7 EDITION

DEVELOPMENT and Social Change

A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Philip McMichael
Heloise Weber



Development and Social Change

Seventh Edition

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Development and Social Change

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2455 Teller Road
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E-mail: order@sagepub.com

SAGE Publications Ltd.
1 Oliver's Yard
55 City Road
London EC1Y1SP
United Kingdom

SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044
India

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd.
18 Cross Street #10-10/11/12
China Square Central
Singapore 048423

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 9781544305363

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Acquisitions Editor: Jeff Lasser
Editorial Assistant: Tiara Beatty
Production Editor: Gagan Mahindra
Copy Editor: Colleen Brennan
Typesetter: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd.
Proofreader: Ellen Brink
Indexer: Integra
Cover Designer: Candice Harman
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21 22 23 24 25 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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About the Authors

Philip McMichael grew up in Adelaide, South Australia, completing undergraduate degrees in economics and in political science at the University of Adelaide. After traveling in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and doing community work in Papua New Guinea, he pursued his doctorate in sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He has taught at the University of New England (New South Wales), Swarthmore College, and the University of Georgia, and he is presently International Professor of Global Development at Cornell University, in Ithaca, NY. Other appointments include Visiting Senior Research Scholar in International Development at the University of Oxford (Wolfson College) and Visiting Scholar, School of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Queensland.

His book *Settlers and the Agrarian Question: Foundations of Capitalism in Colonial Australia* (1984) won the Social Science History Association's Allan Sharlin Memorial Award in 1985. In addition to authoring *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions* (2013), McMichael edited *The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems* (1994), *Food and Agrarian Orders in the World Economy* (1995), *New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development* (2005) with Frederick H. Buttel, *Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change* (2010), *The Politics of Biofuels, Land and Agrarian Change* (2011) with Jun Borras and Ian Scoones, and *Finance or Food? The Role of Cultures, Values and Ethics in Land Use Negotiations*, with Hilde Bjørkhaug and Bruce Muirhead (2020).

He has served twice as chair of his department, as director of Cornell University's International Political Economy Program, as chair of the American Sociological Association's Political Economy of the World-System Section, as president of the Research Committee on Agriculture and Food for the International Sociological Association. He has also worked with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Civil Society Mechanism of the FAO's Committee on World Food Security (CFS), the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), the international peasant coalition *Via Campesina,* and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty.

He and his wife, Karen Schachere, have two children, Rachel and Jonathan, and he thanks them so much for their love and patience.

Heloise Weber was born in Colombo, Sri Lanka, where she spent her childhood before growing up and studying in England. She completed her undergraduate degree in International Politics from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (now Aberystwyth University), and received her doctorate from the University of Southampton. She held a research fellowship and

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Her research interests are in the politics of global development and inequality, and critical approaches to international relations. Her publications include *Rethinking the Third World: International Development and World Politics* (coauthored with Mark T. Berger), and *Politics of Development: A Survey* (edited). She also coedited a special section of the *Review of International Political Economy* on the political economy of the GATS/ WTO and development as well as a special issue of *Globalizations* on Rethinking Development: Beyond Recognition and Redistribution. She has published on the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Goals Agenda in the *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, *Globalizations* and *World Development* (the latter coauthored with Martin Weber). Her work engaging international relations includes "Colonialism, Genocide and International Relations: Struggles for Restorative Relations" in the *European Journal of International Relations* (coauthored with Martin Weber).

She is an active member of the Global Development Studies (GDS) Section of the International Studies Association (ISA), and has served twice as GDS program and section chair.

Preface to the Seventh Edition

The seventh edition of this text updates and refines the narrative. The thread that weaves together this story is that *development* is a concept and practice stemming from the era of European colonisation of the Americas, Asia, and Africa. The intersection of colonialism and capitalism (as part of the European project) as such embodies power relationships, including of race, gender, and class. It marks a dynamic process that has always been contested, from anticolonial struggles to struggles for labor protections and rights, the women's movement for equality and justice, and pushes for ecological sustainability. Such struggles, rooted in the history of the development project continue, revealing multiple crises and the urgent need for a sustainable development project. We are at a crossroads. Our book traces these dynamics and guides critical reflection of possibilities for more humane futures.

In its most elemental form, the development project was advanced as a blueprint of progress across a diverse world through a singular lens of cultural evolution, problematically equating "civilization" with Europe and thereby discounting non-European cultures as well as masking the violence of European colonialism. At the same time, given the association of development with economic growth, the ecological foundations of human civilization have been seriously discounted. The long arc of development—from colonialism through what came to be referred to as the development decades to the era of globalization—is now bending toward recognition of the importance of cultural diversity, racial justice, and biodiversity for human and planetary sustainability. As a method of rule, development takes distinctive forms in different historical periods, and these are laid out here as changing sets of political-economic and political-ecological relations, animated by powerful discourses of discipline, opportunity, and sustainability.

As such, development is examined here as a contested historical project, rather than something to take for granted—operating through relationships of power among and within countries and world regions. Modern social thought identifies development as human progress, stemming from an Enlightenment ideal. It is, of course, an ideal not necessarily shared by the majority world, and yet it has become the dominant trope governing international relations via the project of development and its prioritization of the market as a civilizing force. The limits of this secular ideal, as it shaped modern social thought, are becoming increasingly clear today, as the accumulation of environmental uncertainty dramatically reveals the

problematic implications of failing to respect the centrality of ecosystems to human life—and, therefore, also the illusion of unlimited economic growth. This text engages critically with an economistic understanding of development, since development is generally associated with economic growth. To introduce the development project, as well as indicate where it comes from, it is necessary to trace its origins as well as how it has been shaped in recent world history. At the same time, it is important to defetishize the economic interpretation and reveal the social *relations* and processes, and the ecological consequences of development, as well as the power relations ordering this historic enterprise and thence the world. This account of development focuses on these social and political transformations and the various ways in which development is realized through social and spatial inequalities. It also considers these processes from the perspective of social movements and how their resistances problematize, or question, the dominant vision of economism as a form of rule and as an increasingly evident threat to ecological stability.

The conceptual framework posits development as a political construct, devised by dominant actors such as metropolitan states, multilateral institutions, and political and economic elites to order the world and contain opposition. Development and its variant expressed through neoliberal globalization are presented as projects with clear ideological proclivities evident in their organizing principles (e.g., economic nationalism, market liberalization). However, they are highly problematic in their vision and potential for accomplishment since these principles obscure their realization through inequality. The theoretical subtext of the development project is organized by extended Polanyian cycles of "market self-regulation" and resistance (countermovements). In the mid-twentieth century, a form of "embedded liberalism" (market regulation within a maturing nation-state system to contain labor and decolonization movements) informed social-democratic (developmentalist) goals within a Cold War context, including economic and military aid to what was then called the "Third World." This occurred as the former Third World states sought to steer a course of nonalignment and struggled through a strategy of solidarist internationalism aimed at changing the unequal international structures of world politics. That strategy was undermined by the capitalist bloc, and this "development era" ended with a "countermobilization" of corporate interests dedicated to instituting a "self-regulating market" on a global scale from the 1970s onward.

The dominant discourse of neoliberalism advances market liberalization, privatization, freedom of capital movement and access, and so on. This globalization project was already "test run" during the debt regime of the 1980s and was institutionalized with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.

A *further* countermovement, this time against the deprivations of the globalization project, has gathered momentum through maturing global justice movements in the 1990s, the Latin American and Arab rebellions of the new century, and globally connected social movements around, for instance, climate change, antiracism and austerity protests. All of these are in one way or another directed at a growing "legitimacy deficit" of the global development establishment. This is reflected in the reconstitution of the Washington Consensus following the 1997 Asian-originating global financial crisis, recovery of the trope of "poverty reduction" in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) initiative of 2000 and now in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals agenda, stalemate at the WTO, and growing antipathy toward the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) among countries of the global South. Neoliberalism is at a crossroads, complicated by serious security concerns with social, ecological, and economic dimensions that are all related to and altering the politics of development, for instance, rising global impoverishment, evident not least in expanding slums and refugee camps; financial volatility and the casualization of employment; political conflict and violence, including rising authoritarian populism; and evidence of global climate change and the spread of deadly viruses. How the current cycle of opposition and creative development alternatives will unfold is yet to be determined, but we may see a "sustainability project" emerge, with grassroots initiatives toward rethinking the values that define development, nevertheless contested by political and economic elites.

