply focusing on Westminster votes and seats. In the 2011 Scottish Parliament election, the SNP managed a feat previously thought impossible—despite an electoral system designed to discourage parliamentary majorities, the SNP secured a decisive majority of parliamentary

seats. Analyses of the 2011 Scottish Election Study survey show that Scots seem to be developing multilevel partisan allegiances with one set of allegiances for the Scottish system and another for the UK system. This, then, leads to greater support for the SNP when discussing Scottish politics than might be evident when examining general UK politics.[14] The SNP is the third-largest political party in the United Kingdom, as well as by overall representation in the House of Commons. Nicola Sturgeon has served as First Minister since 2014.

Although Welsh nationalism has been less successful than Scottish nationalism as a political force, Plaid Cymru, the Welsh national party, did win over 13 percent of the Welsh vote in the October 1974 Westminster election. Nationalist voting declined after 1974 but remained a significant factor in these Celtic portions of the United Kingdom. In the 1997 election, Plaid Cymru won 10 percent of the vote and continued to push for the referendum that eventually approved setting up the National Assembly for Wales. The party received 14.3 percent in 2001 but slipped to 12.6 percent in 2005 and dropped again to 11.3 percent in 2010. In June of 2017, Jonathan Edwards of the Plaid party made history both by being elected as a member of Parliament for the third time and by winning by a landslide of 39.31 percent of the vote.

Party politics in Northern Ireland, which has been based as much on cleavages of the seventeenth century as those of the twenty-first century, bears little resemblance to politics in the rest of the United Kingdom. Two parties represent the Roman Catholic population, and one has been allied with the former IRA. Two parties also represent the Protestant majority, varying primarily in the intensity with which they express allegiance to the United Kingdom and distrust of Roman Catholics, especially the IRA. Finally, one party attempts to be a catchall for the two confessional groups. Some elements of economics and class are in the political party equation—one of the Roman Catholic parties also has a moderate socialist agenda—but the fundamental basis of politics has been religion.

Thus, the first feature of the context of contemporary politics in the United Kingdom is that it is a single state composed of separate parts. Unlike the states of the United States, these elements of the union possess no reserved powers—only the powers delegated to them by the central government. This delegation of powers is true even for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh assembly. Although these institutions were created in response to regional referenda, they exert only the authority delegated to them by Westminster. Nevertheless, in practice, it would be politically impossible for a UK government to reverse the powers granted to these institutions. Such a move would likely provoke a strong nationalist backlash that could lead to the secession of Scotland. The political system might therefore best be described as quasi-federal. It retains many of the features of the centralized and majoritarian democracy described by Lijphart, but, increasingly, as the devolved parliaments and assemblies are granted more powers, it is coming to resemble a more federalized union.[15]

It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that this uneasy compromise is under such strain. A key feature of devolution in the United Kingdom is its lopsided nature. There has been no devolution to England, the part of the United Kingdom that represents the greatest share of population and economic output. There is also the question of how far devolution can reasonably go within the United Kingdom. Would a UK government, for instance, be willing to countenance a more fiscally autonomous Scottish Parliament undercutting tax rates in order to attract companies away from the northeast of England? The evolution of devolution will remain a thorny issue for UK governments.

STABILITY AND CHANGE

A second feature of the context of contemporary politics in the United Kingdom is the continuity of social and political institutions, combined with a significant degree of change. If a subject of Queen Victoria were to return during the reign of the present monarch, Elizabeth II, he or she might comment that—at least on the surface—little had changed. Laws are made by the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The leader of the party who commands a majority in the House of Commons is prime minister.

Yet there is a great sense of change in the United Kingdom. The political system has been greatly democratized since Victorian times. When Queen Victoria came to the throne in 1837, only about 3 percent of the adult population was eligible to vote, despite the Great Reform Act of 1832. During the reign of Elizabeth II, almost all adults have been entitled to vote. Before 1911, the House of Lords was almost an equal partner in making legislation; since then, the House of Lords has exercised far less influence over policy. A Victorian prime minister was definitely primus inter pares (first among equals), whereas in the twentieth century, collegial patterns of decision making changed to create something approaching a presidential role for the prime minister. The monarchy in Victoria's day still had substantial influence over policy, but today it has been constitutionally reduced to virtual impotence. Finally, but not least important, the United Kingdom has evolved from perhaps the strongest nation on earth and the imperial master of a far-flung empire to a second-class power—economically and militarily—in a nuclear age.

