The POLITICS of UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

SEVENTH EDITION

JAMES M. SCOTT
JEREL A. ROSATI

The Politics of United States Foreign Policy

Seventh Edition

This one is for Elizabeth.
—J.M.S.

Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE publishes more than 1000 journals and over 600 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. Our growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company's continued independence.

Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

The Politics of United States Foreign Policy

Seventh Edition

James M. Scott
Texas Christian University

Jerel A. Rosati
University of South Carolina

SAGE | CQPRESS

FOR INFORMATION:

CQ Press
An imprint of SAGE Publications, Inc.
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320
E-mail: order@sagepub.com

SAGE Publications Ltd.
1 Oliver's Yard
55 City Road
London EC1Y 1SP
United Kingdom

SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044
India

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd.
18 Cross Street #10-10/11/12
China Square Central
Singapore 048423

Printed in the United States of America.

ISBN: 9781544374550

LCCN: 2019037307

Acquisitions Editor: Anna Villarruel
Content Development Editor: Alissa Nance
Editorial Assistant: Lauren Younker
Production Editor: Bennie Clark Allen
Copy Editor: Amy Marks
Typesetter: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd.
Proofreader: Sue Schon
Indexer: Jean Casalegno
Cover Designer: Candice Harman
Marketing Manager: Jennifer Jones

20 21 22 23 24 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Brief Contents

Detailed Contents

Preface to the Seventh Edition

Welcome to the seventh edition of *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy!*

The Politics of United States Foreign Policy engages students of American foreign policy to consider the players, processes, and politics that drive US decisions and involvement in the global political system. This emphasis on the politics and processes of US foreign policy brings a distinct focus to this text. In this endeavor, we emphasize that a variety of actors play a role, and that the struggle over competing values, purposes, meanings, and interests is never far from the surface of foreign policy. Indeed, politics, and the processes that follow, are even more important than ever in today's world, and they shape US foreign policy choices and behavior in profound ways.

APPROACH

While our approach includes rich discussion of the policies and problems the United States has addressed in its foreign policy over time and in the contemporary context, we approach these aspects through our focus on policymaking and the political process through which they occur. Accordingly, we organize our text around efforts to

- Provide substantive description of problems, policies, and patterns and their explanations in the foreign policymaking process
- Address the global context, government, and society as key levels of analysis, focusing on how they interact and impact the real world of politics and the policymaking process
- Emphasize the political process and the prospects for and challenges to presidential management in the face of the engagement and influence of other institutions; actors; and forces in the government, domestic society, and world—with special attention to how these actors and forces operate, interact, conflict, win, compromise, and lose, and how the competing and complementary beliefs, personalities, and preferences of these actors within and outside government shape foreign policy decisions
- Integrate theory and practice throughout so as to encourage students to think analytically and theoretically to make sense of the foreign policy choices of the United States over time and in different contexts, and to think about and formulate answers to the questions of "how?" and "why?"

How does one study and understand the complex politics of US foreign policy? Three different approaches to the study of US foreign policy have predominated over the years: the policy approach, the historical approach, and the social science approach.

- The *policy approach* predominates among practitioners and those involved in politics and the policy world. Policy analysts tend to concern themselves primarily with contemporary affairs; emphasize the present and the near future; make policy recommendations; and write for policymakers and a broad, general audience.
- The *historical approach* to US foreign policy comes out of the scholarly tradition of diplomatic history and the humanities within academia. It tends to emphasize a historical understanding of US foreign policy, attempts to recapture the specifics of the times, recognizes a wealth of factors influencing foreign policy, relies heavily on primary source documentation (such as government documents and private papers), and results often in well-written narratives for a scholarly and more general audience.
- Finally, the *social science approach* to US foreign policy tends to be focused on identifying and explaining basic patterns in foreign policy and policymaking.

Each approach or orientation has something important to contribute, and synthesizing the three approaches so that they complement each other is key to acquiring breadth and depth of knowledge and understanding. Our orientation to the study of foreign policy is that of a social scientist sensitive to the importance of history and practice, so our text is sensitive to broad patterns and specific information about the politics of US foreign policy, contemporary and past politics, a theoretical and historical understanding, and competing policy views and recommendations.

Overall, while we weave together substantive, historical, and theoretical knowledge to maximize understanding and critical thinking, we approach foreign policy from a policymaking perspective. In essence, a single overarching question informs and leads us: *What are the factors that shape and determine the foreign policy choices of the United States?* We thus stress analytical and theoretical thinking about cause-and-effect in policymaking, integrating factors from the international and domestic contexts with institutional, organizational, and individual dynamics and characteristics.

The Politics of United States Foreign Policy fosters and supports the groundwork to describe what the United States has done, does, or might do, and to evaluate the merits of one policy over another, but we privilege the examination and explanation of *how* and *why* those choices are made at any given time. Underlying this is our fundamental philosophy, organized around student engagement and active learning, and efforts to facilitate subject mastery and the development of critical/analytical thinking generated when students ask "why?" questions and formulate answers. Our text therefore enables a rich array of opportunities for student thinking; active classroom activities such as case-based analysis, simulations, and other approaches; and writing assignments.

NEW TO THIS EDITION

This text (now in its seventh edition) has long received a very warm reception from students, instructors, and practitioners, holding a place among the most successful textbooks on US foreign policy since its inception. In the new edition, we maintain our overall

approach and general outline, while making key changes to strengthen and improve the text and thus ensure its continued relevance and success. The revisions we made include the following:

- ***Chapter reorganization*** to improve the thematic coherence of the text.
- ***A new analytical/conceptual framework*** to examine and understand the complex and shifting politics of US foreign policymaking.
- ***Streamlining and focusing the text for readability***, resulting in a leaner, more accessible book that is more tightly presented even as it maintains breadth and depth of coverage.
- ***Timely updates to cover developments since the end of the Obama administration and the first three years of the Trump administration and the unique politics, personnel, and processes it has involved***, woven into every chapter, making the revised version as up-to-date as possible.
- ***New and expanded attention to the challenges of changing international and domestic contexts*** and their impact on the foreign policy agenda, foreign policy orientations, executive branch structures, legislative-executive interactions, societal concerns and engagement, and the increasingly partisan and polarized political environment in which US foreign policy is made.
- ***New and updated figures, tables, maps, and other supporting material throughout.***
- ***New and updated boxed features throughout***, with each box ending with critical thinking questions to spur analysis and discussion. **A Closer Look** boxes (all new or newly revised) consider significant issues or developments in more detail. **A Different Perspective** boxes (all new or newly revised) explore competing or alternative viewpoints. **Think About This** chapter-ending boxes (wholly new to this edition) prompt reflection and engagement and facilitate critical thinking.

All told, this major revision not only brings the text up to date, but it also delivers a more readable, better focused, and pedagogically helpful book. It draws on our many years of collective experience in the classroom and the success we have enjoyed working together with our students to examine the nature and consequences of the US foreign policymaking process. We hope that you find it helpful in your classes and that it contributes to your efforts to engage your students on this subject as well.

FEATURES AND PEDAGOGY

This book continues to rely on a variety of pedagogical features:

- ***Examples and historical context*** aid students in understanding the nature of the institutions involved, the dynamics of the process, and the larger themes addressed.

- ***Overviews and summaries*** are provided in the introduction and concluding section of each chapter.
- ***Theory and practice are integrated and discussed*** throughout the book.
- ***Key terms*** have been streamlined and ***boldfaced*** in the text, and they are listed at the end of each chapter.
- ***Boxed features offer opportunities for critical thinking and writing exercises in and out of class.***
- ***End-of-chapter puzzles offer opportunities for reflection and application.***

DIGITAL RESOURCES

A password-protected resource site available at **https://edge.sagepub.com/scottrosati7e** provides high-quality content for instructors. This book includes the following instructor resources:

- **Test banks** provide a diverse range of pre-written options as well as the opportunity to edit any question and/or insert your own personalized questions to effectively assess students' progress and understanding
- **Instructor's manual** provides lecture notes outlining key concepts and includes engaging discussion questions and class activities
- Editable, chapter-specific **PowerPoint® slides** offer complete flexibility for creating a multimedia presentation for the course
- **Tables and figures** from the book are available for download

Acknowledgments

We are indebted to a large number of people who inspired us, from whom we have learned, and who took the time and effort to directly assist and support us in the writing of this book.

We also very much appreciate the following reviewers:

Stewart Dippel, University of the Ozarks

Adrien M. Ratsimbaharison, Benedict College

Michael J. Struett, North Carolina State University

Luca Zini, Florida International University

Reviewers of previous editions include:

Andrew Bennett

Douglas Borer

Philip Brenner

Dan Caldwell

Steve Chan

Renato Corbetta

John Creed

Larry Elowitz

John Gilbert

J. Joseph Hewitt

Samuel B. Hoff

David Houghton

Christopher M. Jones

George Kieh

Martin Kyre

J. Patrice McSherry

Dean Minix

B. David Myers

Andrew L. Oros

Martin Sampson

David Skidmore

Donald Sylvan

Larry Taulbee

David W. Thornton

Steve Twing

Lane Van Tassell

Walter F. Weiker

Matthew C. Zierler

Finally, crucial psychological support has been essential and provided by our families and our friends. Altogether, it has been an incredibly satisfying and taxing experience involving the help of many people to produce a book on the politics of US foreign policy for which we alone take complete responsibility.