The major revisions in this edition are as follows. We have revised Chapter 1 (introduction) foregrounding contemporary challenges from rising material impoverishment to struggles for racial equality and justice and ecological sustainability. In line with our understanding of development as a historical framework, we connect these challenges to a critical engagement of the Eurocentric framing of development and its expression in modernization theory. Chapter 2 has been revised to incorporate recent critical revisions of the Eurocentric framing of development, and notions of progress and backwardness. Here we underscore how the development project rested on inverted normative premises. We draw attention to the link between knowledge and power, and the way in which strategic responses to anticolonial struggles and decolonization shaped the instituting of the development project. Chapter 3 has been revised to draw out Third World challenges to the colonial division of labor and how this was countered in ways that prefigured the neoliberal globalization project. We have included some additional case examples to illustrate some core political shifts. Chapter 5 is comprehensively revised, incorporating aspects of Chapter 4 of the sixth edition. Chapter 6 (formerly Chapter 7) includes some updates on countermovements, remaining as an example of how the

Polanyian double movement unfolds across time and space. Throughout, we have looked to update and revise references to data and factual records to reflect more recent trends and transformations.

The remaining four chapters (7–10) have been recast to encourage students to recognize and situate with contemporary expressions of crisis, juxtaposing "business-as-usual" responses with emergent shifts toward alternative and diverse understandings and practices of "development." *Pedagogically, the point here is to engage students with where they are, in the sense of how they interpret current challenges the world is facing and which they experience, and how they see and feel the future.*

Chapter 7 updates the expressions of crisis in the globalization project, focusing on the cumulative social crisis across the world resulting from widespread austerity policies, associated legitimacy questions and initiatives, geopolitical multipolarity as the American century winds down, new developments in India and China, and the public health and ecological crisis. Chapter 8 uses the double entendre of the "development climate" to address how conventional developmentalism attempts to manage and/or take advantage of the climate emergency. This contrasts with Chapter 9 on public and local attempts to build forms of sustainable development in both urban and rural settings. The final chapter (Chapter 10) is an exercise in evaluating a range of emerging ideas pointing toward a sustainable development project, and the institutional limits to and possibilities for building a coordinated, coherent, and just future for all peoples across the world. It is designed to offer hope, at a time of substantial challenges and to encourage students to recognize that this moment offers new opportunities, precisely because the development crisis is revealing the truth of Albert Einstein's adage: "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them."

The subject of development is difficult to teach. Living in relatively affluent surroundings, most university students tend to situate their society on the "high end" of a development continuum—at the pinnacle of human economic and technological achievement. And they often perceive the development continuum and their favorable position on it as "natural"—a well-deserved reward for embracing modernity. Development, thus, tends to be associated with problems of "developing" states rather than as a global project of which we are all a part. Consequently, such limited perspectives also fail to see rising inequality and poverty in the West as a part of this project. It is difficult to put one's world in historical perspective from this vantage point. It is harder still to help students grasp a world perspective that goes beyond framing their experience as an "evolved state"—the inevitable march of "progress." The recent Black Lives Matter movement and rising social solidarities globally, including Indigenous struggles, women's movements, and struggles over ecological integrity in the face of global elite

rule, are powerful reminders of the uneven and contentious implications of development. We are at a crossroads.

In our experience, until students go beyond simple evolutionary views, they have difficulty valuing other cultures and social possibilities. When they do go beyond the evolutionary perspective, they are better able to evaluate their own culture sociologically and politically, to appreciate the link between knowledge and power, and to think reflexively about social change, development, and global inequalities. This is the challenge we face.

A Timeline of Development

WORLD FRAMEWORK	**Developmentalism (1940s–1970s)**
POLITICAL ECONOMY	State-Regulated Markets (Keynesianism) Public Spending
SOCIAL GOALS	Social Contract and Redistribution National Citizenship
DEVELOPMENT [Model]	Industrial Replication National Economic Sector Complementarity [Brazil, Mexico, India]
MOBILIZING TOOL	Nationalism (Postcolonialism)
MECHANISMS	Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) Public Investment (Infrastructure, Energy) Education Land Reform
VARIANTS	First World (Freedom of Enterprise) Second World (Central Planning) Third World (Modernization via Development Alliance)

MARKERS		Cold War Begins (1946)	Korean War (1950–1953)	Vietnam War (1964–1975)
	Bretton Woods (1944)	Marshall Plan (1946)		Alliance for Progress (1961)
	United Nations (1943)	Non-Aligned Movement Forum (1955)	Group of 77 (G77) (1964)	World Economic Forum (1970)

		FIRST DEVELOPMENT DECADE	SECOND DEVELOPMENT DECADE	
	1940	1950	1960	1970
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS	World Bank, IMF, GATT (1944) US$ as Reserve Currency	PL-480 (1954) COMECON (1947)	UNCTAD (1964) Eurodollar/ offshore $ market	

Globalism (1980s–2000s)

Self-Regulating Markets (Monetarism)
Public Downsizing

Private Initiative and Global Consumerism
Multilayered Citizenship and Recognition

Participation in World Market
Global Comparative Advantage
[Chile, South Korea, Kenya; EPZs, NAFTA]

Markets and Credit
Financialization

Export-Orientation
Privatization
Entrepreneurialism
Public and Majority-Class Austerity

National Structural Adjustment (Opening Economies)
Regional Free Trade Agreements
Global Governance

Oil Crises	Cold War Ends (1989)	"New World Order"	Imperial Wars (2001–)	Rising Nationalism
	Debt Regime	WTO Regime	Climate Regime?	China's BRI (2013–)
New International Economic Order Initiative (1974)			Chiapas Revolt (1994)	World Social Forum (2001)

Group of 7 (G7) (1975)	Earth Summit (1992)	Kyoto Protocol (1997)	Group of 20 (G20) (1999)	MDGs (2000)	Stern Report (2006)	IAASTD Report (2008)	SDGs (2015)

"LOST DECADE" "GLOBALIZATION DECADE"

1970 1980 1990 2000

GATT Uruguay Round (1986–1994)
IPCC (1988)
UNFCCC (1988)

NAFTA (1994)
WTO (1995)

Offshore Banking	Structural Adjustment Loans	"Governance"/HIPC Loans	Public–Private Partnerships

Glasnost/Perestroika

Acknowledgments

I wish to express my thanks to the people who have helped me along the way, beginning with the late Terence Hopkins (my graduate school mentor) and teachers James Petras and Immanuel Wallerstein. The late Giovanni Arrighi played a critical role in encouraging me to cultivate "analytical nerve." For the first three editions, which include acknowledgment of the various people who were so helpful, special mention still goes to the original editor in chief, Steve Rutter, for his remarkable vision and his enthusiasm and faith in this project, as well as friends and colleagues who made significant contributions to improving this project—the late Fred Buttel, Harriet Friedmann, Richard Williams, Michelle Adato, Dale Tomich, Farshad Araghi, Rajeev Patel, Dia Da Costa, Gayatri Menon, Karuna Morarji, Ian Bailey, Kathleen Sexsmith, and of course Heloise Weber, whose worldly sensibilities have been critical to this latest revision. And finally, I express my gratitude to all the undergraduate students who taught me over the lifetime of this textbook, since 1966 (and particularly "my" remarkable graduate student teaching assistants) at Cornell.

Philip McMichael

I would like to express my thanks to everyone who has inspired me to think critically about politics and injustices. In particular I would like to thank my mentor and PhD supervisor, and dearly loved friend, Caroline Thomas. Special thanks to Tony McGrew, Julian Saurin, as well as to Richard Higgott and Diane Stone for support and friendship throughout. Over the years, I have learned from and been inspired by wonderful colleagues and friends especially through the Global Development Studies (GDS) Section of the International Studies Association (ISA). My wonderful (former) PhD students and friends, Kamil Shah, Kazi Rahman, Samid Suliman, Michael Spann, George Karavas, and Aliya Abbasi have been constant sources of inspiration. At POLSIS, UQ I would like to thank Roland Bleiker, Gillian Whitehouse, Morgan Brigg, Melissa Curley, Alastair Stark, and Emma Hutchison. Special thanks to Heather Rae and Chris Reus-Smit for all the discussions, support, and friendship. A very big thank-you to Martin Weber for all the constant discussions that I have benefited from, and for support, always.