Social and economic trends have paralleled political trends. Just as the monarchy has been preserved, so, too, has a relatively stratified social system that includes hereditary (as well as life) peerages. Meanwhile, working-class organizations such as trade unions have tended to lessen the domination of the upper classes and to generate some democratization of the society as well as the political system. The economic structure of the United Kingdom is still primarily based on free enterprise, but government ownership and regulation have had a significant, if declining, impact. The decade and a half of Conservative Party domination of politics that ended in 1997 weakened the unions and enhanced the power of business interests, and "New Labour" governments under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown did little to strengthen the influence of the unions. One strategy of the Conservatives in their conscious attempts to reinforce capitalism was the spread of wealth in the society through selling off public housing and privatizing public corporations. The Labour government first elected in 1997 continued to follow many of the same policies, albeit for different ideological reasons. The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government has generally pursued right of center "austerity" economic policies in dealing with the effects of the global economic downturn,



The Magna Carta is one of the world's oldest constitutional documents. It was signed by King John in 1215 in response to noble demands to restrict the arbitrary power of monarchs. The Carta proved an early step in the eventual development of parliamentary democracy in Britain.

Public domain

while simultaneously moderating social policy positions, such as support for same-sex marriage, which was passed in July 2013.

Compared with those of many other industrialized nations, the British economy is no longer the great engine of production it once was. The relatively constrained economy of the United Kingdom, when it is compared with its European and North American counterparts, has severely restricted the policy options available to British government. This is especially true following the global banking and economic crisis that began in 2008. The government invested a great deal to prop up the financial industry in the United Kingdom, sending the public treasury deeply into debt. The coalition government elected in 2010 has significantly restrained public spending in an attempt to create a period of public austerity. Yet despite these efforts, the UK credit rating was downgraded in early 2013 (just as the U.S. rating was reduced in 2011), reflecting the massive debt the country has accrued over a prolonged period. (Credit ratings are determined by financial service companies, such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and the Fitch Group.) UK credit took another hit after Brexit, with the pound continuing to plummet in value. The instability of the United Kingdom is best exemplified by the General Election in June 2017, which resulted in a "hung parliament," that is, no party secured an outright majority in the House of Commons. This is the third hung parliament since 1974.

The evolutionary change so characteristic of British political life has been facilitated by the absence of a written constitution. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say the absence of a single written constitution. Petition of Right, the 1911 Parliament Act, and the Statute of Westminster—have constitutional status. In addition, the Parliament of the day, expressing the political will of the British people, faces fewer checks on its power without the limitations of judicial review that exist in the United States. For example, the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act create a quasi-constitutional form of government that would have been alien to a centralized regime. Such constitutionally unlimited powers had the potential for great tyranny, inasmuch as only other politicians, the threat of elections, and their own good sense restrained governments. The radical changes of Brexit and the makeup of the House of Commons have made the call for a single constitution ring louder and have more support than ever before.

Although many aspects of the monarchy and Parliament have changed little, the executive branch of government underwent a revolution during the Thatcher government (1979–1990), and the pace of change lessened little during Major's tenure (1990–1997). Among other changes, large cabinet departments were broken up into "executive agencies" headed by chief executives who could be recruited from outside the civil service or other government organizations. In addition, in major policy areas, such as those covering the National Health Service (NHS), market-based instruments were introduced in an attempt to increase the efficiency of those services. Procedural changes also were introduced to improve the efficiency and economy of the public sector. The Blair government embraced many of these changes, with some retreat from the internal markets in health, but with a continuing interest in corporatization and privatization. In mid-1999 the Blair government converted the post office into a corporation, a move not dared even by Margaret Thatcher.

TRADITIONAL AND MODERN: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the United Kingdom, much of the ability to accommodate political change while maintaining older political institutions may be explained by its political culture—that is, the values and beliefs that political elites and ordinary citizens have about politics and government. One way of describing this culture is "traditionally modern."[16] Specifically, traditional views are combined with modern elements to produce a blend that, if apparently internally contradictory, appears to produce effective government. This culture has not been static; rather, it has permitted relatively gradual change based on pragmatic acceptance of changing national needs and changing social values. The traditional elements of the political culture are best known, with deference, trust, and pragmatism still important to understanding how the British political system functions.