About the Authors

James M. Scott is the Herman Brown Chair and Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University. His primary research and teaching interests are in international relations and foreign policy analysis, and he has special interests in US foreign policymaking, the role of Congress, and US democracy promotion. He has authored/coauthored seven books and more than 150 journal articles, book chapters, other nonrefereed publications, review essays, and conference papers. During his career, Dr. Scott has earned more than two dozen awards from students, faculty, administration, and professional associations including, most recently, the 2019 Textbook Excellence Award from the Textbook and Academic Authors Association (for *IR: International, Economic, and Human Security in a Changing World,* 3rd edition, coauthored with Ralph G. Carter and A. Cooper Drury); the 2018–2019 Distinguished Faculty Lecture Award (AddRan College of Liberal Arts, Texas Christian University); the 2018 Excellence in Teaching and Mentoring Award (International Studies Association–Midwest); the 2018 and 2019 AddRan College of Liberal Arts Division of Social Sciences Award for Distinguished Achievement as a Creative Teacher and Scholar (Texas Christian University); and the 2012 Quincy Wright Distinguished Scholar Award (International Studies Association–Midwest). Dr. Scott has been active in professional associations, serving on the governing boards, as conference program chair, and as president of both the International Studies Association–Midwest (2000) and the Foreign Policy Analysis Section (2001) of the International Studies Association, and as a councillor for the Council on Undergraduate Research (2017–2019). He served as associate editor of *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2009–2015), coeditor of *Political Research Quarterly* (2015–2018), and lead editor of *International Studies Perspectives* (2020–present). From 2004 to 2013, he was the director of the annual National Science Foundation–funded Democracy and World Politics Summer Research Experience for Undergraduates Program.

Jerel A. Rosati is Professor Emeritus of International Studies and Political Science at the University of South Carolina. His area of specialization is the theory and practice of foreign policy, focusing on the US policymaking process. He has been a Fulbright Senior Specialist in Argentina and Colombia, and a Visiting Scholar in Argentina, Armenia, China, and Somalia (in 1984). He also has been a research associate in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division (FAND) of the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, DC; president of the International Studies Association's (ISA) Foreign Policy Analysis Section; and president of the Southern region of ISA. He was the principal investigator, program director, and academic director of a six-week US Department of State Fulbright American Studies Institute on US Foreign Policy for six years for 108 scholar-practitioners from more than sixty countries. He is the author of more than seventy articles and chapters, as well as five books. The recipient of numerous outstanding teaching awards, Dr. Rosati has been the director and reader of more than fifty PhD dissertations and more than fifty master's theses, and has mentored many more individuals in their academic and professional careers within the United States and throughout the world.

PART I

Introduction

THE CONTEXT OF US FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

Chapter 1 introduces US foreign policymaking and the underlying analytical framework used to understand the complex politics through which it is shaped. Chapter 2 discusses the international context, considering the historical and global-power contexts and major patterns in the US foreign policy response to them.

Understanding the Politics of US Foreign Policy



Ilbusca/DigitalVision Vectors/Getty Images

PHOTO 1.1 How does the United States decide what to do in foreign policy?

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

1. Know the meaning and significance of foreign policy.
2. Understand the foundations of the politics of foreign policymaking.
3. Identify a framework for understanding the politics of foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN POLICY

What is foreign policy, and why should people care about it and the politics that shape it?

Very simply, **foreign policy**, or foreign relations, refers to the scope of involvement abroad and the collection of goals, strategies, and instruments that are selected by governmental policymakers (see Rosenau 1976). To understand the foreign policy of a country, one needs to recognize who decides and acts. To say "the United States intervened" is part of our everyday language. But what do people mean when they use this phrase? In reality, countries do not act; people act. What the phrase usually means is that certain governmental officials, representing the state—that is, the United States—acted. A state is a legal concept that refers to the governmental institutions through which policymakers act in the name of the people of a given territory. The **foreign policy process**,

or the politics of foreign policy, therefore, refers to how governmental decisions and policies get on the agenda, are formulated, and are implemented—which is the focus of this book. Nevertheless, while we stress process and politics, the substance of policy is woven throughout.

Although it may not seem so to either Americans or people from other countries, US foreign policy engagement in the world profoundly affects their lives in many ways. Thus, studying how and why the United States chooses to do what it does in foreign policy—the politics of US foreign policy—is important for both Americans and the world.

For example, in 2018, the United States spent about $700 billion on defense (not counting military-related expenditures in departments other than the Department of Defense), close to 40 percent of the world's total military expenditures. About 200,000 American troops (roughly one sixth of the US armed forces) are stationed worldwide in around 800 US military bases, big and small. Since the 1930s, the US has been engaged in numerous conflicts, including five major wars, which required millions of personnel to serve in the military and potentially place their lives at risk. World War II resulted in more than 400,000 US battle deaths, and the United States has sustained more than 400,000 military casualties since then. More than 35,000 Americans died during the Korean War, more than 58,000 died during the Vietnam War, and about 7,000 Americans have died in the Afghan and Iraqi wars as of 2019. In addition to those who died, many suffered physical and psychological injuries in each of these major wars as well.

The American standard of living is also heavily affected by the world economy, which is affected by US foreign economic policies involving trade in goods and services, investment in companies and capital, monetary policies and currency fluctuations, and access to raw materials and energy. In fact, as the global economy has expanded, the American economy has become increasingly more dependent on foreign markets and investment. Today, about one third of the US gross domestic product (GDP) comes from the import and export of goods and services. Although the United States now imports about a third of its oil, much of it from the Middle East, that figure was as high as 60 percent as recently as 2006.

Other important areas of foreign policy impact Americans beyond security and war or economics. Some areas that come to mind are immigration and population dynamics, the drug trade, the spread of AIDS, travel and tourism, and transnational issues such as global climate change. Additionally, times of war and national emergency are also times of greater presidential power and political tension at home when the demands of democracy often conflict with the demands of national security. This affects individual freedom, liberties, and civil rights guaranteed in the US Constitution.

Not only does US foreign policy have significance for Americans, but it also impacts the lives of people throughout the world. Because the United States is much more powerful and wealthy than most other societies and peoples, Americans must understand that US foreign policy can affect societies and lives all around the world—sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. In fact, the impact can be quite profound on the lives as well as the "perceptions and attitudes" of others, including Americans. Certainly the September 11 terrorist attacks, the subsequent war on terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the economic crisis of 2008–2010 clearly highlight the importance of America's connection to and policies toward the world. In sum, US foreign policy involves many activities and issues

throughout the world that have implications—sometimes more immediate and direct, sometimes more indirect and underlying—for the everyday lives and futures of Americans.

Finally, our focus on the politics and processes of US foreign policy is motivated by several other foundational insights. Clearly, "what" the United States chooses to do in its foreign policy is quite consequential. But, policy—choices about the scope of involvement abroad and the collection of goals, strategies, and instruments to pursue it—is conditioned by "how," the process by which those choices are made. And the process is, in turn, conditioned by who is deciding—the characteristics of the individuals, agencies, and institutions that interact to make foreign policy choices. Since those individuals, agencies, and institutions have different preferences and perspectives, their interactions in the process are highly political; policy, therefore, is ultimately politics.

UNDERSTANDING US FOREIGN POLICY

How should we try to understand the politics of US foreign policy? Let us begin with two simple, but very important, points about the nature of the US foreign policy process:

- It is a very complex process.
- It is a very political process.

First, the US foreign policy process is complex and extremely messy. Many Americans initially tend to hold a very simple view of the foreign policy process: that US foreign policy is made and defined at the top of the political hierarchy, especially by the president. According to Roger Hilsman (1964:5), former assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs in the John Kennedy administration, "As Americans, we think it only reasonable that the procedures for making national decisions should be orderly, with clear lines of responsibility and authority." We expect decisions to be made by "the proper, official, and authorized persons, and to know that the really big decisions will be made at the top . . . with each of the participants having roles and powers so well and precisely defined that they can be held accountable for their actions by their superiors and eventually by the electorate."

Clearly, the president is important, and presidential leadership is central to the politics of US foreign policy. The individual characteristics and beliefs of the individual elected to hold the office of the presidency play a crucial role in the making of US foreign policy. However, the president does not make US foreign policy alone, and presidential leadership in foreign policy is more a variable than a constant. President Lyndon Johnson colorfully put it this way:

> Before you get to be president you think you can do anything. You think you're the most powerful leader since God. But when you get in that tall chair, as you're gonna find out, Mr. President, you can't count on people. You'll find your hands tied and people cussin' you. The office is kinda like the little country boy found the hoochie-koochie show at the carnival, once he'd paid his dime and got inside the tent: "It ain't exactly as it was advertised." (quoted in Cronin [1979], 381)

As President Johnson's description suggests, the reality is that many other individuals and institutions within the government and throughout society are involved in the foreign policy process. In the United States, these include presidential advisers, employees in the White House, the foreign policy bureaucracies, and other bureaucratic agencies in the executive branch; members of Congress and their staffs in the House of Representatives and the Senate; the courts; the public, political parties, and interest groups; the media; and even state and local governments at times. From outside the US, international actors such as foreign leaders, allies, and international organizations can also play a role. It is in this sense that the making of US foreign policy is a complex process. It is also a messy process, for the variety of individuals and institutions that affect US foreign policy do not stand still but constantly interact with and have an impact on one another. In other words, the policymaking process is not static but, as the word *process* implies, is dynamic.

Second, the foreign policy process in the United States is a very political process. What is politics? One common definition of **politics** is "who gets what, when, and how" (Lasswell 1938). This definition emphasizes that politics is, as Hedrick Smith (1988:xvi) says in *The Power Game*, a "serious game with high stakes, one in which the winners and losers affect many lives—yours, mine, those of the people down the street, and of people all over the world." Politics might also be defined as *the competition for power and shared meaning*. This simple but meaningful definition emphasizes the importance that ideas and symbolism play in the policy process. A final definition might describe politics as *competition between different individuals and groups for support of the public and influence throughout society in order to control the government and policymaking process for certain ends.* This is the broadest of the three definitions, emphasizing the role of different goal-oriented individuals and groups and the various arenas in which the political process takes place.

The three definitions are complementary and contribute to an understanding of what politics is all about. Together they illustrate that the politics of US foreign policy involves competition among differently motivated individuals and groups, that politics involves the flow of power and symbolism throughout government and society, and that it involves winners and losers. Such politics defines the **national interest**—a concept that is supposed to represent what is best for the country. However, policymakers will often invoke the idea of "the" national interest to justify and gain support for their particular preference from other policymakers or society. Different people, groups, and institutions have competing conceptions of what is best for the country, and it is through politics that such competing interests are "resolved" into policy choices. Ultimately, US foreign policy (and the so-called national interest) tends to reflect the goals and priorities of those individuals and groups who are the most successful in influencing the political process within government and throughout society.