My deep gratitude is to Philip McMichael—thank you for being such an outstanding inspiration, mentor, and educator over the past decades. Your intellectual, social, and political commitments have had a deep and lasting imprint on my work and outlook. I have tried to share this with numerous enthusiastic young learners who have benefited so much from

engaging with *Development and Social Change*. Thank you, Phil and Karen, for your friendship and support.

Heloise Weber

For this seventh edition, we have been fortunate to have the encouragement and understanding of Jeff Lasser, publisher for sociology at SAGE, and the thoughtful guidance of editorial assistant Tiara Beatty. Also, special thanks go to production editor Gagan Mahindra, to marketing specialists Jennifer Jones and Rob Bloom for their work behind the scenes, and especially to Colleen Brennan, our fastidious, engaged and highly effective copy editor. Great thanks are also due to reviewers of previous editions.

Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ALBA	Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
AoA	Agreement on Agriculture (WTO)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BAIR	bureaucratic-authoritarian industrializing regime
BIP	Border Industrialization Program
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAFTA	Central American Free Trade Agreement
CBD	Convention on Biodiversity
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COP	Conference of the Parties
ECA	export credit agency
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America
EOI	export-oriented industrialization
EPZ	Export processing zone
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FDI	foreign direct investment
FTA	free trade agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GAD	gender and development
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDI	Gender Development Index
GDL	global division of labor
GDP	gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GEM	gender empowerment measure
GHG	greenhouse gas
GlobalGAP	a retailer produce working group on Good Agricultural Practices
GNH	gross national happiness
GNP	gross national product
GPI	genuine progress indicator

HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	heavily indebted poor countries
HYV	high-yielding variety
IAASTD	International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development
ICT	information and communication technologies
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDS	Institute for Development Studies
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFI	international financial institutions
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPR	intellectual property rights
ISI	import-substitution industrialization
LDC	least developed countries
LDCF	Less Developed Countries Fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
MENA	Middle East North African states
MICs	middle-income countries
NAC	new agricultural country
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIC	newly industrializing country
NIDL	new international division of labor
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NTE	nontraditional export
OAU	Organization for African Unity
ODA	overseas development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RAI	responsible agricultural investment
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
SAL	structural adjustment loan
SAP	structural adjustment programs
SDG	sustainable development goals
SEZ	special economic zone

TFN	transnational feminist network
TIE	Transnationals Information Exchange
TNB	transnational bank
TNC	transnational corporation
TPN	transnational policy network
TRIMs	trade-related aspects of investment measures
TRIPs	trade-related intellectual property rights
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Convention on Climate Change
USMCA	United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (revised NAFTA)
WEEE	waste from electrical and electronic equipment
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organization
WID	Women in Development
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER

1 Development

Development, today, is increasingly about how we survive the present and future, rather than its claim to improve on the past. But what past, and how is this past represented? By convention, it is perceived *normatively* as the baseline in framing development as a linear process from tradition to modernity. The convention was established through a Eurocentric narrative of human progress, even as its signifiers (e.g., rationalism, scientific discovery, technological change) were viewed as unique to the European experience. Such a narrative not only discounts non-European technologies and sciences, including Pacific Islander navigation techniques, but alternative signifiers of being. From this idealized perspective of Eurocentric accounts of progress, the non-European world has been identified as embodying the past. This baseline framing of development means that the violence of colonization by European states, slavers, and merchants is not rendered as integral to the history of development. Such disconnection has a double effect: it has produced knowledge conventions about development that disarticulates the implications of colonialism for the non-European world and the dependence of European commercial wealth and "development" on that relationship. Ultimately, it promotes a sanitized understanding of development as a continuum, *within* each country, emulating the idealized European path. But it is more complicated than this: "development" has global dimensions, starting with European extraction of resources from colonies which resulted in a profoundly unequal relationship shaping the modern world. The inequality is both material and epistemic (how the world is viewed), and interlaced with enduring racial inequality. It was, to be sure, also resisted, and such resistance continues today (symbolized in recent global uprisings against racism).

Development, today and in all countries, is in question, with deepening global inequality and an environmental emergency. A 2020 World Health Organization commission reported: "Every country in the world is failing to shield children's health and their futures from intensifying ecological degradation, climate change and exploitative marketing practices. . . ." Further, "today's children face an uncertain future," with every child confronting "existential threats," and "while the poorest countries need to do more to support their children's ability to live

healthy lives, excessive carbon emissions—disproportionately from wealthier countries—threaten the future of all children."[1]

A key insight into the mechanics of this problem comes from the *World Inequality Report 2018*. Since 1970, a general rise in net private wealth has occurred, from between 200 and 350 percent of national income in most rich countries to between 400 and 700 percent today. Meanwhile, net public wealth (state revenues) has declined in almost every country since 1980. Thus, in China and Russia, public wealth declined from 60 to 70 percent of national wealth to 20 to 30 percent, and net public wealth has even become negative recently in the United States and the United Kingdom and only slightly positive in Japan, Germany, and France. And the kicker: "this arguably limits government ability to regulate the economy, redistribute income, and mitigate rising inequality."[2] *Why is this so significant?* Because it registers *transformation of the welfare-state*—first, away from taxing private wealth even as private property depends on so much public infrastructure (e.g., education, transport, communications, private research subsidies, energy subsidies), and second, from providing social protections: impoverishing public goods provision to balance an unleashed private sector in an era of neoliberalism (market privileging).

Development's mission and form of economic growth is profoundly challenged, as we cross planetary boundaries (e.g., climate change, biodiversity) and natural disasters pile up. The question is: how can, or why should, development maintain its goal of increased economic growth (and how does it serve to reinforce social inequalities)? This question animates a broad range of responses at all scales of political and social life, encountered in later chapters.

Development's economic focus on emulation of an idealized Western material lifestyle, became the universal standard when in 1949 U.S. President Truman proclaimed the "era of development" as the alternative to Soviet communism. He defined it as achieving "the decent satisfying life that is the right of all people. Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force."[3] *How, and how well, and with what implications development has addressed this goal is our subject*.

One contemporary perspective is that of "basic income" expert, Louise Haagh, who in 2019 underscored the combination of deteriorating public protections and class polarization as a universal reflection of the trajectory of development:

> Arguably, generating the basis for a future stable civil society is the biggest generational challenge of our time. The postwar project was formed around the idea of inter-generational independence and justice: the notion that parents' status should not affect the chances of a new generation. Conversely, the way

> young people have become increasingly dependent on parents for housing, savings, and inheritance represents the diminution of the public sphere today. The public project itself is at stake, spelling political chaos, the emergence of para-states and economies, and a new politics of envy. After the great recession of 2008, labour fragmentation has seen very low- and high-skill employment grow, yet the majority of the labour force is at risk and youth unemployment has reached "crisis proportions."[4]

Beyond the deepening bifurcation of employment opportunities is the current share of world income, with the income of 62 of the wealthiest individuals matching that of the bottom 50 percent of the world population—the former benefiting from reduction of corporate tax rates by between a half and a third across the so-called developed world between the early 1980s and 2015.[5]

Fifty years after Truman's freedom doctrine, the United Nations General Assembly recycled the development quest on September 18, 2000, in *The Millennium Declaration*:

> We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected. We are committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and freeing the entire human race from want.[6]

Not only has the entire human race not been relieved of want since the development era began, but also the trajectory of development has increasingly compromised its claims and possibilities. Across the past half century annual consumption of global resources has outstripped Earth's carrying capacities (as depicted in Figure 1.1). Such consumption is hardly equal within and across societies. Nevertheless, as a comment on the false promise of development, and its problematic goals such as high mass consumption, we find statements like the following: if all of humanity emulated *average* North American living standards, we would need about five planets.[7]

As an orienting term, *emulation* is ideological and unrealistic—not only because of deepening inequalities in Western societies but also because Western (stratified) lifestyles depend so much on non-Western resources. Mass consumption, theorized as the ultimate goal of development, depends on a dense network of global supply chains delivering raw materials, foodstuffs, and manufactured goods produced with majority world resources (including exploited labor) for the world's minority with purchasing power

Figure 1.1 Humanity's Ecological Footprint



Source: Global Footprint Network, 2010 National Footprint Accounts.