As for deference, the British population has historically been deferential to authority. Deference implies citizens' lack of opposition to the actions of their government—or perhaps even positive acceptance of those actions. The British government enjoyed a large reservoir of authority, since few citizens in the past questioned the correctness of the current political arrangements or the right of the government to make and enforce laws. Until recently, the populace exhibited diffuse support for the political system and was willing to obey laws and accept the authoritative decrees of institutions of government, hence the United Kingdom was an easier nation to govern than many.

Over the years, the authority of elected governments in the United Kingdom has encountered only a few major challenges aside from the peculiar politics of Ulster. The trade unions attempted to bring down Conservative governments and their economic and industrial policies, succeeding against the government of Edward Heath in 1974 but not against Thatcher in the mid-1980s. In both attempts, the miners union was central. The miners were able to bring about the changes they desired with the fall of Heath, but a yearlong strike against mine closings and working conditions under Thatcher resulted merely in a reassertion of the power of government to make law. During the early 1990s, the Thatcher government's attempt to change the system of local government finance from property taxes (rates) to a per capita community charge (poll tax) provoked political violence and significant tax evasion. More recently, the 2011 London protests and riots, which spread to other English metropolitan areas, might now be considered the first signs that deference had its limits in the United Kingdom. The rampant discord the United Kingdom now suffers from might take years to resolve.

The obverse of the public's trust is the responsible behavior of elected leaders. Government has generally conducted itself responsibly, and, for the most part, has not violated existing political norms. When those norms have been violated, such as when elections were suspended during the two world wars, it has been by broad agreement among the political parties. Responsibility has also meant that parties and governments are expected to deliver more of what they promised in election campaigns than would be expected of American parties.

Despite relatively broad diffuse support, specific support for governments and institutions (i.e., trust in the government of the day) in the United Kingdom has declined over the past two decades. In response to this decline and to public scandals during the Thatcher decade,

in 1994, Major established the Committee on Standards in Public Life.[17] This committee has, of course, come in under attack due to the unsettled populace and government.

Scandals have continued to undermine specific support of elected politicians and civil servants. Many in Britain questioned the Blair government's motivations in invading Iraq, going so far as to call the prime minister "George [W.] Bush's poodle."[18] Further, the 2009 scandal over expenses claims submitted by MPs, with daily revelations in the *Telegraph* newspaper, seems to have further eroded public support for politicians. Certainly the revelations that among some of the parliamentarians' expenses were the costs of creating a "duck island" in a pond, repairing a tennis court, and moat cleaning—all at MPs' private residences—caused taxpayers to question politicians' integrity.[19] Indeed, somewhat over a month after the scandal first broke, the British Election Study's Continuous Monitoring Survey found that 59 percent of survey respondents said that the expenses scandal proved that most MPs are corrupt.[20] Scandals have continued to plague the United Kingdom, from unsubstantiated and substantiated sexual scandals to political corruption and embezzlement. The most notable scandals in the 2010s are probably Conservative Party's Jeremy Hunt's affiliation with Rupert Murdoch in 2012, various allegations surrounding MP David Cameron in 2015, and the Iraq Inquiry of 2016.

These outbursts serve to undermine the traditional British norm of deference over time, but another feature of the political culture that remains secure is pragmatism. Although ideologies are frequently spouted during campaigns or in speeches delivered for mass consumption, British politics is extremely practical. Indeed, an empirical, pragmatic mode of political thought has so dominated British political life that the preservation of traditional political institutions such as the monarchy is justified not on grounds that they are right and just but simply on grounds that they have worked. Even in the more ideological Thatcher government, there were enough turnarounds and changes in policy to illustrate the pragmatic mode of thinking about government at work. This pragmatism certainly infused the Blair and Brown Labour governments in their support of privatization in the public sector, and the political compromises struck within the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government all but enshrined the idea of practical, pragmatic politics. Obviously, such a political epistemology will be associated with continual adjustment to changing conditions, thereby helping the system to modify all but its essential features to accommodate a modern world.