The Changing Politics of US Foreign Policy

Clearly, the making of US foreign policy is a complex process inseparable from politics. This has been a dominant theme that most of the early theorists—including Gabriel Almond (1960); Richard Snyder (1958); Charles Lindblom (1959); Richard Neustadt (1960); Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder (1962); Roger Hilsman (1964); and Stanley Hoffmann (1968)—emphasized throughout their work on the US

foreign policymaking process during the "high Cold War" period of the 1950s and 1960s, when the world seemed simpler, a time when presidential power and the Cold War consensus were at their apex.

Since the Vietnam War, the policy process has become increasingly complex, political, and visible. One consequence is that it has become very difficult for a president to govern successfully and lead the country in foreign policy. In the words of I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake (1984:20), "The making of American foreign policy [has] entered a new and far more ideological and political phase." Or as Hedrick Smith (1988:xvi) likewise observed, "Presidents now have much greater difficulty marshalling governing coalitions" for "it is a much looser power game now, more wide open, harder to manage and manipulate than it was a quarter of a century ago when I came to town."

The complex politics of US foreign policy, if anything, has been heightened with the collapse of the Cold War, the war on terrorism, the challenges of globalization, and the rising **political polarization** with which Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have had to contend. Indeed, with its roots in the domestic reaction to the Vietnam War, polarization in foreign policymaking has increased steadily. With the end of the Cold War, the glue of anticommunism largely disappeared and polarization in foreign policymaking increased further, while ideological and partisan differences amplified the complexity and consequences of foreign policy politics.

A Framework for Understanding US Foreign Policymaking

How will we make sense of the complex politics of US foreign policy? We use a general **analytical framework** that provides the basic structure or frame of reference for organizing and thinking about (i.e., analyzing, conceptualizing, and synthesizing) the information and knowledge available in order to understand the politics of US foreign policy. As we noted, it is common practice to refer to the preeminence of presidents over American foreign policy. In fact, a common framework of US foreign policymaking is the **Presidential Preeminence** framework, illustrated on the left side of Figure 1.1. This framework is depicted as a series of concentric circles beginning with the president and expanding outward to include advisers, bureaucracies, Congress, and the public. According to this framework, the influence and relevance of actors decreases with the distance from the center of the circles, suggesting that the president dominates policymaking. Because we understand that presidential leadership is more a variable than a constant in the politics of US foreign policy, we adopt the analytical framework shown on the right side of Figure 1.1, which we call **Shifting Leadership and Politics**.

Unlike the Presidential Preeminence framework, the Shifting Leadership and Politics framework recognizes the complex and messy politics of the US foreign policy process and the varying roles and leadership of the president, presidential advisers, the agencies of the foreign policy bureaucracy, Congress and its members, societal forces and actors such as public opinion, interest groups and the media, and international factors as well. Our framework indicates that the White House *may* dominate, but it does not necessarily *always* dominate. Thus, while presidential leadership is a key aspect of US foreign policymaking, our analytical framework encourages consideration of the conditions under which it is more or less likely, as well as the roles and resources of other players in the foreign policy

FIGURE 1.1

Two Frameworks for Understanding US Foreign Policymaking: Presidential Preeminence (left) and Shifting Leadership and Politics (right)



process, including the foreign policy bureaucracy and Congress, and the roles and resources they bring to the process as well.

Organized by this analytical framework, our examination of the players and process of US foreign policy addresses two central and overarching themes: (1) the patterns and changes in the politics of US foreign policy, and (2) the conditions for and challenges to presidential leadership of foreign policy. We begin our examination of the politics and processes of US foreign policy with the international and historical contexts, which set the stage and provide the foundation for understanding the politics of US foreign policy. Chapter 2 briefly provides the global and historical context, focusing on an overview of international settings, US orientations to roles in the world, and the major historical patterns of US foreign policy since the founding of the country. Our discussion in Chapter 2 thus incorporates factors and forces from the international and societal circles of our analytical framework.

In Part II of our text, we turn to the inner core of our analytical framework, focusing on the three circles at the center of the policymaking process: the major governmental institutions and players from the White House, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and Congress.

The White House. The role of the president and top aides and advisers stems from the president's position as the chief executive. The person of the president and his or her individual characteristics and the nature of the presidency and its institutional characteristics are important aspects that affect the politics and processes of US foreign policy and the opportunities for presidential leadership.

The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy. This circle consists of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as economic agencies created

to provide advice and implement policy decisions. The bureaucracy's expertise and control of information place it in a position to shape the formulation of policy by performing much of the generation and consideration of policy alternatives. Moreover, the various agencies of the foreign policy bureaucracy shape policy with their primary role in its day-to-day implementation. In both of these roles, the role and influence of the officials and agencies of the foreign policy bureaucracy are affected by the nature and organizational characteristics of bureaucracy.

Congress. This circle includes the leadership, committees, individual members, and staff of both houses of Congress. While Congress and its members are affected by many structural characteristics and electoral constraints, including its size, decentralized nature, limited access to information, and procedures, the institution and its individual members have access to potentially potent avenues of influence. These include tools such as the ability to pass laws; the constitutional and statutory authority to hold oversight hearings, require reports, and request individual briefings; the advise-and-consent authority over treaties and appointments; and the "power of the purse."

Our framework invites consideration of the opportunities and challenges of presidential—or White House (i.e., the president and top staff/advisers)—leadership, and we devote considerable attention to the conditions under which White House leadership is enhanced but also constrained. However, our framework also directs consideration to foreign policy leadership by the foreign policy bureaucracy and by Congress, as well as competition among some or all of the three governmental circles over foreign policy influence. Thus, our framework highlights the importance of presidential leadership and management, but it accounts for shifting patterns of leadership and influence among the governmental actors. In effect, we treat presidential leadership as a variable, not a given.

We examine the players and institutions at the center of the foreign policy process in the eight chapters that make up Part II of our text. Chapter 3 examines presidential power and the president's ability to direct US foreign policy. This sets the stage for examination of the major institutions of the foreign policy bureaucracy and their input in the policy process: the State Department in Chapter 4, the military establishment in Chapter 5, and the intelligence community in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses how the president attempts to manage foreign policy and makes use of the National Security Council within the executive branch. Chapter 8 focuses on the players, institutions, and processes of foreign economic policymaking. Chapter 9 examines the role of Congress in foreign policy and the nature of interbranch politics. Part II concludes with Chapter 10, which offers a summary overview and theoretical synthesis of presidential, bureaucratic, and congressional policymaking power and employs different policymaking models to discuss the interaction of these actors and the opportunities for leadership to explain the dynamics of the policymaking process.

Part III turns to the examination of how the larger society and domestic politics affect the government and the foreign policymaking process. We begin in Chapter 11 with the significant and often underestimated role of the public and its beliefs—public opinion, political ideology, and American national style—in the making of US foreign policy. Then we examine the role and influence of interest groups and group politics in Chapter 12. Chapter 13 addresses the nature and effects of the media and the role of communications in the politics of US foreign policy.

The book concludes in Part IV with Chapter 14, which provides a summary of all that we have covered. In the concluding chapter, we synthesize our discussions of the global, governmental, and societal factors; we explore key patterns of influence and the shifting leadership that our analytical framework leads us to, returning to the two central themes of our text; and we also offer final insights on the politics of US foreign policy for the future.

POLITICS AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Our text is organized by our Shifting Leadership and Politics framework and the two themes we build around throughout its pages. The analytical framework thus provides a meaningful way to make sense of the complexity and politics of US foreign policy. We hope the net result will be your acquisition of better insights into and understanding of how and why the United States engages in foreign policy as it does.

This is a particularly interesting time to examine the complex politics of US foreign policy because the Cold War has come to an end, the United States has entered the twenty-first century, and the nation has experienced the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Great Recession. Significant changes in global politics and power have ensued, and disagreement and uncertainty about the role of the US and its engagement in the world have heightened throughout the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. How has the global context shaped the patterns and politics of US foreign policy? How will the interaction of global context, government, and society shape the future patterns of the politics of US foreign policy and presidential leadership? We take up these questions throughout this book.

THINK ABOUT THIS

Hubert Humphrey, who served in the US Senate from 1949 to 1964 and from 1971 to 1978, and as vice president from 1965 to 1969, once said, "Foreign policy is really domestic policy with its hat on." Think about the nature of the foreign policy process as we have initially presented it in this chapter.

What makes the politics of US foreign policy complex and messy?

KEY TERMS

analytical framework 7
foreign policy 3
foreign policy process 3
national interest 6
political polarization 7
politics 6

The Global and Historical Context

POWER, ROLE, AND POLITICS ON THE WORLD STAGE

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Zachary A. Anderson/Released/Flickr

PHOTO 2.1 The USS *Abraham Lincoln*, F/A 18 Hornets, and MH-60S helicopters project US global power.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

1. Know the meaning and significance of the global context as a factor in US foreign policy.
2. Understand the meaning and limits of the isolationism-internationalism debate.
3. Identify the nature and characteristics of the Continental, Regional, and Global eras of US foreign policy.
4. Assess the relationship between the global context and the historical patterns of US foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE

Since his surprise election victory in 2016, President Donald Trump has pursued a broad, often controversial agenda to reverse the course of current policies in many arenas. In foreign policy, the Trump administration retreated from decades of bipartisan commitment to free trade, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and support for the European Union, to name a few examples. The administration's inconsistent approaches to Russia, China, and other important states have generated uncertainty at home and abroad. According to some observers, President Trump's pursuit of a muscular nationalism "seems determined to challenge the policies and practices that have cemented America's vast power and influence

in the 20th and 21st centuries" (Sestanovich 2017). President Trump did little to allay such fears when he asserted that the post–World War II international order, which all presidents since Harry Truman have been committed to building and sustaining, is "not working at all" (Landler 2017).

As at numerous points in history, US policymakers now grapple with questions about the nature of world politics and United States's role in the world. After seventy years of relative consensus over US global leadership and engagement, significant debates over the nature and purpose of US involvement in world affairs and the United States's relationship to the rest of the world raise questions about almost all aspects of US foreign policy. Some observers point to potentially far-reaching shifts in global power and to problems and potentially major changes in the United States's relationships with its allies and friends, competitors, and adversaries that impact US security, freedom, and prosperity as well as the United States's roles and policies in the international arena.