(disproportionately in the so-called developed countries). Such products include timber from Indonesia and smartphone coltan from the Congo, quinoa from Peru and avocado from Mexico, and clothing from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Behind these relations dispersed geographically stands a legacy of colonial exploitation, now compounded in new forms of global market exploitation by powerful corporate and financial interests. This is not to say non-Western societies do not have their affluent elite classes, but there is a profound inequality between the West and the rest. For example, a 2020 Oxfam report noted that the world's 22 most affluent males combine more wealth than all 325 million women in Africa. Further, "women and girls across the globe contribute an estimated $10.8tn to the global economy with a total of 12.5bn hours a day of unpaid care work, a figure more than three times the worth of the global tech industry."[8] And such exploitation to source Western lifestyles generates an outsized ecological footprint, increasingly at the expense of non-Western habitats, resources, and weather patterning.

One key example of resource-grabbing is the growing water crisis across the world, with Nestlé (the world's largest producer of bottled water) reported for its extractive incursions in India, Fiji, Bolivia, and elsewhere.

For example, households lack running water in the Six Nations of the Grand River Indigenous reserve in Ontario, Canada, but the beverage company extracts millions of liters of water daily from this treaty land.[9] And we know that the Western lifestyle footprint is responsible for the grossly uneven greenhouse gas emissions producing climatic disturbances with particularly devastating effect across the majority world. This is depicted in Figure 1.2,[10] reflecting the extraordinary inequality between what is conventionally categorized as the "developed world" and the "developing world." And this inequality of consumption and emissions divides individual countries themselves. For example, in the United States and the United Kingdom, the richest 10 percent of the population produce at least 5 times those emissions of the poorest 50 percent.[11]

Note that these figures record data quite differently from the key metric measuring development across all states. That metric is the gross domestic product (GDP), and it measures the total economic output of a country—meaning all *marketed* goods and services. As U.S. economist Simon Kuznets testified in 1934 to the U.S. Senate: "no income measurement undertakes to estimate the reverse side of income, that is, the intensity and unpleasantness of effort going into the earning of income. The welfare of a nation can, therefore, scarcely be inferred from a measurement

Figure 1.2 Global Income Deciles and Associated Lifestyle Consumption



Source: Oxfam, reproduced in Beuret (2019).

of national income as defined [in GDP statistics]."[12] Extrapolating, the "reverse side of income" suggests labor exploitation primarily but extends to non-monetized activities such as domestic work and community care, as well as to the unpleasantness of environmental despoliation and public ill-health as effects of income-earning activities. In spite of this limitation, or blind spot, GDP was adopted internationally in the 1950s as the key standard measure of development. And it has remained the principal metric to the present day. As Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate in economics, remarked in 2019:

> If our economy seems to be growing but that growth is not sustainable because we are destroying the environment and using up scarce natural resources, our statistics should warn us. But because GDP didn't include resource depletion and environment degradation, we typically get an excessively rosy picture.[13]

As the standard, not only is it incapable of representing social and environmental well-being across a national society, but also it reinforces a one-dimensional understanding of development—invisibilizing the unequal social relations through which this growth is realized. Accordingly, GDP licenses a powerful and self-reproducing institutional (World Bank, UN, financial houses) and policy infrastructure, discounting the market's environmental foundations, and climate change—challenged in the UK *Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change* (2006) as "the greatest market failure the world has ever seen."[14]

What Is the World Coming To?

Development, then, is a problematic term. Represented as a universal aspiration, its origins are overwhelmingly Eurocentric. It is a trope stemming from the era of European colonization of the Americas, Asia, Australasia, and Africa. Colonization was in part justified through a European "civilizing" lens, as non-European cultures were devalued and redefined as "backward," as their habitats and resources were converted for commercial exploitation. And this perspective remains with us today: underscored recently in Brazilian President Bolsonaro's claim, when opening Indigenous reserves in the Amazon to logging and mining, that prehistoric forest-dwellers need jobs in the modern economy.[15] There is pure irony here, in destroying the world's largest rainforest in the name of development at a time of global climate emergency.

Destruction of the natural world is not the only source of development disillusion today. We see this all around us: in rebellions cascading

across the world as economies stagnate and social services and stable jobs erode; in populist upsurges expressing dissatisfaction with political and economic elites captivated by global economic deals; in renewal of sustainable practices; in demands for race, class, and gender equality, massive new global circuits of migrant labor, and declining life expectancy from "deaths of despair" from rising precarity.[16] The response to the latter—closing the door to those impoverished by development processes—is perhaps the key allegory of our times. It rests on a disconnection of colonialism from the present postcolonial world's condition, reproduced as it is through the minority world's overconsumption of majority world resources, producing forms of destitution. And it is this condition that expels displaced people into migrant streams.

At face value, waves of immigration from the non-European world *appear* as masses of people seeking better lives in the "developed world." But this perception is based on erasure of the relational legacies of colonialism. To *reconnect histories relationally* means to question viewing development as conventionally framed in terms of a simple dichotomy of "premodern" and "modern" societies. It is this critical insight that underpins arguments about the "rightful presence" of immigrants.[17] Rather, development remains an unequal world-socioeconomic *relationship*, with harsh consequence. Racism is cause and effect here, as global development has been historically premised on, and productive of, unequal race relations. Racism is expressed across time in minority world exploitation, patronage, and exclusion of majority world peoples: through enslavement and forced labor, Indigenous genocide, and fear of yielding privilege to nonwhite migrants. Such fear is expressed by French author Renaud Camus, in a book titled *Le Grand Remplacement* (2011), claiming that "native 'white' Europeans . . . are being reverse-colonized by black and brown immigrants."[18] And racism currently animates nativist hostilities in Europe, North America, and Australia (the "global North," with Japan) toward economic, political, and environmental refugees from the "global South."

There is a lesson in this current international standoff. And that is that global development is inherently uneven, and indeed unequal, in its process, outcomes, and effects. Most importantly it is embedded in one-sided histories serving as dominant narratives, with the colonial empires from the sixteenth to the twentieth century leaving an indelible racist imprint on modernity and its world view—and increasingly openly challenged across the global South and North. This is most evident in the global North (which includes Australia and New Zealand) in 2020 with mobilizations to dismantle particular statues as symbols of empire and slavery. From the European perspective the colonized world, in all its cultural diversity, was simply framed as "backward" and inferior in racial terms. But from the non-European perspective, New World explorers and colonists brought

incessant violence, including genocide. Colonialism introduced a panoply of novel diseases to the Indigenous peoples, such as smallpox and measles, triggering a catastrophic reduction in population: as many as 56 million people, 10 percent of the world's population died by the early 1600s, with a mortality rate of 90 percent for Indigenous communities. Such pandemics were one-way scourges; today they are universal following patterns of global commodity flows and all-round travel.[19]

When immigrants from the postcolonial "majority world" now come in waves, seeking redress (symbolically) for centuries of colonial disruption of their life-worlds, their presence triggers political "nativism" in the "minority world." Underlying this response is an implicit assumption that development is a national process and that racial groups have their place—forgetting white-settler colonization, trade in enslaved persons, historic Chinese and Indian diasporas, and even elite diasporas today.

To study "development," then, is to recognize its history, as an integrated and unequal process across world regions, states, and cultures. This is the underlying theme of this book. The historical process is subdivided into successive colonial, development, globalization, and potential sustainability projects—to distinguish key periods, or political conjunctures, in the making of the modern world. Each project shapes its successor, which in turn reconfigures what it inherits from the previous project. And the process of succession involves substantial/large-scale sociopolitical mobilizations.