The traditional values of deference, trust, and pragmatism exist even in the context of a modern, or even postindustrial, political system. The policies pursued, the presence of mass democracy and mass political parties, a very high level of public revenues and expenditures, and some increasingly close linkages between state and society are evidence of the modernity of the political system. Yet with all that, political leaders are allowed the latitude to discuss and decide political issues without directly involving the public or press. This is a modern democracy, but it is a democracy that allows an elite to govern and exercises latent democratic power only at agreed-upon times.

CLASS POLITICS, BUT . . .

Social class (meaning primarily levels and sources of income) has been the principal basis of social differentiation and political mobilization in the United Kingdom, although

education and ancestry still matter as well. Traditionally, the major partisan alignments in politics are along class lines, with the Labour Party representing the interests of the working classes and the Conservative Party (and to a lesser extent the Liberal Democrats) reflecting the interests of the middle and upper classes. The correspondence between class and party is far less than perfect and has been declining over time, but the generalization remains a useful one if only because the party-class linkages still pervade popular political discourse.

Social class is both an objective and a subjective phenomenon. Objectively, the United Kingdom has significant inequalities of income, even after the effects of redistribution of taxes and government expenditures are taken into account. The United Kingdom experienced a sharp increase in income inequality during the 1980s, and it has never returned to its pre-1980s level. Income inequality rose to its highest level since 1961 between 2007 and 2008 and 2009 and 2010, but there was a sharp drop in 2010 and 2011 due to the effects of the economic recession.[21] Although Britain now generates most of its wealth through services, there are regional variations. For instance, London has the highest proportion of jobs in the service sector (92.3 percent) while Wales has the lowest (78.6 percent).[22] Finally, according to some of the most recent evidence, in the United Kingdom, intergenerational mobility is, at best, "limited," signifying that younger generations generally do not dramatically improve their class standing relative to their parents' position in their own generation. This limited mobility is, however, not markedly different from that in other European countries, and intergenerational mobility has been declining in the United States as well.

Access to other goods and services is also affected by class considerations, although again, perhaps, not to the extent as in other European nations. In particular, education is class-related, both in the small, elite private sector and in the larger state sector. Access to postsecondary education retains a pronounced upper-class bias, although again less so than in many European nations.

Subjectively, people in the United Kingdom are generally more willing to identify themselves as members of a particular social class than are Americans, who overwhelmingly identify themselves as members of the economic middle class. Issues of all kinds may become polarized on a class basis. Any policy that preserves or extends the privileges and power of the more affluent is immediately held suspect by the Labour Party and the trade unions, even when the policy (such as selling council houses to their current tenants) may have benefits for working-class families as well as the government.

Several caveats must be raised about a simple class model of British politics. The first is that it is changing. The rise of the working classes into the middle class, so obvious in many European nations, is occurring in Great Britain as well. Manual labor is a declining share of the labor force, even though it remains a larger share in the United Kingdom than in many Western European countries. Also, the wages paid to manual workers now often approach or even surpass wages and salaries paid to many nonmanual workers, and manual workers find some of their economic interests served by the Liberal Democrats and even the Conservatives. These changes within the occupational and economic structure may mitigate the impact of class on politics, making class a less resolute predictor of voting behavior across the country.

Other factors also have reduced the dominance of class. The ethnic and regional cleavages based on the national constituent elements of the United Kingdom were noted

earlier. Within those cleavages, nationalism in Scotland and Wales has tended to cut broadly across class lines. The 2011 census showed that the white ethnic group was 86 percent of the residential population in England and Wales, a decrease from 91.3 percent in 2001.[23] Ethnic minorities now dominate many of the older industrial towns such as Birmingham, Manchester, and Nottingham, and in some inner-city schools, English is taught as a second language. Because these groups are also multiplying more rapidly than white Britons, the specter of nonwhite domination and the loss of jobs by whites is a powerful weapon for some political groups, especially the British Nationalist Party, which won two UK European Parliament seats in the 2009 elections, and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which had an exceptionally strong showing in the 2013 English local elections. Pressure by minorities for representation has already begun to affect the local and national political systems, with the main political parties attempting to court the ethnic minority vote. Meanwhile, shortly after the Conservatives took office in 2010 and the summer of 2016, homelessness among black and minority ethnic households increased by 52 percent, compared with 13 percent among people identified as "White British." Ethnic minorities now account for about 40 percent of all homeless households in England, though they are only 15 percent of the population.