Contemporary American foreign policymakers have strategic choices to make about US foreign policy engagement and policy in this current time of transition and change. Understanding the politics and processes of US foreign policy choices in this critical time begins with understanding the broad global context—the outer circle of our analytical framework introduced in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.1). The present and future of US foreign policy is shaped in part by this context and by the past decisions and actions of US policymakers in response to it. In this chapter, we consider how and why US foreign policy—in national security and economics—evolved after independence as the United States became a global power in the twentieth century, and how the global environment has affected American policy and power from the Cold War into the twenty-first century.

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT: PATTERNS AND DEBATES IN US FOREIGN POLICY

The **global context**—or setting, environment, or milieu—refers to phenomena external to the institutions, beliefs, and processes of human interaction in government and society. This context refers to such elements as the country's power (military and economic), resources, and level of technology, and to the larger global arena of which the United States is a part, all of which influence the complex politics of US foreign policy in the past, present, and future.

The global environment plays a significant role in the politics of US foreign policy in two principal ways. First, global structures and patterns set the underlying conditions or parameters of likely US foreign policy. For example, the general patterns that prevail throughout the globe affect American power and the United States's international role, thus setting the stage on which the politics of US foreign policy operates in society and government. Second, particular world events and relationships often have an immediate impact on domestic politics and the US policymaking process. For example, **international crises** (commonly defined in terms of surprise, a threat to values, and little time to respond) are events that catapult an issue onto the political agenda and often play an influential role in the politics of US foreign policy. Similarly, **international conflict** and war present problems and challenges to which the United States might respond and shape the politics

and processes of those responses. Therefore, both general patterns and immediate events in America's global context affect one another and are often mutually reinforcing (see Gilpin 1981; Hermann 1969; Lebow 1981; Morse 1973; Waltz 1959). Set in this global context, the foreign policy of the United States has a long and rich history since American independence, and understanding the connections between the international system and US foreign policy through the rise of American power is important to understanding where we are today.

A Different Perspective

COMPETING GLOBAL THEORIES

In the aftermath of World War II, the study of international relations became a serious discipline, especially within the United States and academia. Since the 1970s, **three different global theoretical approaches (or perspectives or paradigms)** have dominated: (1) classical realism, (2) liberal idealism (or internationalism), and (3) social globalism (see Knutsen 1997).

Classical realism tends to see the world as relatively anarchical and conflictual. In this view, the primary actors are (sovereign and independent) states, the most important issues revolve around national security and the use of force, and the principal motivation is the promotion of national power and wealth and prestige. So-called realists focus on the tremendously uneven distribution of power among states, on great power conflicts (and alliances and empires), the rise and decline of power, the maintenance of stability and order, and the utility of force as a means to settle disputes and international conflict. Conservative realists tend to be more pessimistic about the future possibilities of a world of greater peace, prosperity, and human development. According to Michael Doyle (1997:18) in *Ways of War and Peace*, to realists it is "the nature of humanity, or the character of states, or the structure of international order (or all three together) that allows wars to occur. This possibility of war requires that states follow 'realpolitik': be self-interested, prepare for war, and calculate relative balances of power."

Liberal idealism (or internationalism) tends to see a world of more cooperation and complex interdependence. Although they see states as important actors, liberal idealists contend that the dominance of states has diminished with the advent of other influential actors, such as international organizations (governmental actors like the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund, and nongovernmental ones like private voluntary organizations), multinational corporations, and ethnic groups. Such complexity allows for a much more interdependent (capitalist) international political economy, in which a variety of issues may be significant, including not just national security but political, economic, social, and cultural issues as well. This suggests that despite a world of considerable conflict, there is also much cooperation and order that regularly does and can occur—hence, the importance of such forces as international law; international norms and rules; international networks; international markets, finance, and commerce; and democratic institutions. Liberal idealists tend to be much more optimistic about the potential

(Continued)

(Continued)

for greater cooperation and peace, prosperity, and human development throughout the world. In their view, the state is not a hypothetical single, rational, national actor in a state of war (as it is in the classical realist view) but, instead, is a coalition or conglomerate of coalitions and interests, representing individuals and groups and transnational actors.

Social globalism tends to see the existence of a global system, but one in which power and wealth is incredibly unevenly distributed throughout the world. The world is often divided into different classes: a small, wealthy class of powerful or "core" states (and actors—basically the "developed countries" or "First World"); a predominantly poor class of weak or "peripheral" states (and actors—the "developing countries" or "Third World"); and a small group of industrializing or "semiperiphery" states (and actors—such as India and Brazil). These political and especially economic distinctions between different classes of people also seem to exist within different countries and societies. The emphasis is on the international political economy, the dominance of the capitalist system, and the inherent inequalities and dependencies that result for the poor relative to the wealthy that are difficult to change. Social globalists are extremely pessimistic about the future, given the global system of inequality and injustice; at the same time, they remain optimistic or hopeful that major or radical changes can occur to dramatically increase peace, prosperity, and human development for all.

What are the implications of these three competing perspectives for American power and US foreign policy?

From Isolationism to Internationalism?

The original thirteen colonies—established as a result of European (especially English and French) colonial expansion—rebelled against England in the American Revolution. The issues that over time incited the American revolutionaries, formerly loyal British subjects, involved the nature of the imperial relationship with the "mother" country. From the perspective of the British crown, the thirteen colonies were an integral part of the British colonial and mercantile empire that increasingly spanned the globe. Therefore, the colonists rightfully were subjects of British imperial rule. From the perspective of the colonists, who increasingly saw themselves as possessing the rights of Englishmen, the British increasingly were abusing their power as they denied representation, taxed the colonies, and controlled trade with the rest of the world.

Eventually the political and economic conflicts escalated to the point of a formal Declaration of Independence in 1776. With significant French assistance, the ensuing five-year "war of independence" resulted in American independence and official recognition with the signing of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 (by England, France, Spain, and the United States). The treaty gave the United States territory from the upper Great Lakes almost to the Gulf of Mexico (Spain held Florida and the Gulf Coast) and reaching westward to the Mississippi. European expansion and power politics were heavily involved in the creation of the United States and would continue to play an important role in US foreign policy after independence.

In his 1796 farewell address, America's first president, George Washington, offered the following advice: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible . . . . It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." In 1801, President Thomas Jefferson used his inaugural address to call for "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none." Two decades later, then–Secretary of State John Quincy Adams emphasized similar limits on US involvement in world affairs, declaring, "Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." Taken together, comments such as these, and some of the ensuing features of US foreign policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have led some observers to characterize the US approach to the world as a contest between isolationism and internationalism. In this perspective, isolationism dominated until World War II, with a brief period of engagement around the end of World War I, and internationalism has dominated since then.

However, as most US diplomatic historians argue, this simple breakdown of US foreign policy over time distorts much more than it enlightens. If one defines **isolationism** to mean noninvolvement abroad, the United States has never truly been isolationist during its history. Even if one defines isolationism more narrowly to mean *no* involvement in European political affairs, it would still be stretching reality to conclude that US foreign policy was isolationist. In fact, the United States was never uninvolved with Europe, whether in North America or across the Atlantic. As historian A. J. Bacevich (1994:75) stated,

> Only by the loosest conceivable definition of the term, however, could "isolation" be said to represent the reality of United States policy during the first century-and-a-half of American independence. A nation that by 1900 had quadrupled its land mass at the expense of other claimants, engaged in multiple wars of conquest, vigorously pursued access to markets in every quarter of the globe, and acquired by force an overseas empire could hardly be said to have been "isolated" in any meaningful sense.

For example, consider the regular use of US armed forces outside the country between 1798 and World War II (see Table 2.1). Before World War II, US armed forces were used abroad 163 times. Before the Spanish-American War of 1898, there were 98 uses of US armed forces abroad. Overall, the frequency of US armed intervention has remained pretty much the same over time—an average of about one "armed intervention" per year for more than 140 years. Although many of the cases might be considered "minor" incidents, especially from a twenty-first-century perspective, they all involved the "official" use of US armed forces in conflicts with other states while pursuing American interests. Moreover, this list does not include the use of US armed forces against Native American people as the United States expanded westward during the nineteenth century.

TABLE 2.1

US Military Interventions Before World War II

1798–1801—Undeclared naval war with France
1801–1805—Tripoli
1806—Mexico
1806–1810—Gulf of Mexico
1810—West Florida (Spanish Territory)
1812—East Florida (Spanish Territory)
1812–1815—Great Britain
1813—West Florida (Spain)
1813–1815—Marquesas Islands
1815—Tripoli
1816—Spanish Florida
1816–1818—Spanish Florida (First Seminole War)
1817—Amelia Island (Spanish Territory)
1818—Oregon
1820–1823—Africa
1822—Cuba
1823—Cuba
1824—Cuba
1824—Puerto Rico
1825—Cuba
1827—Greece
1831–1832—Falkland Islands
1832—Sumatra
1833—Argentina
1835–1836—Peru
1836—Mexico
1838–1839—Sumatra
1840—Fiji Islands
1841—Drummond Islands
1841—Samoa
1842—Mexico
1843—China
1843—Africa
1844—Mexico
1846–1848—Mexico
1849—Smyrna
1851—Turkey
1851—Johanna Island
1852–1853—Argentina
1853—Nicaragua
1853–1854—Japan
1853–1854—Ryukyu and Bonin Islands
1854—China
1854—Nicaragua
1855—China
1855—Fiji Islands
1855—Uruguay
1856—Panama
1856—China
1857—Nicaragua
1858—Uruguay
1858—Fiji Islands
1858–1859—Turkey
1859—Paraguay
1859—Mexico
1859—China
1860—Angola, Portuguese West Africa
1860—Colombia
1863—Japan
1864—Japan
1865—Panama
1866—Mexico
1866—China