Thus, the anticolonial mobilization across the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century shapes the development project (1940s–1970s), as decolonization and political independence nurtures "economic nationalism," within a United Nations internationalism. But this in turn is challenged by an increasingly powerful corporate and financial sector, championing a global economy, and hence a globalization project (1970s–2010s), opening world markets for trade and investment liberalization. The resulting ecological stress on Earth of intensifying global consumption patterns and a "race for resources" stimulates an array of environmental movements and sustainability initiatives, anticipating a sustainability project in coming years.

This book is a guide to the rise and transformation of "development" as a powerful instrument of global social change over several centuries. From one (long-term) angle, it appears increasingly cometlike: a brilliant lodestar for ordering the world, but perhaps destined to burn out as its energy-intensive foundations meet their limits. From another (immediate) angle, the energy and inequality dilemma forces renewed critical thinking about how humans might live sustainably and equitably on the planet. These perspectives are the subjects of chapters to come.

Development: History and Politics

Development originated in the colonial era, as European domination came to be self-justified in terms of superiority and leadership along a development axis. Key to this relationship was power, vested in imperial states, and their military and mercantile operations dedicated to extending the realm of commercial and landed propertied classes. While development is represented in theory as a set of idealized outcomes (at the expense of devaluing other cultures), its implementation often has a violent history. For example, the private enclosure of land and forests in the name of economic development dispossesses and displaces inhabitants. It also converts such habitats into "resources" to be marketed, thereby replacing one cultural life-world with a singular commodity culture, in the name of progress. Here, development's ends justify its means, however socially and ecologically disruptive the process may be. And this process in turn is politically sanctioned and managed.

The distinction between development as an unfolding universal social *process* and development as a political *intervention* is useful here.[20] For our purposes it illuminates the ideological belief in "improvement" (European style), paired with distinct power relations to manage modern development. In Enlightenment terms, development was understood in Europe *philosophically* as improving humankind. Nineteenth-century European political elites interpreted development *practically,* as a way to socially engineer emerging national capitalist societies. Elites formulated government policy to manage the social transformations attending the rise of capitalism and industrial technologies. Development came to be identified with *both* industrialization *and* the regulation of its disruptive social impacts. These impacts began with the displacement of rural populations by land enclosures for cash cropping, a process generating impoverished individuals and families, such paupers who were in turn framed as menacing, restless proletarians ("undesirables"), as well as producing unhealthy factory towns.[21] Development, here, meant balancing technological change and the rise of new social classes, fashioning policies to manage wholesale social transformations. At the same time, such transformations became the catalyst of competing political visions—liberal, socialist, conservative—of the ideal society.

In Europe's colonies, the inhabitants appeared undeveloped—in European self-referential (evolutionary) terms—legitimizing imperial intervention. By the nineteenth century, social engineering underpinned European imperialism. While colonial resource extraction facilitated European industrialization, colonial administrators managed subject populations, as they experienced wrenching social transformations. Here, development came to be associated with an additional, normative meaning,

namely, a "white man's burden"—the title of a poem by nineteenth-century English poet Rudyard Kipling. Such racist patronage remains a key legacy of European civilizing claims. When the leader of India's twentieth-century independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi, was asked what he thought of British civilization he reputedly replied: "It would be a good idea."

Thus, development came to mean the extension of modern social engineering to colonies incorporated into the European orbit and through use of justifications steeped in racism. Subject populations were exposed to a variety of new disciplines, including forced labor schemes, schooling, and segregation in native quarters. Forms of colonial subordination differed across time and space, but the overriding object was either to adapt or marginalize the colonized in the processes of their dispossession. In this sense, development involved a relation of power. For example, British colonialism introduced the new English factory-model "Lancaster school" to the (ancient) city of Cairo in 1843 to educate Cairo's emerging civil service. Egyptian students learned the new disciplines of a developing society that was busily displacing peasant culture with plantations of cotton for export to English textile mills and managing an army of migrant labor, which was building an infrastructure of roads, canals, railways, telegraphs, and ports.[22] Through the colonial relation, industrialism transformed both English and Egyptian society, producing new forms of social discipline among working- and middle-class citizen-subjects. And while industrialism produced new class and gender inequalities within each society, the racist underpinnings of colonialism added further and persisting forms of domination and inequality. In this way, new class and racial hierarchies within and across societies were introduced.

While development informed modern narratives in the age of industrialism and empire, it only became formalized as a *project* in the mid-twentieth century. This period was the high tide of decolonization, as the Western (British, Italian, German, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and Belgian) and Japanese empires succumbed to the moral force of anticolonial resistance and when development (associated with independence) became an emancipatory promise. The United States, identifying as a noncolonial power (disregarding its settler-colonial history) and strengthened by its New Deal, by which Keynesian public economic stimulus offered a model of "planned development," seized the post–World War II moment to proclaim a new (free) world project of development. Meanwhile, the United Nations, intent on expanding membership as colonies became independent as sovereign states, institutionalized the System of National Accounts. A universal quantifiable measure of development, the GDP, was born, as key to the **Development Project**, based on the ideal of self-governing states united by the ideology of nationalism. Here, *subjects* became *citizens*, in an era of U.S.-inspired "development" idealizing modern society

as composed of self-maximizing *consumers* as the promise of the future. Western development culture contrasted with Soviet bloc socialism, where industrialism was driven not by consumerism but by central planning and social need—in part idealizing the worker-state and in part for self-defense against Western anticommunism.

Development Theory

Identifying development with rising consumption privileges the market as the vehicle of social change. The underlying philosophy—deriving from a popular (but limiting) interpretation of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*[23] and formalized in neoclassical economic theory—is that markets maximize individual preferences and allocate resources efficiently. Whether this theory reflects reality or not, it is a deeply held belief now institutionalized in much development policy across the world. Why is this the case?

Naturalizing Development

There are two ways to answer this question. First, a belief in markets is a central tenet of liberal Western philosophy. Hungarian philosopher Karl Polanyi noted that modern liberalism rests on a belief in a natural human propensity for self-gain. This translates in economic theory as the market principle.[24] Self-gain, via the market, drives the aspiration for improvement, aggregated as consumption. Second, as Polanyi noted, naturalizing market behavior as an innate propensity discounts other human traits or social values—such as cooperation, redistribution, and reciprocity, which are different organizing principles by which human societies have endured for centuries. For Polanyi and other classical social theorists, pursuit of individualism via an economic calculus is quite novel in the history and organization of human societies. That is, it is a social construct of modernity, rather than inherent in human social life.

Although individual improvement remains the ultimate goal of development, it is realized quite unevenly across gender, race, and class groupings, as well as across time. In this respect, the middle decades of the twentieth century saw powerful anticolonial, labor, and citizen movements pressing to temper private, with public, provisions, such as infrastructure, education, health, water supply, commons, clean air, and so forth. These measures were included in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in the 1940s and constituted the welfare state most clearly in Western societies in the postwar period. Postcolonial states faced the task of challenging the colonial division of labor and implemented social protections for their destabilized communities. This was the era of the development project,

modeling these social protections to regulate uncertain markets. But, as noted earlier, such protections hamstrung increasingly powerful financial interests, whose combined power in policy circles contributed to intensifying **privatization** of public goods, and a pervasive discourse subordinating social-democratic states to market imperatives, as the medium of development in the subsequent **Globalization Project**.

This privatizing outcome was prefigured in one of the most influential theories of development emerging in the post–World War II world. In 1960, economist Walt Rostow published *The Stages of Economic Growth:* A *Non-Communist Manifesto,*[25] outlining a development theory celebrating the Western model of free enterprise—in contrast to a state-planned economy. The "stages" traverse a linear sequence, beginning with "Traditional Society" (agrarian, limited productivity) and moving through "Preconditions for Take-Off" (state formation, education, science, banking, profit-systematization), "Take-Off" (normalization of growth via industrialization), and "Maturity" (the second industrial revolution from textiles and iron to machine-tools, chemicals, and electrical equipment)—and finally to the "Age of High Mass-Consumption," characterized by the movement from basic to durable goods, urbanization, and a rising level of white-collar versus blue-collar work, as in postwar America.