Religion also plays a role in British politics. The monarch is required to be a Protestant, which, in practice, has meant a member of the Church of England, though prominent politicians have suggested that the ban on Catholic monarchs instituted in the 1701 Act of Settlement should be repealed.[24] While that repeal may be some time in coming, changes to the rules of succession that followed the announcement that Kate Middleton, the Duchess of Cambridge, was pregnant allow for sex-neutral primogeniture and future monarchs to marry Catholics (or people of other religious faiths). The Anglican monarch (Presbyterian while in Scotland) rules a population that is only about two-thirds Christian and contains a significant Roman Catholic minority. This characteristic has been most visible in Northern Ireland, but cities such as Liverpool and Glasgow also have large and politically relevant Roman Catholic populations. Overall, however, Christianity in Great Britain is, with the exception of Northern Ireland, of decreasing relevance, because only a small and declining proportion of the population actually practices its nominal religion. For many, "Christianity" is a cultural—not religious—identification.

Perhaps even more important, the fastest-growing religions in Great Britain are not Christian of any denomination but rather are Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist. As well as affecting political behavior, these religions raise questions about civil liberties and tolerance in a country without a formal bill of rights. The tensions created by the growing ethnic diversity are not as great as in France or Germany, but they are present nevertheless, and racial tensions are becoming of increasing concern to the police and civil libertarians alike. Ethnic and religious tensions have increased since the July 7, 2005, bombings in London that killed 56 people (including the four suspected bombers) and injured 700 people. This was the worst terrorist attack in the United Kingdom since the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am jet over Scotland. The July 7 attacks were followed two weeks later by another incident in which four bombs placed in the London Underground fortunately failed to detonate. Although these attacks were not as severe as those that brought down the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, they shocked Britons and were the catalyst that dramatically increased religious

and racial tensions across the country. Terrifyingly, the most recent terroristic bombing occurred on May 22, 2017.

Twenty-two people, including seven children, were killed and 59 people were injured when a bomb detonated after an Ariana Grande concert. UK prime minister Theresa May raised the UK's terror threat level to "critical," its highest level. Operation Temperer was started, allowing 5,000 soldiers to replace armed police in protecting parts of the country.

In summary, politics in Great Britain is not entirely about class, but social class is still relevant for politics. The importance of other cleavages varies with the region of the nation (with the Celtic fringe being the most influenced by other cleavages) and with the time and circumstances of the controversy. That said, politics in Great Britain also may revolve around substantive issues. For example, the green (environmental) movement has not been as powerful in Great Britain as in most of the rest of Europe, but its influence is growing. The Green Party enjoyed some success in the 2003 Scottish Parliament elections (when it won seven seats) but has since seen its electoral fortunes wane, winning just two seats in the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections and 8.6 percent of the vote (and two seats) in the 2009 European Parliament elections. In the 2010 general elections, the Green Party elected its first MP to Westminster (Caroline Lucas, Green Party chair, received 31.3 percent of the vote in the Brighton Pavilion constituency). The nature of the electoral system prevents new parties or social movements from gaining representation in the British Parliament rapidly, but there does appear to be a real interest in issues that go beyond simple class politics.

CONSERVATIVELY LIBERAL POLICY IDEAS

Another apparent paradox about British political life is the "conservatively liberal" nature of many UK policies and policy ideas. For much of the postwar period, members of the Labour Party regularly spoke about the virtues of socialism, and they often sang the "Red Flag" at their party congresses. Members of the Conservative Party regularly spoke about restoring laissez-faire economics, dismantling a good deal of the welfare state, and returning Great Britain to its more significant role in the world.

In practice, however, during the postwar period, most of the policies adopted by most of the governments bore a remarkable resemblance. The Labour Party accepted the fact that most of the British economy would be privately owned, and at the same time, it pressed for the nationalization of certain large industries and the extension of social services to the disadvantaged. The Conservative Party, while in office, generally accepted the virtual entirety of the welfare state, as well as government ownership of industries such as coal, steel, and the railways. The major deviation from this pattern was Thatcher's Conservative government, which began to sell off government stock in nationalized industries such as British Gas, British Telecom, British Steel, and British Airways and began to encourage local authorities to sell off their council housing to sitting tenants. Meanwhile, some social programs were cut or more stringent requirements for recipients were introduced.