1867—Nicaragua	1901–1902—Colombia
1868—Japan	1903—Honduras
1868—Uruguay	1903—Dominican Republic
1868—Colombia	1903—Syria
1870—Mexico	1903–1904—Abyssinia
1870—Hawaiian Islands	1903–1914— Panama
1871—Korea	1904—Dominican Republic
1873—Colombia	1904—Tangier, Morocco
1873—Mexico	1904—Panama
1874—Hawaiian Islands	1904–1905—Korea
1876—Mexico	1906–1909—Cuba
1882—Egypt	1907—Honduras
1885—Panama	1910—Nicaragua
1888—Korea	1911—Honduras
1888—Haiti	1911—China
1888–1889—Samoa	1912—Honduras
1889—Hawaiian Islands	1912—Panama
1890—Argentina	1912—Cuba
1891—Haiti	1912—China
1891—Bering Sea	1912—Turkey
1891—Chile	1912–1941—China
1893—Hawaii	1913—Mexico
1894—Brazil	1914—Haiti
1894—Nicaragua	1914—Dominican Republic
1894–1895—China	1914–1917— Mexico
1894–1896—Korea	1915–1934—Haiti
1895—Colombia	1916—China
1896—Nicaragua	1916–1924—Dominican Republic
1898—Spain	1917—China
1898–1899—China	1917–1918—World War I
1899—Nicaragua	1917–1922—Cuba
1899—Samoa	1918–1919—Mexico
1899–1901—Philippines	1918–1920—Panama
1900—China	1918–1920—Soviet Russia

(Continued)

TABLE 2.1
(Continued)

1919—Dalmatia	1926—China
1919—Turkey	1926–1933—Nicaragua
1919—Honduras	1927—China
1920—China	1932—China
1920—Guatemala	1933—Cuba
1920–1922—Russia	1934—China
1921—Panama, Costa Rica	1940—Newfoundland, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana
1922—Turkey	1941—Greenland
1922–1923—China	1941—Dutch Guiana
1924—Honduras	1941—Iceland
1924—China	1941—Germany
1925—Honduras	1941–1945—World War II
1925—Panama	

Source: US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Background Information on the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Foreign Countries*, 1975 Revision, Committee Print (94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975).

The extent of the US government's use of military force throughout the world since independence may come as a surprise to many Americans. Although the scope of armed intervention tended to be concentrated in the Western Hemisphere and Asia, Table 2.1 shows that the United States intervened in other parts of the world as well. Such interventionist behavior indicates that the US was quite active internationally (see Braumoeller 2010).

Instead of the simple—and misleading—distinction between isolationism and internationalism, another way to think about the development and trajectory of US foreign policy after independence is to divide it into **three major eras since independence**: (1) the Continental Era, 1776–1865; (2) the Regional Era, 1865–1940; and (3) the Global Era, 1941–present.

The Continental Era, 1776–1865

From its earliest days as an independent state, the United States had an active foreign policy. Indeed, the noted addresses by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson might be better interpreted as arguments for "nonalignment"—whereby the US should avoid permanent alliances and entanglements—rather than for isolationism. During this period, most US actions focused on the surrounding North American continent until the latter half of the nineteenth century. During this time, American leaders tended to focus on two general goals: nation-building and continental expansion.

Nation-building was critical since the United States was a new and relatively weak (emerging) country at the turn of the nineteenth century. It had won its national independence from the global superpower of its time, England, but it faced many of the problems that any new country with a colonial history faces upon gaining independence. Although far from Europe, the former thirteen colonies were surrounded by territories that England, France, Spain, and Russia coveted and fought over. As Walter LaFeber (1994:11) has stated, "From the beginning of their history, Americans lived not in any splendid isolation, far from the turmoil and corruption of Europe many had hoped to escape. They instead had to live in settlements that were surrounded by great and ambitious European powers."

The economy of the North American colonies also was dependent on the English economy. In addition, the new country was attempting to implement the first democratic experiment in the modern world. Given this environment, a priority for most Americans was nation-building: to build an independent country safe from its neighbors, construct a strong national economy, and establish a stable democratic polity. Therefore, much of the focus was on strengthening the internal situation in the United States.

The second goal, **continental expansion**, was closely linked to nation-building. What better way to protect the nation from potentially hostile neighbors than to expand its territory and push the British, French, Spanish, and Russians (as well as the Mexicans and Native Americans) farther and farther away from the eastern seaboard, preferably off the North American continent and out of the Western Hemisphere? What better way to build a strong economy than through the acquisition of more land that could be put to work? Strengthening national security and the national economy also contributed to political stability. But this meant that "Americans—whether they liked it or not—were part of European power politics even as they moved into the forests and fertile lands beyond the Appalachian Mountains. They could not separate their destiny from the destiny of those they had left behind in Europe" (LaFeber 1994:12; see also Weeks 1996).

Up to and including the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, US foreign policy aimed at acquiring and/or annexing increasing amounts of territory throughout the North American continent. Although such territory was inhabited predominantly by Native Americans, the United States acquired it from European states: from England in the North and Northwest, such as northern Maine and the Oregon territories; from France in the Louisiana Territory to the west; from Spain in the Florida territories to the south; from Mexico in the Southwest, such as Texas and the southwestern territories (including California); and from Russia in the farthest reaches of the Northwest (Alaska) (see Figure 2.1). Native American peoples suffered the most from this expansion. According to Walter LaFeber (1994:10), "A central theme of American diplomatic history must be the clash between the European settlers and the Native Americans"—a population estimated to be between 8 million and 10 million inhabitants throughout North America by the time Christopher Columbus first arrived. Clashes were constant with Native Americans—misnamed "Indians"—as Americans expanded westward. As Thomas Jefferson put it to James Madison in 1801:

> However our present interests may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid multiplication will expand it beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern if not the southern continent, with people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws. (quoted in Van Alstyne 1974:87)

The agents of US continental expansion were not only the government, especially the army, but also thousands of private and entrepreneurial Americans spilling westward in search of land, gold, profit, and freedom. The net result was that by the 1860s the United States had grown from thirteen colonies on the eastern seaboard to a country that spanned the continent. In the words of diplomatic historian Thomas Bailey (1961:3), "The point is often missed that during the nineteenth century the United States practiced internal colonialism and imperialism on a continental scale."

During the Continental Era, the United States was active outside North America as well, but this activity was more sporadic in nature. American commerce and merchants were active in all areas of the globe, especially Europe, the West Indies (i.e., the Caribbean), the Orient (i.e., Asia), and the slave trade of Africa. "During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," according to Alfred Eckes (1995:1), "the founders of U.S. foreign policy pressed

FIGURE 2.1

US Territorial and Continental Expansion by the Mid-Nineteenth Century



Source: Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad,* 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), p. 132.

to open markets and attacked mercantilistic barriers abroad in order to bolster the domestic economy and secure independence." Interruption of American commerce by the British during the Napoleonic War, for example, was a major cause of the War of 1812 between the United States and England.

Despite the "spirit of commerce" since colonial times, American merchants were unable to open up the mercantilist control of trade by the European powers and increasingly adopted a policy of **economic nationalism**, including the use of tariffs to encourage (and protect) the growth of domestic manufactures. Increasingly, tariff policy became trade policy in the nineteenth century (e.g., Eckes 1995; Kindleberger 1977).

The US government was also politically and militarily active beyond the continent, especially through the Navy. The first diplomatic consulate established overseas by the new government was in Canton, China, in 1789. As early as 1821, "the navy began operating a squadron off the west coast of South America; and by 1835 intercourse with China and the East Indies reached the point where it justified the establishment of a separate East India squadron" (Van Alstyne 1974:126).

Regarding Latin America, the **Monroe Doctrine** (declared in 1823) insisted on an end to European interference and colonization in the Western Hemisphere, for which the United States promised noninterference in European affairs. As early as 1850, the US negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty for rights to build an interoceanic canal. And attempts also were made to annex Cuba and Santo Domingo (now known as the Dominican Republic) to the US republic. In Asia, the United States, led by Daniel Webster, negotiated the 1844 Treaty of Wanghia, giving Americans "most favored nation" status (like other European countries) in trade and extraterritorial rights with China. Americans, led by Commodore Matthew C. Perry, forced Japan to open its ports to foreigners and commerce in 1854; and the Hawaiian and Midway Islands were occupied as transit points for American commerce with Asia.

The Regional Era, 1865–1940

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the United States had been quite successful in building an independent and transcontinental country that was growing more powerful. By the end of the Civil War, the United States no longer faced any immediate threats from its neighbors in the hemisphere. The Civil War also settled the divisions between the North and the South, allowing political stability at the national level. The national economy was vibrant and growing, and the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869. According to Van Alstyne (1960:10), as the US "entered its period of consolidation and centralization, it began developing its internal economy intensively, and abroad it soon joined in the international scramble for material wealth and power," best exemplified by the Spanish-American War of 1898 in which Cuba and the Philippines became US colonies.

As the United States reached the limits of continental expansion, more and more Americans during the latter half of the nineteenth century were beginning to speak of the future of the United States in terms of a **manifest destiny**. According to William Weeks (1996:61), "Manifest Destiny was founded on the a priori conviction of the uniqueness

of the American nation and the necessity of an American empire." Such an orientation reflected three key themes (see also Stephanson 1995):

> The special virtues of the American people and their institutions; their mission to redeem and remake the world in the image of America; and the American destiny under God to accomplish this sublime task. Under the aegis of virtue, mission, and destiny evolved a powerful nationalist mythology that was virtually impossible to oppose. (Weeks 1996:61)

In fact, the foundation for ideas of US **exceptionalism**, mission, and destiny had existed from the time of the Puritan settlements in New England. They were popularized by John Winthrop's sermon in 1631 that the Puritan colony in Massachusetts Bay represented a "city upon a hill" from which the regeneration of the world might proceed. Many Americans came to characterize the United States as a special place where human society might begin anew, uncorrupted by Old World institutions and ideas, giving it a special mission and role in the world.

Following the Civil War, US foreign policy actively promoted political stability and economic expansion abroad, especially in Latin America and Asia. US foreign policy increasingly became a presence on the global stage. The US government and American business dramatically increased their presence in Latin America throughout Central America and the Caribbean. The US government promoted friendly political regimes in the region that would be unresponsive to European involvement, open to American trade and investment, and stable enough to pay back their American bank loans. In turn, American business intensified with the rapid expansion of American trade, loans, and investment in the region.