This evolutionary sequence, ostensibly distilled from the U.S. experience, represents the consumer society as the terminal stage of a complex historical process. Rostow viewed the U.S. model as the goal to which other (i.e., developing) societies should aspire, which partly explains his book's subtitle—expressing the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time. The theorization of development as a series of evolutionary stages naturalizes a process comprising unequal relations, framing it in terms of stages, whether it occurs on a national (development era) or an international (globalization era) stage. Mass consumption was a final goal to be realized through membership of the "free world" at the time, and by implication, U.S. assistance would be available to spur **Third World** (postcolonial states) progress along the stages.

However, note that Rostow's "development blueprint" depended on a political context. Rostow's theory is premised on the convention of approaching development from the "baseline" we outlined earlier. It thereby served to disconnect colonialism and its legacies as an explanation for the conditions of development of the new states. Furthermore, it sought to naturalize liberal capitalism as the development dynamic. That is, markets are not natural; they required securing by **development states**. And development was neither spontaneous nor inevitable; rather, it was shaped by social struggle and required nurturing by an institutional complex on a world scale (a **development project**), via trade, monetary, and investment rules, aid regimes, and a military umbrella—all of which were supplied

through postwar, multilateral institutions and bilateral arrangements led by the United States, especially in the capitalist bloc. In this way, a theory of spontaneous markets diverges from reality. But reality was nonetheless shaped by this theory—informing public discourse and translated into implementation of policies governed by a market calculus. This is a central paradox explored in this book.

Global Context

Reality is more complicated than it first appears. For example, Rostow's prescriptions artificially separated societies from one another, perhaps expressing the idealism of mid-twentieth-century nationalism. But to assign stages of growth to individual societies, without accounting for their historic (and unequal) interdependence, discounts patterns of imperial wealth extraction. As we shall see, not only did European powers once depend on their colonies for resources and markets, but these patterns have continued in the postcolonial era. Because of continuing Western dependence on raw materials from the ex-colonial world, the latter struggled to challenge these historic structural inequalities.

This reality stimulated **dependency analysis** and **world-system analysis**. The concept of "dependency" (referring to unequal economic relations between Western and non-European states) emerged in the mid-twentieth century from several quarters: an empirical observation by economist Hans Singer that "peripheral" countries were exporting more and more natural resources to pay for increasingly expensive manufactured imports; an argument by Singer's collaborator, Argentinean economist Raul Prebisch, that Latin American states should therefore industrialize behind protective tariffs on manufactured imports; and earlier Marxist theories of exploitative imperialist relations between the European and the non-European world.[26] Dependency was, then, a relationship describing the development of Europe at the expense of the **underdevelopment** of the non-European world. Economist Andre Gunder Frank put it this way:

> [H]istorical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now-developed metropolitan countries. . . . When we examine this metropolis-satellite structure, we find that each of the satellites . . . serves as an instrument to suck capital or economic surplus out of its own satellites and to channel part of this surplus to the world metropolis of which all are satellites.[27]

A similar imagery was used by political scientist Samir Amin, who drew the following conclusion based on an analysis of three case examples from the history of development in the African context: "We have to conclude that there are no traditional societies in modern Africa: there are only dependent peripheral societies."[28]

World-system analysis, advanced by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, deepened the concept of dependency by elevating the modern social system to a global scale. States became political units competing for—or surrendering—resources within a **world division of labor**. Here, regional labor forces occupy a skill/technological hierarchy, associated with state strength or weakness in the capitalist world economy.[29] From this perspective, the "core" concentrates capital-intensive or intellectual production and the "periphery" is associated with lower-skilled, labor-intensive production, whether plantation labor, assembly of manufactured goods, or routine service work (e.g., call centers). The point of a world division of labor emphasizes that labor everywhere has a global, rather than a national, locational value. As we shall see, this kind of geographical hierarchy increasingly complicates what journalist Thomas Friedman called "flat world" processes, as in information technology.[30]

The concept of dependency challenges the assumption that societies are independently aligned on a "growth stages" spectrum. But its binary, reflected in the framing of development/underdevelopment, rests on valuing Western-style development over other more collective, low-input lifeworlds associated with non-Western cultures. Indian postcolonial theorist and political psychologist Ashis Nandy's critique of the conflation of "poverty" with both modern experiences of destitution and customary frugal lifestyles is instructive here. His point is that when we conventionally refer to poverty, we mean destitution "but are too clever by half to admit that."[31] This digression, Nandy argues, serves as a self-justification, a collective ego-defense of our support of a development industry premised on overcoming poverty but producing conditions of destitution.

While measuring all societies against a conception of (industrial) development may have seemed the appropriate goal for modernization and dependency theory at mid-century, from the vantage point of the *twenty-first century* it is quite problematic. The growing recognition that the planet cannot sustain current Western-emulating socially unequal urban-industrial trends in China and India is one dramatic expression of this new reality.

Agrarian Questions

Urbanization is a defining outcome of development and the "stages of growth" metaphor, where "tradition" yields to "modernity" as industrialization

deepens. As political scientist Samuel Huntington put it: "Agriculture declines in importance compared to commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural activities, and commercial agriculture replaces subsistence agriculture."[32] Although this theoretical sequence has validity and informs policies discounting small-scale farming, there is a question as to whether and to what extent this trajectory is inevitable—especially in a global context. In fact, as we shall see, the demise of millions of small producers is an outcome of unequal global relations such as colonialism, targeted foreign aid, and policies favoring global agribusiness. How we perceive these relationships is important: we know, for instance, that agricultural productivity ratios across high- and low-input farming systems have risen from 10:1 before 1940 to 2,000:1 in the twenty-first century,[33] putting small producers at an overwhelming global market disadvantage. Thus, if small-farming systems erode, is this because they do not belong on a society's "development ladder"?[34] A related question here is whether and to what extent development—as modeled—is inevitable or intentional, and national or global?

Ecological Questions

This example of conversion of farming into an industrial activity underscores a significant *ecological blind spot* in development theory. As is becoming clearer, where the passage from small farming to large-scale (commercial) agriculture is represented as improvement, or development, it is an insufficient claim if it does not account for what economists call "externals." These are the significant environmental impacts, such as disruption of agrarian cultures and their ecosystems, dependency on fossil fuels, and agriculture's responsibility for up to a third of greenhouse gas emissions. Such consequences challenge the wisdom of replacing long-standing knowledge-intensive farming culture/ecology with increasingly unsustainable industrial agriculture.

One key example of this ecological blind spot is its reproduction in the **Human Development Index (HDI)**, constructed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990. Its *Human Development Report* then challenged the singular emphasis on economic growth as development (as GDP) but still left out the ecological dimension:

> The concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and progress. The real objective of development should be to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. Though this may appear to be a simple truth, it is often overlooked as more immediate concerns are given precedence.[35]

Development Paradoxes

The environmentalist's paradox, when inverted, is, in fact, a "development paradox." Former World Bank economist Herman Daly formulated this as an "impossibility theorem"—namely, that the universalization of U.S.-style high mass consumption economy would require several planet Earths. Either way, the *ultimate paradox here is that the environment is not equipped to absorb its unrelenting exploitation by the current growth model of endless accumulation.* In other words, development as we know it is undermining itself.

Three of the nine designated planetary operational boundaries (i.e., climate change, biodiversity, and the nitrogen cycle) have been crossed already, whereas others (e.g., fresh water use and oceanic acidification) are at serious tipping points. Meanwhile, the costs of environmental degradation are borne disproportionately by the poor—the very same people targeted by the development industry. This is a key development paradox. Related to these formulations is the notion (advanced by the World Bank in 1992) that economic growth is a condition for sustainable development, which the *UK Stern Review* of 2006 termed a paradox since the cost of climate change adaptation would be far greater if we wait for higher future levels of wealth to address the problem.

Other paradoxes include such questions as the following: Are low-carbon cultures that live with rather than seek to master nature backward? Are non-Western cultures judged poor in what makes Western cultures rich? Is frugality poverty? Why is malnutrition common to Western and non-Western cultures? Are non-Western cultures rich in what Western cultures are now poor (nonmonetized items such as open space, leisure, solidarity, ecological knowledge)? Should we measure living standards only in monetary terms?