These Thatcherite policies, largely continued by the Major government that followed, represented a significantly more ideological approach to policymaking than has been true

for most postwar governments in the United Kingdom. The public water supply system was sold off to the private sector, and some local government services such as garbage collection were contracted out to the private sector under a system of "compulsory competitive tendering."[25]

In something of a return to the traditional British consensual style, the Blair government continued many of the programs of the previous governments. "New Labour" was much less interested in talking seriously about socialism than was old Labour. Instead, there was a good deal of discussion about how to use the private sector to provide many public services and the need to make government more like the private sector. The Blair government pursued the "third way," by seeking to inject "competition" in the system through programs such as quasi-privatization schemes within the NHS.[26] Following the 2010 election, the coalition government headed by David Cameron was a clear expression of consensual politics, with its pursuit of austerity in the public accounts yet moderate social policies such as the proposal to allow same-sex marriage. There has also been a degree of continuity in major domestic policy areas in England. The use of market-based mechanisms in the NHS, expanded by the Labour governments (1997–2010), has been continued. The coalition government's education reforms, including the major expansion of academy schools (similar to charter schools in the United States), can also be seen as a mark of continuity rather than radical change.

Despite the episodic intrusions of ideology, there is broad support for a mixed-economy welfare state. All major political parties favor the principal programs of the welfare state such as pensions, other social insurance programs such as unemployment protection, and the NHS. At the same time, the majority of the population accepts private ownership and management as the primary form of economic organization, despite the presence of a (declining) number of nationalized industries. What the parties and politicians appear to disagree about is the proper mix of a mixed economy and just how much welfare there should be in the welfare state.

ISOLATED BUT EUROPEAN

One of the standard points made about the history of Great Britain is that its insular position in relation to the European continent isolated the country from various influences and allowed it to develop its own particular political institutions and political culture. The mental separation from Europe was to some degree greater than the geographic separation, and so Great Britain may have looked European from North America, but Britons did not always feel European. The separation of Great Britain from the continent and from the world can, however, be overstated; as John Major said, "We are only an island geographically." The country has not been invaded successfully since 1066, but it has been deeply involved in European politics and warfare. Also, Great Britain has by no means been insular when dealing with the rest of the world, managing a far-flung empire and even more far-flung trade routes from its little islands.

One of the major changes in the political environment of the United Kingdom was its entry into the European Union four decades ago, and recently, its decision to leave the European Union in June of 2016, commonly referred to as Brexit. After two denials of admittance, largely at the instigation of France and Charles de Gaulle, Great Britain joined the European Union in 1973, followed by the first advisory public referendum in its history.

Many citizens felt that joining the European Union not only brought Great Britain closer to its continental counterparts but also had important domestic consequences, including the introduction of a whole new level of government—some of the previously exclusive rights of Parliament to legislate for British subjects now actually reside in Brussels. In addition, in keeping with the EU's move toward closer integration of the Europe market, some economic decision-making power was transferred to Brussels. Meanwhile, the move toward greater political integration arising from the Maastricht treaty of 1992, the subsequent Lisbon treaty of 2007, and the adoption of the euro as a common currency by most EU member states (but not the United Kingdom) placed even more pressure on the British government to bring its policies in line with those of the continental countries. The Blair government pressed, if gingerly, for greater involvement in the European Union, but it faced stiff opposition from Conservatives and from a largely "euro-skeptic" population.[27] The British people, more than those of any other nation in Europe, were reluctant to accept any greater economic and political unification by the European Union. Great Britain may be a part of Europe, but it maintains some distance (psychological as well as geographic) from its EU partners. As an overt demonstration of this skepticism, 16.5 percent of those who voted in the 2009 European Parliament elections (turnout was only 34 percent of the voting population) voted for UKIP, which advocates separation from the European Union. The June 2017 decision to leave the EU has been building for a long time, reaching its crescendo in the past decade.