Increased US involvement in Latin America—a region that was experiencing decolonization, nation-building by independent states, and considerable political instability—resulted in frequent American military intervention and occupation, especially after the turn of the century. As Secretary of State Richard Olney proclaimed in 1895, "The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." The Olney Proclamation reinforced the original purpose of the Monroe Doctrine, that the United States had the right, and now the power, to intervene in and dominate its "own backyard"—foreshadowing what was to come with the Spanish-American War and after.

From President Theodore Roosevelt's "Big Stick" policies to William Howard Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy" and Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom," through the Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover administrations, the United States regularly sent the Marines to crush local rebellions, prop up old or new regimes, and restore political stability in virtually every major state in Central America and the Caribbean, often only to return again and again. Military intervention usually meant that the local "customs houses" were subsequently run by US government (usually Treasury Department) officials to guarantee that revenues from tariffs and duties were collected to repay American loans. Financial supervision, for example, lasted thirteen years in Nicaragua (1911–1924), twenty-five years in Haiti (1916–1941), thirty-six years in the Dominican Republic (1905–1941), and sixty years in America's colony of Cuba (1898–1958). American leaders so badly wanted a

canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans that in 1903 President Roosevelt actively instigated and supported Panamanian secession from Colombia. He then immediately recognized the new country and signed a treaty giving Panama $10 million, plus $250,000 a year for rights "in perpetuity" for a ten-mile-wide strip—which became the Panama Canal Zone—that cut the new country literally in half.

Thus, American involvement and power had carved out a regional **sphere of influence**. This was the period during which the United States acquired its earliest colonial possessions (and "protectorates") in the area, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Not until the 1920s and 1930s, under Herbert Hoover and then Franklin Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy, was direct intervention of American troops into the domestic affairs of US neighbors temporarily abandoned.

American foreign policy was in search of political stability and US economic expansion in Asia as well, with China being the major prize. "Merchants, missionaries, adventurers, sea captains, naval officers, and consular officers crowded into the Pacific during the nineteenth century and spun a web whose strands extended to every part of the ocean" (Van Alstyne 1974:125). Unlike Latin America, which was Christianized by the Spanish, there was a large American missionary presence in Asia, particularly in Japan and in China (over 3,000 by 1905). And during the crisis with Spain over Cuba, the US Navy, just before the Spanish-American War began, attacked the remnants of the Spanish empire in Asia, producing American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, and, most important, the Philippines as colonies of the United States (see also Rosenberg 1982).

However, American involvement in Asia and the Pacific resulted in more limited uses of force because of the region's distance from American shores and the strong military presence of England, France, Russia, and Japan. US foreign policy in China, for example, emphasized an **Open Door** approach in order to maximize American involvement and trade (Williams 1988). Therefore, America's military and commercial involvement resulted in fewer costs as well as fewer gains. The United States, nevertheless, sent more than 120,000 American troops from 1899 to 1902 to fight its first noncontinental counterinsurgency war, eventually defeating a national independence movement in the Philippines to preserve its new colonial control.

Even though US foreign policy was oriented toward the regions to its immediate south and distant west, the final two decades of the Regional Era saw increasing engagement in European and world affairs as well. Entering the twentieth century, France and especially Great Britain were the two global powers that dominated the global status quo. At the same time, Japan and Germany rapidly grew in power and challenged Great Britain, France, and the status quo. Ironically, the resulting two world wars contributed to the shift from Europe as the center of world politics to the rise of American power and the international leadership of the United States.

While officially neutral during the early part of World War I, the United States eventually became a major participant in bringing about the war's outcome. Woodrow Wilson was, in fact, highly instrumental in influencing the Treaty of Versailles, which officially ended the war and attempted to create a new liberal world order through the League of Nations. During 1918–1919, the United States even sent 14,000 troops—along with the British, Canadians, French, Czechs, and Japanese—to occupy part of the

newly declared Soviet Union in an effort to aid the anti-Bolsheviks and reestablish a Russian front against Germany.

After World War I, the 1920s and 1930s are popularly thought of as a return to isolationism. The US rejection of American participation in the League of Nations, the rise of isolationist sentiment among the American public and a strong peace movement, and American reluctance to become actively involved in European conflicts (especially during the Great Depression and the early years of World War II) provide good evidence of the more isolationist orientation during the interwar period. However, as diplomatic historian William Cohen (1987:xii) has argued, "rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and lack of membership in the League had little impact . . . on American involvement in world affairs in the decade that followed. In the 1920s the United States was more profoundly engaged in international matters than in any peacetime era in its history."

In addition to the active regional foreign policy engagement already discussed, the United States undertook a number of important global diplomatic initiatives. From November 1921 to February 1922, the US hosted and actively promoted a major naval disarmament conference in Washington, DC, that resulted in the first major arms control treaty in modern times, along with the Four Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty involving Pacific island possessions and the rivalry in China). In 1928, the United States and France jointly sponsored the Kellogg-Briand Pact in an effort to outlaw war. The US also began to play a more active, though unofficial, role in League of Nation activities.

Just as important, the United States became increasingly important to the international political economy following World War I, which was still dominated by the Europeans. As a result of the debts and damage incurred by the war, European economies became increasingly dependent on the US government and on American business as a source of trade and finance. According to Cohen (1987:41), "Clearly, the impact of American trade, investments, and tourism on the world economy in the 1920s was enormous. No other nation even approximated the United States in economic importance." Nevertheless, as the British role declined, the United States also continued its embrace of **protectionism** in trade—especially in the 1930s—and refrained from taking a strong political leadership role in the international economy, which contributed to the world falling into a great depression (Kindleberger 1977).

The Global Era, 1941–present

World War II ended the Regional Era of US foreign policy, and its consequences for European power and the global system contributed to the rise of American leadership and engagement in world politics. With the decline of Europe following World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States filled the political vacuum in world affairs. The ascendance of the Soviet Union and the United States in the wake of the European collapse resulted in a global context of bipolarity in which American assertiveness in world politics and an American-Soviet conflict of some type were almost inevitable.

World War II lifted the American economy out of the Great Depression of the 1930s and catapulted it into unprecedented prosperity. American economic production was the key to Allied success in the war and was responsible for producing almost half

the value of the world's goods and services following the conflict. As Godfrey Hodgson (1976:19) observed:

> In 1945, the United States was bulging with an abundance of every resource that held the key to power in the modern world: with land, food, raw materials, industrial plant, monetary reserves, scientific talent, and trained manpower. It was in the war years that the United States shot ahead of all its rivals economically. In four years, national income, national wealth, and industrial production all doubled or more than doubled. In the same period, . . . every other industrial nation came out of the war poorer and weaker than when it went in.

American multinational corporations and financial investment, which had been expanding since the turn of the century, came to dominate the postwar international marketplace. The United States emerged from World War II not only as a superpower but as the **hegemonic power** of its time (Ikenberry 1989).

After the US entered World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States were cautious partners who found themselves in an alliance of convenience during the war. The United States set its sights not only on defeating Germany and Japan but also on establishing a postwar order that would promote stability and security. Under President Franklin Roosevelt, the US took an active leadership role in planning for a global order that learned the lessons of the interwar period and their consequences for the Great Depression and World War II. Thus, the Roosevelt administration sought to establish structures and practices that would better ensure economic stability and prosperity and promote peace and multilateral cooperation.

In the world economy, the American strategy, arrived at in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, was to promote multilateral efforts with American allies to restore and manage an increasingly liberal, global market economy, based on a new system of fixed exchange rates and open, free trade. What came to be called the **Bretton Woods system** would provide necessary assistance and rules for economic transactions principally through the creation of three multilateral international organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, known as the World Bank) to make loans for economic recovery and development, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to support the stability of national currencies based on gold, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to promote and govern open trade (originally the ITO, International Trade Organization, was to be created but was opposed by the US Senate). Success on the economic front in promoting a liberal capitalist world order was thought to be crucial for ensuring peace and minimizing threats to international stability, as had occurred when the Great Depression led to the rise of Adolf Hitler (Gardner 1980; Ikenberry 1992).

The United States also sought to construct a new international political order that would promote cooperation and prevent the outbreak of further wars. Under Roosevelt, the US initially emphasized a strategy of multilateral cooperation based on a sphere-of-influence approach and the creation of a new international organization to replace the League of Nations—the United Nations. Roosevelt's strategy depended

on global cooperation among members of the "Grand Alliance" during the war: the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China. The instrument for maintaining cooperation among the "big five" and preventing a challenge to the status quo, which could lead to the outbreak of a new war, was the high-level diplomacy and creation of the United Nations, and especially the operation of the United Nations Security Council (a body in which each of the big five held veto power). Roosevelt also assumed that each of the five so-called great powers would exercise power over its regional sphere of influence: the United States in Latin America, the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, Great Britain and France in Europe and their colonial possessions, and China in East Asia.

Before his death in April 1945, Roosevelt laid the foundation for the post–World War II US foreign policy and international leadership. However, Roosevelt's death left the White House to Harry Truman, who was unfamiliar with Roosevelt's postwar plans and lacked Roosevelt's considerable experience. Moreover, as war ended, it was soon clear that the European economies were in much worse shape than most people had thought and were in need of assistance beyond that which the Bretton Woods–devised multilateral international organizations were capable of providing.

Finally, hope for lasting cooperation among members of the Grand Alliance to achieve national security eroded quickly as distrust, fear, and conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated. Roosevelt's grand strategy gave way to the realities of the postwar context. Specific international events and crises reflecting these World War II and postwar developments influenced domestic politics and the government policymaking process in such a way that they spurred the onset of the Cold War. Within the United States, for example, disputes over postwar European economic reconstruction; the fate of Germany; the rise of communism in Eastern Europe; the Soviet-American conflict over Iran, Greece, and Turkey; the fall of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government in China; the North Korean attack on South Korea; and the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb all contributed to the growing Cold War environment both abroad and at home.