Sources: Daly (1990); J. B. Foster (2011); Stern (2006).

Although the HDI is known for its more robust measurement of (human) development, its data sources have disregarded inequality and the environment. It was only in 2011 that the annual UNDP *Human Development Report* began to adopt an ecological sensibility, regarding "the adverse repercussions of environment degradation for people, how the poor and disadvantaged are worst affected, and how greater equity needs to be part of the solution."[36]

Given the UNDP's reputation for questioning conventional development wisdom, this new focus complements the UN *Millennium Ecosystem Assessment* (2005), which noted that the last half century of human

action has had the most intensive and extensive negative impact on world ecosystems ever, and yet this has been accompanied by continuing global gains in human well-being.[37] Known as the **"environmentalist's paradox"** (since ecosystem degradation negatively affects human well-being), researchers have noted "technology has decoupled well-being from nature" and time lags will only tell.[38] In other words, mastery of nature may be effective in the short term in generating rising consumption patterns but also effective in masking the long-term health implications of ecosystem stress, if these are "externalized." What such research suggests is that development needs a robust sustainability dimension—as emergent now in a possible **sustainability project**.

Social Change

As we have seen, development theory offers a blueprint, and justification, for universalizing a European-centered process. European industrialization depended on devaluing and displacing non-European knowledges and industry, and capturing non-European resources (labor, minerals, raw materials, and foodstuffs). Of course, colonial subjects resisted—for example, the successful late-eighteenth-century uprising of the enslaved in the French colony of Saint-Domingue (forming the first, Haitian, postcolonial state in 1804), but also the unsuccessful Amritsar rebellion, put down savagely by British forces in India in 1919. Such uprisings (including by the enslaved in the southern United States) marked a long-term politics of decolonization, with colonial subjects articulating and gaining moral, material, and political power as **countermovements** to European empires. Resistance to colonialism —including substantial peasant mobilizations from China to Mexico to Kenya—was matched with labor uprisings and political organization during the late-colonial era. The British faced widespread labor strikes in their West Indian and African colonies in the 1930s, and this pattern continued over the next two decades in Africa as British and French colonial subjects protested conditions in cities, ports, mines, and on the railways.[39]

Colonial rule eventually surrendered to definitive anticolonial power struggles, animated by class and cultural mobilizations for independence. The **colonial project** reconfigured and subordinated communities and resources to service imperial needs, including through the creation of labor regimes. However, colonialism was rooted in and defended through racial politics that both justified subjugation (including enslavement) and fueled resistances across the colonial world. These struggles ushered in a postcolonial era, embedded in an expanding system of sovereign

nation-states forming the United Nations organization. The UN Security Council comprised China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with new states joining through the 1940s and 1950s. During this period French demographer Alfred Sauvy coined the term *Third World*: the world region of postcolonial states distinct from the **First** (Western bloc) and **Second** (Soviet bloc) **Worlds**. Both First and Second Worlds were engaged in expanding their spheres of influence in the Third World with economic and military assistance. In this context, the Third World was also consolidating its power as a third force in world politics through the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). And in this political context President Truman identified the postcolonial states as "underdeveloped" countries, requiring access to Western largesse. This decree licensed the mid-twentieth-century global development project, facilitating the expansion of liberal capitalism, and the application of the GDP metric to measure national economic growth.

The transformation of material relations into commodities is represented in pricing. As Karl Marx pointed out, even human labor-power came to be commodified, as villagers lost their means of livelihood and were forced to work for monetary wages.[40] Karl Polanyi extended this observation to land and currency, noting that with the rise of nineteenth-century market society each of these substances came to be traded for a price. He argued that neither labor nor land, nor money were *produced for sale,* and so were really "fictitious commodities." When they are treated as commodities, workers, farmers, and firms are exposed to exploitative or uncertain conditions (as experienced in the 2008 world financial/debt crisis). That is, their labor, farming, or business is subject to competitive relations beyond their control by a market with seemingly independent authority. Accordingly, *social countermovements inevitably arise and advocate for protection from unregulated markets*.[41] This kind of "double movement" is definitive of the market system, where commodity relations appear to govern social relations, and people push back—as we see today across the world with a diverse range of mobilizations against stagnating economies, deteriorating environments, and minority marginalization.

Polanyi focused on the 1930s' combination of progressive and reactionary countermovements from below and above, with states as objects and/or agents of intervention for market regulation—either progressive or fascist. Here, the defeat of fascism enabled progressive forms of social protection in postwar welfare/**development states**, regulating markets as the **development project** took hold. Today, countermovements, both left and right, are again in play in response to the crisis of the **globalization project**, as it produces labor precarity and migrant labor streams, ecosystem breakdown, and financial corruption in both private and public sectors. As we shall see, their pervasive effects generate countermovements demanding livelihood

rights or nativist protections, environment protections, and anticorruption measures. Notably, in 2019, the *Human Development Report* noted:

> The wave of demonstrations sweeping across countries is a clear sign that, for all our progress, something in our globalized society is not working . . . A connecting thread is deep and rising frustration with inequalities. Understanding how to address today's disquiet requires looking "Beyond Income, Beyond Averages and Beyond Today," . . . Too often, inequality is framed around economics, fed and measured by the notion that making money is the most important thing in life.[42]

The Projects as Historical Framework

This book frames the development story around three projects: colonialism, development, and globalization, with a sustainability project emerging. Each project models a specific kind of development as political-economic and environmental conditions transform. For example, the transition from Development to Globalization Project was provoked by increasingly powerful business and financial interests and their political allies engaging in a "countermovement" from above, to protect their expanding global markets from public regulations. This was accomplished with policies of deregulation in the name of "globalization," legitimized by neoliberal economic theory. That countermovement pendulum has now swung the other way as social mobilization from below responds to economic destabilization and intensification of social inequalities as markets have largely escaped social controls.[43]

The current market malaise and combination of crises—food, energy, climate, social—suggest the world may transition toward another project, which we term the **Sustainability Project**. The dynamic that links these projects and accounts for their succession can be thought of as a series of Polanyian "double movements": politicization of market rule (for or against) via social mobilization. The colonial project, accompanying the rise of capitalist markets, yielded to the development project, as social and decolonization countermovements challenged the ascendancy of the market in their respective territories. Then the development project yielded to a globalization project installed by a global power elite to restore market sway and *reduce* the power of states and citizens to the status of facilitators and consumers, respectively.

Currently, the crisis of the globalization project (see Chapter 6) stimulates a wide range of sustainability initiatives at all scales, geared to reducing environmental degradation and climate warming. How these may coalesce into some kind of world ordering is not yet clear. Whether we will see a

more authoritarian world order built on energy and climate security claims or some decentralized, ecologically based social organization is among the possibilities informing debate. In the meantime, we can situate our condition via some "development coordinates."

The Development Experience

Contrary to the idealized version of development, which suggests Western citizens enjoy living standards that are the goal and envy of the rest of the world, the West appears to be "undeveloping," as jobs relocate to growth areas such as China and India, as northern public infrastructure decays, as social services such as education and health care dwindle, and as ecosystems degrade. From this perspective, development does not look like a linear process.