Great Britain's involvement with Europe was an important issue in domestic politics. Thatcher lost her office in no small part because of her European policies, but she continued to oppose deeper involvement from the backbenches. Prime Minister Major sought to follow the more moderate path of a greater political role for European institutions but without supporting a more complete political union. Nevertheless, divisions within his party over Europe hastened the downfall of his government. Under the Blair and Brown Labour governments, the United Kingdom moved more in alignment with the European Union, although skepticism remained high. With the European Union struggling to maintain and secure the euro in the wake of the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish economic troubles, the UK's relationship with the European Union became a major source of contention within the (increasingly euro-skeptic) Conservative and (largely pro-European) Liberal Democrat coalition government. In a major address in early 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron, in pushing for the adoption of greater austerity measures in the EU budget, began to raise the issue of a UK-wide referendum on continued EU membership. He called for the referendum to occur after the UK general election in 2015. Euro-skeptic backbench Conservative MPs, as well as the leaders of UKIP, used the idea of a referendum to pursue an anti-Europe agenda. The prime minister insisted he would be able to negotiate a new settlement for the United Kingdom in the European Union, which would involve the repatriation of some powers and a stronger focus on economic matters. Ultimately, however, a majority of UK citizens became convinced that the United Kingdom had ceded too much sovereignty to the European Union and that it would be better off economically outside it, citing the examples of Norway and Switzerland.

The Liberal Democrats are the most instinctively pro-European Union of the main UK political parties. At the same time, the Conservative Party has become in recent years increasingly euro-skeptic. In opposition, David Cameron (Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Lord President of the Council from 2010 to 2015 in the

Cameron–Clegg coalition) removed his MEPs (members of the European Parliament) from the main center-right grouping in the European Parliament in order to set up a new group committed to focusing the European Union on economic matters and returning powers to national governments.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Richard Rose, *The Territorial Dimension of Government: Understanding the United Kingdom* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1982).
2. In some ways, the referendum was designed to fail. Passage required approval by a majority of all eligible voters, not just those actually voting.
3. Commission on Scottish Devolution, "Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st Century," June 2009, www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/uploads/2009–06–12-csd-final-report-2009fbookmarked.pdf.
4. Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, *Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2012).
5. Commission on Devolution in Wales, "Empowerment and Responsibility: Financial Powers to Strengthen Wales," November 2012, http://commissionondevolutioninwales.independent.gov.uk/files/2013/01/English-WEB-main-report1.pdf.
6. "A Knock at Number Ten," *Economist*, February 4, 1995.
7. "Now IRA Stands for I Renounce Arms," *Economist*, July 28, 2005.
8. Unfortunately, in early 2006, riots once again broke out in Belfast and across Northern Ireland, marking the worst violence seen in the province in seven years. The sectarian riots began in response to a government directive rerouting an Orange Order (Unionist) parade away from a Catholic neighborhood.
9. Alan Cowell and Eamon Quinn, "Two Former Enemies Are Sworn to Lead in Northern Ireland's Government," *New York Times*, May 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/world/europe/09nireland.html.
10. Although there are agreements about which policy areas have devolved, it will be difficult at times to separate UK law and Scottish law cleanly. For example, education has devolved, but research and science support have not.
11. Nicola McEwen, Wilfreid Swenden, and Nicole Bolleyer, "Intergovernmental Relations in the UK: Continuity in a Time of Change?" *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 14, no. 2 (April 2012): 323–343.
12. Mark Devenport, "Stormont's Power-Sharing Flaws," BBC News, September 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/northern_ireland/8237962.stm.
13. Kenneth Wald, *Crosses on Ballots* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
14. Christopher Carman, Robert Johns, and J. Mitchell, *More Scottish Than British: The 2011 Scottish Parliament Election* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).
15. Vernon Bogdanor, *The New British Constitution* (London: Hart Publishing, 2009).
16. Richard Rose, "England: A Traditionally Modern Political Culture," in *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).
17. The scandals include disinformation about the sinking of the *General Belgrano* during the Falklands War and suspect dealings about the purchase of helicopters from Westland Corporation. See Magnus Linklater and David Leigh, *Not With Honour* (London: Sphere, 1986).
18. Nick Asinder, "Blair Battles 'Poodle' Jibes," BBC News, February 3, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2721513.stm.
19. See the *Telegraph's* dedicated website on the expenses scandal at http://parliament.telegraph.co.uk/mpsexpenses/home.
20. Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, "Public Reactions to the MPs' Expenses Claims Scandal: Evidence from the BES-CMS" (paper presented at the annual meeting of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, August 29–31, 2009).