American foreign policy was soon dominated by a view of the Soviet Union as no longer an ally but an evil enemy attempting to achieve world empire. Americans in both government and society saw a "free world" led by the United States pitted against a "totalitarian world" led by the Soviet Union in a global Cold War throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Thus, soon after World War II, the Global Era of US foreign policy emphasized American **internationalism** in the form of engagement and leadership or hegemony. Since the early postwar years, the US approach to the world has passed through four phases: (1) the Cold War Consensus, 1947–1968; (2) the Cold War Dissensus, 1969–1989; (3) the post–Cold War years, 1990–2001; and (4) the post-9/11 years, 2002–present.

The Cold War Consensus, 1947–1968. For roughly twenty years, through the administrations of President Truman and President Lyndon Johnson, US foreign policy experienced considerable continuity based on the twin goals of national security and economic prosperity. The twin goals were based on the quest for global security and stability from a perception of the rising "threat" of Soviet communist expansionism and the promotion of

a liberal international market economy based on the principles of free, open trade and fixed exchange rates. The Cold War era also represented the height of the president's power to lead the country in foreign policy, as we discuss further in subsequent chapters.

Following the war, for the first time since independence and the Continental Era, Americans began to perceive an external threat to their national security: the advance of Soviet communism. In the postwar international context—a **bipolar world** with two "superpowers"—US engagement became more important. Because the new fear of Soviet communism became the key problem for most Americans, national security concerns drove US foreign policy and was defined in terms of global security and stability. In the bipolar world, the threat was perceived to be global and American leaders believed that, with the collapse of the British and French empires, only the United States had the power to respond. Although the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged in a "hot war" (i.e., a direct military clash), the United States prepared for a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union and engaged in a global **Cold War**.

The US foreign policy strategy during this phase rested on a broad policy consensus that had four central pillars. First, US policymakers broadly shared a commitment to American engagement and leadership in world affairs. Although elements of both the left and the right in American politics dissented, a substantial bipartisan consensus supported internationalism and active American leadership, and the importance of American power to the security and stability of the international order.

Second, under American leadership, a **containment strategy** was developed that aimed to deter, by the threat of coercion, the spread of Soviet communism, first in Europe, then in Asia with the Korean War, and eventually throughout the world. The containment strategy was initially embodied in the Truman Doctrine, announced in 1947 and directed at containing Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean countries of Greece and Turkey. In the words of one analyst, its future implications for US foreign policy were to be global and quite profound:

> The Truman Doctrine contained the seeds of American aid, economic or military, to more than one hundred countries; of mutual defense treaties with more than forty of them; of the great regional pacts, alliances, and unilateral commitments: to NATO, to the Middle East, to the Western Hemisphere, and to Southeast Asia. It justified fleets of carriers patrolling the Mediterranean and the South China Sea, nuclear submarines under the polar icecap, air bases in the Thai jungle, and police advisers in Uruguay and Bolivia. In support of it, an average of a million soldiers were deployed for twenty-five years in some four thousand bases in thirty countries. It contained the seeds of a habit of intervention: clandestine in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, the Philippines, Chile, and the CIA alone knows where else; overt in Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. (Hodgson 1976:32)

Resting in part on the foundation of **anti-communism**, the focus of the first strand was to surround the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe and mainland Asia with American allies, alliances, and military (conventional and nuclear) forces in order

to deter the Soviet Union from initiating a military strike and possibly triggering World War III—which came to be known as "deterrence theory." In the Third World, where the US-Soviet confrontation tended to be fought more indirectly over the "hearts and minds" of local elites and peoples, the United States relied on foreign assistance, counterinsurgency, and the use of covert paramilitary operations to promote friendly regimes. The United States also pursued containment of the Soviet Union and its allies (such as in Eastern Europe and Cuba) through the use of broad economic sanctions (i.e., boycotts). Diplomacy and other less coercive instruments of policy were put aside by the United States in East-West relations and superseded by the threat and use of coercion to deter and contain what American leaders saw as major challenges to American national security commitments and national interests (see George and Smoke 1974; Jentleson 1987; Mastanduno 1985).

Third, the bipartisan US global strategy involved a commitment to a **liberal international economic order (LIEO)**. As Western European economies struggled to recover from the Great Depression and the war, the United States took the lead in unilaterally sustaining and expanding Roosevelt's Bretton Woods system to promote a stable and prosperous international market economy built around economic openness and multilateral management. The original Bretton Woods system was to be based on a multilateral effort by the Europeans and Americans, but the war-torn European economies were in need of recovery, and the Soviet bloc remained outside the system, which prevented the Bretton Woods system from operating as originally agreed. Instead, the US shifted to **Bretton Woods II**, in which the strength of the American economy allowed the United States to unilaterally support the Bretton Woods system and focus on European economic recovery.

The Bretton Woods II liberal international economic order was to be accomplished by providing massive capital outlays (of dollars) in the form of American assistance (such as the Marshall Plan for aid to Europe), private investment and loans by US multinational corporations, and trade based on opening the US domestic market to foreign imports. Therefore, the Bretton Woods international economic system based on free trade and fixed exchange rates became dependent on the United States acting as the world's banker. Although primarily European oriented, and later also Japanese oriented, US foreign economic policy was also active in promoting a market system in the Third World through its support of private investment and development abroad (see Kuttner 1991; Spero and Hart 2009).

Fourth, the Cold War Consensus also included a commitment to liberal norms and values. This pillar included broad agreement on the importance of **multilateralism** through cooperative international institutions, and a rules-based international order, as well as commitment to the importance of democracy and human rights. Unfortunately, while the first strand was actively embraced, the second was often relegated to the back seat as the United States pursued its anti-communist/anti-Soviet containment strategy in the political and economic world. To be sure, rhetorical support for freedom, democracy, and human rights was central to American policies. In practice, however, that support was often compromised by more strategic concerns for power and prosperity in the Cold War calculations of the period.

A Closer Look

WAR, PEACE, AND THE PENDULUM EFFECT

As a country founded on the principles of liberty and limited government, the United States has grappled regularly with the tension between the requirements of those principles and the demands of national security in an anarchic and dangerous world. One way to understand the consequences of the tension and trade-offs between democracy and national security is to examine the patterns in terms of a pendulum effect. During times of war and danger when perceptions, real and imagined, of threat and fear of enemies increase, US leaders have tended to embrace policies to curtail the civil rights and liberties of Americans, sometimes dramatically, in the name of national security. As the periods of national emergency and danger pass, and perceptions of threat decline, leaders have generally taken steps to restore and protect liberties and roll back the security measures that were adopted. Thus, the pendulum swings between these two competing objectives, as it has done throughout US history (see Farber 2008; Stone 2007).

We could trace this pattern back to the earliest days of the United States (e.g., the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798; measures such as the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the imposition of martial law during, and after, the American Civil War), but let's consider examples of this pendulum effect from the last 100 years or so. These examples illustrate the actions and reactions that form the pattern and make for a good discussion of the dilemmas between liberty and security over the course of American history.

During World War I, the US government imposed a broad array of restrictions on socialist, anarchist, and other groups, including German Americans, in the name of security. This included the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 (regulating antigovernment speech and opinion) and continued with the anti-Bolshevik and anti-socialist Palmer Raids in 1919–1920 led by J. Edgar Hoover and the early FBI. In the years following World War I, almost all of these restrictions were rolled back by the Supreme Court and Congress.

World War II led to the infamous presidential decision in Executive Order 9066 to relocate and intern more than 100,000 Japanese Americans in a series of "War Relocation Camps," actions later rescinded in 1945, and the Smith (or Alien Registration) Act of 1940, which required non-US citizens to register with the government and established criminal penalties for advocating—or belonging to a group advocating—the overthrow of the US government.

During the early Cold War, the threat and fear of communism led to numerous congressional investigations (such as by the House Committee on Un-American Activities); loyalty oaths; official lists of supposed subversive organizations; informal "blacklists"; and domestic surveillance, investigations, and infiltration of thousands of individuals and groups by the government and local leaders (such as *Operation Cointelpro* under J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI). This came to be known as McCarthyism and produced a powerful backlash with the rise of the civil rights and anti–Vietnam War movements.

After 9/11, the Bush administration quickly submitted an antiterrorism bill known as the (which stands for United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), which became

(Continued)

(Continued)

law in October 2001. The USA Patriot Act increased penalties for acts of terrorism and for harboring or financing terrorists or terrorist organizations. It expanded the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance; get subpoenas for e-mail, Internet, and telephone communications; acquire nationwide search warrants; detain immigrants without charges; and penetrate (and sanction) money-laundering banks. It also permitted government officials to share grand jury information to thwart terrorism and relax the conditions under which judges may authorize intelligence wiretaps. Beginning in 2005, when the Iraq War went badly, the act became increasingly controversial and was later challenged and modified (but not outright eliminated).

According to Geoffrey Stone (2007), it is almost as if the United States has two constitutions: one for war and one for peace. Or as Richard Hofstadter (1965) has found, times of fear and perceived threats to national security are often accompanied by what he has called "the paranoid style in American politics." This typically occurs because most segments of society tend to rally behind the president and the government in order to fight the enemy abroad (and at home). War and national emergencies, in particular, tend to be times when fear increases and little tolerance exists for individuals and groups that publicly criticize or challenge the government's foreign policy or the status quo within society. Clearly, leaders and citizens of the United States continue to struggle with the dilemmas of liberty and security.

Is the United States currently in a time of war, a time of peace, or "war in a time of peace"? What should be the appropriate balance between the demands of liberty and security for conducting a war on terrorism?

For twenty years, American leaders from both political parties broadly embraced this strategy of "**liberal hegemony**" (Posen 2018). As Ikenberry (2017) summarized, American power and leadership was directed to a "liberal international order" organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation, democratic solidarity, and internationalist ideals. Global containment and deterrence were at the core of US national security policies as American policymakers emphasized trying to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its communist empire. American policymakers believed that protecting other countries from the Soviet threat indirectly protected the United States and enhanced its national security. Hence, the United States drew lines, labeled countries as friend or foe, and made national commitments to and alliances with friendly regimes. And when foreign threats were perceived, the United States responded. Moreover, the broad bipartisan policy consensus also led to a procedural consensus in which presidential leadership—even preeminence—in the politics and processes of US foreign policymaking flourished (e.g., Melanson 2015).