In redistributing jobs to lower-wage regions, transnational firms enhance profitability, and northern consumers with incomes enjoy access to low-cost goods produced offshore. In this sense, development is identified— for its beneficiaries—as consumption. This, of course, corresponds with Rostow's final growth stage and as the *global relationship* it always was. Much of what we consume today has global origins. Even when a product has a domestic "Made in . . ." label, its journey to market probably combines components and labor from production and assembly sites located around the world. Sneakers, or parts thereof, might be produced in Indonesia or China, blue jeans assembled in the Philippines, a smartphone assembled in Singapore, and a watch made in Hong Kong. The British savor organic vegetables from western China, the Chinese eat pork fed with South American soy, and North Americans consume fast foods that may include chicken diced in Mexico or hamburger beef from cattle raised in Costa Rica. And, depending on taste, our coffee is from Southeast Asia, the Americas, or Africa. We readers may not be *global citizens* yet, but we are certainly *global consumers.*

But global consumers are still a minority. While over three-quarters of the world's population can access television images of global consumption, only half of that audience has access to sufficient cash or credit to consume. Television commercials show images of people everywhere consuming global commodities. We know that much of the world's population does not have Internet access (despite increasingly ubiquitous smartphones), and we know that a relative minority of the world's population consumes a vast majority of global goods and services.[44] Distribution of, and access to, the world's material wealth is extraordinarily uneven. Almost half of the ex-colonial world dwells now in slums. Over three billion people cannot, or do not, consume in the Western style. Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano makes this observation:

> Advertising enjoins everyone to consume, while the economy prohibits the vast majority of humanity from doing so . . . . This world, which puts on a banquet for all, then slams the door in the noses of so many, is simultaneously equalizing and unequal: equalizing in the ideas and habits it imposes and unequal in the opportunities it offers.[45]

And yet it is important also to note that while readers may be accustomed to a commercial culture and view it as the development "standard," other cultures and peoples are not (as) comfortable with commercial definition, or are simply marginal (by choice or circumstance) to commercial life.

Nevertheless, the global marketplace binds consumers, producers, and even those marginalized by resource consumption. Consumers everywhere are surrounded, and often identified, by world products. One of the most ubiquitous but invisible world products is coltan, a metallic ore used in consumer electronics, such as computers and smartphones, in addition to nuclear reactors. It comes predominantly from the Congo, where militarized conflict over this valuable resource has caused nearly four million deaths, and mining, sometimes with child labor, has negative environmental consequences for forests and wildlife. Such ethical issues, similar to those associated with "blood diamonds," have driven some electronics corporations to mine coltan elsewhere in Africa.[46]

The global economy is a matrix of networks of commodity exchanges, organized in a variety of cross-border chains, accounting for approximately 80 percent of world trade. In any one network, there is a sequence of production stages, located in a number of countries at sites that provide inputs of labor and materials contributing to the fabrication of a final product. These networks are called **commodity, or supply, chains**. The chain metaphor illuminates the interconnections among producing communities dispersed across the world. And it allows us to understand that, when we consume a product, we often participate in a global process linking us to a variety of places, people, and resources. iPhones, for example, assembled in China, use components produced across a network of countries, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Workers in these sites often have little security—or few rights—as they constitute important but undervalued links in these chains stretching across an often unregulated global workplace, here conceptualized as "poverty chains."[47] Although we may experience consumption individually, it is a fundamentally social, and environmental, act. Not only does it bind us to producers elsewhere, but they may be disadvantaged by exporting potential local resources.

Case Study
Waste and the Commodity Chain

The disconnect between development theory and the environment is dramatized by the problem of waste, concealed in plain sight. The fact that consumption simultaneously produces waste is neither acknowledged by consumers nor featured in measures of economic growth. And yet waste in general, and electronic waste (e-waste) in particular, are huge and problematic by-products of our lifestyle. The household electronics sector is now the fastest growing segment of municipal waste streams, as computing and communication technologies rapidly evolve. The UN estimates the annual global generation of waste from electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) runs at a rate of between 20 million and 50 million tons. In 2009, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that e-waste could increase by 500 percent over the next decade in rising middle-income countries. The toxicity of this waste is extraordinary: From 1994 to 2003, for example, disposal of personal computers released 718,000 tons of lead, 287 tons of mercury, and 1,363 tons of cadmium into landfills worldwide.

Cellular, or mobile, phones (1.2 billion sold globally in 2007) leach more than 17 times the U.S. federal threshold for hazardous waste. And yet the noxious ingredients (including silver, copper, platinum, and gold) are valued on secondhand markets, just as discarded e-waste may be recycled for reuse in poorer markets, sometimes by businesses such as Collective Good, which donates a portion of the profits to the Red Cross or the Humane Society. Refurbishing phones occurs from Ghana to India, where labor costs are lower and environmental regulations are less strict than in other countries. About 70 percent of the world's discarded e-waste finds its way through informal networks to China, where it is scavenged for usable parts (often by children with no protection) and abandoned to pollute soil and groundwater with toxic metals. Africa is one of the largest markets for discarded phones, while China sells between 200 million and 300 million phones annually to dealers in India, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Thailand, from where they may pass on to buyers in Laos, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Just as water seeks its own level, unregulated markets enable toxic waste to leach into the global South. Despite regulations regarding hazardous waste, the 170-nation agreement called the Basel Convention is ambiguous on the question of restricting the movement of e-waste from North to South.

Why is the current fixation on the virtual, or "dematerialized," information economy unable to recognize the dependence on offshore manufacturing and disposal of waste, both of which pose social and environmental hazards?

Sources: Leslie (2008); Mooallem (2008); Salehabadi (2011); Schwarzer et al. (2005); Widmer et al. (2005).

Global agribusiness, for example, transports food (or biofuels) to the global market, undermining local possibilities for food security. Supplying global consumers rather than improving local conditions is extroverted rather than introverted as in the Rostow schema. Thus:

> Half of all [Guatemala's] children under five are malnourished—one of the highest rates of malnutrition in the world. Yet the country has food in abundance. It is the fifth largest exporter of sugar, coffee, and bananas. Its rural areas are witnessing a palm oil rush as international traders seek to cash in on demand for biofuels created by US and EU mandates and subsidies. But despite being a leading agro-exporter, half of Guatemala's 14 million people live in extreme poverty, on less than $2 a day.[48]

Globalization deepens development paradoxes by virtue of its sheer scale. Integrating the lives of consumers and producers across the world does not necessarily mean sharing the benefits of development globally. The distance between consumers and producers and their environments means it is virtually impossible for consumers to recognize the impact of their consumption on people and environments elsewhere.

SUMMARY

In sum, this opening chapter introduces the multiple dimensions of development as a historical process. We connect to the world in multiple ways, with development organizing our lives, and our thoughts and aspirations. While we are its participants and agents, we are not its principal architects. These are the power brokers in state administrations, international organizations, and corporate/financial circles, in addition to the powerful discourse of "free markets," idealizing the market as natural and a neutral source of material benefits. This is why markets do not just appear; rather, they are instituted, enabled, and gamed by powerful interests. Such interests, as we have suggested, prioritize economic growth. And here's the paradox: that, as stated in the World Bank's *International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development* report, "markets fail to adequately value social and environmental harm."[49] In other words, externalizing the market's unequal social impacts and related "ecological footprints" means human well-being takes a back seat to living standards measured in market values. *Well-being* has two distinctive meanings. Amartya Sen argues that development should pivot on a quality intrinsic to individuals, that the "appropriate 'space' is neither that of utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor that of primary goods . . . but that of substantive freedoms—the capabilities—to choose a life one has reason to value."[50] While this assumes

individual agency, alternatively, the Spanish American term *buen vivir* ("living well"), derived primarily from Indigenous visions of well-being, promotes community, subordinating economy to ecology and human dignity.

Viewing development as a paradox encourages evaluation of how development is represented, how it works, and how it plays out. This is particularly so given the looming threats to human and planetary health, over and above the automation of jobs, and continuing socioeconomic inequalities.

Ultimately, it is important to link local effects and global context in such a way as to see the global in the local and vice versa. While development is conventionally assumed and measured as a national process, its coordinates are worldwide, and this has been so from the colonial era onward. Disconnecting European development from colonialism obscures its global history and transfer of wealth from exploited colonial subjects. The racist justifications of colonial exploitation have had enduring legacies, which continue to be resisted. Development, therefore, is more complex than its conventional measure (GDP). It comprises power relations that are always contested in one way or another. This is because "[d]evelopment is anchored not just in institutions and structures, but also in the lives of its subjects."[51]

Finally, development is not the same across time. We address this by identifying its projects as expressing particular world ordering by a dominant set of norms, practices, and instituted policies. The projects embody differential effects across space, as depicted in case studies of local impacts and initiatives, including resistances. In this sense, development is uneven within and among societies. It has been, and remains, contentious. This book illuminates this, emphasizing development paradoxes and offering a "birds-eye" (global) perspective on development controversies not easily seen at ground level.

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