This policy and procedural consensus centered on US leadership, global containment, and the liberal international economic order inevitably led to American interventionism abroad and the tragic involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War. Over four different presidential administrations from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, the steady and increasing American commitment to South Vietnam was never seriously challenged within

the executive branch or by members of Congress. American policymakers were operating within the Cold War Consensus in which South Vietnam was seen as an independent state threatened by the expansionist designs of a communist monolith (North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union). Therefore, the United States could not afford to appease the so-called expansion anywhere in the world for fear that this would feed the appetite of the aggressor and allow other countries to fall (like dominoes) to communism.

The Cold War Dissensus, 1969–1989. Changes in the global context and the effects of international events had significant consequences for US foreign policy and its politics. The most important changes in the global context included perceived parity between the United States and the Soviet Union; the economic recovery and rising power of Europe and Japan; growing economic influence from the newly industrializing countries of the developing world and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); and the growth of Third World nationalism and independence. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the relative decline of American power and a more pluralistic and interdependent world made it increasingly difficult for the United States to pursue its Cold War policies abroad.

As the world became noticeably more pluralistic and interdependent from the 1960s through the 1980s, the United States's economic and military ability to influence the world declined relative to its post–World War II apex. The US decline was not in "absolute" or real terms but was "relative" to changes occurring in the global environment. In some respects, the decline of American power was inevitable. The immensity of American power in the late 1940s and early 1950s was clearly extraordinary—and temporary—given the devastation wrought by the war throughout most of the world. As Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union recovered from the war, American power could only decline in comparison. The United States continued to be the most powerful country in the world but no longer was as able to exercise the kind of economic, political, and military influence that it enjoyed at its height during the late 1940s and 1950s.

In many ways, the Cuban Missile Crisis (with its crystal ball–like revelations about the potential consequences of unrestrained US-Soviet confrontation) and the growth in Soviet military power contributed to perceived parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Economically, although the United States remained the preeminent power, its economic influence nonetheless declined quite dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s from its post–World War II peak. Between 1950 and 1976, for example, America's economic role in the world declined in the following ways:

- The percentage of total world economic production produced within the United States declined from almost 50 percent to 24 percent.
- The American share of world crude steel production fell from 45 percent to 17 percent.
- American iron ore production shrank from 42 percent to 10 percent of the world total.
- Crude petroleum production declined from 53 percent to 14 percent.

- The percentage of international financial reserves decreased from 49 percent to 7 percent.
- American exports fell from 18 percent to 11 percent of world trade.
- Even American wheat production as a percentage of global production declined from 17 percent to 14 percent. (Krasner 1982:38).
- Very simply, economic production had increased more rapidly in Europe and Japan and throughout the world than in the United States.

The American failure in the Vietnam War (with its harsh exposure of the costs of the logic of global containment) and the rising nationalism and independence of the Third World highlighted the limits to the ability of the United States to achieve its goals and control outcomes in the developing world. The Vietnam War was the first time in its history that the United States lost a war. Simply put, after investing as much as $30 billion a year and more than 500,000 troops during the height of American involvement in a war that lasted at least fifteen years, the United States's containment strategy was unsuccessful in keeping South Vietnam an independent, noncommunist country. As a result of America's failure in Vietnam, the policy of global containment of Soviet communism, which had prevailed since World War II, was challenged by competing foreign policy perspectives.

At the time, this challenge was probably best represented by J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the first prominent critic to receive popular attention. In *The Arrogance of Power* in 1966, Fulbright argued that there were two Americas: one, generous, humane, and judicious; the other, narrowly egotistical and self-righteous. For Fulbright (1966:3), Cold War policies and US interventionism abroad indicated that an aggressive and self-righteous America was prevailing in US foreign policy. This perspective fueled dissensus over the ends and means of US foreign policy.

Economically, the **relative decline** of the United States and the rise of new forces in the developing world and the international economy led to major changes to US foreign economic policy. In 1971, President Richard Nixon responded to increasing international pressure on the US economy by discarding the convertibility of the US dollar to gold and placing a 10 percent surcharge on Japanese imports. In doing so, he violated the principles of fixed exchange rates and free trade, contributing to a situation in which the Bretton Woods system could no longer be sustained. This reflected a "relative" decline in the US economy, the economic recovery of Europe and Japan, and the rise of OPEC. Currencies would now float: The German Deutschmark, the British pound, the French franc, and the Japanese yen increased in value relative to the dominance of the US dollar (the euro did not exist until 1999). The price of oil would rise periodically. International trade and investment grew tremendously between the increasingly developed countries, while developing countries increased their foreign debt. In summary, the international economic system became increasingly market oriented, complex, and open to periods of rapid growth and prosperity at the same time that economic instability, recessions, and the periodic collapse of different economies occurred throughout the world. The United States and a recovered Europe (the Group of 7 or G-7) found it increasingly difficult to manage these changes—a trend that has intensified to the present day.

A similar pattern occurred with respect to ability of the United States to threaten and use force successfully abroad after the Vietnam War. The US government found it increasingly difficult to promote political stability and to exercise overt and covert military force. In Iran, for example, the United States was able to covertly overthrow the Iranian government with relative ease, restoring the shah to power in 1953. Twenty-five years later, however, the United States could not stop the Iranian revolution and the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini, triggering the Iran hostage crisis in American politics. Even in Central America, the traditional region of American hegemony, the United States faced new obstacles to the exercise of foreign policy influence. Small military or covert US operations had determined the fate of Central American countries throughout most of the twentieth century; by the 1980s, however, the Ronald Reagan administration's covert war in Nicaragua involving more than 10,000 Contras was unable to defeat militarily the Sandinistas. Clearly, quick, and easy military victories, such as in Grenada and Panama, were still possible, but they were becoming more costly politically and, with the rise of global complexity, they were becoming the exception to the rule.

These changes in the global context, and the US foreign policy response to them, resulted in major challenges to the policy and policymaking procedures of the Cold War Consensus. First, with each new administration, there was a modification in the direction of US national security policy. Although a policy of containment continued to have its share of advocates, other policy orientations gained legitimacy and influenced the policymaking process (e.g., Melanson 2015). Second, with the growth of economic problems at home and abroad, foreign economic policy grew in importance to the foreign policy agenda. Although most American leaders continued to see the need for a stable and liberal international market economy, they were often unsure over the particular strategy and means to promote economic stability. Third, in contrast to the Cold War years, after the Vietnam War it became very difficult for any president or administration to dominate foreign policymaking, devise a foreign policy that responded successfully to changes in the global environment, and obtain substantial domestic support over time. Indeed, concerns over the excesses of US foreign policy during the Cold War Consensus—including the United States's reliance on the use of force and interventionism and the growth of what many viewed as excessive presidential power and influence over policy—led to both substantive and policy debates and challenges as well as efforts to challenge and limit the dominance of an "**imperial presidency**" (e.g., Schlesinger 1989). These things forced every president to change or modify US foreign policy during his term, usually toward the political center, and increased the inconsistency and incoherence of US foreign policy since Vietnam.

Although US foreign economic policy became more important in the Cold War Dissensus phase, it tended to lack coherence in an increasingly globalized economy despite the simple rhetoric of "free markets." This is because of the growing difficulty that governments have addressing complex and intractable economic issues—such as inflation, unemployment, energy needs, deficits, currency fluctuations, "bull" and "bear" markets, environmental concerns, and the like—in both the domestic and international arenas. This meant that US foreign economic policy has tended to be reactive to domestic and international economic problems as they have arisen.

In the national security area, incoherence and inconsistency in US foreign policy also has been visible. The Nixon and Ford administrations represented the first real change

from the Cold War emphasis on containment of Soviet communism to ensure global security to a "realpolitik" orientation and a policy of **détente** focused on counterbalancing the Soviet Union as a traditional great power in order to promote global stability and order. Although there was much disagreement during the early 1980s as to the nature of the Carter administration's foreign policy, a broad consensus has recently emerged that the administration entered office with a relatively optimistic vision of global change and a liberal internationalist orientation. In 1981, US foreign policy under the Reagan administration fully returned to an emphasis on global containment of Soviet communism through the threat and use of force reminiscent of the Cold War era of the 1950s and 1960s, while retreating from multilateralism as well, until the latter years when greater cooperation with the Soviet Union emerged with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Thus, the Global Era in US foreign policy that began with American involvement in World War II resulted in two globally oriented foreign policy periods separated by the Vietnam War. From World War II until Vietnam, American national security policy was devoted to containing the threat of Soviet communism throughout the globe and was supported by a foreign economic policy based on American leadership of the international political economy. Changes in the global context and events like the Vietnam War and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system challenged the United States's ability to promote a global containment policy and to maintain economic prosperity at home. After Vietnam, successive administrations embraced different foreign policy initiatives to address the new context, and foreign economic policy was restored to a significant place on the foreign policy agenda.

The Post–Cold War Years, 1990–2001. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States entered a new phase of its Global Era in foreign policy. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and 1990 made the world an even more complex place, with contradictory implications for American power and US foreign policy. Two key features of the post–Cold War global context have been most important for the politics of US foreign policy: (1) the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, and (2) the rise of globalization.

The most significant long-term development in the global environment has been the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union. After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power as the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he embarked on a course of domestic and foreign policy reforms to improve Soviet political and economic structures, policies, and performance and the Soviet Union's relations with the United States and Europe. Gorbachev led efforts to decentralize economic policymaking and open greater political participation, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press at home. He also sought to reduce Cold War tensions and improve cooperation with the United States and Western Europe, while rejecting the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted the Soviet Union's right to intervene militarily in other communist countries (e.g., in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, and elsewhere) if their Marxist-Leninist governments were under threat.

In 1989, the Soviet-aligned governments of Central and Eastern Europe fell peacefully to popular movements seeking to replace them, although the revolution to remove the Ceausescu regime in Romania turned violent. The Soviet Union did not interfere, even as